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Doing Good, Choosing Freely: How Moral Enhancement Can Be Compatible with Individual Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2018

JOSHUA M. BROSTOFF
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Abstract:

Moral enhancement has been accused of curtailing human freedoms. In this article, I suggest the opposite: moral enhancement and individual freedom can go hand in hand. The first section defines freedom, enhancement, and morality and argues that only a naturalistic account of morality allows for the concept of enhancement. The second section looks at ways that freedom may be threatened by moral enhancement, especially by the method of implementation, the creation of new externalities, or the limitation of volitional options. I argue that virtue ethics offers the safest model for moral enhancement. The third section describes ways in which moral enhancement can be achieved while maintaining, or even increasing, individual freedom. Such methods include shifting of the moral axis, replacing vicious options with virtuous ones, and increasing the number of volitional options available. The article concludes in the fourth section by arguing that the technology and techniques that allow us moral enhancement are likely to be the same ones that allow greater freedom than we already enjoy.

Keywords

moral enhancementfreedommoralityvirtue ethics
Type
Articles
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 27 , Special Issue 4: Clinical Neuroethics , October 2018 , pp. 698 - 709
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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