The centenary of the Cambridge Law Journal represents an important milestone not only for the Journal itself but for the Faculty of Law at Cambridge. As the current Chair of the Faculty Board of Law, it is an honour and a great pleasure to have the opportunity to write the preface to this special issue, in which we celebrate a hundred years of outstanding legal scholarship by republishing – and offering contemporary reflections stimulated by – a series of seminal articles that have featured in the Journal.

It is a remarkable achievement for anyone to be celebrating their 100th birthday, and the Cambridge Law Journal must be one of the few legal journals anywhere to have done so. In this, its 100th year of publication, the Journal continues to enjoy a global reputation, and every congratulation must go to all the editors and contributors over the period of its publication, not to forget the publishers.

This introductory essay reviews the history of the Journal, divided into two stages: the period from 1921 to 1953; and that from 1954 to today. It examines the changing institutional arrangements, personnel, as well as some of the highlights in the content of the Journal. If there is a theme, it is that the Journal was established by and developed its reputation because of the efforts of many of the outstanding scholars at Cambridge who over the decades offered the outputs of their talents to the Journal; and that the Journal has used that reputation more and more to attract the scholars outside Cambridge – indeed from all over the world. Whatever the aims of those who established the Cambridge Law Journal in 1921, and without much self-consciousness, the Journal incrementally acquired the status and practices of a learned journal. Finally, the essay reflects on the future, in particular the challenges of digitisation, open access and inclusivity.

Tunc's inaugural lecture “Tort Law and the Moral Law” in 1972 aimed to set out the moral foundations of tort liability in common law and French law. It triggered exchanges in this Journal with Hamson who challenged Tunc's views. This article explores the context of the debate and then reviews the subsequent developments of English and French law. Both systems have continued on the same path as the protagonists set out in their debate with France deepening its grounding in social solidarity as a justification for tort liability while English law sees its place only in state action or private charity.

Glanville Williams's influential 1989 article on causation, “Finis for Novus Actus?”, addressed two pertinent questions: (1) when, and on what grounds, may a person be judged to bear causal responsibility for harms most immediately brought about by the subsequent action of another person (the locus classicus of the novus actus interveniens doctrine), and (2) how should questions of causation be resolved in cases where the potential cause in question constitutes an omission? This article revisits these questions through an engagement with some of the major causation cases decided in the criminal courts in the past decade. The discussion of these cases is set in the broader context of a critique of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré's influential doctrinal-theoretical framework for findings of legal causation, the autonomy doctrine, on which Williams had built his arguments.

John Baker's “English Law and the Renaissance” is perhaps the most significant paper in English legal history to appear in the Cambridge Law Journal. In many ways it was a response to, and development from, F. W. Maitland's Rede Lecture with the same title, published some 80 years previously. Baker's paper marks a punctuation in his study of English law under the early Tudors, a subject which he has made his own, culminating in his magisterial sixth volume of The Oxford History of the Laws of England. In addition, it marked a major break with the earlier orthodoxy that English law in this period was fundamentally distinct from the law which was developing on the European continent. The present paper explores both of these themes.

This article surveys Tony Weir's case notes and book reviews for the Cambridge Law Journal between 1963 and 2002 in order to illuminate Tony's unique genius as a legal academic and thinker. Reading Tony's case notes and book reviews reveals that he cannot be characterised as either a “lumper” (someone who seeks to reduce the law down to a few elemental ideas and concepts) or as a “splitter” (someone who resists such a reduction). Instead, Tony's genius lay in his possessing the Keatsian quality of “negative capability”. This quality allowed Tony to be both a lumper and a splitter at the same time, refusing to identify himself definitively with either way of thinking about the law.

As part of the Cambridge Law Journal's centenary celebrations, this article reads two essays from the journal's 50th anniversary issue. The essays, by Cambridge professors Robert Jennings and Derek Bowett offer resources for the history of international law and its historiography. They shine a light on key debates on the law of the sea at a crucial moment of its development. A close reading of these essays also reveals starting points for new scrutiny of an “English” tradition of international law, including the place of the academy within the tradition, its blueprints for the future of international law and international legal order, and its relation to empire and capitalism.

This article takes as its starting point three ground-breaking articles by Len Sealy in the 1960s, and examines their lasting impact on the modern law of fiduciaries. It includes a detailed consideration of the modern tendency to describe rather than define fiduciaries; it critiques the current readiness to merge fiduciaries with other power-holders, thus ignoring the significant differences between the duties of loyalty in issue in the two contexts; and finally it evaluates and defends the modern approach to fiduciary remedies, especially equitable compensation.

In “The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations” Forsyth argued that English law should protect substantive legitimate expectations. However, he was concerned that too great an expansion of legitimate expectations could lead to incoherence and intuitive decision-making. I argue that recent case law, and Forsyth's analysis, have clarified some of these inconsistencies. Nevertheless, the doctrine of legitimate expectations stands at a crossroads. Should it adopt a rules-based approach and narrow legitimate expectations, or a principled approach that embraces a broader conception? I argue that English law needs both for legitimate expectations effectively to balance legal certainty and substantive equality.