The case of Re Rose, Rose v. I.R.C. is a well-known authority for the significance of the last act; equity treats a gift as complete where the donor has done all in his power to divest himself of the property, and to vest it in the transferees. The Court of Appeal followed a first instance decision, Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co., Ltd. v. Rose, whose similar name was purely coincidental. In the earlier case, the unusual provisions of a will made it necessary for one Hook to argue that the transfer of preference shares had taken effect prior to the death of the testator. Jenkins J. held that it had, although registration of the transfer by the directors did not occur until later, because the testator had done all he could to transfer the shares before his death. Midland Bank v. Rose was approved, obiter, by Lord Wilberforce in Vandervell v. I.R.C. In Mascall v. Mascall, it was expressly argued that Rose v. I.R.C. was wrongly decided, but the authority of the earlier Court of Appeal decision was upheld, so there is little doubt that what has been called “the Rule in Re Rose” is correct.

In its recent report on privity of contract the Law Commission considered, inter alia, whether reform of section 11 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 should be entertained at this time. The title of that Act is somewhat misleading but in essence section 11 provides that a life assurance policy on the life of a man or woman for the expressed benefit of his/her spouse and or children, creates a trust in favour of the named spouse or child. Thus the beneficial interest in the policy never forms part of the assured's estate, which result may be of particular importance to the beneficiary in the event of the assured's insolvency because by section 283 of the Insolvency Act 1986 trust assets are expressly excluded from the bankrupt's estate capable of vesting in the trustee in bankruptey and thereafter being available for distribution to creditors.

There is a growing literature concerning the role of the ultra vires doctrine and its place within administrative law. For some the doctrine is the central principle of administrative law, without which judicial intervention would rest on uncertain foundations. For others, it constitutes at best a harmless fiction, which is incapable of explaining all instances of judicial intervention, and at worst a device which allows the judiciary to conceal the real justifications for developments in judicial review. Christopher Forsyth falls into the former camp. He has written a vigorous defence of the ultra vires principle, contending that “it remains vital to the developed law of judicial review”. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate on this issue by putting the opposing view. The article will be divided into four sections.

The devastating impact that psychiatric illness can have on people's lives is beyond dispute. It would be absurd to contend that such harm is somehow intrinsically less serious than physical injury; indeed, over many years, medical research has pointed to the artificiality of characterising it as lacking physical manifestations. Its destructive potential is brought into sharper focus as mental attributes become ever more integral to everyday functioning. Yet, to this day, neither popular nor judicial opinion is noticeably receptive to a cause of action based on proof of a “recognised psychiatric disorder”, which is still often trivialised by the label “nervous shock”. This negative attitude is most apparent when claimants are not, or are not regarded as, the direct victims of someone else's conduct. The very notion of compensating people whose suffering derives from their reaction to the injuring of others often evokes surprise, indignation and disdain.