Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T05:05:31.664Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Damages, The Liesbosch, and Impecuniosity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2001

Brian Coote*
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
Get access

Extract

Developments in the law since The Liesbosch was decided in 1933 have made it increasingly difficult in principle to justify special treatment of the plaintiff’s impecuniosity in the context of any of the four aspects of damages considered in this article. Almost certainly, had The Liesbosch not been a decision of the House of Lords, it would before now have been overruled. To state the obvious, litigation by the impecunious is not frequently taken to the very highest level. Even when it is, the Court may still not feel prompted or required to undertake a fundamental reconsideration. Alcoa was such a case and an opportunity was missed.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Salmond's Law of Torts, 10th ed. by W.T.S. Stallybrass (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., London, 1945), p. 125.

2 [1933] A.C. 449.

3 Dodd Properties v. Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, 458.

4 Ibid., p. 452.

5 E.g. Perry v. Sydney Phillips & Son [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1297, 1302; Attorney General v. Geothermal Produce NZ Ltd. [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 348, 355.

6 E.g. Martindale v. Duncan [1973] 1 W.L.R. 574, 577.

7 [2000] 3 W.L.R. 23.

8 [1933] A.C. 449, 450-451.

9 Sub nom. The Edison [1931] P. 230, 231-232.

10 Ibid., p. 232.

11 Ibid., p. 238.

12 [1907] A.C. 291, 303.

13 His Lordship went on to add “On the other hand, the victim being in fact a poor man is not entitled to claim damages in respect of lost opportunities which he could not have utilised unless he had been rich”, words as true now as they were then.

14 [1933] A.C. 449 , 461.

15 Dodd Properties V. Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, 453.

16 Martindale v. Duncan [1973] 1 W.L.R. 574.

17 [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1297.

18 Ibid., p. 1302.

19 Ibid., p. 1305.

20 Ibid., p. 1307. Foreseeability has not commonly been seen as an element of the “duty” to mitigate.

21 [1973] 1 W.L.R. 574, 577.

22 See text above, at note 1.

23 [1897] A.C. 596, 605.

24 The Edison [1932] P. 52, 64.

25 Cf. Goode, , Commercial Law, 2nd ed. (Penguin Books, London, 1995), pp. 415416Google Scholar.

26 Startup v. Cortazzi (1835) 2 C.M. & R. 165; 150 E.R. 71.

27 At p. 65.

28 At p. 73.

29 At p. 65.

30 At p. 67.

31 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433 (HC and CA).

32 Ibid., p. 443.

33 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 471, 474.

34 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, 444-445.

35 [1976] A.C. 443.

36 [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1262.

37 [1980] A.C. 367. A more recent example is Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Citibank NA [1997] A.C. 254.

38 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, Megaw L.J. at p. 453; Donaldson L.J. at p. 459.

39 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, 442.

40 Brown L.J., 456, queried the use of the word “objective”.

41 [1980] A.C. 367, 401.

42 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, 1287.

43 Ibid., pp. 1285, 1286.

44 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433.

45 At p. 453.

46 At p. 458.

47 See e.g. Vol 12 (1), Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., reissue (Butterworths, London, 1998), para. 859.

48 [1907] A.C. 291, p. 303.

49 [1987] R.T.R. 72.

50 [1933] A.C. 449, e.g. at p. 468.

51 At pp. 467-468.

52 See text at n. 28.

53 [1932] P. 52, 58, 59, 67.

54 [1933] A.C. 449, 468.

55 This, presumably, was what Cantley J. had in mind (above, n. 33) when in the Dodd case he spoke of an objectively reasonable time. The Court of Appeal in that case appear to have concluded that, in relation to the newly emerging test of reasonableness in fixing the date at which damages should be assessed, different criteria should apply.

56 [1933] A.C. 449 , 461.

57 Ibid., p. 461.

58 Dimond v. Lovell [2000] 2 W.L.R. 1121, 1139, per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough.

59 [1921] 3 KB 560. See text below, at fn. 82 el seq.

60 [1933] A.C. 449, 460-461.

61 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, 453.

62 [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 348.

63 (1999) 21 W.A.R. 402.

64 [1947] A.C. 414.

65 [1940] 3 D.L.R. 641.

66 [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 530, applying the ratio of Wadsworth v. Lydall [1981] 1 W.L.R. 598. It was pointed out by Holland J. in Krehic v. Clark [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 703, 709, that this approach can have the effect of conferring an advantage on the impecunious which is denied to those who have funds available. See also Jarvis v. Richards & Co. (1980) 124 Sol. Jo. 793.

67 [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 348.

68 [1932] P. 52, 61.

69 E.g. Hart, and Honore, , Causation in the Law, 2nd ed. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985), pp. 172Google Scholar et seq; Vol 12(1), Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., reissue (Butterworths, London, 1998), para. 858; McGregor on Damages, 16th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997), paras. 210 et seq.

70 [1907] A.C. 291, 303.

71 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433, 458.

72 E.g. McGregor on Damages, cited above at n. 69, para. 210.

73 At p. 175.

74 (1854) 9 Ex. 341; 156 E.R. 145.

75 (1888) 13 PD 191, 201 (affirmed (1889) 14 App. Cas. 519).

76 At p. 197.

77 He referred to page 44 of that edition.

78 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 519, 523.

79 [1920] A.C. 956.

80 At pp. 983-984.

81 At p. 984.

82 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.

83 We are not told what became of the five Arab workmen!

84 At pp. 564-566.

85 At p. 567.

86 [1933] A.C. 449 , 461.

87 Ibid., p. 460.

88 [1949] A.C. 196, 224.

89 Ibid., p. 221.

90 See text above, at fn. 75.

91 [1961] A.C. 388.

92 [1996] A.C. 155.

93 [2000] 3 W.L.R. 23.

94 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433.

95 Ibid., p. 32.

96 Ibid., p. 30.

97 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

98 [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1297, 1304.

99 [2000] 3 W.L.R. 23, 31.

100 [1980] A.C. 367.

101 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262.

102 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 433.

103 [1947] A.C. 414.

104 Cited above, at fn. 71.

105 See text at fnn. 9-22.

106 See text at fnn. 23-58.

107 See, now, Glenmont Investments Pty Ltd. v. O’Loughlin (2001) 79 S.A.S.R. 151, a case of destruction, where Millhouse J., in fixing the date at which damages for the primary loss were to be assessed, took account of the plaintiff's impecuriosity. He did, though, appear to see the question as one of mitigation.

108 See text at fnn. 39-73.

109 See text at fnn. 74-92.

110 See text at fnn. 103-104.