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MAKING SENSE OF MESNE PROFITS: CAUSES OF ACTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2021

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Abstract

The article examines a series of cases spanning a 250-year period in which the courts have awarded “mesne profits” against defendants who have occupied claimants’ land. The article argues (1) that various causes of action are disclosed by the facts of cases in which such awards have been made, (2) that these causes of action have changed as the law of obligations has evolved, (3) that modern courts often do not consider what causes of action are disclosed by the facts of “mesne profits cases”, (4) that this is unfortunate because practical consequences can flow from categorising the cases in one way or another and (5) that the resolution of future “mesne profits cases” will become more just and more transparent when it is understood that their facts may variously disclose causes of action in tort, contract or unjust enrichment.

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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2021

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Footnotes

*

Q.C. (Hon.), F.B.A., Professor of Law, University College London.

**

Fellow and Tutor in Law at Trinity College, Oxford and Associate Professor of Property Law, Oxford University. For their comments on drafts, we thank the anonymous CLJ referees, Toby Boncey, Jessica Hudson, Ben McFarlane and members of the Oxford Property Law Discussion Group. For her research assistance, we thank Neeva Desai. Address for Correspondence: Trinity College, Oxford, OX1 3BH. Email: [email protected].

References

1 Dunn v Large (1783) 99 E.R. 683 (K.B.).

2 Sydney Local Health District v Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty. Ltd. [2020] NSWCA 274, at [89]–[93].

3 Saunders, J.S., The Law of Pleading and Evidence in Civil Actions (London 1828)Google Scholar, vol. 2, 670. See too Goodtitle v Tombs (1770) 95 E.R. 965 (K.B.) (and note Wilmot C.J.’s description of the general damages recoverable in actions for mesne profits at 967: “You have turned me out of possession, ... therefore I desire to be paid the damages to the value of the mesne profits which I lost thereby”); Symonds v Page (1830) 148 E.R. 1322 (Ex.); Bramley v Chesterton (1857) 140 E.R. 548 (C.P.).

4 See e.g. Ramzan v Brookwide Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 985, [2011] 2 P. & C.R. 22, at [44]; Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd. v Handy [2015] EWHC 1175 (T.C.C.), at [32].

5 As in e.g. Viscount Chelsea v Hutchinson (1996) 28 H.L.R. 17 (C.A.); Graves v Graves [2007] EWCA Civ 660, [2008] H.L.R. 10; Bindra v Chopra [2008] EWHC 1715 (Ch), [2008] 3 F.C.R. 341.

6 (1993) 66 P. & C.R. 195, 201 (C.A.). See too Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 278 (H.L.).

7 (1996) 72 P. & C.R. 9, 13 (Ch.).

8 By the Civil Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 55A, rule 55.3, para. 1.5.

9 The form is published online: “Particulars of Claim for Possession”, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/732257/n119_web_0818_save.pdf (last accessed 5 December 2020).

10 C. Mitchell and L. Rostill, “Making Sense of Mesne Profits: Remedies” (forthcoming).

11 Two other claims can also lie in cases of overholding after the termination of a lease, both of some antiquity but both still with us: a claim for “double value” under section 1 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1730 and a claim for “double rent” under section 18 of the Distress for Rent Act 1737. These have not been assimilated with “claims for mesne profits” and therefore fall outside the scope of our discussion.

12 For an influential statement of this “continuity thesis” see Gardner, J., “What Is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 There is an ongoing scholarly debate about the basis on which awards of “mesne profits” are assessed when these are made as a remedy for the tort of trespass. We engage with this debate in our second article, although this is also concerned with other topics, including the basis on which “mesne profits” are assessed when awarded as a means of giving effect to a contractual promise to pay for the use of land, or as restitution for unjust enrichment.

14 E.g. Birch v Wright (1786) 99 E.R. 1148 (K.B.).

15 E.g. Wilkins v Wingate (1794) 101 E.R. 436 (K.B.); King v Fraser (1805) 102 E.R. 1320 (K.B.); Smith v Eldridge (1854) 139 E.R. 412 (C.P.); Bayley v Bradley (1884) 136 E.R. 932 (C.P.).

