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Revisiting the Dominant Discourse on Conditionality in the EU: The Case of EU Spending Conditionality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2017

Viorica VIŢĂ
Viorica VIŢĂ*
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Law Department
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Abstract

This article maps the rise of EU spending conditionality in the 2014–20 financial period and shows how the study of this novel type of conditionality adds to the dominant legal discourse on conditionality in the EU. It also suggests that the rise of conditionality may signal more profound transformations in the deep tissue of the EU, expressed by a transition towards a conditionality-based culture within the EU internal relationships.

Keywords

European Unionconditionalityspendinginternal policiesgovernancecompliance
Type
Articles
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 19 , December 2017 , pp. 116 - 143
Copyright
© Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 

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References

1 In external policy, EU conditionality has seen a strong development especially in the post-Cold War period with the most significant first human rights conditionality developed by the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, (Lomé Convention) [1991] OJ L229/3. The Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Convention in 2000 and subsequently revised in 2010. The human rights clause currently stands at Article 9.

2 COM(2017) 2025 final, Reflections and Scenarios for the EU 27 by 2025, White Paper, p 9.

3 Ibid.

4 Treaty on European Union (TEU), Art 21 para 1. See inter alia Fierro, E, European Union’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003)Google Scholar; Bartels, L, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See note 1 above.

5 Art 49(1) TEU.

6 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, 21–22 June 1993, p 13

7 Council of the European Union in Thessaloniki, Conclusions of the Presidency, 19–20 June 2003.

8 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN (2015) 050 final, p 4.

9 European Council in Brussels, Presidency Conclusions, 15–16 December 2005, point 4, Annex I; COM(2011) 743, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility; COM(2016) 385, A New Partnership Framework with Third Countries Under the European Agenda on Migration.

10 García Andrade, P et al, ‘EU Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Migration’, European Parliament study (2015) PE 536.469 Google Scholar.

11 Ruffert, M, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’, (2011) 48 (6) Common Market Law Review 1777 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Kilpatrick, C, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts’ (2015) 35 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 326 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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14 The European legal scholarship narrative on conditionality concentrates almost exclusively on the operation of the tool in EU external policy. See inter alia Tomaševski, K, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisted (Pinter, 1993)Google Scholar; Tomaševski, K, Between Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and Their Human Rights Performance (Pinter, 1997)Google Scholar; Fierro, see note 4 above; Bartels, see note 4 above; Kochenov, D, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Kluwer Law International, 2008)Google Scholar; Weber, S, ‘European Union Conditionality’, in B Eichengreen et al (eds), Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe (Springer, 1995), pp 193–220 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Recent contributions, developed in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, concentrate on sovereign debt conditionality, criticizing its non-EU nature and highlighting the problems caused by this state of art. See inter alia Kilpatrick, C, ‘Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are Not EU Law?’ (2014) 10 (3) European Constitutional Law Review 393 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kilpatrick, see note 12 above; Ioannidis, M, ‘Financial Assistance Conditionality after “Two Pack”’, ZaöRV 74 (2014)Google Scholar; Sacchi, S, ‘Conditionality by Other Means: EU Involvement in Italy’s Structural Reforms in the Sovereign Debt Crisis’, (2015) 13 (1) Comparative European Politics 77 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wallace, H et al (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 7th ed (Oxford University Press, 2015), p 433 Google Scholar.

15 EU conditionality in all the above areas is usually translated into soft-law action plans, memoranda of understanding, dialogues and negotiations which generally have a non-legal nature. Even if conditionalities may have a legal nature sometimes, this is diluted in similar soft-law action plans and chapters of conditions. See Kilpatrick note 14 above. See also Grabbe, H, A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants (European University Institute, 1999)Google Scholar Working Paper http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/1617; Featherstone, K and Maria Radaelli, C, The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kapanadze, J, Human Rights Conditionality in European Union’s External Affairs (Verlag Dr Müller, 2010)Google Scholar.

