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A Failure of Justice and Defect of Police*
A Commentary on Ridge v. Baldwin
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 January 2009
Extract
On March 7, 1958, the Brighton watch committee decided to dismiss their chief constable; on March 14, 1963, the House of Lords ruled that this decision was ineffective. Among the conclusions of the majority of the House was that natural justice required a hearing to have been given to the chief constable before his dismissal and that in the absence of a hearing the dismissal was invalid. In attempting an assessment of Ridge v. Baldwin, which concerns what has since been called “a doctrine of the highest constitutional value,” it seems necessary (a) to examine the dispute against its administrative background, in particular the intertwining pattern of statute and ministerial regulation governing police dismissal; (b) to consider in detail a number of difficult points of principle raised by the arguments on natural justice; and (c) to set the decision within the broad context of the development of administrative law. It will be suggested that although the House of Lords may have restored to favour a once classic principle of interpretation, this in itself helps but little in the search for a fruitful relationship between the courts and the administration. The interpretation of statutory powers may well be important in particular situations, but the judge's ability to do justice in this way necessarily depends on the words of the statute he is interpreting and thus may stand or fall on the vagaries of legislative history. Had Mr. Ridge been the chief constable of a county force and not of a county borough force, although he could still have invoked the Police Regulations, the rules of natural justice would almost certainly have helped him but little—simply because the County Police Act, 1839, is phrased differently from the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882.
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References
1 Ridge v. Baldwin [1964]Google Scholar A.C. 40, reversing Streatfeild J. and the C.A. [1963] 1 Q.B. 539.
2 Prof. Wade, H. W. R., “The Due Process of Law,” The Listener, August 8, 1963.Google Scholar See also criticism by Prof. A. L. Goodhart in (1964) 80 L.Q.R. 105–116.
3 County Police Act, 1839, s. 4: “… every chief constable … may hold his office until dismissed by the justices…”; Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, s. 191 (4): “The watch committee … may at any time suspend, and the watch committee may at any time dismiss, any borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same.” The former power is an absolute power of dismissal; the latter is a power to dismiss only on certain grounds. See [1964] A.C. 65—66.
4 See previous note.
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9 See rules made by the Home Secretary on February 2, 1857 (printed in Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, 1857, Sess. 1, XIV, p. 157) and on April 12, 1886 (printed in “Statutory Rules and Orders issued prior to 1890,” V, pp. 162–168, and also in Carmichael, E.G.M., The County and Borough Police Acts, 1831–1900 (London 1900), pp. 343–348Google Scholar). The 1886 rules remained in force until revoked by the Police Regulations of August 20, 1920, S.R. & O. No. 1485.
10 Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, s. 191 (3), replacing Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, s. 77.
11 Hart, The British Police, pp. 38–48, and see the Report of the Desborough Committee on the Police Service of England, Wales and Scotland, Part I, 1919 (Cmd. 253) and Part II, 1920 (Cmd. 574). Government proposals in 1854 and 1856 to extend the Secretary of State's rule-making power to the boroughs were abandoned because of borough opposition: J. Hart, (1956) 34 Public Administration, 405, 406–7.
12 S.R. & O. 1920 No. 1485, regs. 12–26 and Appendix.
13 The Police (Discipline) Regulations, 1952 (No. 1705).
14 The Police (Discipline) (Deputy Chief Constables, Assistant Chief Constables and Chief Constables) Regulations, 1952 (No. 1706). Attention was drawn to the need for such regulations in the Report of the Oaksey Committee on Police Conditions of Service, Part II, 1949 (Cmd. 7831), paras. 258–262.
15 The Police (Discipline) Regulations, 1952, regs. 15–17.
16 See now Police Bill, clause 36 and 4th Sched.
17 Police Pensions Regulations, 1955 (No. 480), r. 52. See also paras. 179 and 189 of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Police, 1962 (Cmnd. 1728).
18 Desborough Report, Cmd. 574, paras. 122–124; Oaksey Report, Cmd. 7831, paras. 255 and 257.
19 Cmnd. 1728, paras. 176, 185, 190.
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27 Introduced into the House of Commons on November 14, 1963, the Bill had an unopposed Second Reading on November 26 (H.C.Deb. 5 s., Vol. 685, cols. 81 et seq.); see also H.C.Deb. 5 s., Vol. 677, cols. 680 et seq. (May 9, 1963).
28 Clause 32.
29 Clauses 5 (4) and 28, which give effect to the recommendations of the Royal Commission (paras. 178–185). An opposition amendment giving the Secretary of State power to call on the chief constable to retire was defeated in committee—reported, inaccurately, in The Times, December 13, 1963.
30 so See note 17 above.
31 [1922] 2 Ch. 490 (power to dismiss teacher “on educational grounds”).
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35 Ibid, at p. 564, and see Harman L.J. at p. 574.
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1 In either case the matter could still come before the court. The inconvenience of the second course is that, unless the committee accepts the Home Secretary's ruling, the individual is compelled to litigate.
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21 e.g., if it was a forgery, or if it contained such an ambiguity in the description of the land that the court could not decide to which land it referred. It is submitted that Woollett v. Ministry of Agriculture [1955] 1 Q.B. 103Google Scholar has not ruled out this form of challenge and that the dicta of Jenkins L.J. at p. 129 are too wide. Cf. per Danckwerts, L.J. in Re Pritchard [1963]Google Scholar Ch. 502, 527. “… [the originating summons] has no more application to the matter to be decided than a dog licence.”
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23 Zamir. op. cit., pp. 138–148, reviews the recent decisions, particularly McClelland v. N.I. General Health Service Board [1957] 1 W.L.R. 594Google Scholar and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board [1958] 1 W.L.R. 181Google Scholar. See now Dudfield v. Ministry of Works and Faithful v. Admiralty, The Times, January 24, 1964.Google Scholar
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25 See p. 85 above.
26 [1964] A.C. at p. 66. At p. 96, Lord Evershed misinterprets Lord Reid'a position in discussing whether natural justice may be invoked “whenever anyone is discharged from some office.”
27 County Courts Act, 1959, s. 8 (1); Ex p. Ramshay (1832) 18 Q.B.D. 173.
28 Local Government Act, 1933, ss. 105 (2), 106 (2) and 107 (2) and 121. Some officers are specially protected, e.g., clerks of county councils can be dismissed only on certain grounds and subject to the approval of the Minister; medical officers of health and public health inspectors can be dismissed only with the approval of the Minister. But, e.g., town clerks have no special protection: see Headrick, T. E., The Town Clerk in English Local Government\, pp. 18–22 and 34Google Scholar, citing Wood v. East Ham U.D.C. (1907) 71Google Scholar J.P. 129.
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33 [1963] Ch. 57.
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35 The position of certain long-standing notices to treat was regulated by ss. 14–16, Town and Country Planning Act, 1959.
36 [1963] 2 Q.B. 196.
37 [1963] 2 W.L.R. 722.
38 See Upjohn, L.J. in Miller-Mead's case, p. 232Google Scholar. Do these decisions, coming sixteen years after the introduction of our present system of town planning control, illustrate Geoffrey Marshall's comment, op. cit., p. 279: “If regulatory interference is long-standing, terms such as ‘livelihood’ and ‘penalisation’ tend to lose their suggestive force”?
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