16 E.g. Wood v Newton (1746) 95 E.R. 538 (K.B.); Boot v Wilson (1807) 103 E.R. 360 (K.B.); Huffell v Armitstead (1835) 173 E.R. 25 (Assizes). For the history, see J.B. Ames, “Assumpsit for Use and Occupation” (1889) 2 Harvard L.R. 377.

17 As noted in Harro Group Pty. Ltd. v Aspire Pty. Ltd. [2019] QSC 189, at [32].

18 E.g. Bolton MBC v Torkington [2003] EWCA Civ 1634, [2004] Ch. 66; Derhalli v Derhalli [2019] EWHC 3286 (Ch.).

19 (1996) 72 P. & C.R. 9 (Ch.).

20 Ibid., at 13.

21 Ibid., at 16.

22 See e.g. Graves v Graves [2007] EWCA Civ 660, [2008] H.L.R. 10, at [47].

23 Another reason for the blurring of conceptual boundaries which has taken place is the practice which has emerged of describing “mesne profits” as “damages for use and occupation”: e.g. Rogers v Lambeth LBC (2000) 32 H.L.R. 361, 371 (C.A.); Mohammadi v Anston Investments Ltd. [2003] EWCA Civ 981, [2004] H.L.R. 8, at [37]; Cook v Thomas [2010] EWCA Civ 227, at [108]; J. Furber and J.R. Moss (eds.), Hill and Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant, loose-leaf ed. (London 2020), para. 5184.

24 A further problem created by the muddle is that it can make the wording of settlement agreements difficult to interpret, as in e.g. Thorne v Courtier [2011] EWCA Civ 460.

25 The Hon. Lord Justice Lewison et al. (eds.), Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant, loose-leaf ed., vol. 1 (London 2020 release), para. 10.001.

26 Furber and Moss, Hill and Redman, para. 1830.

27 E. Cooke, S. Bridge and M. Dixon (eds.), Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, 9th ed. (London 2019), para. 18-094.

28 (1837) 112 E.R. 318, 322 (K.B.).

29 (1841) 113 E.R. 1357, 1359 (K.B.).

30 (1841) 151 E.R. 973 (Ex.). See also Dean of Rochester v Pierce (1808) 170 E.R. 1023 (Assizes); Mayor of Stafford v Till (1827) 130 E.R. 697 (C.P.); Mayor of Thetford v Tyler (1845) 115 E.R. 810, 812 (K.B.).

31 (1841) 151 E.R. 973, 974–75.

32 This point has been made by many legal scholars. Two examples are D. Ibbetson, “Implied Contracts and Restitution: History in the High Court of Australia” (1988) 8 O.J.L.S. 312; J.H. Baker, “The Use of Assumpsit for Restitutionary Money Claims 1600–1800” in J.H. Baker (ed.), Collected Papers on English Legal History, vol. III (Cambridge 2013), 1312.

33 (1850) 19 L.J. Q.B. 295.

34 Ibid., at 296.

35 (1857) 157 E.R. 184, 185 (Ex.).

36 [1996] A.C. 669, 710 (H.L.). See too Pavey & Matthews Pty. Ltd. v Paul (1987) 162 C.L.R. 221, 227, 256–57 (H.C.A); Sempra Metals Ltd. v I.R.C. [2007] UKHL 34, [2008] 1 A.C. 561, at [112]–[113]; Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50, [2014] A.C. 938, at [148].

37 Cleveland Bridge U.K. Ltd. v Multiplex Constructions (U.K.) Ltd. [2010] EWCA Civ 139, at [121]. See too Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579, [2012] Q.B. 549, at [87]; Lone v Hounslow LBC [2019] EWCA Civ 2206, [2020] 1 W.L.R. 952, at [47]. For the history, see D. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford 2001), 276–81.

38 Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant, para. 10.001.

