Section I shows that the idea, founded on the “principle of legality”, that all legal flaws make a decision void as a matter of law is erroneous. Infringing a legal requirement may not affect validity, or may make a decision only voidable. Section II shows the significance of distinctions between various stages of decision-making processes, and between different types of issues for judges, and argues that case law shows that seven guiding principles operate alongside the “principle of legality”. Section III concludes that these common-law principles reflect professional practice and provide a realistic basis for predictable, normatively legitimate administrative law.

It is five years since Lord Hoffmann delivered the advice of the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd. In that landmark decision, Lord Hoffmann assimilated contractual interpretation and implication with the result that when implying a term in fact the court must ask a single question: “is that what the instrument, read as a whole against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?” It might have been thought that five years was enough time for the English courts to come to terms with this approach. Belize is regularly cited in the courts, but the judges appear to struggle with its application. There remains uncertainty as to the roles (if any) to be afforded to the traditional “business efficacy” and “officious bystander” tests, and the requirement of “necessity”. This article seeks to re-evaluate Belize five years on. It concludes that Belize provides a doctrinally coherent and workable basis for identifying and giving effect to the intention of the parties through the implication of terms. However, the article questions whether it remains necessary, or even helpful, to continue to make reference to tests based on “business efficacy” or the “officious bystander”, as the tests distract from the central idea advanced by Lord Hoffmann and have led to uncertainty in its application.

Although English privacy law has developed significantly over the past two decades, it continues to focus almost exclusively on the disclosure of private or confidential information. This article argues that if privacy is to be comprehensively protected, then the importance of physical privacy – which is breached when a person is looked at, listened to or recorded against his or her wishes – must also be recognised. After discussing what physical privacy is and why existing protections for it are inadequate, the author contends that a physical privacy action can, and should, be developed from within English common law.

The Children and Families Act 2014 pursues the twin policies of increasing the number of children adopted out of compulsory state care and reducing the scope for court-ordered contact between such children and their birth families. Building upon previous work by Dr. Kirsty Hughes and me, this paper critically evaluates these reforms to post-adoption contact in view of the fact that adoption terminates the legal relationship of parent and child. Aspects of the analysis include the impact of the proposals on “open adoption” and child welfare in the light of the available empirical evidence, and their compatibility with both the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

In recent years two views have developed as to the efficacy of prohibitions on the assignment of contractual rights. One view, “the property view”, dictates that such prohibitions characterise contractual rights as choses in action and robs them of their transferable nature. Another view, “the contract view”, dictates that such prohibitions operate only at the level of contract and cannot prevent the equitable assignment of the benefit of a contract. Both views have judicial and academic support. The view that is ultimately adopted will have important implications for contract drafting and the law of assignment. This paper explains both views and puts forward an argument for adopting the property view.