Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T16:41:58.828Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Meaning of Undertaking within 81 EC

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2017

Okeoghene Odudu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Who is bound by the competition rules in the EC Treaty? Article 81 EC applies to agreements and concerted practices between undertakings and to decisions of associations of undertakings; two addressees are specified: (a) undertakings and (b) associations of undertakings. This paper is mainly concerned with the meaning of (a) undertaking. As noted by Advocate General Jacobs, ‘the concept of “undertaking” serves a dual purpose in the system of Article [81]. On the one hand—and this function is more obvious—it makes it possible to determine the categories of actors to which the competition rules apply. . . . On the other hand, it serves to establish the entity to which a certain behaviour is attributable’.

Type
Research Article
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 7 , 2005 , pp. 211 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Art 82 EC prohibits ‘abuse by one or more undertakings’.

2 Case C–67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I–5751, AG’s Opinion at para 206.

3 The second purpose is considered in Wils, WPJ ‘The Undertaking as Subject of EC Competition Law and the Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons’ (2000) 25 ELRev 99 Google Scholar. In Levy, N, European Merger Control Law: A Guide to the Merger Regulation (Newark, NJ, LexisNexis 2003)Google Scholar para 5.01, n 3, emphasis added, it is stated that ‘the concept of undertaking for merger purposes is similar to that defined by the Court of Justice under Art 81’. It is likely that it is in the attributional sense that the terms differ.

4 W Wils, above n 3, 99–100, Baquero-Cruz, J, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic Constitutional Law of the European Community (Oxford, Hart, 2002) 128 Google Scholar. Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AGs Opinion at para 206.

5 Undertaking is defined in Art 80 ECSC as ‘any undertaking engaged in production in the coal or the steel industry within the territories referred to … and also … any undertaking or agency regularly engaged in distribution other than sale to domestic consumers or small craft industries’. Undertaking is defined in Art 196 Euratom as ‘any undertaking or institution which pursues all or any of the activities in the territories of Member States within the field specified … whatever its public or private legal status’.

6 Deringer, A, The Competition Law of the European Economic Community: A Commentary on the EEC Rules of Competition (Articles 85 to 90) Including the Implementing Regulations and Directives (New York, Commerce Clearing House, 1968) 4–5 Google Scholar.

7 Case 118/85 Commission v Italian Republic [1987] ECR 2599, at 2610. The Court’s first definition of the term ‘undertaking’ in the context of EC competition law came in Case 170/83 Hydrotherm Gerätebau [1984] ECR 2999 at para 11, though this definition relates to the attribution function of the term.

8 Case C–41/1990 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I–1979, para 21. Also Case 170/83 Hydrotherm [1984] ECR 2999, at para 11. This definition seems to lean heavily on one suggested by the Bundeskartellamt, reported in Deringer, above n 6, 5.

9 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 1 AOK Bundesverband; Bundesverband der Betriebskrankenkassen; Bundesverband der Innungskrankenkassen; Bundesverband der Landwir schaftlichen Krankenkassen; Verband der Angestelltenkrankenkassen eV; Verband der Arbeiter-Ersatzkassen; Bundesknappschaft; See-Krankenkasse v Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes; Mundipharma GmbH; Gödecke Aktiengesellschaft; Intersan [2003] ECR (not yet reported) AG’s Opinion at para 25 (citations omitted). Also Ibid, para 45, and judgment at para 58.

10 Deringer, above n 6, at 5.

11 Ibid, at 6 writes ‘The type of activity determines when the legal entity, as an [undertaking], comes within Article [81(1)]’. Also Case C–218/00 Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C Sas v Istituto Nazionale per l’Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (Inail) [2002] ECR I–691 AG’s Opinion at paras 48–49; Case C–475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I–8089, AG’s Opinion at paras 71–81; Case C–343/95 Diego Calì & Figli Srl v Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA (SEPG) [1997] ECR I–1547 at paras 16–17, AG’s Opinion at para 40; Case C–67/96 Albany International, AG’s Opinion at para 207, citing Case 170/83 Hydrotherm above n 2, above n 7, para 11; Case T-319/99 Federación Nacional de Empresas De Instrumentación Científica, Médica, Técnica y Dental (FENIN) v Commission [2003] ECR II-357 at paras 14–19; L Gyselen ‘Case C–67/96, Albany v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie; Joined Cases C–115–117/97, Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen; and Case C–219/97, Drijvende Bokken v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoeren Havenbedrijven’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 425 at 439; Goyder, DG, EC Competition Law (4th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 60–61 Google Scholar; Winterstein, A, ‘Nailing the Jellyfish: Social Security and Competition Law’ (1999) 20 ECLR 324 at 325Google Scholar; Sierra, JL Buendia, Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies under EC Law: Article 86 (Former Article 90) of the EC Treaty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999)Google Scholar paras 1.149–1.152.

12 See section IV below. Some implications of the functional approach are recognised in Hatzopoulos, VG, ‘Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but Healing Patients? The European Market for Health Care Services after the Judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 683 at 710Google Scholar; and Spaventa, E, ‘Public Services and European Law: Looking for Boundaries’ in Bell, J and Dashwood, A (eds), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2003 (Oxford, Hart, 2004) 271 at 287Google Scholar.

13 See JL Buendia Sierra, above n 11 paras 1.148–1.213; and Case 1006/2/1/01 Bettercare Group Limited v the Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 7 at paras 71–103.

14 Case 118/85 Commission v Italy, above n 7, para 7; Case C–343/95 Diego Calì, above n 11, para 16; Joined Cases C–180/98 to C–184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I–6451 at para 75; Case C–475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, above n 11, at para 19; Case C–218/00 Cisal, above n 11, para 23, AG’s Opinion para. 38; Case T-319/99 FENIN, above n 11, at para 36; Montana, L and Jellis, J, ‘The Concept of Undertaking in EC Competition Law and Its Application to Public Bodies: Can You Buy Your Way into Article 82?’ (2003) 2 Competition Law Journal 110 at 112Google Scholar.

