Prosecutions for the crime of blasphemy are rare. But one which took place recently in London has elicited from the Home Secretary an utterance which is of interest and of importance.

Mr. President and Gentlemen,—You make me feel a little shy. When I somewhat incontinently accepted your kind invitation I wholly forgot that I was a Judge of the Privy Council. Thank heaven, I have no written address to deliver, and I am informed that there are no reporters present. But even that does not free me from embarrassment. I have under-taken to speak to you tonight of the position of the Judicial Committee in the Constitution of the Empire, and I have to remember that we who sit on the Judicial Committee have taken a tremendous oath not to disclose any of the secrets that come to the fore there; and I have also to consider that it was only this very morning that at half-past ten, in the absence of the Lord Chancellor, who is frequently called away at this moment on other business, I was sitting to dispose of the list in that Court, presiding as the senior remaining ex-Lord Chancellor. Well, we finished the list at eleven, and I went over to sit on the Woolsack at the House of Lords, which I occupied till a ' quarter to four, when public business made it necessary that I should adjourn the tribunal a little early. I did not say why, and my unsuspecting colleagues acquiesced. Now, gentlemen, you will see why I have something of the sense of the boy who comes to tell tales out of school. However, let us begin.

Looked at with respect to subject-matter these two books are more truly two parts of one work, the former being the historical introduction and the latter the dogmatic and critical exposition of the present law. Indeed they were intended originally to be one volume and separation resulted from inclusion of the historical portion in the Cambridge Studies in English Legal History, to which the dogmatic and critical portion, perhaps with excess of scrupulousness, was thought inappropriate. It must be said, however, that the line has been drawn skilfully between the two volumes and those who have occasion to use the second for practical purposes may very likely prefer the arrangement as it stands.

There have been, and are, good manuals of Roman law in plenty which might seem to render superfluous the publication of yet another. But, after all, they are foreign, sind what is more (ranitas canitatum!) however carefully later researches are digested in successive editions, there are changes of point of view which cannot be adopted in this fashion. What one may look for in a new manual is, besides a synthesis of recent work, the specification which that work lias undergone in the author's mind, also his general point of view and the special qualities which give his work individuality.

The publication of a new edition of the late Professor Oppenheim's second volume on International Law, which deals with “War and Neutrality,” will raise in some minds the question as to the applicability of the maxim inter arma silent leges. If it be true, how can there be a law and laws of war?

In an article on “Contributory Negligence” in the January number of the Law Quarterly Review, the learned writer, Lord Justice O'Connor, draws attention to the state of confusion which a study of recent cases reveals as reigning with regard to this subject, and concludes by suggesting that the bare question should be put to the jury, “Whose fault was it?”. This article is not intended as a criticism of that thesis. But if the condition of principle is such that experience suggests its total abandonment, it is surely high time that Theory bestirred herself. The following observations constitute an attempt to apply the current formula to a particular class of cases—those namely which may be described as collision and running down cases—with the intention of showing that the formula does adequately cover the cases.