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Assessing the Public Administration’s Intention in EU Economic Law: Chasing Ghosts or Dressing Windows?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 May 2016
Abstract
Here I reflect on the role of subjective or intentional elements in EU economic law prohibitions, particularly in relation to rules concerning public administration. From a normative perspective, it is desirable to suppress the need for an assessment of subjective intent and to proceed with an objectified enforcement of such prohibitions. With this in view, I consider public procurement and Member State aid rules as two examples of areas of EU economic law subjected to interpretative and enforcement difficulties due to the introduction – sometimes veiled – of subjective elements in their main prohibitions. I establish parallels with other areas of EU economic law – such as antitrust, non-discrimination law and the common agricultural policy – and seek benchmarks to support the main thesis that such intentional elements need to be ‘objectified’, so that EU economic law can be enforced against the public administration to an adequate standard of legal certainty. This mirrors the development of the doctrine of abuse of EU law, where a similar ‘objectification’ in the assessment of subjective elements has taken place.
I draw on the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union to support such ‘objectification’ and highlight how the Court has been engaging in such interpretative strategy for some time. The paper explores the interplay between this approach and more general protections against behaviour of the public administration in breach of EU law: the right to good administration in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the doctrine of State liability for infringement of EU law. I conclude with the normative recommendation that the main prohibitions of EU economic law should be free from subjective elements focused on the intention of the public administration.
Keywords
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- © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
Footnotes
*
ORCiD: 0000-0002-3602-1191. I presented this paper at a lunchtime seminar of the Michaelmas term 2015–16 organised by the Centre for European Legal Studies (CELS), Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. I am thankful to Prof Kenneth A Armstrong for the invitation and to all attendees for their useful comments and feedback, in particular that of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston QC, Dr Okeoghene Odudu and Darren Harvey. I am also indebted to Prof Roberto Caranta, Prof Tony Prosser, Dr Jule Mulder, Prof Cosmo Graham and Prof Francisco Marcos for comments on a previous draft. I am also thankful for the insightful discussions I had with Dr Daniel Attenborough, Dr Sean Thomas and Dr Paolo Vargiu during the preparation of this paper. The final version of the paper also benefitted from the comments of two anonymous reviewers for the Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, for which I am also grateful. The usual disclaimer applies. Further comments welcome ([email protected]).
References
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29 Impresa Pizzarotti, C-213/13 EU:C:2014:2067, para 63, with reference to Commission v Portugal, C-70/06, EU:C:2008:3, para 40; Mikhaniki, C-213/07, EU:C:2008:731, para 55; Commission v Cyprus, C-251/09, EU:C:2011:84, paras 37 to 39; and Manova, C-336/12, EU:C:2013:647, para 28.
30 Hochtief and Linde-Kca-Dresden, C-138/08, EU:C:2009:627, para 47, with references to Fracasso and Leitschutz, C-27/98, EU:C:1999:420, para 26; Lombardini and Mantovani, C-285/99 and C-286/99, EU:C:2001:640, para 34; Universale-Bau, C-470/99, EU:C:2002:746, para 89; and Sintesi, C-247/02, EU:C:2004:593, para 35.
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36 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement, 20 December 2011, COM(2011) 896 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0896:FIN:EN:PDF.
37 This intentional element is common to different language versions of the Directive: ‘intención’ (Spanish), ‘intention’ (French), ‘intento’ (Italian), ‘intuito’ (Portuguese) or ‘Absicht’ (German). Thus, it cannot be justified as a deficiency in translation or an error in the wording of the provision.
38 See Presidency compromise text of 24 July 2012, 12878/12, 2011/0438 (COD), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12878-2012-INIT/en/pdf.
39 Art 15. For discussion of the legislative process that led to such alteration of the drafting, see Sanchez-Graells, A, ‘A Deformed Principle of Competition? The Subjective Drafting of Article 18 (1) of Directive 2014/24’ in GS Ølykke and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar) forthcoming Google Scholar. See also Sanchez-Graells, A, ‘Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law’ in C Bovis (ed), Research Handbook on EU Public Procurement Law, Research Handbooks in European Law Series (Edward Elgar, 2016)Google Scholar.
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41 See note 37 above.
42 See Article 5(3) of Directive 2014/24, which absorbed the content of Article 9(7) of Directive 2004/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L 134/114. See also Article 6 of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts [1993] OJ L 199/54.
43 As stressed very recently, see Spain v Commission, T-384/10, EU:T:2013:277, paras 65–68 (emphasis added); the Judgment has, however, been set aside on appeal by the Court on procedural issues (disregard of a time limit by the Commission); see Spain v Commission, C-429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310. Nonetheless, the same wording had been used in Commission v France, C-16/98, EU:C:2000:541; Commission v Italy, joined cases C-187/04 and C-188/04, EU:C:2005:652; Auroux and Others, C-220/05, EU:C:2007:31; and Commission v Germany, C-574/10, EU:C:2012:145.
44 Swoboda, C-411/00, EU:C:2002:660, paras 57–60.
45 Commission v Italy, C-412/04, EU:C:2008:102, paras 72–74.
46 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Commission v Germany, C-271/08, EU:C:2010:183, para 165 (emphasis added and references omitted). Cf Opinion of AG Jacobs in Commission v France, C-16/98, EU:C:2000:99, para 38, where the AG stresses that the intentional or subjective element cannot be eliminated, but suggests that the applicable test still lies on whether the decision under assessment can be ‘justified on objective grounds’.