16 The few comprehensive studies on conditionality compliance largely fail to find a strong causation between conditionality and compliance. The success of compliance is positively correlated with conditionality, yet together with multiple other economic, political and contextual factors. See generally: Checkel, J, Compliance and Conditionality, (ARENA Centre for European Studies, 2000)Google Scholar Working Paper 18/2000 http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/1994-2000/2000/wp00_18.htm; Featherstone, K, ‘The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime’, (2011) 49 (2) JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies 193 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bieber, R and Maiani, F, ‘Enhancing Centralized Enforcement of EU Law: Pandora’s Toolbox?’, (2014) 51 (4) Common Market Law Review 1057 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bogdandy, A and Ioannidis, M, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done’, (2014) 51 (1) Common Market Law Review 59 Google Scholar; Mosley, P, ‘Conditionality as Bargaining Process: Structural-Adjustment Lending, 1980-86’ (1987) 168 Essays in International Finance 1 Google Scholar; Epstein, R and Sedelmeier, U, ‘Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe after Enlargement’ (2008) 15(6) Journal of European Public Policy 795 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 The actual enforcement of EU conditionality can be counted on fingers. The enforcement of human rights conditionality has been enforced on about twenty occasions in two decades only in extreme scenarios of major political instability, or human rights atrocities and has been criticized for arbitrariness. The same holds true for the enforcement of sovereign debt conditionality which is virtually not enforced in cases of non-compliance, but rather adjusted to meet the poor performance of the debtor state.

18 Cremona, M, ‘EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditionality’ (2005) 30(1) European Law Review 3 Google Scholar.

19 There are multiple constitutional discussions that fall beyond the scope of this contribution. They relate in particular to the impact of spending conditionality on distribution of EU competences, principle of conferral and ultra vires action, legal basis, the principle of equality between Member States, democratic principles of accountability, legitimacy and transparency of EU action, judicial review, applicability of the Charter, etc.

20 See note 2 above. See Monti, M et al, Future Financing of the EU (European Commission, 2016) http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/hlgor/index_en.cfm Google Scholar.

21 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art 317. See also, Crowe, R, ‘The European Council and the Multiannual Financial Framework’, (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 69 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Council Regulation (EU) No 1311/2013 [2013] OJ L347/884, Annex I.

23 Eurostat, EU-28 expenditure by function (2015) https://perma.cc/LM7N-S5R8

24 Núñez Ferrer, J and Katarivas, M, What Are the Effects of the EU Budget: Driving Force or Drop in the Ocean? (CEPS, 2014) Special Report 86 https://perma.cc/4UKD-HYJN Google Scholar.

25 Ibid.

26 T Ward et al, Expert Evaluation Network Delivering Policy Analysis on the Performance of Cohesion Policy 2007–2013: Synthesis of National Reports 2011 (European Commission, 2012) https://perma.cc/6QFS-V9FJ.

27 Ibid. EU cohesion spending ranges from 20 to 68% of national capital investment expenditure in 13 EU countries: Hungary 68.3%, Estonia 62.4%, Slovakia 59%, Lithuania 58.3%, Malta 49.3%, Bulgaria 42.7%, Latvia 41.2%, Poland 35.5%, Czech Republic 31.7%, Romania 27.3%, Greece 26.3%, Slovenia 25.4%, Portugal 22.4%.

28 European Commission, The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 and EU Budget 2014 (2014) https://doi.org/10.2761/9592

29 Craig, P, ‘Shared Administration, Disbursement of Community Funds and the Regulatory State’ in H Hofmann and A Turk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, 2009)Google Scholar.

30 Berkowitz, P et al, The Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis on the Reform of Cohesion Policy 2008–2013, (Commission, 2015) Working Paper 3/2015, https://perma.cc/62R8-2EM5 Google Scholar. Tomova, M et al, EU Governance and EU Funds – Testing the Effectiveness of EU Funds in a Sound Macroeconomic Framework (Commission, 2013) Economic Paper 510, https://perma.cc/ZP9H-CAER Google Scholar. Tsoukala, P, ‘Euro Zone Crisis Management and the New Social Europe’ (2013–14) 20 Columbia Journal of European Law 31 Google Scholar.

31 D Kochenov, ‘The EU in its most serious crisis ever (and that’s not the Euro crisis)’ (Verfassungsblog, 13 June 2013).

32 For an influential study during negotiations, see Spahn, P, Conditioning Intergovernmental Transfers and Modes of Interagency Cooperation for Greater Effectiveness of Multilevel Government in OECD Countries (OECD, 2012) https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/Conditioning-Intergovernmental-Transfers-paper.pdf Google Scholar. See note 13 above.

33 See Fierro, note 4 above.

34 See Bieber and Maiani note 16 above, pp 1076–80.

35 Tallberg, J, ‘Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union’, (2002) 56(3) International Organization 609 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hovi, J et al, ‘The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead’, (2003) 3(3) Global Environmental Politics 74 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chayes, A and Chayes, AH, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, 1st ed (Harvard University Press, 1998)Google Scholar. See Bieber and Maiani note 16 above; also A Bogdandy and M Ioannidis note 16 above, pp 85–90.

