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Conflict of law 1921–1971 the way ahead

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

K. Lipstein
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Extract

(1) Legal Basis

When the first issue of the Cambridge Law Journal appeared in 1921, the English rules of the conflict of laws were those stated and reformulated by Dicey and by the editors of Westlake and Foote. Their progress between 1858 and 1912 had been charted by Dicey himself in a survey published in 1912. The legal basis for the application of foreign law in England was and remained Lord Mansfield's pronouncement in Holman v. Johnson: “Every action here must be tried by the law of England, but the law of England says that in a variety of circumstances … the law of the country where the cause of action arose shall govern.” Dicey never waivered in his adherence to this rule of English law, but he supplemented it with an argument drawn from the doctrine of acquired rights which bedevilled English lawyers for a long time, until in 1949 the editors of the sixth edition of Dicey took what they believed to be a bold, but substantially honest, step by restricting the concept to its proper boundaries and thus by depriving it of its capacity to serve as a general principle of the Conflict of Laws.

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Research Article
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 31 , Issue 1: Jubilee Issue , April 1972 , pp. 67 - 120
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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1972

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References

1 Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), pp. 1–33Google Scholar; (1890) 6 L.Q.R. 1; (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113.

2 Private International Law (7th ed., 1925, by Bentwich, N.).Google Scholar

3 Private International Law (5th ed., 1925, by Bellott, H.).Google Scholar

4 (1912) 28 L.Q.R. 341.

5 (1775) 1 Cowp. 161, 171. See also Harford v. Morris (1776) 2 Hag.Ecc. 423, 430, 434; Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hag.Con. 54, 58, 59. But see Lord Mansfield in Robinson v. Bland (1760) 1 W.Bl. 234, 246.

6 (1890) 6 L.Q.R. 1, at pp. 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 18, 20, 21; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), pp. 3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14, 20.Google Scholar

7 Ibid., pp. 10, 11, 13 without any detailed discussion, but noting Savigny's critique of circuity; cf. (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at p. 114, 115; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), pp. 11, 12, 14, p. 23Google Scholar (General Principle No. 1), p. 25, and in particular p. 26.

8 Foreshadowed in the 3rd ed. (1922), p. 33. See also Cheshire, Private International Law (2nd ed., 1938), pp. 85–86.

9 Müller, Horst, Der Grundsatz der wohlerworbenen Rechte im Internationalen Privatrecht (1935)Google Scholar, reviewed by Gutzwiller (1936) 10 Rabels Z. 1056; Weiller, Der Schutz der wohlerworbenen Rechte im Internationalen Privatrecht (1934).

10 See Gutzwiller loc. cit., above, note 9.

11 Wächter (1841) 24 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 230, at p. 300 and note 146; 25 (1842) 361, at p. 391; Savigny (1849) 8 System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, par. 361 (5), p. 132, Guthrie's transl. (2nd ed., 1880), pp. 147 et seq.; von Bar (1889) I Theorie und Praxis des Internationalen Privatrechts, p. 67, par. 23; Lorenzen (1924) 33 Yale L.J. 736; Selected Articles (1947)Google Scholar 1; W. W. Cook (1924) 33 Yale L.J. 745; The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws (1942)Google Scholar 1; Arminjon, Hague Rec. 44 (1933 II)Google Scholar 1.

12 Ius et Lex, Festgabe für Gutzwiller (1959) 263 at pp. 276–279.Google Scholar

13 (1885) 1 L.Q.R. 246, 248: “the rules of … private international law are based on the recognition of actually acquired rights, i.e., of rights which when acquired could be really enforced by the sovereign of the state where they have their origin.”

14 (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113.

15 p. 22; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), p. 23Google Scholaret seq., especially p. 27; see also (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at pp. 113 et seq., 114. In (1890) 6 L.Q.R. 1, at pp. 3, 5, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19–21, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed.), p. 3 note (e), p. 5 note (f), pp. 12, 15 and note (9), 19, 20, 21, 23, he speaks of the extraterritorial operation of law or recognition of rights. This phrase is copied from Holland, Jurisprudence (1880), p. 288; see below, note 18. And see the critique of Pillet, Principes de droit international privé (1905) 514Google Scholar, note.

16 Conflict of Laws, p. VII.

17 1st ed. (1880), p. 288 and note 1; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), pp. 3, 5, notes.Google Scholar

18 Nadelmann, loc. cit. (above, note 12), 277, 278; for the revision of these references in subsequent editions see Nadelmann, p. 277, note 90, and p. 278. The wording of Dicey's Principle I (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922) p. 23: “duly acquired” recalls a similar passage in Pillet, Principes (above p. 68, note 15) p. 496, no. 273;Google ScholarHague Rec. 8 (1925 III) 489, at p. 496Google Scholar who speaks of “un droit étant supposé acquis regulièrement dans un pays, c'est-à-dire conformément à la loi en vigueur dans ce pays,” which is limited to a well-defined situation. See p. 497, no. 274; p. 510, note.