39 Wilkinson v Kirby (1854) 139 E.R. 492, 497 (C.P.) (Jervis C.J.).

40 Butcher v Butcher (1827) 108 E.R. 772 (K.B.); Hey v Moorhouse (1839) 133 E.R. 20 (C.P.); Jones v Chapman (1849) 154 E.R. 717, 724 (Ex.) (Maule J.).

41 Hampton v BHP Billiton Minerals Pty. Ltd. [2012] WASC 285, at [310] (Edelman J.). The main remedy awarded to a successful plaintiff in an action for ejectment was a writ of possession (ordering the sheriff to remove the defendant and restore the plaintiff to the disputed land). Substantial damages could not be recovered where the action was brought by a freeholder because the action was founded (prior to reform by the Common Law Procedure Act 1852) on a fictitious lease held by a nominal plaintiff: F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Actions at Common Law: A Course of Lectures (Cambridge 1936), Lecture V. Damages awarded in ejectment actions were therefore nominal: W. Woodfall, The Law of Landlord and Tenant, 4th ed. (London 1814), 418. The fictional pleadings in ejectment were not carried over into associated actions of trespass, however, and the damages awarded to successful plaintiffs in trespass actions corresponded to the loss suffered by the true plaintiff: Goodtitle v Tombs (1770) 95 E.R. 965, 966–67 (K.B.).

42 Barnett v Earl of Guildford (1855) 156 E.R. 728 (Ex.); Radcliffe v Anderson (1860) 120 E.R. 715 (Q.B.); Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v Ilford Gas Co. [1905] 2 K.B. 493 (C.A.).

43 Barnett v Earl of Guildford (1855) 156 E.R. 728, 733 (Parke B.); Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v Ilford Gas. Co. [1905] 2 K.B. 493, 497–98 (Collins M.R.); Minister of State for the Interior v R.T. Co. Pty. Ltd. [1962] HCA 29, (1962) 107 C.L.R. 1, 5–6 (Taylor J.).

44 (1830) 5 E.R. 843, 844 (H.L.). See too Goodtitle v Tombs (1770) 95 E.R. 965, 966–67.

45 Cf. Hampton v BHP Billiton Minerals Pty. Ltd. [2012] WASC 285, at [270]–[318] (Edelman J.).

46 Bocardo S.A. v Star Energy U.K. Onshore Ltd. [2010] UKSC 35, [2011] 1 A.C. 380, at [29]–[31] (Lord Hope).

47 Mayfair Property Co. v Johnston [1894] 1 Ch. 508.

48 Recovery of Possession by Landlords Act 1820, s. 2; Common Law Procedure Act 1852, s. 214.

49 Dunlop v Macedo (1891) 8 T.L.R. 43 (Q.B.); Southport Tramways Co. v Gandy [1897] 2 Q.B. 66 (C.A.); Portland Managements Ltd. v Harte [1977] Q.B. 306 (C.A.). See “Mesne Profits” (1964) 108 Sol. J. 570. Cf. C.P.R. rule 7.3: “A claimant may use a single claim form to start all claims which can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings.”

50 Farrar v Leongreen Ltd. [2017] EWCA Civ 2211, [2018] 1 P. & C.R. 17, at [15].

51 When a lease is forfeited after quarterly rent has been paid in advance, and the tenant wrongfully remains in possession into the next quarter, the modern rule of practice is to allow the landlord to keep the advance payment and claim mesne profits only for the period in respect of which he has not already been paid: T. Boncey and J. Tipler, “Implied Terms: From ‘Characteristically Inspired Discussion’ to Authoritative Guidance” (2016) 20 Landlord & Tenant Review 4, 10–11, noting Canas Property Co. Ltd. v KL Television Services Ltd. [1970] 2 Q.B. 433 (C.A.) and Capital & City Holdings Ltd. v Dean Warburg Ltd. (1989) 58 P. & C.R. 346, but querying whether this rule of practice is well founded in principle and whether these cases are consistent with obiter dicta from Lord Neuberger in Marks & Spencer P.L.C. v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co. (Jersey) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] A.C. 742, at [47].

