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Trust and EU Law and Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2017

Imelda Maher
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Abstract

The impetus for this chapter is the extraordinary difficulties surrounding the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. It aims to provide a framework within which to explore trust in EU law. The question of trust has become even more significant since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty with the emergence of the fiscal crisis in Greece and in the wider eurozone. This chapter initially seeks to locate the question of trust within the much-discussed notion of the democratic deficit in the EU, drawing on the work of Snell. It argues that the question of democratic deficit raises questions about trust in the EU, and that institutionalised distrust is what is required in order to secure appropriate trust in EU law and governance. It then examines the nature of trust before turning to two major crises of distrust in the EU: the Irish referenda on the Lisbon Treaty and the ongoing difficulties presented to the eurozone of the indebtedness of some of its members.

Type
Research Article
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 12 , 2010 , pp. 283 - 311
Copyright
Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 2010

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References

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61 [2008] OJ C115/1 (5 May 2008).

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63 In Ireland, a version was provided quickly online by the Irish Institute of International and European Affairs, a think tank.

64 Set up by The Referendum Commission Act 1998, with its role now governed by the Referendum Act 2001. The Government is not allowed by law to spend public monies on the conduct of a referendum following McKenna II [1995] 2 IR 10. See C Costello, above n 49.

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68 Ibid, 112.

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70 23% were shown to have voted ‘No’ on the second occasion because of concern for it. Neutrality has also been a feature in earlier referenda: see Costello, above n 49, 368.

71 Its poor performance in the subsequent European Parliament elections meant it did not play a role in the second referendum.

72 53.4% against; 46.6% in favour; with a turnout of 53.4%: see Dinan, D, ‘Institutions and Governance’ in Copsey, N and Houghton, T (eds), JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2008 (Chichester, Wiley, 2009) 113 Google Scholar.

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77 R Hyman, ‘Trade Unions and “Europe”: Are the Members out of Step?’ LEQS paper no 14, November 2009.

78 Coughlan v Broadcasting Complaints Commission and RTE [2000] 3 IR 1. For a critique of the three most significant Irish Supreme Court decisions on the conduct of referenda, see Barrett, G, ‘Building a Swiss Chalet in an Irish Legal Landscape? Referendums on European Union Treaties in Ireland and the Impact of Supreme Court Jurisprudence’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 32 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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82 Hardin, above n 13.

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94 Key early cases are Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfurh-und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125; Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491; and Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727. More recently, see Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659; and Opinion 2/94 on Accession by the Community to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759.

95 The key German cases where this debate was discussed are Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I) [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II) [1987] 3 CMLR 225; and Brunner v The EU Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. See also the decision of the BVerfG in the Bananas case, decision of 7 June 2000-2BvL 1/97, discussed in Peters, A, ‘The Bananas Decision 2000 of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Towards reconciliation with the ECJ as regards fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’ (2000) 43 German Yearbook of International Law 276 Google Scholar. The most recent case relates to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: see Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, available at: <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bvel>, accessed 8 July 2010, discussed in D Halberstan and C Möllers, above n 65.

96 See Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; and Opinion 1/91 on a draft agreement relating to the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6097. For a discussion of pluralism, see McCormack, N, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97 The Strategy had as its objective making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, defined in terms of sustainable economic growth, more and better jobs, greater social cohesion and environmental protection: see European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Press Release: Lisbon 24/03/2000, No 100/1/00; and European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, Press Release: Göteborg 15/6/2001, No 200/1/01.

98 Described by de Búrca and Scott as the wide range of processes and practices that have a normative dimension but do not operate primarily or at all through the formal mechanism of traditional command-and-control-type legal institutions: see de Búrca, G and Scott, J, ‘Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in de Búrca, G and Scott, J (eds), New Governance and Constitutionalism in Europe and the US (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 2 Google Scholar.

99 Hodson, D and Maher, I, ‘The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination’ (2001) 39(4) JCMS 719 Google Scholar.

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102 For example, Arts 119 TFEU (in relation to economic policy coordination) and 145 TFEU (employment policy).

103 On hybridity, see de Búrca and Scott, above n 98, 6. On how it is found in EMU, see D Trubek, P Cottrell and M Nance, ‘“Soft Law”, “Hard Law” and EU Integration’ in at G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), above n 98, 93 and Maher, I, ‘Economic Governance: Hybridity, Accountability, and Control’ (2007) 13(3) Columbia Journal of European Law 679 Google Scholar.

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107 European Council, Extraordinary Meeting Economics and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 9 and 10 May 2010, Provisional Press Release, 9596/10.

108 Amtenbrink, F, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999)Google Scholar.

109 The members of the eurozone are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain.

110 Art 119 TFEU.

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113 Art 12, Regulation 1467/97/EC, [1997] OJ L209/6.

114 Case C-27/04 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-6649.

115 Council Regulation 1056/2005/EC amending Regulation 1467/97/EC, [2005] OJ L174/5; Council Regulation 1055/2005/EC, amending Regulation 1466/97/EC, [2005] OJ L174/1.