19 Praelectiones ad Pandectas II, 1, 3.15, who may have envisaged a doctrine of acquired rights in order to counter the doctrines of the statutists; see ibid., II, 1, 3.2. Thus the respect for acquired rights may have served as a motive for the application of foreign law which could not apply proprio motu, as the statutists would have it, but not as a principle requiring the application of foreign law replacing a similar doctrine of the statutists. Cf. Dicey (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at p. 118; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), p. 33.Google Scholar

20 See above p. 67, note 5.

21 See the writers cited above p. 68, note 11, and Dicey's own admission in (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at 118; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), p. 33.Google Scholar And see in particular the formulation adopted in Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), p. 27Google Scholar: “The word ‘duly’ [acquired] … fixes in effect the limit of the application of General Principle I. This principle is … only that rights which have been, in the opinion of English courts (italics mine), properly and rightly acquired are … enforceable here.” This restriction appeared first in Dicey article (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at pp. 118–119, but in a less explicit sense, when it was stated: “This grant of ‘due acquisition’ may arise either from A's own conduct, or from the conduct of the [foreign] sovereign either as a legislator or as judge.”

22 Above p. 68, note 19.

23 Praelectiones II, 1.3, 2; Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt (1686) I, 3.4–6; De jure civitatis I, 4.1 (3rd ed.); III, 10 (1st ed., 1684).

24 Meijers, Hague Rec. 49 (1934 III) 547, at p. 670, citing Praelectiones II, 1, 3.3, Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt I, 3.8 and 10; Kollewijn, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Wetenschap van het I.P.R. tot 1880 (1937) 145, 146, but see pp. 138, 142; Yntema, Vom deutschen zum europäischen Recht II (1963) 65, at p. 75 et seq.; (1966) 65 Mich.L.R. 1, at p. 19 et seq.

25 Meijers loc. cit., at p. 664 demonstrates the difference between the use of the terms “de summo jure,” “de necessitate,” on the one hand, and of “de humanitate,” “de comitate,” on the other hand. See also Yntema, op. cit., II, p. 76, n. 30; p. 79, n. 40, n. 44. For Dicey's view, see (1890) 6 L.Q.R. 1, at pp. 9 et seq., 14, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

26 I, 3.7. See also Praelectiones II, 1.3. para. 1: “quamquam ipsa quaestio magis ad jus gentium quam ad jus civile pertineat quatenus quid diversi populi inter se servare debeant, ad juris gentium rationes pertinere manifestum est.” See Meijers, p. 668, note.

27 Praelectiones II, 1.3. para. 2; Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt I, 3.4–6.

28 For the “tacit pact” of states, see Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Prolegomena 1, 15, 16, 17, 26, 40: Yntema, op. cit., II, pp. 76, 81, 83, 84, and 85 n. 65. See also Kollewijn loc. cit., p. 133. But see Huber, De jure civitatis III, 10 nos. 1 and 2: “etsi non teneantur ex pacto vel necessitate subordinationis” (Meijers loc. cit., 667, n. 2).

29 See Pillet, Principes 135: “The respect for acquired rights is a … fundamental notion of Private International Law, provided that the applicable law has been determined previously and applied”; see also Hague Rec. 8 (1925 III) at p. 503Google Scholar; Lainé, Introduction au droit international privé II (1892) 108; Gutzwiller (1936) 10 Rabels Z. 1064; Kollewijn, loc. cit., p. 133: “… it follows from the character as natural law of his jus gentium that inasmuch as the rule has come into existence which requires the application of foreign law, no country can withdraw from this of its own motion.” Cf. Dicey (1890) 6 L.Q.R. 1, at p. 11; (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at p. 118. Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), at pp. 12, 24, 333.Google Scholar

30 See above p. 69, note 21. It was only the last step in the logical argument when the editors of the sixth edition (1949), pp. 11, 12, replaced the qualification that the right must have been “duly” acquired by the requirement that it must have been acquired “according to the English rules of the conflict of laws.” For comments, see Falconbridge (1950) 66 L.Q.R. 104, 106; Mann (1949) 12 M.L.R. 518, 520; Cavers (1950) 63 Harv.L.R. 1278, 1280; Rheinstein (1950) 35 N.Y.U.L.R. 180, 181.

31 If it is assumed that a division of legislative competences exists between states, and that this division must be respected, the doctrine of acquired rights assumes the character of a legal principle based upon an overriding international duty. But such was not Dicey's point of departure, which is firmly based upon the practice of English courts as initiated by Lord Mansfield (see above, p. 67, note 5). Nevertheless traces of such a doctrine are to be found in Dicey's General Principle II (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at pp. 118, 119; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), pp. 27, 28Google Scholar; cf. Gutzwiller (1936) 10 Rabels Z. 1062.