52 [1897] 2 Q.B. 66 (C.A.). See too Jones v Merton L.B.C. [2008] EWCA Civ 660, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1269.

53 Ibid., at 67.

54 Ibid., at 70.

55 The fact that an award of damages for “use or occupation” may be based on a genuine contract between the parties was recognised by Lord Atkinson in Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 508, 533 (H.L.).

56 [1986] 2 E.G.L.R. 255 (Q.B.). See too Eleftheriou v Costi [2013] EWHC 2168 (Ch), at [39].

57 Ibid., at 258.

58 Cf. Manfield & Sons v Botchin [1970] 2 Q.B. 612 (Q.B.); Hagee (London) Ltd. v A.B. Erikson and Larson [1976] Q.B. 209 (C.A.).

59 Cf. Turner v York Motors Pty. Ltd. (1951) 85 C.L.R. 55 (H.C.A.) 65. For a general discussion of cases in which parties failed to conclude an intended contract but were nonetheless bound by a collateral or preliminary contract, see H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 33rd ed. (London 2018), paras. 2-209, 2-210, 2-217, 2-219.

60 [2014] EWCA Civ 303, [2014] 2 P. & C.R. 4.

61 Ibid., at [23].

62 Ibid., at [23].

63 Ibid., at [23]. This part of Patten L.J.'s judgment embraces the influential reasoning of Nicholls L.J. in Javad v Aqil [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1007 (C.A.).

64 Ibid., at [16].

65 Knowsley Housing Trust v White [2008] UKHL 70, [2009] 1 A.C. 636, at [79]. See also Austin v Southwark L.B.C. [2010] UKSC 28, [2011] 1 A.C. 355, at [45] (Baroness Hale).

66 E.g. S. Bright, “The Concept of the Tolerated Trespasser: An Analysis” (2003) 119 L.Q.R. 495; I. Loveland, “Tolerated Trespass: A Very Peculiar Legal Creature” (2007) 123 L.Q.R. 455.

67 Section 299 of, and Part 1 of Schedule 11 to, the 2008 Act, which came into force on 20 May 2009, prevented the creation of further “tolerated trespassers” by providing that, where a landlord obtains a possession order against a secure tenant, the tenancy continues until the landlord recovers possession. The effect of Part 2 of Schedule 11, and certain secondary legislation made thereunder, was to convert existing “tolerated trespassers” into tenants.

68 Thompson v Elmbridge B.C. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1425 (C.A.); Burrows v Brent L.B.C. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448 (H.L.); Harlow D.C. v Hall [2006] EWCA Civ 156, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2116; Knowsley Housing Trust v White [2009] 1 A.C. 636; Austin v Southwark L.B.C. [2011] 1 A.C. 355.

69 Greenwich L.B.C. v Regan (1996) 28 H.L.R. 469 (C.A.); Burrows v Brent L.B.C. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448.

70 Greenwich L.B.C. v Regan (1996) 28 H.L.R. 469; Burrows v Brent L.B.C. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448. The court also has a power, by virtue of section 85(4), to discharge or rescind an order for possession, and the effect of discharging or rescinding a possession order was to revive the tenancy.

71 Burrows v Brent L.B.C. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448, 1455 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).

72 Jones v Merton L.B.C. [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1269, at [8] (Wilson L.J.).

73 See e.g. Burrows v Brent L.B.C. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448.

74 See e.g. Jones v Merton L.B.C. [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1269.

75 See e.g. Harlow D.C. v Hall [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2116.

76 Pemberton v Southwark L.B.C. [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1672, 1681 (Roch L.J.) and 1683–84 (Clarke L.J.); Jones v Merton L.B.C. [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1269.

77 [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1269.

78 Ibid., at [25].

79 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448.

80 The authority's consent was subsequently withdrawn. Burrows failed to comply with the agreement and the authority decided to issue a warrant for possession.

81 [2011] 1 A.C. 355, at [45].

82 [2001] EWCA Civ 594, [2002] H.L.R. 22. The Court of Appeal's judgment was partially overruled in Knowsley Housing Trust v White [2009] 1 A.C. 636, but this has no bearing on the point discussed in the text.

