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From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel as a Cause of Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

M. P. Thompson
M. P. Thompson
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Law, University of Essex.
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Extract

In recent years, one of the most vibrant doctrines has been that of equitable estoppel. This doctrine is generally seen as having two main branches: the defensive doctrine of promissory estoppell and the older and more aggressive doctrine of proprietary estoppel, which can itself be used to obtain rights: to be the cause of action itself. The aim of this article is to analyse the central concepts of equitable estoppel in order to distinguish it from its common law counterpart, to consider its relationship to the law of contract and also to present the two main branches as being closely related concepts, based on common underlying themes.

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Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , November 1983 , pp. 257 - 278
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1983

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References

1 Originating in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877) 2 App.Cas. 439 and rejuvenated in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947] 1 K.B. 130.

2 For early examples, see Hunt v. Carew (1649) Nels, 47; Hobbs v. Norton (1682) 1 Vern. 137.

3 Cf. United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough Council (1978) A.C. 904, 925, per Lord Diplock. But see Baker, P. V., (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 529.Google Scholar

4 For a full exposition of the notion of detriment, see Grundt v. The Great Boulder Pty. Goldmines Ltd. (1938) 59 C.L.R. 641, 674–675, per Dixon, J..Google Scholar

5 Bower, Spencer and Turner, , Estoppel by Representation, 3rd ed., p. 4.Google Scholar

6 [1976] 1 All E.R. 902. See also Pickard v. Sears (1877) 6 Ad. & El. 469. Cf. Toepfer v. Warinco A.G. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 569.

7 [1983] 1 All E.R. 1073. For the background to this case, see Pile, The Book of Heroic Failures, p. 30.

8 Ibid., at p. 1087.

9 Bower, Spencer and Turner, , op. cit., p. 3.Google Scholar

10 Eg. Dillwyn v. Llewelyn (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 517; Plimmer v. The Mayor of Wellington (1884) 9 App.Cas. 699. See D. C. Jackson (1965) 81 L.O.R. 85.

11 Although this expression is deprecated by Bower, Spencer and Turner, , op. cit., p. 12 citing Canadian Pacific Rail Co. Ltd. v. R. [1931] A.C. 414, 429, it will nonetheless be used in this article as a convenient shorthand for the doctrines of promissory and proprietary estoppel. See also Snell's Principles of Equity, 28th ed., p. 554 et seq.Google Scholar

12 (1762) 1 Wm. Bl. 363, Jones (1957) 73 L.Q.R. 49, 50–51. See also Spry, Equitable Remedies, 2nd ed., p. 413.

13 (1854) 5 H.L.Cas. 185. For searching criticism of this decision, see D. C. Jackson, loc.cit.

14 Ibid., at pp. 215–216. Cf. Ramsdenv. Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129, 136, per Lord Cranworth.

15 See, e.g.. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank of New Orleans (1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 352. Cf. Atiyah, Consideration in Contracts, pp. 54–55. But see Treitel (1976) 50 A.L.J. 439.

16 Supra.

17 [1942] 2 K.B. 38: Cf. Spence v. Shell U.K. Ltd. (1980) 256 E.G. 55, where a similar argument failed on the facts.

18 Ibid., at pp. 51–52.

19 See Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., supra, at p. 134, per Denning J. and Spence v. Shell U.K. Ltd., supra, at p. 63, per Oliver L.J. on the necessity for the statement to be made with the intention of affecting the legal relations of the parties.

20 Supra.

21 (1889) 40 Ch.D. 268.

22 See, e.g., Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co., supra; Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North West Rail Co., supra; Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd. [1955] 2 All E.R. 657; W. J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 Q.B. 189, 213.

23 See Dugdale and Yates (1976) 39 M.L.R. 680.

24 Panchaud Frères v. Etablissements General Grain Co. [1970] Lloyd's Rep. 53.

25 Panoutsos v. Raymond Hadley of New York [1917] 2 K.B. 473.

26 Re William Porter & Ltd. [1937] 2 All E.R. 361 (a decision of Simonds J.); Je Maintiendrai Pty. Ltd. v. Quaglia and Quaglia (1980) 26 S.A.S.R. 101; Morgan (1982) 13 M.U.L.R. 475; cf. Marston [1983] C.L.J. 34.

27 Scandanavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana, “The Scaptrade” [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 146, affirmed on an unrelated ground [1983] 2 All E.R. 763; Tradex Exports S.A. v. Doradu Compania Naviera S.A., “The Lutetian” [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 140.