15 Case 118/85 Commission v Italy, above n 7, paras 3, 7.

16 Oliver, P and Jarvis, MA Free Movement of Goods in the European Community: Under Articles 28 to 30 of the EC Treaty (4th edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003)Google Scholar paras 2.02–2.11.

17 Barnard, C, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 335 Google Scholar.

18 Case T–313/02 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission, [2004] 3 CMLR 60 at para 42; Case C–41/1990 Höfner above n 7 AG’s Opinion at paras 19–20, 40.

19 As Jones, A and Sufrin, B, EC Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 120 Google Scholar point out, the employee/employer relationship is only indirectly considered. At any rate, the case is read as rejecting the idea that Community competition law applies to the employee/employer relationship: Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, at paras 46–60, AG’s Opinion at paras 131–194, 209–217; Boni, S and Manzini, P, ‘National Social Legislation and EC Antitrust Law’ (2001) 24 W Comp 239 Google Scholar.

20 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 211.

21 Ibid, at para 212.

22 Ibid, at para 215. On the competition law status of the employee/employer relationship in various jurisdictions see Ibid, at paras 80–111, and Brunn, N and Hellsten, J (eds), Collective Agreement and Competition Law in the EU: The Report of the COLCOM-Project (Copenhagen, DJF, 2001)Google Scholar.

23 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 216.

24 This limitation on Art 81 stems from the need for action between undertakings.

25 Deringer above n 6, 8.

26 This position finds some support in Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK above n 8, AG’S, Opinion at para 46, when the status of consumption was raised but not addressed, ‘The Oberlandesgericht suggests that purchasing may amount to an economic activity whether or not the entity which purchases is itself active on another market for which the goods or services purchased constitute an input. The Commission, the appellants and the German Government all contend otherwise’. It is accepted that purchase without resale (i.e. consumption) is not economic activity in Case 1006/2/1/01 Bettercare above n 13 II at paras 46, 53, 264. See further Lasok, KPE, ‘When Is an Undertaking Not an Undertaking’ (2004) 25 ECLR 383 at 383Google Scholar. This distinction may resolve the quandary over funding from the public purse found in Davies, G, ‘Welfare as a Service’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of European Integration 27 at 32–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 Case T–319/99 FENIN above n 11.

28 Ibid, at para 37, emphasis added. The Court does not restrict the excluded use to consumption, and so it may be more accurate to use the term dissipation. The case is on appeal as Case 205/03 P, see below 34 n.

29 Ibid, at para 36; and Office of Fair Trading, ‘The Competition Act 1998 and Public Bodies’ (2004) OFT 443 Policy Note 1/2004.

30 Joined Cases C–180/98 to C–184/98 Pavlov, above n 14, at para 78.

31 Ibid, at para 79.

32 See Buendia Sierra, above n 11 at paras 1.156–1.157. Under Art 49/50 EC remuneration need not come from the recipient of the service to be considered economic. In Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others v the Netherlands State [1988] ECR 2085 at para 16 the Court considered that ‘It is irrelevant that the [service recipients] generally do not themselves pay the [service providers] … Article [50] does not require the service to be paid for by those for whom it is performed’. The case law under Art 49/50 EC is not entirely consistent. In relation to health care services provided to fulfil a social service obligation, the Court has tended towards the view that how the service is financed is irrelevant. See the implications in relation to social provision: see Hatzopoulos, above n 12; Davies, above n 26, Spaventa above n 12; AP van der Mei, ‘Cross Border Access to Medical Care: Non-Hospital Care and Waiting Lists—European Court of Justice, 13 May 2003, Case C–385/99, Muller-Faure v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Oz Zorgverzekeringen Ua and van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Zao Verzekeringen, ECR I–0000’ (2004) 31 Legal Issues of European Integration 57; and M Flear ‘Case C–385/99, Muller-Faure v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Oz Zorgverzekeringen Ua and Eem van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Zao Verzekeringen, Judgment of the Court of 13 May 2003’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 209. In relation to education services provided to fulfil a social service obligation, the Court has tended to view the means of financing as relevant . Thus, privately funded education is considered an economic activity (Case C–109/92 Stephan Max Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover [1993] ECR I–5473 at para 17) and state funded education is not considered an economic activity (Case 263/86 Belgium v Humbel [1988] ECR 5365 at paras 17–19). The education cases, by using the method of funding to determine whether an activity is economic, cast doubt on the oft-repeated Höfner mantra that activity is economic independent ly of ‘the way in which it is financed’. Compare with D Oliver ‘The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public Functions under the Human Rights Act’ [2000] Public Law 476 at 481–482.

33 Case 1006/2/1/01 Bettercare II, above n 13, at paras 46, 49, 110–15, 136–37, 140–50, 155–56, 183–88, 201, 264. Though the case is decided under UK competition law, the meaning of ‘undertaking’ is intended to be the same as in EC competition law: see at paras 29–34. The controversy caused is noted by Bright, C and Currie, K, ‘Is Bettercare a Better Pill’ (2003) 24 ECLR 41 Google Scholar; Skilbeck, J, ‘Bettercare: The Conflict between Social Policy and Economic Efficiency’ (2002) 1 Competition Law Journal 260 Google Scholar; and Office of Fair Trading ‘The Competition Act 1998 and Public Bodies’. The OFT subsequently rejected the complaint of abusive pricing in Case CE/1836–02 Bettercare Group Ltd/North & West Belfast Health & Social Services Trust (Remitted Case), 2003 18 Dec at paras 22, 24–39 because the price was set by the state, and in setting the price the state was not engaged in economic activity. The case can be seen as turning on the meaning of undertaking in its attributional sense.

34 See text accompanying n 28 above. In Case T–319/99 FENIN, above n 11, at para 19 it is noted that sometimes the health care provider did make purchases for resale, though the point was not addressed by the Court. The case is on appeal as Case 205/03 P.