36 Daintith, T, ‘Legal Analysis of Economic Policy’ (1982) 9(2) Journal of Law and Society 191 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Daintith, T ‘The Techniques of Government’ in JL Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1994), pp 209–236 Google Scholar.

37 V Vita, ‘In the shadow of sovereign debt conditionality: the rise of spending conditionality in the EU’ (Verfassungsblog, 30 June 2016).

38 Regulation (EU) 966/2012 [2012] OJ L298/1, Art 59.

39 The remaining 25% of EU budget is committed to competitiveness for jobs and growth budgetary sub-headings comprising EU-wide programmes in the areas of: research (Horizon 2020), transport, energy, education (Erasmus) et al (13.1%); Global Europe heading for external action spending (6.1%); and EU administration (6.5%). See note 28 above, p 9.

40 The European Social Fund (ESF) was established by the EU founding treaties, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was established in 1975 in the context of the UK accession (jointly the ‘Structural Funds’) and the Cohesion Fund was established in 1994 to support the completion of the European Monetary Union. Regulation (EU) 1303/2013 [2013] OJ L347/320, and subsequent fund specific regulations.

41 European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF, 1st CAP pillar) established in 1962, and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD, 2nd CAP pillar) established in 2005. Regulation (EU) 1306/2013 [2013] OJ L347/549 and subsequent fund specific regulations.

42 Regulation (EU) 508/2014 [2014] OJ L149/1.

43 Regulation (EU) 514/2014 [2014] OJ L150/112 and subsequent fund specific regulations.

44 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above.

45 Ibid, Art 19, Annex XI, part 2.

46 Ibid, Art 19, Annex XI, part 1; Regulation (EU) 1305/2013 [2013] OJ L347/487; Regulation (EU) 508/2014, see note 42 above.

47 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Art 19, Annex X1.

48 Ibid, Art 6 corroborated with Art 85.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid, Annex XI, part 2, points 1–7.

51 Ibid, Art 19.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid, Art 19(5), states that the Commission ‘may decide’ to suspend interim payments upon the adoption of the programme. At the same time, the failure to fulfil an applicable ex ante conditionality by the end of 2016 ‘shall constitute a ground for suspending [affected] interim payments.’

54 Ibid, Art 2(33).

55 European Commission, The Implementation of the Provisions in Relation to the Ex-Ante Conditionalities During the Programming Phase of the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds (2016) Final Report, p 26.

56 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Art 19.

57 Ibid.

58 See for instance the example of non-discrimination conditionality, Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, Annex XI, Part 2, point 1, see note 40 above:

59 See for instance the example of state aid conditionality, Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, note 40 above, Annex XI, Part 2, point 5.

60 See note 55 above, p 26.

61 Ibid, p 103.

62 Ibid.

63 Here one should mention that self-suspension has never been mentioned as a conditionality enforcement mechanism in any of the funding regulations. Nevertheless, it is good law today as both Member States and the Commission concerted in this sense. The result is not satisfactory as the self-suspension does not correspond in any way to the basic standards of legality, transparency and accountability.

64 See Part II.A.1 above.

65 Cohesion Funds (27), Rural Development (8) and Fisheries Fund (4).

66 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Art 2 (33).

67 Mendez, C et al, European Commission Perspectives on the 2014-2020 Partnership Agreements & Programmes: A Comparative Review of the Commission’s Position Papers (European Policies Research Centre, 2013)Google Scholar European Policy Research Paper 84.

68 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Annex XI, Part 1. See also note 55 above, p 27.

69 Regulation (EU) 1305/2013, see note 46 above, Annex V.

70 Regulation (EU) 508/2014, see note 42 above, Annex IV.

71 European Commission, see note 55 above, p 64.

72 COM(2015) 639 final, Investing in jobs and growth - maximising the contribution of European Structural and Investment Funds, p 5.

73 European Commission, interviews, Brussels, 5–6 July 2016.

74 See note 72 above, Annex II, Country fiches.

75 Ibid, p 26. (In the case of Greece, conditionality has been self-enforced on three occasions. This is also the case for Portugal and Romania.) See also Commission note 60 above, p 64.

76 See note 55 above, p 103.

77 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Arts 23–24; Regulation (EC) No 1164/1994 [1994] OJ L130/1.

78 Art 104c TEU.

79 Regulation (EC) 1164/1994 [1994] OJ L130/1.

80 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Arts 23–24.

81 Ibid, Art 96(2).

82 Ibid, Art 23.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid, Art 24.

86 Ibid, Art 96.

87 Ibid, Art 23(10).

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid, Art 23–24.

