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The New Ethics of Neuroethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2018

TOM BULLER
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Abstract:

According to a familiar distinction, neuroethics incorporates the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics of neuroscience. Within neuroethics, these two parts have provoked distinct and separate lines of inquiry, and there has been little discussion of how the two parts overlap. In the present article, I try to draw a connection between these two parts by considering the implications that are raised for ethics by scientific findings about the way we make moral decisions. The main argument of the article is that although neuroscience is “stretching” ethics by revealing the empirical basis of our moral decisions and, thereby, challenging our present understanding of the dominant ethical theories, substantial further questions remain regarding the impact that neuroscience will have on ethics more broadly.

Keywords

moral theoryneurosciencemoral enhancementethicsneuroethics
Type
Symposium: Competing Identities of Neuroethics
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 27 , Special Issue 4: Clinical Neuroethics , October 2018 , pp. 558 - 565
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

Notes

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