35 Case 5/79 Procureur General v Hans Buys, Han Pesch and Yves Dullieux and Denkavit France Sarl [1979] ECR 3203 at para 30; Cases 1002/2/1/01(IR) 1003/2/1/01, 1004/2/1/01 The Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers v the Director General of Fair Trading and the General Insurance Standards Council; Association of British Travel Agents Limited v the Director General of Fair Trading and the General Insurance Standards Council [2001] CAT 4 at paras 142, 156; Buendia Sierra, above n 11, 55–56; Gagliardi, A Filippo, ‘United States and European Union Antitrust versus State Regulation of the Economy: Is There a Better Test?’ (2000) 25 ELRev 353 at 360, 365Google Scholar.

36 The regulated aspects were the carriage of the body after it has been placed in the coffin, the provision of hearses, coffins and external hangings for the house of the deceased, conveyances for mourners, the equipment and staff needed for burial and exhumation and cremation.

37 Case 30/87 Bodson v Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées SA [1988] ECR 2479, para 18, AG’s opinion para 94.

38 Marenco, G, ‘Competition between National Economies and Competition between Businesses—a Response to Judge Pescatore’ (1987) 10 Fordham Int’l LJ 420 at 421–423Google Scholar.

39 Shaw, J, ‘A Healthy Monopoly for a Dying Trade?’ (1988) 13 ELRev 422 at 423Google Scholar; Cases 1002/2/1/01(IR) 1003/2/1/01, 1004/2/1/01 GISC, above n 35, at para 245–247.

40 Gagliardi, above n 35, and T Hervey ‘Social Solidarity: A Buttress against Internal Market Law?’; Shaw, J, Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Oxford, Hart, 2000) at 39–40 Google Scholar. The effect approach finds support in Joined cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Heintz van Landewyck SARL and Others v Commission (Fedetab) [1980] ECR 3125 at para 88, when the Court considers that Art 81(1) EC ‘applies … in so far as … activities …. are calculat ed to produce the results which it aims to suppress’. See also Case C–244/94 Fédération Française des Sociétés d’assurance v Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche [1995] ECR I–4013 at para 21, Case 1006/2/1/01 Bettercare II, above n 13, at paras 244–249; Montana and Jellis, above n 14, 114 and Skilbeck, above n 33, at 261–62.

41 Case C–309/99 JCJ Wouters, JW Savelbergh, Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap, Intervening) [2002] ECR I–1577 at para 58, emphasis added.

42 See section IV.B below.

43 Case C–55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1996] ECR I–4165; Lonbay, J, ‘Case C–55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano’ (1996) 33 CML Rev 1073 Google Scholar.

44 Case 36/74 BNO Walrave and LJN Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federacion Espanola Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405 at para 17, emphasis added, confirmed in Case 13/76 Gaetano Dona v Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333 at para 17. See also Case T–313/02 Meca-Medina, above n 13, paras 44–47. Weatherill, S, ‘Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality in Sport’ (1989) 9 YEL 55 Google Scholar at 63–66 considers that Walrave is authority for the proposition that the free movement rules can be applied to operations in the private sphere, as opposed to the view taken here that it established that regulation is inherently a public sphere activity. Bogaert, S van den, ‘Horizontality: The Court Attacks?’ in Barnard, C and Scott, J (eds), The Law of the Single European Market (Oxford, Hart, 2002) 123 Google Scholar. at 126–28 notes that Case 251/83 Haug-Adrion [1984] ECR 4277 supports the Weatherill view, but that it is not followed in Case C–415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association Asbl v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal Club Liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and Others and Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I–4921.

45 van den Bogaert, above n 44, 126. This is not to suggest that there is autonomy in regulatory activity; rather there is a complex Treaty mechanism designed to co-ordinate regulatory activity. See section IV.A.3 below.

46 Case C–364/92 Sat Fluggesellschaft mbH v Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I–43, AG’s Opinion, para 9, citing Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 631, Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1982] ECR 1845, Case 307/84 Commission v France [1986] ECR 1725, Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88 Ufficio Distrettuale delle Imposte Dirette di Fiorenzuola d’Arda [1989] ECR 3233. This definition of official authority is used by Jacobs AG’s in Case C–41/1990 Höfner, above n 7, at para 22. Compare with the use of ‘authority’ in Oliver, above n 11, 481. Allison, JWF, ‘Theoretical and Institutional Underpinnings of a Separate Administrative Law’ in Taggart, M (ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford, Hart, 1997) 71 Google Scholar at 82 defines imperium as ‘the power to pass prohibitive and authorising statutes’.

47 Case C–343/95 Diego Calì, above n 11, AG’s Opinion, para 41. In Case 30/87 Bodson above n 13 at para 18, emphasis added, the Court writes that ‘Article [81] of the Treaty … does not apply to contracts for concessions concluded between communes acting in their capacity as public authorities’. See Winterstein, above n 11, 325–327; Gyselen, above n 11, Louri, V, “Undertaking” as a Jurisdictional Element for the Application of EC Competition Rules’ (2002) 29 Legal Issues of European Integration 143 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 160–64; Montana and Jellis, above n 14, 111.

48 van den Bogaert, above n 44, 125; GR Milner-Moore, ‘The Accountability of Private Parties under the Free Movement of Goods Principle’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No 9/95 http://wwwjeanmonnetprogramorg/papers/95/9509indhtml (last visited 31 May 3005) in the text accompanying n 25–26 writes that dealing with the conduct of private actors under the free movement rules only when they are engaged in regulatory activity is ‘superficially attractive’. However, compare with Joined Cases 266 and 267/1987 The Queen v Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, Ex Parte Association of Pharmaceutical Importers and Others [1989] ECR 1295 at paras 14–15; and see Hatzopoulos, above n 12, 709.

49 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AG’s Opinion at para 52.

50 Case C–415/93 Bosman, above n 44, para 83–84; van den Bogaert, above n 44, 124–126; Milner-Moore, above n 48, at text accompanying n 111–125. Compare with Whish, R, Competition Law (5th edn London, Butterworths, 2003) 98 Google Scholar, text accompanying n 173–174.

51 Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, AG’s Opinion at paras 76, 85–86.

52 The functional nature of the question can be seen in Case C–415/93 Bosman, above n 44, at paras 82 and 87, where the Court considers UEFA to be engaged in regulatory activity for the purpose of the transfer rules and nationality restrictions, whilst in [2003] OJ L291/25 Commission 2003/778/EC Decision of 23 July 2003 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Comp/C.2–37.398)—Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League [2003] at para 106, the Commission had much difficulty in characterising UEFA, finding that it was simultaneously an association of associations, an association of undertakings, and an undertaking. See text and references cited below at n 146.

