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Similar Facts—Makin Out?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

Peter Mirfield
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Extract

It is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that Lord Herschell's famous statement in Makin of the law relating to similar fact evidence was and is valueless, that it continues to exert a baneful influence both upon the cases and upon much of the academic commentary on them, and that it is overdue for commitment to the scrapheap. The essence of my argument is that English law does not, in truth, regard reasoning from disposition as illegitimate. Hence, there is no negative principle from which positive exceptions need to be carved out and no rational basis for applying different law according to whether or not the prosecution seeks to place reliance on the nature of the accused's disposition. An attempt will be made to explain why, even after Lords Wilberforce and Cross had, in identifying some or all of these truths in Boardman, made the crucial “intellectual breakthrough,” they have not been grasped by the rest of the judiciary.

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Articles
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , March 1987 , pp. 83 - 105
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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1987

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References

1 [1894] A.C. 57.

2 [1975] A.C. 421.

3 Hoffman (1975) 91 L.Q.R. 193, at p. 193. It will become apparent to the reader how much I have been influenced by this most important and illuminating article.

4 [1894] A.C. 57, at p. 65.

5 Ibid.

6 See [1975] A.C. 421, p. 453.

7 Ducsharm [1957] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 732, considered infra p. 92, is a good example of the failure of a court to appreciate this point.

8 (1956) 40 Cr.App.R. 8.

9 Ibid., p. 11.

10 (1939) 27 Cr.App.R. 139.

11 (1865) Le. and Ca. 520. See also Redgrave (1981) 74 Cr.App.R. 10. But cf. Williamson (1807) 3 C and P. 635.

12 Ibid., p. 529, where Cockburn C.J., who gave the leading judgment for the majority, very clearly states this to be the case.

13 See the discussion of Mustafa, infra, pp. 86–87.

14 (1978) 67 Cr.App.R. 235.

15 Cross on Evidence, 6th ed., by , Tapper (1985), p. 321Google Scholar.

16 (1915) 11 Cr.App.R. 229. Other examples are Barrington [1981] 1 W.L.R. 419 and Reading [1966] 1 W.L.R. 836.

17 (1976) 65 Cr.App.R. 26.

18 Allan so regards the case—see (1985) 48 M.L.R. 253, at p. 270.

19 (1976) 65 Cr.App.R. 26, at p. 30.

20 See ibid, p. 30.

21 Moreover, it is argued infra, pp. 96–102, that it is not the case that the special exclusionary rule applies only where the prosecution relies upon the accused's disposition to behave in a particular bad manner.

22 [1975] A.C. 421, at pp. 456–457.

23 [1952] 2 Q.B. 911.

24 [1975] A.C. 421, at p. 442.

25 Ibid., pp. 456–457.

26 Ibid., p. 438.

27 Ibid., p. 453.

28 Ibid., p. 461.

29 Ibid., p. 441.

30 Ibid., p. 454.

31 Ibid., p. 462.

32 (1976) 65 Cr.App.R. 16.

33 The court finally decided that it ought not to have been admitted because the accused's defence was that the rape with which he was charged must have been carried out by someone else, and there was no satisfactory evidence identifying him as the person who had committed the other rape. Cf. Butler (1986), considered infra, pp. 103–104.

34 (1975) 62 Cr.App.R. 118.

35 [1918] A.C. 221.

36 (1982) 76 Cr.App.R. 33, strongly criticised by Carter (1985) 48 M.L.R. 29.

37 (1982) 76 Cr.App.R. 33, at p. 35.

38 [1956] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 732.

39 Ibid., p. 735.

40 Op. cit., n. 15, supra, pp. 325–329. See also Tapper's important essay in Well and Truly Tried, eds. , Campbell and , Waller, 1982Google Scholar.

41 (1975) 62 Cr.App.R. 118.

42 Ibid., p. 121.

43 Downes (1981), Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) No. 1471/B2/80, briefly reported [1981] Crim.L.R. 174.

44 Chee [1980] V.R. 303.

45 Perry (1982) 44 A.L.R. 449.

46 (1977) 65 Cr.App.R. 125.

47 (1977) 65 Cr.App.R. 276.

48 (1977) 65 Cr.App.R. 304.

49 (1977) 67 Cr.App.R. 143.

50 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 419.

51 See, in particular, Noor Mohamed [1949] A.C. 182 and Harris [1952] A.C. 694.

52 [1980] A.C. 402.

53 [1975] A.C. 421. at p. 445.

54 Op. cit., n.15, supra, pp. 339–340.

55 Helpful discussion of the possible meanings of “discretion” is to be found in , Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977, pp. 31–33Google Scholar, and in , Pattenden, The Judge, Discretion and the Criminal Trial, 1982, pp. 3–10Google Scholar.

56 Op cit., n. 15, supra, p. 340.

57 On which see Weinberg, “Multiple Counts and Similar Fact Evidence” in Well and Truly Tried, op. cit., n.40, supra.

58 (1977) 65 Cr.App.R. 125, at p. 135.

59 (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 453.

60 [1975] A.C. 421, at p. 463.

61 Ibid., p. 453.

62 See Allan (1985) 48 M.L.R. 253, at p. 265. See also Cross, op. cit., n.15, supra, at p. 339.

63 Clear examples are Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr.App.R. 26, Scarrott (1977) 65 Cr.App.R. 125, Barrington [1981] 1 W.L.R. 419, Downes (1981), Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) No. 1471/B2/80, Lewis (1982) 76 Cr.App.R. 33 and Butler (1986), Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) No. 5219/C/85 (full transcript through LEXIS).

64 (1985) 48 M.L.R. 253.

65 Op. cit., n.15, supra, p. 342.

66 [1975] A.C. 421, at p. 452.

67 Ibid., pp. 461–463.

68 Cross, op. cit., n.15, supra, p. 334.

69 Loc cit., n.18, supra, pp. 254–255.

70 [1911] A.C. 47.

71 Loc. cit., n.18, supra, p. 261.

72 Loc. cit., n.18, supra, p. 270.

73 Loc. cit., n.18, supra, p. 263.

74 Loc. cit., n.18, supra, pp. 255, 261.

75 [1975] A.C. 421, at p. 457.

76 Op. cit., n.15, supra, p. 321.

77 (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 453.

78 Op. cit., n.15, supra, p. 342.

79 Loc. cit.. n.18, supra, p. 262, where Allen states that “[t]he notion of the balancing exercise is appropriate only when no reliance is placed on the defendant's disposition.”

80 See, e.g., Allan, loc. cit., n.18, supra, pp. 271–272.

81 Cf. the comments of Carter [1985] Crim.L.R. 143. at pp. 145–146, in the context of corroboration.

82 Considered supra, p. 92.

83 Cross, op. cit., n.15, supra, p. 327.

84 A possibility canvassed in Mackie (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 453, at p. 464, and referred to in Cross, op. cit., n.15, supra, p. 328.

85 (1978) 67 Cr.App.R. 239.

86 [1981] 1 W.L.R. 419, at p. 429.

87 (1982) 76 Cr.App.R. 33.

88 (1986) 83 Cr.App.R. 7 Cf. Williams, The Times, 28 October 1986.

89 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) No. 5219/C/85 (full transcript through LEXIS), reported in The Times, 24 June 1986.

90 Per Sir Ralph Kilner Brown.

91 See , Archbold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases, 42nd. ed. 1985Google Scholar, ch.13 and Phipson on Evidence, 13th. ed. 1982, ch.12.

92 See [1975] Crim.L.R. 62.

93 (1975) 91 L.Q.R. 193, at p. 193.