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Constitutional Pluralism's Unspoken Normative Core

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2019

Jessica C. LAWRENCE
Jessica C. LAWRENCE*
Affiliation:
Central European University
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Abstract

This article argues that discourses of constitutional pluralism contain a strong normative core which is made up of a series of largely unacknowledged implicit claims about legitimacy and community. This argument is illustrated by reference to various constitutional pluralist responses to the Hungarian Constitutional Court's ruling concerning the protection of constitutional identity in the context of EU asylum and refugee protection law and policy, demonstrating that whether this decision falls ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ constitutional pluralist tolerance depends on how the observer defines the minimum amount of shared substantive or procedural content that is fundamental to the EU order.

Keywords

constitutional pluralismEU lawdiscourselegitimacyHungaryConstitutional Court
Type
Symposium
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 21 , December 2019 , pp. 24 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge

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