53 Case 249/1981 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005 at para 15; Case 222/1982 Apple and Pear Development Council v K J Lewis Ltd and Others [1983] ECR 4083 at paras 2–7, 17, Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, at paras 58–63, AG’s Opinion at paras 70, 75; Joined Cases C–180/98 to C–184/98 Pavlov, above n 14, at para 87–88; Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AG’s Opinion at para 53; Cruz Between Competition and Free Movement 148–149, 154; J Snell ‘Private Parties and the Free, above n 4, Andenas, M and Roth, W-H (eds), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 211 Google Scholar. at 218–221; Schepel, H, ‘Delegation of Regulatory Powers to Private Parties under EC Competition Law: Towards a Procedural Public Interest Test’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 31 at 36–38Google Scholar, 44–47; Stiglitz, JE, Economics of the Public Sector (3rd edn London, W W Norton, 2000) 13–14 Google Scholar.

54 Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, at paras 51, 58–71, AG’s Opinion at paras 74–75; Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AGs Opinion para 53; AJ Vossestein, ‘Case C–35/99, Arduino, Judgment of 19 February 2000, Full Court; Case C–309/99, Wouters et al v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Judgment of 19 February 2002, Full Court; Not yet Reported’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 841 at 848–49.

55 Joined Cases C–180/98 to C–184/98 Pavlov, above n 14, at para 73.

56 Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, para 48, also AG’s Opinion at 51.

57 Joined Cases C–159/91 and C–160/91 Christian Poucet v Assurances Générales de France (AGF) and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon (Camulrac) and Daniel Pistre v Caisse Autonome Nationale de Compensation de l’ Assurance Vieillesse des Artisans (Cancava) [1993] ECR I–637 at para 12, cited and accepted by the UK CAT in Case 1006/2/1/01 Bettercare II, above n 13, at paras 239–40. I n contrast see Case C–244/94 FFSA, above n 40, AG’s Opinion at para 18.

58 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, at para 53.

59 See also section III.A.1 above.

60 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 215, emphasis added. This reasoning is criticised in Nihoul, P ‘Do Workers Constitute Undertakings for the Purpose of the Competition Rules?’ (2002) 25 ELRev 408 Google Scholar

61 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 210.

62 Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73, and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663 at para 539. The definition of employee (worker) under Art 39 EC given in Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121 at para 17 requires that a person provide services ‘for and under the direction of another’.

63 Case C–22/98 Jean Claude Becu [2001] ECR I–5665, AG’s Opinion at paras 53–54, emphasis added. Risk for the purpose of attribution (thus responsibility) is central to the extent to which agency is covered by Community competition rules: see Whish above n, at 586–88.

64 This element of economic activity finds its juridical basis in Case C–41/1990 Höfner, above n 7, at para 22, when the Court concludes that employment procurement is economic activity on the basis that ‘employment procurement has not always been, and is not necessarily, carried out by public entities’.

65 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AG’s Opinion at para. 27, emphasis added, citations omitted. The potential to make profit is explicitly used by numerous Advocates General, in particular in Case C–343/95 Diego Calì, above n 11, AG’s Opinion at para 32, Joined Cases C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre, above n 57, AG’s Opinion at paras 7–8; Case C–364/92 Eurocontrol, above n 46,> AG’s Opinion at para 9; Case C–244/94 FFSA, above n 40, AG’s Opinion at para 11; Case C–218/00 Cisal, above n 11, AG’s Opinion at para 38; Case T–128/98 Aéroports de Paris [2000] ECR II–3929 at para 124; and Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 311. See also Winterstein above n 11, 325; Louri above n 47, 145–47.

66 Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 Van Landewyck v Commission [1980] ECR 3125 at para 88; Case C–244/94 FFSA, above n 40, at para 21; and Montana and Jellis, above n 14, 112. However, compare with Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, at para 74, AG’s Opinion at paras 214, 311, 338; and Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, at paras 47, 51. On irrelevance of profit in determining econom ic activity under Art 49 EC, see Davies, above n 26, 29–30.

67 It may be possible to look at the market of the particular territory in question, or markets in other Member States or third states. In Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, at paras 83–84 and Case C–475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, above n 11, at paras 14 and 20, AG’s Opinion at para 68, the idea that a product or service could not be offered to the market by an entity bearing the financial risk with the potential to profit was rejected because entities bearing financial risk profitably offered the particular product or service in the market place.

68 Case C–41/1990 Höfner, above n 7, at para 19, AG’s Opinion at paras 1–10.

69 Ibid, AG’s Opinion at paras 14–17.

70 Ibid, at para. 21, AG’s Opinion at paras 40.

71 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, at para 47.

72 It is not clear whether social and exclusively social are the same thing. Here the view is taken that the two are distinct and that profit is only impossible when pursuing an exclusive ly social objective. Further, exclusively social is a conclusion drawn when a measure is based on the principle of solidarity. Solidarity is distinguished from non-profit-making and social purpose in Joined Cases C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre, above n 57, AG’s Opinion at para 9. On solidarity, see Menendez, AJ, ‘The Sinews of Peace: Rights to Solidarity in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 374 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Winterstein, above n 11, 327–31; Louri, above n 47, 169–72; and Spaventa, above n 12, 275, 284–85.

73 Joined Case C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre, above n 57, para 10. Also AG’s Opinion at paras 9–11.

74 Case C–70/95 Sodemare SA, Anni Azzurri Holding SpA, Anni Azzurri Rezzato Srl v Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I–3395, AG’s Opinion at para 29, emphasis added. That redistribution is the essence of what is meant by solidarity is emphasised in the Court’s judg ment at para 29.

