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Moral Bioenhancement and the Utilitarian Catastrophe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2014

NICHOLAS AGAR
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Abstract:

This article challenges recent calls for moral bioenhancement—the use of biomedical means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions or characters. It responds to those who take a practical interest in moral bioenhancement. I argue that moral bioenhancement is unlikely to be a good response to the extinction threats of climate change and weapons of mass destruction. Rather than alleviating those problems, it is likely to aggravate them. We should expect biomedical means to generate piecemeal enhancements of human morality. These predictably strengthen some contributors to moral judgment while leaving others comparatively unaffected. This unbalanced enhancement differs from the manner of improvement that typically results from sustained reflection. It is likely to make its subjects worse rather than better at moral reasoning.

Keywords

bioenhancementutilitarianismmoralitymoral reasoning
Type
Special Section: How Moral Is (Moral) Enhancement?
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , January 2015 , pp. 37 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

Notes

1. Persson, I, Savulescu, J. Unfit for the Future? Modern Technology, Liberal Democracy and the Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2012.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. Persson, Savulescu 2012, at 46.

3. Persson, Savulescu 2012, at 8.

4. Harris, J. Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics 2011;25:102–11.Google Scholar

5. Indeed, this clip demonstrates that survival is possible: Russian daredevil stunts. 9 News.com; available at http://news.ninemsn.com.au/world/2013/11/20/11/15/russian-daredevil-stunts (last accessed 22 May 2014).

6. They say, “The moral normalcy that Agar appeals to (his example of it is, incredibly, Joseph Stalin) is far from good enough.” See Persson I, Savulescu J. Reply to commentators on Unfit for the Future. Journal of Medical Ethics 2014 Jan 10; available at http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2014/01/10/medethics-2013-101796.full (last accessed 5 Nov 2014).

7. For a prominent recent presentation of this response, see Greene, J. Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them. London: Penguin Press; 2013.Google Scholar

8. Indeed, this is how Tom Douglas uses them. See Douglas, T.Moral enhancement. Journal of Applied Philosophy 2008;25:228–45.Google Scholar