IT IS now 18 years since the Law Commission Report which led to the introduction of the reformed R.S.C., Order 53,1 the procedure which still governs all applications for judicial review in England and Wales. The Law Commission has now returned to the field with its 1994 Report entitled Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals.2 During the interval between the two reports, judicial review has undergone enormous change in terms of both thequantity of claims brought3 and the substantive and adjectival developments in the jurisprudence. Moreover, important additions to the reform agenda have been made from a variety of sources.4 The Law Commission's latest contribution could thus hardly be better timed.

Barclays Bank p.l.c. v, O'Brien1CIBC Mortgages p.l.c.v. Pitt2presented the House of Lords with an opportunity to consider when a creditor should be prevented from eforcing a transaction against a person who entered int it as a result of the undue influence or misreprentation of another. Lord Browne-Wilkinson's declared objective was to restate the law on this point “in a form which is principled, reflects the current requirements of society and provides as much certainty as possible”.3 Whether he achieved these three aims is a question on which commentators disagree. According to one, his Lordship proved himself “a master of the judicial art”4 by achieving all three.5 Another has argued that his judgments “may give rise to as much confusion as this difficult area has already witnessed”6 and that, in his efforts to attain the second of his goals, he overlooked the first and the third.

A plaintiff who is deprived of a thing might seek out that very thing in order to assert his rights. The victim of a car thief tries to find the car. This is a natural response to such a misfortune, although it is not necessarily a fruitful one. Alternatively, the plaintiff might find that the original thing has been used to acquire some new asset: for example, the thief has swapped the car for a motorcycle. In that case, especially if for some reason the plaintiff will be unlikely or unable to establish a claim in relation to the car, the plaintiff might choose to assert a claim in relation to the motorcycle.

HILLEL STEINER'S book An Essay on Rights1 proposes and develops an intriguing suggestion: that we should approach the discussion of justice at “the elementary particle level”. “The elementary particles of justice” Steiner tells us “are rights”:

Rights are the items which are created and parcelled out by justice principles. We learn something about justice by examining the formal or characteristic features of rights. These features constrain the possible content of justice principles in much the same sense as architectural precepts must be informed by the properties of the construction materials they orchestrate.2

THE privilege against self-incrimination has always attracted controversy. Legal historians continue to disagree over its origins,1 and its justification has been keenly debated ever since Bentham's famous attack on it as a misguided concession to the guilty.2 This debate has recently entered a new and critical phase as the result of diametrically opposed developments by, on the one hand, the courts and legislature in England and, on the other, by the institutions of the European Convention of Human Rights.