116 LG Mora and JN Martins, ‘How Reliable are the Statistics for the Stability and Growth Pact?’ (2007) Notas Estadísticas No 4, Bank of Spain.

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119 Commission Recommendation for a Council Opinion on the updated Stability Programme of Greece, 2010–2013, Brussels, 3.2.2010 SEC(2010) 94 final, at § 2.5.

120 Council Regulation 479/2009/EC on the Application of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure Annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, [2009] OJ L145/1.

121 Specifications on the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and Guidelines on the Format and Content of Stability and Convergence Programmes endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 10 November 2009.

122 Art 126 TFEU.

123 Dabrowski, M, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for European Integration’ (2010) 34 Economics Systems 38, 45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; D Hodson and I Maher, above n 99, 801.

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126 Dabrowski, above n 123, 4.

127 ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2010. The ECB has not just bought Greek government bonds see e.g. A. Bradbery, ‘ECB Buys Irish Government bonds to Calm Markets’ Wall Street Journal, August 13 2010.

128 Art 127(1) TFEU: ‘The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks … shall be to maintain price stability.’ The Treaty also prohibits any bail-outs see Art. 125 TFEU.

129 A Council Decision is to be drafted on the basis of Arts 126 and 136 TFEU. For a summary of the measures agreed to by Greece, see Comments by H Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, on Greece and Solidarity in the Euro Area, Brussels, 5 May 2010, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/114223.pdf>, accessed 8 July 2010.

130 C Atkinson, Press Briefing, IMF, 6 May 2010, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2010/tr>, accessed 8 July 2010.

131 Eurogroup, Statement on Support to Greece, 2 May 2010, available at <http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100502-%20Eurogroup_statement.pdf>, accessed 8 July 2010.

132 Arts 126 and 136 TFEU. The conditions of the austerity package include an increase in VAT from 21 per cent to 23 per cent; significant cuts in bonuses, pensions and subsidies to the public sector, changes in the schemes on retirement age including an increase in the official retirement age to 67 years. Finally, there was also to be a loosening of restrictions on the cirucmstnaces surrounding laying-off employees.

133 Statement by the Heads of State and Government of the Euro Area, Brussels, 25 March 2010, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/113563.pdf> accessed 8 July 2010.

134 See, eg, ‘Greek Storms Spreads Across Europe’, Investment Adviser FT Business, 10 May 2010.

135 European Council, above n 107.

136 See, eg, ‘Stocks, Euro Soar on EU Rescue Package’, Agence France Presse (English), 10 May 2010.

137 A Willis, ‘EU Ministers to Debate Controversial Eurozone Reform’, EU Observer, 17 May 2010, available at <http://euobserver.com/?aid=30080>, accessed 8 July 2010.

138 A Willis, ‘EU Miffed by Unilateral German Ban on Short-Selling’, EU Observer, 19 May 2010, available at <http://euobserver.com/?aid=30104>, accessed 8 July 2010.

139 D Scally, ‘Merkel Insists Treaty Changes are Essential’, Irish Times, 13 May 2010.

140 H Mahony, ‘Barroso says German calls for Treaty Change are ‘Naïve’’, EU Observer, 25 May 2010, available at <http://euobserver.com/9/30129/?rk=1>, accessed 8 July 2010.

141 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Reinforcing Economics Policy Coordination Brussels, 12.2.2010 COM(2010) 250 final.

142 See, eg A Willis, ‘Barroso urges Reform as Shine Fades on Bail-out’, EU Observer, 11 May 2010, available at <http://euobserver.com/?aid=30059>, accessed 8 July 2010.

143 EC Commission, Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf>, accessed 8 July 2010, which was endorsed by the Council in March: see European Council, Conclusions on Europe 2020, 3003rd Economics and Financial Affairs Council, Brussels, 16 March 2010, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/113395.pdf>, accessed 8 July 2010.

144 In its Communication on economic policy coordination, the Commission has advocated even tighter surveillance than proposed under EU2020, showing the fluid nature of the political climate in the crisis see above n 141, at III.2.

145 Dabrowski, above n 123, 51.

146 Commission, above n 125, 17.

147 T Connelly, ‘We Do Not Sacrifice Ourselves for the Rich’, Sunday Business Post, 9 May 2010.

148 J Strupczewski and I Wissenbach, ‘Eurozone Agrees Emergency Steps to Contain Crisis’, Reuters, 7 May 2010.

149 As well as Greece, the IMF and EU have provided loans to Latvia, (see e.g. the Supplemental MOU between the EU and Latvia, July 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/balance/pdf/mou_add3_bop_latvia_en.pdf (viewed 31 August 2010); Romania (see e.g. Supplemental MOU, February 2010) and Hungary (see e.g. MOU between the EU and Hungary 17 November 2009 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication13495_en.pdf (visited 31 August 2010).