75 See Jones and Sufrin, above n 19, at 534. In Joined Case C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre, above n 57, at para 11 the relevant redistribution was between active workers and retired workers. Redistribution from an identified affluent to an identified needy group was lacking in Case C–244/94 FFSA AG’s opinion at para 19. In Case 1006/2/1/01 Bettercare II, above n 13, at paras 231–235, the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal felt that, distinct from providing or procuring services, funding the provision of social services was not economic activity, as it could never be carried out for profit.

76 Case C–415/93 Bosman, above n 44, AG’s Opinion at para 227.

77 Redistribution is the hallmark of solidarity in Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK AG’s Opinion at para 32, Case C–218/00 Cisal AG’s Opinion at paras 56, 59–60, Case 1006/2/1/01 Bettercare II at paras 51, 239–240; and Commission Decision 2003/778/EC at paras 164–167. It is accepted by Boni and Manzini ‘National Social Legislation and EC Antitrust Law’ 240-241; Hatzopoulos ‘Killing National Health and Insurance Systems’ 684, 711–12; RJ van den Bergh and PD Camesasca, ‘Irreconcilable Principles? The Court of Justice Exempts Collective Labour Agreements from the Wrath of Antitrust’ (2000) 492, 505, and references cited at n 66; redistribution must not only be the purpose, it must also be the effect. See Case C–415/93 Bosman AG’s Opinion at paras 147, 218–234; and S Weatherill, ‘Case C–415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association Asbl v Jean-Marc Bosman; Royal Club Liégois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman, SA d’Economie Mixte Sportive de l’Union Sportive du Littoral de Dunkerque, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association Asbl, Union des Associations Européennes de Football; Union des Associations Européennes de Football v Jean-Marc Bosman . Article 177 Reference by the Cour D’appel, Liége, on the Interpretation of Article 48, 85 and 86 EC. Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 15 December 1995’ (1996) 33 CML Rev 991 Google Scholar at 994, 999, 1004–6, 1012–17.

78 An alternative view is that redistributive activities are economic, but that the Court has treated them as non-economic in order to shield them from the strictures of Community competition law: Buendia Sierra, above n 11, 59. This view is supported by implication in Case C–415/93 Bosman, above n 44, at paras 147, 218–234, and [1999] OJ C—99/23 Central Marketing of the Commercial Rights to the UEFA Champions League Case IV/37.398-UEFA Champions League at para 8; Commission Decision 2003/778/EC, above n 52 at paras 125–135, since redistribution claims are treated as going to justification rather than jurisdiction, meeting an objection raised by Gyselen ‘Case C–67/96 Albany’ 439. An alternative view is that profit cannot be made from redistribution when the winners and losers are identifiable ex ante but it is possible to profit from redistribution when the winners and losers can only be identified ex post, e.g., insurance. For a discussion of when redistributive activities do fall within the scope of Community competition law, see Hancher, L and Sierra, JL Buendia ‘CrossSubsidization and EC Law’ (1998) 35 CMLRev 901 Google Scholar; and Abbamonte, GB, ‘CrossSubsidisation and Community Competition Rules: Efficient Pricing Versus Equity?’ (1998) 23 ELRev 414 Google Scholar.

79 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 338.

80 Ibid, at para. 338.

81 Case C–218/00 Cisal, above n 11, AG’s Opinion at para 67. Also Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AG’s Opinion at para 35.

82 That the requirements are cumulative is suggested in Case C–244/94 FFSA, above n 40, at paras 18–20; that the requirements are alternative is suggested in Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, at para 56, as the sickness funds are able to set the price and thus engaged in competition, but unable to determine the level of service provided.

83 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above, n 8, at para 50; Case C–475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, above n 11, at paras 14, 20; Case C–70/95 Sodemare, above n 74, AG’s Opinion at para 29; Hervey, above n 40, 36; Menendez, above n 72, 378–79; Turner, DF ‘The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies’ (1969) 82 Harv L Rev 1207 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 1208–11.

84 Case C–70/95 Sodemare, above n 74, AG’s Opinion at para 25.

85 Compare with Case C–364/92 Eurocontrol, above n 46, AG’s Opinion at para 14.

86 Case C–244/94 FFSA, above n 40, at para 17, emphasis added.

87 Ibid, at para 17, AG’s Opinion at paras 8, 17.

88 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AG’s Opinion at para 52, Case C–218/00 Cisal, above n 11, at para. 71.

89 Case C–244/94 FFSA, above n 40, AG’s Opinion at para. 21.

90 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, at para. 56, Case C–218/00 Cisal, above n 11, at paras 39–40, 44–45, AG’s Opinion at paras. 25, 76; Joined Case C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre, above n 57, at para 11; Case C–364/92 Eurocontrol, above n 46, at para 29.

91 Case C–343/95 Diego Calì, above n 11, AG’s Opinion at para 42. See further, Joined Cases C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre, above n 57, at para 15; and Lasok, above n 26, 384–85.

92 Case C–218/00 Cisal AG’s, above n 11, Opinion at para 62, also at para 80.

93 Ibid, at para 81.

94 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, at paras 78–79, AG’s Opinion para at 342; and Joined Case C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre, above n 57, at paras 10, 15.

95 Cases C–218/00 Cisal, above n 11, at paras 35–36, 44–45, AG’s Opinion at paras 68–76.

96 Cases C–364/92 Eurocontrol, above n 46, AG’s Opinion at paras 13.

97 On the need for subsidy to fund the European social model see Hatzopoulos, above n 12, 684.

98 Stiglitz, JE and Driffill, J, Economics (London, W W Norton, 2000) 126 Google Scholar point out that few goods are pure public goods, but instead exhibit the characteristics to a greater or lesser extent.