28 Cf. Panchaud Frères S.A. v. Elablissemenls General Grain Co., supra, at p. 59, per Winn L.J.; Dugdale and Yates, loc. cit., p. 691.

29 Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North West Rail Co. (1889) 40 Ch.D. 268,

30 [1964] 3 All E.R. 556, 559.

31 Societe halo-Beige Pour Le Commerce el L'Industrie v. Palm and Vegetable Oils (Malaysia) SDN BHD, “The Post Chaser” [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 695, 700, per Robert Goff J.

32 For examples of the latter category see Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd. [1968] 2 All E.R. 987; Evenden v. Guildford City Association Football Club Ltd. [1975] Q.B. 917

33 For the interrelation between variation and promissory estoppel, see Dugdale and Yates, loc. cit.

34 [1972] A.C. 741. See also Peter Cremer v. Granaria B.V. [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 583, 587 and Scandanavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana, “The Scaptrade” [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 146, 149–150.

35 Ibid. at p. 757. See also Lord Denning M.R. in the same case [1972] 2 Q.B. 23, 59–60.

36 Ibid., at p. 762.

37 Cf. Atiyah (1975) 38 M.L.R. 65, 68.

38 Bremer Handelgesellschaft m.b.H. v. Vanden Avenne-Izegem P.V.B.A. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 109, 126.

39 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 146.

40 Ibid., at p. 150.

41 Binns v. Wass [1981] I.R.L.R. 355, 357, reversed on the facts sub nom. Wass v. Binns [1982] I.R.L.R. 283.

42 B.P. Exploration Ltd. v. Hunt [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 810.

43 E.g., Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215 discussed infra., p. 275. Woodhouse A.C. Israel Cocoa Ltd., S.A. v. Nigerian Produce Marketing Co. Ltd., supra, at p. 757. Cf. Crabb v. Arun D.C. [1976] Ch. 179, 193, per Scarman L.J.

44 The term “proprietary” is unfortunate as it assumes that it will bind a purchaser with constructive notice, in much the same way as a pre-1926 restrictive covenant. For arguments that this may not be so, see Maudsley (1956) 20 Conv.(N.S.) 281; Thompson [1983] Conv. 50.

45 See n. 2, ante.

46 (1711)Gilb.Rep. 85.

47 Cf. the early cases on part performance such as Lockey v. hockey (1719) Ch.Prec. 518; Bond v. Hopkins (1802) 1 Sch. & Lef. 413, 433. See Thompson [1979] Conv. 402.

48 (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129. See also Dann v. Spurrier (1802) 7 Ves 232.

49 Ibid., at p. 168.

50 (1884) 9 App.Cas. 699.

51 Ibid., at pp. 711–712.

52 (1880) 15 Ch.D. 96.

53 Ibid., at pp. 105–106. Italics supplied. But see the discussion in Crabb v. Arun D.C. [1976] Ch. 179, 194–199, per Scarman L.J.

54 Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. [1971] A.C. 850, 884, per Lord Diplock; Bower, Spencer and Turner, , op. cil. pp. 287–295Google Scholar; Cf. Dawson, and Pearce, , Licences Relating to the Occupation or Use of Land, pp. 33–36.Google Scholar

55 [1981] 1 All E.R. 897; Habib Bank Ltd. v. Habib Bank A. G. Zurich [1981] 2 All E.R. 650,666, per Oliver L.J. See P. Jackson [1982] Conv. 450.

56 For a discussion of this issue, see Thompson (1981) 125 S.J. 816.

57 See also Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. [1971] A.C. 850, 884, per Lord Diplock.

58 In Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd., supra, the House of Lords (Viscount Dilhorne dissenting) held that the statutory provisions as to time under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, s. 26 could be waived.

59 Bower, Spencer and Turner, , op.cit., p. 141.Google Scholar

60 For a similar analysis of analagous problems, see Re Young [1951] Ch. 344, 350 (secret trusts); Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App.Cas. 467,475–476 (part performance).

61 [1976] Ch. 179; Inwards v. Baker [1965] 2 Q.B. 29; Dillwyn v. Llewellyn (1862) 4 De G. F. & J. 517.

62 [1967] 1 All E.R. 504; Thompson [1983] Conv. 50, 52–53. Cf. Briggs [1981] Conv. 212.