47 Spain v Commission, T-384/10, EU:T:2013:277, para 95 (references omitted).
48 Such grounds need to be interpreted strictly, as repeatedly stressed by the Court. See Commission v Italy, 199/85, EU:C:1987:115, para 14; Commission v Italy, C-57/94, EU:C:1995:150, para 23; Commission v Germany, C-318/94, EU:C:1996:149, para 13; Commission v Germany, joined cases C-20/01 and C-28/01, EU:C:2003:220, para 58; Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, C-26/03, EU:C:2005:5, para 46; and Commission v Germany, C-480/06, EU:C:2009:357, paras 34–35.
49 See Art 2d of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC. Consolidated version available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0665:20080109:en:PDF.
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56 This is the approach to the enforcement of the prohibition of Article 102 TFEU in cases of predatory pricing. For discussion, see Part IV.A below.
57 Similarly, this was the interpretation presented by the Commission when the rule preventing the artificial split of contracts was first assessed; see European Commission, Guide to the Community Rules on Public Works Contracts other than in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors (Directive 93/37/EEC) (1993) 17, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/guidelines/works_en.pdf.
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87 van der Ham, EU:C:2014:98, para 41.
88 Voorde, see note 12 above, pp 564–566.
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95 Dutheil de la Rochère, see note 93 above, p 168.
96 Hofmann, HCH and Mihaescu, C, ‘The Relation between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 (1) European Constitutional Law Review 73 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p 87.
97 Craig, see note 89 above, p 1085. Interestingly, the GC expressly highlights the link between the duty to give reasons and the right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 Charter. See Sviluppo Globale GEIE v Commission, T-183/10, EU:T:2012:534, para 40. See also A Sanchez Graells, ‘Duty to give reasons under EU procurement law and EU trademark law: is there a contradiction?’ (How to Crack a Nut, 16 October 2012) http://howtocrackanut.com/blog/2012/10/duty-to-give-reasons-under-eu.html.
98 Along these lines, the fact that a specific EU regime requires the public authority to follow a given procedure to channel its objectively good reasons or concerns will prevent it from acting outside of that procedure and, consequently, those will not be good reasons for the purposes of justifying the behaviour. To that effect, see Synthon, C-452/06, EU:C:2008:565, paras 41 to 43.
99 In the area of standardisation and public procurement, see Medipac - Kazantzidis, C-6/05, EU:C:2007:337. The case is interesting because it limits the scope of ‘acceptable’ objectively good reasons that the public administration is allowed to adduce in justification of a behaviour that infringed secondary EU economic law.
100 The issue is very similar to the assessment of non-economic justifications provided to derogate from EU competition law rules. For discussion and further references, see Sanchez Graells, note 33 above, pp 185–193.
101 For general discussion, see Craig and Búrca, see note 60 above, pp 257–261.
102 This requirement has been found to be the most difficult condition for a claimant to establish in a State liability case; see Lock, T, ‘Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth? An Assessment 20 Years after Francovich’ (2012) 49 (5) Common Market Law Review 1675 Google Scholar, p 1693.
103 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen / Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others, C-46/93 and C-48/93, EU:C:1996:79.
104 Ibid, paras 55, 56. See also Haim, C-424/97, EU:C:2000:357; and Evans, C-63/01, EU:C:2003:650.
105 Robins and Others, C-278/05, EU:C:2007:56, para 70; Synthon, EU:C:2008:565, para 37; Specht and Others, C-501/12, EU:C:2014:2005, para 102.
106 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland), C-5/94, EU:C:1996:205, para 28; Dillenkofer and Others, C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94, EU:C:1996:375, para 25, and Stockholm Lindöpark, C-150/99, EU:C:2001:34, para 40. See also Robins, EU:C:2007:56, para 71; Synthon, EU:C:2008:565, para 38.
107 Synthon, EU:C:2008:565, para 39. See, to that effect, Robins and Others, EU:C:2007:56, paras 72 and 73.
108 See Tridimas, T, ‘Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing Down?’ (2001) 38 (2) Common Market Law Review 301 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p 310. For discussion, see Cruz, J Baquero, ‘ Francovich and Imperfect Law’ in M Poiares Maduro and L Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart, 2010), p 423 ffGoogle Scholar.
109 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, EU:C:1996:79, para 80. The situation is different when it comes to the liability of EU institutions, where the case law regarding fault requirements is much less clear. See Aalto, P, Public Liability in EU Law: Brasserie, Bergaderm and Beyond (Hart, 2011), pp 47–51 Google Scholar.
110 Indeed, there is a distinction between establishing liability independently of intention and then imposing a remedy that takes intention into account. This can be particularly relevant in relation to compensation claims.
111 Larsy, C-118/00, EU:C:2001:368, paras 39 ff.
112 Synthon, EU:C:2008:565, paras 41–43.
113 Robins, EU:C:2007:56, paras 78–82. In less clear terms, Specht, EU:C:2014:2005, para 103.
114 For discussion of the standard, see Beutler, B, ‘State Liability for Breaches of Community Law by National Courts: Is the Requirement of a Manifest Infringement of the Applicable Law an Insurmountable Obstacle?’ (2009) 46 (3) Common Market Law Review 773 Google Scholar. Zingales, Cf N, ‘Member State Liability vs. National Procedural Autonomy: What Rules for Judicial Breach of EU Law?’ (2010) 11 (4) German Law Journal 419 Google Scholar.
115 Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C-173/03, EU:C:2006:391, para 44.
116 Köbler, C-224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paras 53–56.