99 Stiglitz, above n 53, 128–29; Stiglitz and Driffill, above n 98, 124; Carlton, DW and Perloff, JM Modern Industrial Organization (3rd edn Harlow, Addison-Wesley, 2000) 82 Google Scholar; Case, KE and Fair, RC, principles of Economics (5th edn Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1999) 387 Google Scholar

100 Hummel, J Rogers, ‘National Goods versus Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament, and Free Riders’ (1990) 4 The Review of Austrian Economics 88 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

101 Stiglitz, above n 53, 128–29; Case and Fair, above n 99, 388, Stiglitz and Driffill, above n 98, 124.

102 Stiglitz, above n 53, 130–46; Groves, T and Ledyard, J ‘Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem’ (1977) 45 Econometrica 783 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

103 Case and Fair 392. This is a classic example of the free-rider problem; see Groves and Ledyard.

104 Stiglitz and Driffill 126–27; Stiglitz 129–35; and Case, and Fair, 289.

105 Buendia Sierra paras 1.158–1.159, 1.188–1.190, 1.198–1.201.

106 Joined Case C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet and Pistre AG’s Opinion at para 12, emphasis added. The AG’s is actually speaking about solidarity, raising the question whether redistributive activity is not considered economic because it is a public good.

107 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 314, emphasis added. Also Case C–475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, above n 11, at para 20; and Buendia Sierra, above n 11, para. 1.158.

108 On the definition of imperium, see text accompanying nn 46–47 above.

109 Case C–364/92, above n 46, para 16.

110 Ibid, AG’s Opinion at para 13, emphasis added. Also judgment at para 25; and Buendia Sierra, above n 11, paras. 1.166–1.170.

111 Case C–364/92 Eurocontrol, above n 46, AG’s Opinion at para 14.

112 Ibid, at para 30. Also AG’s Opinion at paras 12–13.

113 Information on Genoa port services is available from http://www.informare.it/news/forum/capoc1uk.htm (last visited 31 May 2005).

114 Case C–43/95 Diego Calì, above n 11, AG’s Opinion at para 44.

115 Ibid, para 22, AG’s Opinion paras 29, 43–64.

116 Ibid, AG’s Opinion at para 46.

117 Ibid, at paras 8, 13, 24, AG’s Opinion at paras 52–54.

118 Ibid, AG’s Opinion at paras 52–54.

119 Ibid, para 23. Various functions of port authorities have been classified as economic. In Case C–179/90 Merci v Siderurgica [1991] ECR I–5889, loading and unloading of ordinary freight in the Port of Genoa was seen as economic activity. In Case C–18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia v Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova [1994] ECR I–1783, piloting services are seen as economic activity.

120 Case C–343/95 Diego Calì, above n 11, AG’s Opinion at para 49.

121 Deringer, above n 6, 5.

122 Van den Bogaert, above n 44, 123.

123 Oliver, D, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London, Butterworths, 1999)Google Scholar; Harlow, C and Rawlings, R Law and Administration (2nd edn London, Butterworths, 1997) 7–9 Google Scholar; Aronson, M, ‘A Public Lawyer’s Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing’ in Taggart, M (ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford, Hart, 1997) 40–70 at 52–56Google Scholar; Galbraith, JK, The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time (London, Penguin, 2004) 47–51 Google Scholar, 69–72.

124 Kennedy, D, ‘The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 U Pa L Rev 1349 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 1349.

125 Bamforth, N, ‘The Public Law – Private Law Distinction: A Comparative and Philosophical Approach’ in Leyland, P and Woods, T (eds), Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (London, Blackstone, 1997) 136–159 at 137, 140–51Google Scholar; Loughlin, M, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 1 Google Scholar, 7–12; Harlow and Rawlings, above n 123, 9–15.

126 Bamforth, above n 125, 138–40, 151–54; Loughlin, above n 125, 46–47, 13–14, 54–80; and Craig, P, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union’ (2001) 7 ELJ 125 at 128CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

127 Oliver, above n 123, 12–13; Stiglitz, above n 53, at 13–14.

128 Public law must then deal with competing public interests, on which see Maduro, M Poiares, ‘Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the European Constitution: Economic Freedom and Political Rights’ (1997) 3 ELJ 55 at 73–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

129 Cruz, above n 4, 88–89, 111, 132–34, 149, 155–61. Democratic legitimacy does not confer immunity—majoritarian democracy does not allow all interests to be represented. The inability to override a legal interest because of a competing public interest shows that the inviolable interest is a right, Dworkin, R ‘Rights as Trumps’ Waldron, J (ed) Theories of Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984) 153–67Google Scholar. Resolution of this problem is considered in the Community law context is considered by Maduro, above n 128, at 67–80, and Weatherill, S ‘Pre-Emption, Harmonisation and the Distribution of Competence to Regulate the Internal Market’ Barnard, C and Scott, J (eds) The Law of the Single European Market (Oxford, Hart, 2002) 41–73 Google Scholar.

130 Oliver, above n 123, 19–22, 80–88; Loughlin, above n 125, 5; Maduro, above n 128, 55–56; Snell, J, ‘Who’s Got the Power? Free Movement and Allocation of Competences in EC Law’ (2003) 22 YEL 323 Google Scholar at 324, 337; Alder, J, ‘Obsolescence and Renewal: Judicial Review in the Private Sector’ in Leyland, P and Woods, T (eds), Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (London, Blackstone, 1997) 160 Google Scholar at 166–67.

131 The debate over a public/private divide is advanced in the terminology of whether particular provisions have horizontal or vertical direct effect. On this debate see Pescatore, P, ‘Public and Private Aspects of European Community Competition Law’ (1987) 10 Fordham Int’l LJ 373 Google Scholar; Marenco, above n 38; Milner-Moore, above n 48; Cruz, above n 4, Quinn, M and MacGowan, N, ‘Could Article 30 Impose Obligations on Individuals’ (1987) 12 ELRev 163 Google Scholar; Van den Bogaert, above n 123; Oliver 117–22, above n 44, Snell, above n 53.

132 Van den Bogaert, above n 44, at 123; Mortelmans, K, ‘Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and on Competition?’ (2001) 38 CML Rev 613 Google Scholar at 622–23, 635–36; Hatzopoulos, V, ‘Recent Developments of the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of Services’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 43 Google Scholar at 76–80; Weatherill, S and Beaumont, P, EU Law (3rd edn London, Penguin, 1999) 521–22Google Scholar; O’Loughlin, R ‘EC Competition Rules and Free Movement Rules: An Examination of the Parallels and Their Furtherance by the ECJ Wouters Decision’ (2003) 24 ECLR 62 at 62Google Scholar; Snyder, F, New Directions in European Community Law (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990) 92–93 Google Scholar; Slot, PJ ‘The Application of Articles 3(F), 5 and 85 to 94 EEC’ (1987) 12 ELRev 179 at 181Google Scholar; Bamforth, above n 125, 143–51; Whish, above n 50, 211 writes that ‘Article 81 and 82 are essentially private law provisions … many other Articles in the Treaty are primarily of a public law nature, imposing obligations on Member States.’