90 Ibid, Art 23(9a–e) (compulsory); Art 23(6) (optional).

91 Council Implementing Decision 2012/156/EU [2012] OJ L78/19. Council Implementing Decision 2012/323/EU [2012] OJ L165/46.

92 Z Darvas and Á Leandro, The Limitations of Policy Coordination in the Euro Area under the European Semester, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/19, https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/126693; D Gros and C Alcidi, ‘Economic Policy Coordination in the Euro Area Under the European Semester’ (2015) 123 CEPS Special Report, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2715501. For discussion of unenforced conditionalities and sanctions, see inter alia Gros and Alcidi, ibid; Creel, J et al, ‘ Euro Area Policies and Macro Economic Performance, Ten Years On: Institutions, Incentives and Strategies’ in JP Fitoussi and JL Cacheux (eds) Report on the State of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)Google Scholar; Ruffert, see note 11 above, pp 1802–03; R Bieber and F Maiani, ‘Sans Solidarité Point d’Union Européenne Regards Croisés Sur Les Crises de l’Union Économique et Monétaire et Du Système Européen Commun D’asile’(2012) 48 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, pp 306–12.

93 European Parliament, Debates on 2014–20 Cohesion Funds Package, 19 November 2013; European Parliament, ‘The European Structural and Investment Funds and Sound Economic Governance: Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 23 of the Common Provisions Regulation’, Briefing Note, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/529088/IPOL_BRI(2014)529088_EN.pdf. The negotiation hardship is also reflected in the complex suspension rules. To enforce a macroeconomic conditionality, the Commission may choose between suspension of payments or commitments, with a preference for the latter. This means that even if future commitments are suspended, payments are still disbursed from previous commitments for a maximum period of three years. Moreover, the actual suspension rates are quantified in maximum thresholds depending on a Member States’ GDP, unemployment rate and further criteria, including the general principles of proportionality and equality between Member States. Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Art 23(9–12). See also, Verhelst, S, ‘Cohesion Policy and Sound Economic Governance: A Loveless Marriage’, (2014) 3 The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 113 Google Scholar.

94 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, see note 40 above, Art 85.

95 Ibid, Art 6.

96 Ibid, Art 85.

97 Regulation (EU) 966/2012, see note 38 above, Art 135(3).

98 Italy v Commission, T-99/09, EU:T:2013:200, para 60; see also note 142 below.

99 See Part III.A.1–4 above.

100 Regulation (EU) 1306/2013, see note 41 above, Annex II, SMR 2, 3.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid, Art 93, Annex II.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Regulation (EU) 1307/2013 [2013] OJ L347/608, Arts 43–47.

106 See ibid Rec 37, Arts 43–47.

107 Regulation (EU) 1306/2013, see note 41 above, Art 77(6).

108 Alliance Environnement, ‘Evaluation of the application of cross compliance as foreseen under Regulation 1782/2003’, Prepared for the European Commission, 26 July 2007, pp 5–6.

109 Ibid.

110 Regulation (EU) 508/2014, see note 42 above.

111 See Part III.A.–4 above. Regulation (EU) 508/2014, see note 42 above, Arts 100–101, 105.

112 Ibid.

113 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/852 [2015] OJ L135/13.

114 Regulation (EU) 508/2014, see note 42 above, Art 10(1–2).

115 See Part III.B above. Regulation (EU) 508/2014, see note 42 above, Art 10(2).

116 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/288 [2014] OJ L51/2.

117 Court of Auditors, Special Report 7/2007 and Special Report 11/2012. See inter alia Self, E, ‘Who Speaks for the Fish: The Tragedy of Europe’s Common Fisheries Policy Notes’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 577 Google Scholar.

118 Interviews, Brussels, 5–6 July, 2016.

119 Regulation (EU) 514/2014, see note 43 above.

120 Regulation (EU) 515/2014 [2014] OJ L150/143, Art 10(2a), (3).

121 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 800/2014 [2014] OJ L219/10, Annex I.

122 Regulation (EU) 513/2014 [2014] OJ L150/93, Art 3(5). Regulation (EU) 515/2014, see note 120 above, Art 3(4). Regulation (EU) 516/2014 [2014] OJ L150/168, Arts 3(1), 19(2).

123 Regulation (EU) 514/2014, see note 43 above, Art 47.

124 See Part III.A.4 above. Regulation (EU) 514/2014, see note 43 above, Art 4.

125 Court of Auditors, Special Report 15/2014, p 33. Interviews, Brussels, 5–6 of June 2016. Bieber and Maiani, see note 92 above, p 324.

126 Ibid.

127 European Commission, 7th meeting of high level group (focus on post 2020), 24 January 2017, https://perma.cc/P6GC-W5UW.

