This article uses Atiyah and Summer's categorisation of the attributes of formal legal reasoning in Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law to examine the type of legal reasoning process used by the courts in England and Wales when determining the second stage of vicarious liability. The analysis shows that, although remaining formal in nature, the shift away from the Salmond test has resulted in a shift in the type of form used by the courts. It is suggested that future guidance issued by the Supreme Court to lower courts when determining the second stage of vicarious liability needs to take account of this change for the guidance to be effective.

Leading cases show Quistclose trusts being used by companies nearing insolvency. Their use in this context raises serious normative problems: it may prefer the beneficiary to the company's other creditors, and creates a misleading impression that trust funds are in fact free of trust. Building on the emergent normative literature on Quistclose trusts, we first examine which Quistclose trusts are currently allowed under company law and the law of corporate insolvency. We then discuss the normative question as to which Quistclose trusts should be allowed, given the principles of these branches of the law.

The literature on the identification of rules of customary international law is extensive. Commentators have focused on isolating the methodologies by which international courts and tribunals identify customary international law, with most of the debate revolving around the use of induction, or deduction and assertion as methods of custom identification. However, the existing literature has overlooked that the choice among custom identification methodologies takes place behind closed doors, during confidential deliberation processes. When all that scholars see may be deduction or assertion, international courts and tribunals may have ascertained the existence of customary rules by induction, but induction may not have made it into the final text of the decision. This article elaborates on the impact of judicial deliberations at the International Court of Justice on the choice among custom identification methodologies. It argues that individual-driven stages of deliberations favour custom identification by induction, while collegial stages promote custom identification by non-inductive methodologies.

Professor Goode once observed that “Novation need not be left to ad hoc agreement; it is open to the parties to provide for it in advance and in particular to establish a contractual mechanism by which novation takes place automatically on the occurrence of a designated act or event”. This deceptively straightforward proposition is examined in the present article. It explores the legal footing for, and the risks in adopting a pristine version of, the proposition, and considers possible safeguards that may be incorporated within the process of scrutiny, if in any case there arises concern over the effectiveness of a novation that is undertaken pursuant to consent given in advance.

Clear understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) usage risks and how they are being addressed is needed, which requires proper and adequate corporate disclosure. We advance a legal framework for AI Fairness Reporting to which companies can and should adhere on a comply-or-explain basis. We analyse the sources of unfairness arising from different aspects of AI models and the disparities in the performance of machine learning systems. We evaluate how the machine learning literature has sought to address the problem of unfairness through the use of different fairness metrics. We then put forward a nuanced and viable framework for AI Fairness Reporting comprising: (1) disclosure of all machine learning models usage; (2) disclosure of fairness metrics used and the ensuing trade-offs; (3) disclosure of de-biasing methods used; and (d) release of datasets for public inspection or for third-party audit. We then apply this reporting framework to two case studies.

Contemporary liberal accounts of free expression are almost exclusively preoccupied with the permissible exercises of state power. Influenced by this framing, free expression guarantees under the ECHR, as well as the US and German Constitutions, focus on protecting a private sphere from state interference: what happens within that sphere is only of peripheral concern. This approach is deeply unsatisfactory, especially given the significant threats emanating from private social media platforms that shape the conditions under which individuals may express themselves online. The article argues that we should take private platforms seriously as a source of significant threats, without abandoning the distinction between private actors and the state. Private platforms that are generally open to the public should have obligations to uphold free speech in their contractual relationship to users under certain conditions: if they are structurally dominant, make arbitrary decisions or significantly impact a user's societal participation.