133 Weatherill 87–92, above n 44; and Weatherill, above n 77, 1003 arguing the Treaty should be seen as a coherent whole.

134 Mortelmans, above n 132, 635–36.

135 See sections III.A.2 and III.C.1 and III.C.2 above.

136 Estrin, S (ed), Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe (London, Longman, 1994)Google Scholar. Wright, V (ed), Privatization in Western Europe: Pressures, Problems and Paradoxes (London, Pinter, 1994)Google Scholar. Wright, V and Perrotti, L (eds), Privatization and Public Policy (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000)Google Scholar. On the transfer of executive functions to the market place see Harlow and Rawlings, above n 123, 15–23; Oliver, above n 123, 11–12; Allison, above n 46, 79–83; Aronson, above n 123, 40–45, M Freedland, ‘Government by Contract and Private Law’ [1994] Public Law 86; Mortelmans, above n 132, 640; Hertz, N, The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (London, Arrow, 2002)Google Scholar; and Monbiot, G, Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain (London, Pan, 2000)Google Scholar.

137 See section III.C above and Stiglitz, above n 53, 28–29, 136–41; Szyszczak, E, ‘Public Services in the New Economy’ in Graham, C and Smith, F (eds), Competition, Regulation and the New Economy (Oxford, Hart, 2004) 185–206 Google Scholar. at 189–90.

138 Mortelmans, above n 123, 624, 634–35; Lord Woolf, ‘Droit Public—English Style’ [1995] Public Law 57 at 63–64.

139 Case 249/1981 Commission v Ireland, above n 53.

140 Case 118/85 Commission v Italy, above n 11.

141 Milner-Moore, above n 48, accompanying n 125. On the attempt to distinguish state from non-state activity see Ibid, at text accompanying nn 110–125; Pescatore, above n 131, 407–16; Schepel, above n 46; Allison, above n 53, at 84–88; Alder, above n 130, 166–70; and Oliver, above n 123.

142 Quinn and MacGowan, above n 131, 166. Milner-Moore, above n 48, at text accompanying n 83; and Gormley, LW ‘Competition and Free Movement: Is the Internal Market the Same as the Common Market?’ (2002) 13 EBLR 517 Google Scholar reject the idea that the competition rules can achieve the same outcome as the free-movement rules.

143 Joined Cases C–2/01 P and C–3/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure v Bayer and Commission [2004] ECR I–23 at para 101; and Snell 228–36.

144 Case 13/77 GB-INNO-BM v ATAB [1977] ECR 2115; Case 229/83 Leclerc [1985] ECR 1, Case 231/83 Henri Cullet and Chambre Syndicale des Reparateurs Automobiles et Détaillants de Produits Pétroliers v Centre Leclerc à Toulouse and Centre Leclerc à SaintOrens-de-Gameville [1985] ECR 305; Faull, J and Nikpay, A (eds), The EC Law of Competition (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999)Google Scholar paras. 5.01–5.07. Whish, above n 50, 211–17; L Gyselen, ‘Anti-Competitive State Measures under the EC Treaty: Towards a Substantial Legality Standard’ (1994) ELRev CC 55; Chung, CM, ‘The Relationship between State Regulation and EC Competition Law: Two Proposals for a Coherent Approach’ (1995) 16 ECLR 87 Google Scholar.

145 Pescatore, above n 131; Marenco, above n 38: Quinn and MacGowan, above n 131. For an account of the various gap closing techniques and the implications of their adoption, see Quinn and MacGowan, above n 131; Snell, above n 53, 228–243; Cruz, above n 4, 85–163; Weatherill, above n 44, 80–87.

146 Case C–415/93 Bosman, above n 44, AG’s Opinion para 253. At para 138 of the judgment, the Court decided not to deal with the issue, on which see Weatherill, above n 77, 1000–3, 1018–26; den Bogaert, S van, ‘The Court of Justice on the Tatami: Ippon, Waza-Ari or Koka?’ (2000) 25 ELRev 554 Google Scholar at 557; Weatherill, above n 44, 60. The inapplicability of the competition rules when the free movement rules apply seems paradoxical to Belhaj, S and de Dronden, JW van, ‘Some Room for Competition Does Not Make a Sickness Fund an Undertaking. Is EC Competition Law Applicable to the Heath Care Sector? Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–453/01 and C–355/01 AOK’ (2004) 11 ECLR 682 Google Scholar at 686.

147 Case C–281/98 Roman Angonese [2000] ECR I–4139. For a summary of the extent to which the free movement rules are capable of binding private parties, see Van den Bogaert, above n 44, 132–133. On the subjecting of the ‘public sector’ to market rules see Spaventa, above n 12, and Hervey, above n 40.

148 See Van den Bogaert, above n 44, 149–150 and Spaventa, E, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non-) Economic European Constitution’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 743 Google Scholar.

149 Quinn and MacGowan, above n 131, 167–170; Van den Bogaert, above n 44, 140, Weatherill, above n 44, 90–92. The redundancy of the competition rules is rejected by MilnerMoore, above n 48, at text accompanying nn 286–292.

150 Weatherill, above n 44, 88–92 suggests the maintenance of the divide creates coherent but less effective Community law.

151 Case 82/77 Open-air Ministerie of the Kingdom of the Netherlands v Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele [1978] ECR 25 at 47. See Van den Bogaert, above n 44, 139–143; and Slot, above n 132, 187.

152 Case C–2/1991 Criminal Proceedings against Wolf W Meng [1993] ECR I–5751 at 5770; Joined Cases T– 528/ 1993, T–542/1993, T–543/1993 and T–546/1993 Métropole Télévision SA and Reti Televisive Italiane SpA and Gestevisión Telecinco SA and Antena 3 de Televisión v Commission of the European Communities (Eurovision) [1996] ECR II–649 at paras 117–118; Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 184 and section IV.A.1 above.