128 EU Commissioner for Justice, ‘Democracy in Europe: EU Commissioner pushes for hard line on Poland’, (Spiegel online, accessed 15 March 2017, https://perma.cc/T87F-5X4T. If adopted, such a policy may be problematic in the absence of a correlative reform of EU’s own democratic, human rights and rule of law performance. See eg Weiler, JHH, ‘Europe in Crisis – On “Political Messianism”, “Legitimacy” and the “Rule of Law”’ (2012) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 248 Google Scholar; Weiler, JHH and Lockhart, N, ‘“Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – Part I’ (1995) 32 (1) Common Market Law Review 51 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency’, see note 12 above.

129 ‘Austria Threatens EU Funding Cuts over Hungary’s Hard Line on Refugees’ (The Guardian, 8 March 2017); ‘Italy Threatens Hungary: EU Countries Who Reject Migrant Quota Should Have Funding Cut’ (Express.co.uk, 12 October 2016); ‘Germany supports cutting EU funds to countries that refuse refugee quotas’ (Business Insider, 15 September 2015).

130 Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May 1950: ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’

131 Cremona, ‘EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditionality’, see note 18 above.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid, p 19.

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

136 See inter alia Sangiovanni, A, ‘Solidarity in the European Union’ (2013) 33(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 213 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thym, D, ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens’ (2015) 52(1) Common Market Law Review 17 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Langford, LM, ‘The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations under the Common European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity Note’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 217 Google Scholar.

137 For a critique, see W Jacoby and J Hopkin, ‘Drunk on Conditionality: The Move to Coercive Conditionality in the EU Periphery’, Conference paper (2016), http://centreurope-montreal.ca/fr/activites-nouvelles/activites/articles/drunk-on-conditionality-how-the-eu-went-from-eas/index.html

138 See note 19 above.

139 See note 130 above.

140 Interviews, Brussels, 5–6 July 2016.

141 Kilpatrick, see notes 12, 14 above; Gerstenberg, O, ‘The Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights, European Solidarity, and the Role of the Court of Justice of the EU’ (2014) 33(1) Yearbook of European Law 245 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

142 Italian Republic v European Commission, C-385/13 P, EU:C:2014:2350, para 84; see also note 98 above.

143 An Taisce and WWF UK, C-235/94 P, EU:C:1996:293, para 25.

144 Latvia v Commission, T‑661/14, EU:T:2016:412.

145 Liivimaa Lihaveis, C-562/12, EU:C:2014:2229, paras 71–73 (holding that access to justice must be ensured during the implementation of EU Funds, as guaranteed by Art 47 of the Charter); Blanka Soukupová, C-401/11, EU:C:2013:223, paras 28–29 (holding that selection conditions set by a Member State cannot discriminate on the basis of sex); Volker, joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, EU:C:2010:662 (declaring null and void a EU Agricultural Fund provision mandating for publication of data concerning natural persons).

146 Nisttahuz Poclava, C-117/14, EU:C:2015:60, para 42 (holding that Art 30 of the Charter on protection against unjustified dismissal did not apply in absence of EU law implementation, even if the national measure was implementing a EU soft-law social policy and even if EU Funds might have been used to financed it).

147 Greenpeace International v Commission, C-321/95 P, EU:C:1998:153; Caruso, D, ‘Direct Concern in Regional Policy: The European Court of Justice and the Southern Question’, (2011) 17(6) European Law Journal 804 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

148 Art 74(3) Regulation 1303/2013, see note 40 above, states that: ‘Member States shall ensure that effective arrangements for the examination of complaints concerning the ESI Funds are in place.’ European Ombudsman, Respect of fundamental rights in the implementation of the EU cohesion policy, Case OI/8/2014/AN, Decision of 11 May 2015, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/59836/html.bookmark

149 COM(2015) 639 final, see note 72 above.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 See note 55 above.

153 See eg Greece v Commission, T-588/10, EU:T:2012:688.

154 See Part III.A.3 above and literature cited therein.

155 Ibid.

156 See Part III above.

157 See Part III.A.1–2 above.

158 Interviews, Brussels, 5–6 July 2016.

159 See Part III.D above.

160 See Part III.A.3 above.

161 See Parts III.B–C above.

162 COM(2016) 603 final, Mid-Term Review/Revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-20: An EU Budget Focused on Results; see note 55 above, pp 117–19.

163 Interviews, Commission, July 5–6 2016.

164 COM(2016) 603 final, see note 162 above.

165 See Part III.D above; COM(2015) 639 final, see note 72 above, Annex II.