The legislature gives effect to the values of democracy and compromise in a pluralist society, but the legislation it produces is mediated in its application by the values inherent in the legal culture into which it is received. The judges complete the law promulgated by Parliament by applying it. In articulating the common law also, the judges act within the bounds of objective standards supplied by legal and political traditions, with a limited legislative role. The legislative role of the judges in applying statutes has been enhanced by the interpretive obligations applicable in areas where EU and ECHR law operates.

The tribunals system in England and Wales has been transformed by the entry into force of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007; among other things, tribunals are now located more firmly and explicitly than ever before within the judicial branch. Questions concerning the relationship between tribunals and regular courts fall to be confronted afresh within this new institutional landscape. Those questions form the focus of this article, which is particularly concerned with the issue recently considered by the Supreme Court in Cart whether, and if so to what extent, decisions taken within the tribunals system (by the Upper Tribunal) should be susceptible to judicial review by the High Court. In Cart, emphasis was placed upon the concept of “proportionate dispute resolution” as a means by which to delimit regular courts' oversight of tribunals' decisions, raising fundamental questions both of legal doctrine (relating to the relevance of the orthodox doctrinal tools of administrative law) and legal policy (concerning the degree of error on the part of a tribunal that a higher court should tolerate in the interests of the efficient, or proportionate, use of judicial resources).

Although rare, giving birth in secret or in concealed circumstances still happens in the United Kingdom. The new born child's existence is unknown to his or her biological ‘father’ and or to the wider biological family of the birth giver who wishes to place the child for adoption without his or her existence being revealed to them. Legal decisions need to be made judicially when a local authority seeks orders as to whether it is required to make further inquiries to identify and notify the biological father and or wider biological family as to any forthcoming adoption proceedings. Developments in European human rights law's protection of a right to respect one's private life provided by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) towards a right to personal autonomy, identity and integrity can be interpreted in different ways. However, three positions are argued here to guard against an erosion of women's confidentiality and privacy in these circumstances. First, women's choices of concealment should be accepted with respect rather than perceived as inauthentic and therefore impermissible; this is in keeping with Article 2's right to life and Article 8's right to personal autonomy and integrity. Second, the right to family life protected by Article 8 of any wider biological family and father is not contravened by allowing women to give birth discreetly. Third, openness and transparency, when it comes to exact knowledge of one's parents in this context is not necessary for a child's identity rights, which are also protected by Article 8's right to personal identity, to be legally protected.

Several recent cases have highlighted the range of legal controls that can be applied to expression on social networks and other amateur digital content. This article identifies three trends in the regulation of digital communications. First, such communications are subject to a wide range of laws, including those primarily regulating the mass media, public order and targeted communications. Second, the persistence and searchability of digital messages make such communications more likely to come to the attention of litigators and prosecutors. Thirdly, that the established approach to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR tends to protect speech that is deemed to be of “high value”, and therefore does little to protect much internet content. This article calls for some greater protection to be afforded to communications that are casual and amateur. The freedom to converse outlined in this article does not call for absolute protection, but seeks to ensure that any controls on expression are proportionate. In particular, alternatives to the criminal law are considered.

The modern legal framework for the protection of the mentally ill was conceived and developed in the nineteenth century. A substantial growth in the numbers of the mentally ill revealed an absence of effective and accessible legal protection for the property of patients with small estates. This challenge was met through the retention and reform of the ancient jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in the Lunacy Court as the sole instrument of protection. The judicial solution was adopted in preference to bureaucratic regulation, despite the strong forces of state intervention and the reform of the legal system and its processes.

EU ‘general clauses’ on fairness offer significant potential for improved consumer protection. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the unfair terms general clause and a related provision by reference to an underlying ethic of self interest and self reliance'; and the same approach is possible under the unfair practices general clauses. This is a significant threat to consumer protection. A more protective ethic may be intended at EU level; and a particular line of argument may be needed to persuade the Supreme Court of this.