63 Hopgood v. Brown [1955] 1 All E.R. 550; Halsall v. Brizell [1957] 1 All E.R. 371.

64 See also in the sphere of promissory estoppel, James v. Heim Gallery (London) (1981) 41 P. & C.R. 269.

65 See also United Overseas Bank v. Jiwani [1977] 1 All E.R. 733. Cf. the unsatisfactory decision in Greasley v. Cooke [1981] 1 All E.R. 195 criticised by Annand [1981] Conv. 154, Thompson, (1981) 125 S.J. 539.

66 Shaw v. Appiegate [1977] 1 W.L.R. 970.

67 See the discussion of promissory estoppel, p. 266 ante.

68 [1981] 3 All E.R. 577.

69 [1981] 1 All E.R. 923.

70 [1981] 1 All E.R. 923, 933, per Robert, Goff J. Cf. [1981] 3 All E.R. 577, 583, per Lord Denning M.R. For further discussion of estoppel arising from mistake, see Avon C.C. v. Howlett [1983] 1 All E.R. 1073, 1082 et seq., per Slade L.J.Google Scholar

71 Bower, Spencer and Turner, , op. cit., p. 157.Google Scholar

72 [1981] 3 All E.R. at p. 588.

73 Ibid., at p. 591.

74 [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 456.

75 Mara v. Brown [1896] 1 Ch. 199; Lyell v. Kennedy (1889) 14 App.Cas. 437. See Oakley, , Constructive Trusts, pp. 69–70.Google Scholar

76 Cf. Lyus v. Prowsa Developments Ltd. [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1004, criticised by P. Jackson [19837] Conv. 64.

77 Cf. Burrows (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 217, 233, n. 61.

78 Re Sharpe [1980] 1 All E. R. 198, 204, per Browne-Wilkinson J.

79 See also Re Wyvern [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1097; Burrows loc.cit., p. 240.

80 See the admirable discussion of Hussey v. Palmer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286 by Davies (1978) 8 Syd. L.R. 578, 587.

81 [1951] 2 K.B. 215. For dicta seeking to limit proprietary estoppel to the acquisition of interests in another's land, see Western Fish Products Ltd. v. Penwith D.C. (1981) 2 All E.R. 204, a case decided on whether estoppel can fetter local authority discretion, on which see the penetrating article by Bradley [1981] C.L.P. 1. For cogent criticism of seeking to limit a general doctrine to previous factual settings, see Sheridan, Fraud in Equity, p. 152, discussing part performance; cf. Thomson (1981) 97 L.Q.R. 513, 515.

82 [1965] 2 Q.B. 29.

83 [1951] 2 K.B. at p. 221.

84 Cf. Appleby v. Cowley, The Times, 14, April 1982.

85 For the origins of this, see Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, pp. 143–146. Cf. J. H. Baker (1960) 43 M.L.R. 468.

86 Consideration in Contracts.

81 Op.cit., p. 11.

88 Op.cit., p. 47.

89 Supra.

90 Atiyah, op. cit., pp. 54–58.

91 See also Davies, (1978) loc. cit., p. 586.Google Scholar

92 See Dillwyn v. Llewellyn (1862) De G. F. & J. 517 and Inwards v. Baker [1965] 2 Q.B. 29.

81 Op.cit., p. 11.

88 Op.cit., p. 47.

89 Supra.

90 Atiyah, op. cit., pp. 54–58.

91 See also Davies, (1978) loc. cit., p. 586.Google Scholar

92 See Dillwyn v. Llewellyn (1862) De G. F. & J. 517 and Inwards v. Baker [1965] 2 Q.B. 29.

93 E.g., Pascoe v. Turner [1979] 1 W.L.R. 431.

94 See the judgment of Scarman L.J. in Crabb v. Arun D.C. supra.

95 Dodsworth v. Dodswonh (1973) 228 E.G. 1115. See also Burrows, , loc. cit., p. 242.Google Scholar

96 See Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed (1971) 3 All E.R. 690, per Lord Denning M.R.

97 Cf. Jackson, D. C., loc. cit., p. 102.Google Scholar

98 Cf. Chitty on Contracts, 25th ed., pp. 236–237.

99 Cf. Denning (1952) 15 M.L.R. 1 at p. 5.

1 Santiago v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (1975) 526 F. (2nd) 488, 494, per Choy J. dissenting.