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Toward a Postmodern Bioethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2015

DAVID GIBSON
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Abstract:

In this article, postmodernism is presented as posing a challenge to the role of philosophy within bioethics. It is argued that any attempt to develop a postmodern bioethics must respond to arguments concerning power, relational responsibility, and violence. Contemporary work on the topic of relational autonomy and naturalized bioethics is interpreted as engaging with the postmodern challenge. This article proposes that the role of philosophy in bioethics should be not to provide moral guidance but rather to adopt a critical approach to the possible consequences of privileging any position or understanding over others.

Keywords

bioethicspostmodernismpowerviolencerelational autonomyrelational responsibility
Type
Special Section: Philosophical Bioethics—Its State and Future
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , April 2015 , pp. 175 - 184
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

Notes

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