That eminent Law Lord, Lord Asquith, now, alas, no longer with us, was somewhat apologetic in comparing legal doctrines of Causation with those as he saw them of science and philosophy. I venture to question if there is any occasion for apology. The different sciences have developed in their own many ways in their efforts to satisfy the needs of human thought which have called them into life; this is particularly true of their treatment of what is called the relation of cause and effect. Lord Asquith truly said that “ the philosophic doctrine of causation and the juridical doctrine of responsibility for the consequences of a negligent act diverge.” They are dealing with different problems and the solutions must differ. Certainly the solutions or explanations propounded by philosophers, scientists and lawyers are different from what is after all a relative and empirical problem. Law in particular has no reason to blush for the results of its age-long efforts.

The great South African case of Harris v. Minister of the Interior will have turned the thoughts of many lawyers to the subject of legal sovereignty. Under English law the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament, “ the dominant characteristic of our political institutions,” is supposed to be something very simple and clear—and so indeed it appears in its classic exposition in the pages of Dicey. But the classic exposition is now widely controverted; an example may be taken from the recent remark of the Lord President of the Court of Session

Textbooks on tort begin with the trite proposition that the commission of a tort requires a duty, breach of that duty and, generally, damage. In the tort of negligence, we are told, the duty is a duty of care. The usual way in which this is formulated is that if you can foresee that your conduct is likely to affect a given person, there arises the duty to take care that your conduct does not injure him. The idea seems to be taking root in Roman-Dutch law as well, which is remarkable in view of its Civil law origin. A good deal of controversy has arisen as to whether the notion of the duty of care is necessary or not. It is here suggested that the differences of opinion are reconcilable, but in order to do that we must examine the place which the duty of care occupies in negligence, both in English law and in Roman-Dutch law, since much comment on English law has been forthcoming from the latter quarter and comparison will be instructive. The basis of the proposed reconciliation is that the duty of care is a hybrid notion, combining a question of law and of fact, a dichotomy which is apparent in the language of judges and writers. Those who seek to defend its utility seem mindful of the element of law in it, while those who attack it are thinking of the element of fact. In order to elucidate these elements it is necessary to analyse the tort of negligence. This article will be confined to the examination of the legal element. It will be helpful to begin by appreciating what is meant by the “tort of negligence.”

Although the rules of international law relating to the acquisition of title to territory have long been substantially clearer than most rules of international law, this clarity has to some extent been obscured by the efforts of writers to make them clearer still. The clarity of the rules is due to the circumstance that this branch of international law—unlike some branches—is one on which international tribunals have frequently been called upon to pronounce. It has, in fact, been elucidated to an unusual degree by a relatively small number of recent and authoritative judgments. The obscurity arises from the fact that the terms and classifications traditionally employed by the writers have not to any great extent been followed by the courts in modern times. No comprehensive attempt to overhaul the traditional doctrine on the subject in the light of the recent decisions seems so far to have been made.

Measures, such as weights, were used in the Roman law of sale for two purposes, (a) to determine the amount of the price of a given lot, and (b) to separate the object of sale from a larger bulk. Weights which are heavier than they should be always operate in favour of the buyer, while weights which are too light always benefit the seller. But it is here suggested that this fact has tended to blur the distinction between the two cases which ought to be considered separately, and that consequently there has been some confusion in the interpretation of certain texts, dealing with the effect of false measures.