153 Ibid, AG’s Opinion at paras 184, 206; Case C–2/1991 Meng, above n 152, at 5770, Joined Cases T–528/1993, T–542/1993, T–543/1993 and T–546/1993 Eurovision, above n 152, paras 117–118; Willimsky, SM, ‘The Concept(s) of Competition’ (1997) 18 ECLR 54 Google Scholar at 54. This is forcefully confirmed in US competition law by National Society of Professional Engineers v United States 435 US 679, 682–692 (1978), discussed in American Bar Association (Antitrust Section) and James E Hartley (chairman), Monograph No. 23: The Rule of Reason (Chicago, Iu, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 1999) 116–119; and Pitofsky, R, ‘Antitrust Modified: Education, Defense, and Other Worthy Enterprises’ (1995) 9 Antitrust 23 Google Scholar.

154 Kennedy, above n 124, 1349.

155 See section IV.A.2 above.

156 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AG’s Opinion para 52, citing Case C–185/91 Reiff [1993] ECR I–5801, para 16; Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at paras 184, 206; Cruz, above n 4, at 156. On the attempted resolution of the problem in UK public law see Hunt, M, ‘Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government’ in Taggart, (ed) The province of administrative Law (Oxford, Hart 1997), 21 Google Scholar. at 27–33.

157 Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, at para 56, emphasis added. Also AG’s opinion at para 70, Joined Cases C–180/98 to C–184/98 Pavlov, above n 14, at paras 87–88; and Cruz, above n 4, at 148–149, 154.

158 Mitchell, G, ‘Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law’ (2002) 43 William and Mary Law Review 1907 at 1941, n 58 Google Scholar; Persky, J, ‘Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo Economicus’ (1995) 9 J Econ Perspect 221 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bowles, S and Gintis, H, ‘The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy’ (1993) 7 J Econ Perspect 83 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hausman, DM and McPherson, MS, Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 27–30 Google Scholar; Zafirovski, M, ‘The Rational Choice Generalization of Neoclassical Economics Reconsidered: Any Theoretical Legitimation for Economic Imperialism?’ (2000) 18 Sociological Theory 448 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Daly, HE and Cobb, JB, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future (London, Green Print, 1990) 5 Google Scholar; Veljanovski, CG, The New Law and Economics: A Research Review (Oxford, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, 1982) 27–31 Google Scholar.

159 See section III above.

160 See references cited above at n 153.

161 Whish, above n 50, 211, considering that Art 81 and 82 EC are private law. For arguments that some bodies must be considered as occupants of the public sphere institutionally, see Oliver, above n 32, 477–79. For a discussion of problems caused by the choice of functional over an institutional approach, see Cruz, above n 4, 85–87 and Szyszczak, above n 137, 194–199.

162 Faull and Nikpay, above n 144, at paras 5.122–5.155.

163 Turner, above n 83, 1210. Compare with Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, para 56. Schepel, above n 53, 44–47 criticises denial of jurisdiction as a means of immunising public interest considerations from competition law scrutiny.

164 Joined Cases C–264/01, C–306/01, C–354/01 and C–355/01 AOK, above n 8, AG’s Opinion at para 53; Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, AG’s Opinion at para 70; Joined Cases C–180/98 to C–184/98 Pavlov, above n 14, at para 87; Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland, above n 53, at para 15; Case 222/1982 Apple and Pear Development Council, above n 53, at paras 2–7, 17; Snell, above n 53, 218–21; Cruz, above n 4, 148–49, 154; Oliver, above n 32, 482–84.

165 Marenco, above n 38, 421–23; Turner, above n 83, 1210; Case C–2/1991 Meng, above n 152, at 5770 on the inability of the competition rules to consider competing public interests. On the ability of EC public law to deal with competing public interests see Maduro, above n 128, 73–79.

166 The national legal framework is more fully set out in Deards, E, ‘Closed Shop Versus One Stop Shop: The Battle Goes On’ (2002) 27 ELRev 618 Google Scholar, 619.

167 Case C–309/99 Wouters, above n 41, at paras 75–78, 81–84, AG’s Opinion paras 42, 94.

168 Ibid, at paras 86–96, AG’s Opinion at paras 116–133.

169 See section III.A. 3 above and Ibid, at paras 56.

170 See n 38 above.

171 Deckert, M ‘Some Preliminary Remarks on the Limitations of European Competition Law’ (2000) 8 ERPL 173 Google Scholar at 176; Monti, G, ‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 1057 Google Scholar at 1089–90.

172 Though beyond the scope of this work, the attribution function of undertakings and association of undertakings may give meaning to association of undertakings without the competition rules applying to non-economic activity. Such an approach is suggested by Deringer, above n 6, 118, writing that ‘Decisions of associations of [undertakings] are legally acts of a juridical person or of a corporate body without legal capacity … whose members are [undertakings]. Actually, however, their decisions are acts of the majority of enterprises belonging to such association’ and Faull and Nikpay, above n 144, at para 2.44, writing that ‘the importance of the concept “decisions by associations of undertakings” therefore lies in the fact that it enables those applying Article 81(1) to hold associations liable for the anti-competitive behaviour of their members’. Support for the attribution theory can be found in repealed UK law: see Whish, R Competition Law 3rd edition (London, Butterworths, London, 1993) 168–69Google Scholar.

173 See section II above.

174 See section III above.

175 See section III.A above.

176 See section III.C above.

177 The lack of legal certainty is objected to in Lasok.

178 Kennedy, above n 124, 1349.

179 See section IV.A.1 above.

180 Kennedy, above n 124, 1349.

181 Case C–67/96 Albany International, above n 2, AG’s Opinion at para 206.

182 Case C–309/99 Wouters at para 56, emphasis added. Also Joined Cases C–180/98 to C–184/98 Pavlov, above n 41, at paras 87–88; Cruz, above n 14, 148–149, 154.

183 See text accompanying nn 44–48 above.

184 See section IV.A.3 above.

185 See section IV.B above.