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Criminal Justice in the Post-Lisbon Era
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 October 2017
Abstract
Having briefly traced the history of EU criminal law, this chapter first examines the new rules governing the competency of the EU in criminal law matters deriving from the Lisbon Treaty. Europol and Eurojust, the EU institutions that have been created with a view to fighting trans-border crime are examined, and the pros and cons of a possible further institution, the European Public Prosecutor are discussed. A final section examines the impact of the EU Charter, and the need to establish in this area an order of precedence between the EU Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights.
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- Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 2011
References
1 For more on this terminology see Corstens, Geert and Pradel, Jean, European Criminal Law (The Hague, London, New York, Kluwer Law International, 2002) 522, 528, 566Google Scholar.
2 At that time, still the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ).
3 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879 and Case C-440/05 Commission v Council [2007] ECR I-7141.
4 See Case C-440/05 Commission v Council [2007] ECR I-7141, para 66.
5 Post-Lisbon, the EU’s courts are grouped collectively within the CJEU, which includes both the Court of Justice and the General Court. See Art 19 TEU.
6 Strijards, G, ‘Het Europees openbaar ministerie, herleefd te Lissabon’ (2008) 38 Delikt en Delinkwent 603 ff, 607Google Scholar: ‘gedachtig het feit dat internationale organisaties nu eenmaal de neiging hebben om allerlei naar zich toe te schoffelen om hun existentie te bewijzen en te prolongeren.’ (Given that international organisations have the tendency to appropriate powers over all sorts of matters in order to both prove and prolong their own existence.)
7 See Ladenburger, C, ‘Police and Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon: A New Dimension for the Community Method’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 20, 29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 See also Art 82 TFEU.
9 Barents, R, Het Verdrag van Lissabon, achtergronden en commentaar (Deventer, Kluwer, 2008) 626 Google Scholar points out that a number of Third Pillar agreements were not ratified by all the Member States.
10 As in the Netherlands.
11 Barents, above n 9, 623, points out that this could give rise to reverse discrimination if defendants in purely national criminal cases enjoy less protection than defendants in transnational criminal cases.
12 See Spencer, J, ‘The Problems of Trans-border Evidence and European Initiatives to Resolve Them’ in Barnard, C (ed) 9 (2006–2007) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007)Google Scholar.
13 See Piris, J-C, The Lisbon Treaty, A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 184 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. To complete the picture, see also the freezing of assets in the framework of counterterrorism, Art 75 TFEU.
14 See above s II, fn 4.
15 See E Herlin-Karnel, ‘The Lisbon Treaty, A Critical Analysis of its Impact on EU Criminal Law’ (2010) Eucrim 59, 60.
16 See Pradel, J, Corstens, GJM and Vermeulen, G, Droit pénal européen 3rd edn (Dalloz, Paris, 2009) 701ff.Google Scholar
17 See above, s III.B.1.
18 Eurojust’s field of action is described inter alia in Pradel, Corstens and Vermeulen, above n 16, 463–64 and 487–92 and Veldt-Foglia, M, ‘Eurojust’, in Corstens, G, Davids, W and Veldt-Foglia, M (eds), Europeanisering van het Nederlands recht (Deventer, Kluwer, 2004) 368, 373–74Google Scholar.
19 See also A Vast and J Kuitert, ‘Eurojust en het Europees Justitieel Netwerk: belangrijke schakels in de opsporing en vervolging van ernstige, georganiseerde grensoverschrijdende criminaliteit binnen de Europese Unie’ (2008) Strafblad 588; see also Klip, A, European Criminal Law (Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, Intersentia, 2009) 410–13Google Scholar and Peers, S, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 2nd edn, Oxford EC Law Library (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 487–89Google Scholar.
20 Eurojust Annual Report 2009, s 9.
21 Barents, above n 9, 626, referring to a working document.
22 See above s 3.B.1.
23 See Strijards, n 6 above, 603, 608.
24 Protocol (no 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. See also Protocol (no 1) on the role of national parliaments in the EU.
25 The procedure is slightly more complicated: every national parliament has two votes; if parliament consists of two chambers, each chamber has one vote.
26 For the rest of the procedure, see the final paragraphs of Art 7(3) of the Protocol.
27 Strijards, above n 6, 603 ff, 607, points out that the Luxembourg court has never designated Commission policy non-binding on account of non-compliance with the subsidiarity principle.
28 See further the ch by S Peers in this volume.
29 See Piris, J-C, The Lisbon Treaty, a Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010) 152 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
30 This could also arise where the Charter lists a right that is established in a Protocol to the ECHR that a particular Member State has failed to ratify. For example, see the Eighth Protocol to the ECHR which has not been ratified by the Netherlands.
31 (22 October 1987) Case 314/85, Foto-Frost CJCE 4199.
32 See www.curia.europa.eu for the institution and discussion documents.
33 See Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, dated 24 January 2011, www.curia.europa.eu for the institution and discussion documents.
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