83 Ibid., at [26].

84 Burrows v Brent L.B.C. [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448.

85 Ibid., at 1454.

86 S. Bright, “Tolerated Trespass or a New Tenancy?” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 48, 51–52.

87 Lambeth L.B.C. v O'Kane [2005] EWCA Civ 1010, [2006] H.L.R. 2, at [60]; Bright, “Concept of the Tolerated Trespasser”, 508; Chitty on Contracts, para. 2-197.

88 [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1448, 1454.

89 Ibid.

90 The occupier's liability to make payments in respect of her occupation cannot be based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel either, because this doctrine does not create new rights; it merely precludes the enforcement of existing rights: Combe v Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215 (C.A.).

91 [1971] 2 Q.B. 143 (Q.B.).

92 Ibid., at 148 (arguendo).

93 Ibid., at 162.

94 Definitive recognition of unjust enrichment as a discrete source of rights and obligations in English law dates from Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, 578 (H.L.).

95 Cf. Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50, [2014] A.C. 938, at [175] (claims grounded on failure of consideration can lie to recover the value of services); Harro Group Pty. Ltd. v Aspire Pty. Ltd. [2019] QSC 189, at [30]–[33] (claims grounded on failure of consideration can lie to recover the value of using and occupying land, although not if the parties have a contract that would thereby be subverted).

96 Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 A.C. 366, 385 (H.L.); Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc. v I.R.C. [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 A.C. 558, at [51]; Sempra Metals Ltd. v I.R.C. [2007] UKHL 34, [2008] 1 A.C. 561, at [70].

97 The leading case is Macdonald Dickens & Macklin (a firm) v Costello [2011] EWCA Civ 930, [2012] Q.B. 244. For general discussion, see Mitchell, C., Mitchell, P. and Watterson, S., Goff and Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 9th ed. (London 2016)Google Scholar, paras. 3.10 ff.

98 Lampson (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd. (No. 3) [2014] WASC 162, at [50]. See Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty. Ltd. v Hills Industries Ltd. [2014] HCA 14, (2014) 253 C.L.R. 560, at [73]; Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty. Ltd. [2019] HCA 32, (2019) 373 A.L.R. 1, at [199]. See too K. Barker, “Unjust Enrichment in Australia: What Is(n't) It? Implications for Legal Reasoning and Practice” (2020) 43 Melbourne University L.R. 903.

99 Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd. [1999] 1 A.C. 221, 227 (H.L.); Benedetti v Sawiris [2014] A.C. 938, at [10]; Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus U.K. Ltd. [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] A.C. 176, at [18] Samsoondar v Capital Insurance Co Ltd [2020] UKPC 33, at [18].

100 Uren v First National Home Finance Ltd. [2005] EWHC 2529 (Ch.), at [16]–[18].

101 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v Birmingham C.C. [1997] Q.B. 380, 386 (C.A).

102 (2000) P. & C.R. 117, 122 (C.A.).

103 [2017] UKSC 29, [2018] A.C. 275, at [50].

104 [2018] UKSC 39, [2019] A.C. 929.

105 Ibid., at [71]–[74].

106 For critical analysis of the reasoning in Prudential, see Mitchell, C., “End of the Road for the Overpaid Tax Litigation?” in Clarry, D. (ed.), The UK Supreme Court Yearbook, Volume 9: 2017–2018 (Cambridge 2019)Google Scholar.

107 School Facility Management Ltd. v Governing Body of Christ the King College [2020] EWHC 1118 (Comm), [2020] P.T.S.R. 1913, at [437].

108 See Mitchell et al., Goff and Jones, ch. 17.

109 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] A.C. 467, at [13].

110 Eastenders Cash & Carry plc. v Crown Prosecution Service [2014] UKSC 26, [2015] A.C. 1, at [115].

111 Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch. 429, 442 (C.A.); Giedo van der Garde B.V. v Force India Formula One Team Ltd. [2010] EWHC 2373 (QB), at [286]. See too Moorgate Capital (Corporate Finance) Ltd. v Sun European Partners L.L.P. [2020] EWHC 593 (Comm), at [140]: no claim lies where C has no expectation of payment and/or D is “not aware of any contrary expectation”.

