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Disability, Harm, and the Origins of Limited Opportunities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2013

SIMO VEHMAS  and
TOM SHAKESPEARE
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Abstract

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Type
Special Section: Rationality, Morality, and Disability
Information
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 41 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

Notes

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