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Precedent Autonomy: Life-Sustaining Intervention and the Demented Patient

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 1999

MICHAEL J. NEWTON
Affiliation:
Mount Sinai Hospital, and Manhattan Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital in New York City

Abstract

How aggressively should we pursue life-sustaining treatment of the demented patient? This question becomes increasingly important as our population ages and medical technology offers ever more life-prolongation. In Life's Dominion, Ronald Dworkin addresses the issue in the context of an Alzheimer patient who had previously declared the desire to avoid life-sustaining intervention. Dworkin argues for the primacy of what he calls precedent autonomy: “A competent person's right to autonomy requires that his past decisions about how he is to be treated if he becomes demented be respected even if they contradict the desires he has at a later point.” In 1995, the Hastings Center Report carried thoughtful rebuttals by Daniel Callahan and Rebecca Dresser. Much of Callahan's article is devoted to patients who never executed an advance directive, but he states unequivocally that such directives can be overridden, basing much of his argument on the writings of Sanford Kadish. Together, Dresser, Callahan, and Kadish define a clear position opposed to precedent autonomy.

Type
SPECIAL SECTION: WHEN OTHERS DECIDE
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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