112 Whincup v Hughes (1870–71) L.R. 6 C.P. 78; Goss v Chilcott [1996] A.C. 788, 797–98 (P.C.); Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd. [2001] HCA 68, (2001) 208 C.L.R. 516, at [14]–[24].

113 See Mitchell et al., Goff and Jones, paras. 12.24–12.32.

114 Cf. Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943] A.C. 32, 65 (H.L.); Goss v Chilcott [1996] A.C. 788, 798 (P.C.); Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd. (2001) 208 C.L.R. 516, at [9]–[13], [109], [195]–[196].

115 As in e.g. Lewisham L.B.C. v Masterson (2000) 80 P. & C.R. 117 (C.A.). Cf. Benedetti v Sawiris [2014] A.C. 938 (services performed in anticipation of a contract that failed to materialise).

116 As in e.g. Ovidio Carrideo Nominees v The Dog Depot Pty. Ltd. [2006] VSCA 6, [2006] V. Conv. R. 54–713. Cf. Guinness Mahon & Co. Ltd. v Kensington and Chelsea R.L.B.C. [1999] Q.B. 215 (C.A.) (payments made under void interest rate swaps contract recoverable on the ground of failure of consideration).

117 Cf. Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v Lincoln C.C. [1999] 2 A.C. 349 (H.L.) (payments made under void interest rate swaps contract recoverable on the ground of mistake of law).

118 Mitchell and Rostill, “Making Sense of Mesne Profits: Remedies”.

119 Harro Group Pty. Ltd. v Aspire Pty. Ltd. [2019] QSC 189, at [34]–[56].

120 Recent cases where this has been an issue are Shi v Jiangsu Native Produce Import & Export Corp. [2009] EWCA Civ 1582 and Ramzan v Brookwide Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 985, [2012] 1 All E.R. 903 (C.A.).

121 Marino v FM Capital Partners Ltd. [2020] EWCA Civ 245, [2020] 3 W.L.R. 109, at [49]. For an argument that change of position should be a defence to some torts, see Rotherham, C., “Morally Blameless Wrongdoers and the Change of Position Defence” (2018) 30 S.Ac.L.J. 149Google Scholar; and note Cavenagh Investment Pte. Ltd. v Kaushnik Rajiv [2013] SGHC 45, at [58]–[75] where the defendant was allowed to invoke change of position as a defence to a claim for restitutionary damages for trespass.

122 Pavey & Matthews Pty. Ltd. v Paul (1987) 162 C.L.R. 221; Patel v Mirza [2017] A.C. 467; Ovidio Carrideo Nominees v The Dog Depot Pty. Ltd. [2006] V. Conv. R. 54–713, at [11], [21], [32].

123 In Naylor v Barlow [2019] EWHC 1565 (Ch), [2019] W.T.L.R. 981, at [25], Judge Hodge Q.C. said: “Mesne profits are covered by the six years’ period for tort claims in s. 2 [of the Limitation Act 1980].” This will be so, of course, only where C's claim is a claim in tort.

124 Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, SI 2006/213, regs. 11(1), 12(1).

125 Welfare Reform Act 2012, s. 11; Universal Credit Regulations 2013, SI 2013/376, reg. 25(2).

126 Universal Credit Regulations 2013, SI 2013/376, sched. 1(2)(b).

127 Department of Work and Pensions, “Universal Credit and Related Regulations: Response to SSAC Technical Comments and Policy Points”, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/324545/ssac-uc-technical-annex-dwp-response.pdf (last accessed 8 December 2020), para. 26 of the “Responses to SSAC policy points”.

128 Ibid.

129 Cf. Inverugie Investments Ltd. v Hackett [1995] 1 W.L.R. 713, 718 (P.C.), where Lord Lloyd analogised between the opportunity to use a concrete mixer and the opportunity to use residential property.