32 (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at p. 118; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), p. 33.Google Scholar

33 (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, at p. 115: “The object for which courts exist is to give redress for the infringement of rights”; see also p. 117; Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), pp. 26, 27.Google Scholar

34 (1964) 78 L.Q.R. 337; XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law (1961) 307.Google Scholar

35 (1961) 10 I.C.L.Q. 818.

36 The Growth of Internationalism in English Private International Law (1962).Google Scholar

37 Nussbaum, Private International Law (1942) 70–73; Morris (1946) 62 L.Q.R. 170; Francescakis, Théorie du renvoi (1958) 11–16, nos. 7–11 with references to earlier literature; Rev.crit.d.i.p. 1966Google Scholar; 1; (1967) 3 Riv.dir.int.e.proc.priv. 691; Graulich, Mélanges Dabin II (1963) 629; De Nova, Dir.int. 1959, 13, 500; Mélanges Maury I (1960) 377Google Scholar; Studi Ghisleriana, Ser. I, vol. IV: Studi giuridici (1967) 126–135Google Scholar; (1966) 54 Calif.L.R. 1569; von Overbeck in De Conflictu Legum (in honour of Kollewijn and Offerhaus) (1962) 362; Ballarino, Mosconi and Pocar in (1967) 3 Riv.dir.int.priv.e.proc. 707, 730, 734; Kelly (1969) 18 I.C.L.Q. 249; Danson (1963) 1 Harv.J.of Legislation 71; Di Vignano, Tommasi, Lex fori e diritto straniero (1964) 122–133.Google Scholar

38 Unger (1952) M.L.R. 88; (1959) 43 Transactions of the Grotius Society 37; (1967) 83 L.Q.R. 427; Mann, Hague Rec. 111 (1964, I) 1, at pp. 69–70; Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (1965) 221. Francescakis calls these rules “règles d'application immédiate.”

39 Morris, loc. cit.

40 De Nova, loc cit.

41 Nussbaum, loc. cit.

42 Examples are: Wills Act 1861, ss. 1, 2; Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s. 265; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924, s. 1; Legitimacy Act 1926, ss. 1, 8; Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act 1938, s. 1 as amended; Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, s. 1 (1); Adoption Act 1958, s. 1 (1) (5); Legitimacy Act 1959, s. 2 (2); Marriage (Enabling) Act 1960, s. 1 (3); Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, ss. 14 (2) (a) (b), 24 (1) (2), 25 (1), 26 (1) 39 (1) (4), 40 (1) (a) (b); Contracts of Employment Act 1963, s. 9 (1) (2) and Sched. 1, para. 1 (3); Redundancy Payments Act 1965, ss. 17, 56 (4); Mann (1966) 82 L.Q.R. 316; see also (1964) 80 L.Q.R. 29.

43 See Lipstein (1949) 26 B.Y.I.L. 553–555.

44 Di Vignano, Tommasi, Lex fori e diritto straniero (1964), pp. 79–97.Google Scholar

45 See, e.g., Re Bettinson's Question [1956] Ch. 67Google Scholar; Regazzoni v. Sethia [1958] A.C. 301Google Scholar, and Ralli Bros. v. Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287Google Scholar, as interpreted by Mann (1937) 18 B.Y.I.L. 97; The Halley (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193, 202, and the cases cited by Lipstein in Ius Privatum Gentium I (1969) 411, at pp. 420–422.

46 I.C.J. Reports 1958, p. 52Google Scholar; Lipstein (1959) 8 I.C.L.Q. 506, 512.

47 See above n. 45.

48 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 1943 (1944), pp. 18–20Google Scholar with reference to s. 1 (1); see Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), pp. 428–431.

49 [1939] 7 C.L.J. 80.

50 [1904] 1 K.B. 492.

51 See Dicey, Conflict of Laws (6th ed., 1949), pp. 754–757Google Scholar; (7th ed., 1958), pp. 927–931; (8th ed., 1967), pp. 903–908.

52 See also Unger (1967) 83 L.Q.R. 427, 444.

53 See the decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court of 12 January 1967, NJW 1967, 1177; IPRspr. 1966–67, no. 19, p. 64, and of 19 December 1958, BGHZ 29, 137, IPRspr. 1958–59, no. 112; Kropholler, NJW 1968, 1561 with further references; Wengler, Rev.crit.d.i.p. 1954, 661, at 683, n. 2.

54 s. 3. And see the Hague Convention of 1961 on the Form of Wills, s. 5.

55 See Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), pp. 235–237; Beckett (1934) 15 B.Y.I.L. 46, at 73, n. 1; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), pp. 90–94; Lorenzen, Selected Articles, pp. 129–130; (1941) 50 Yale L.J. 743, at 755, 756; and the former practice of the German Supreme Court, RG., JW 1913, 333.

56 [1932] P. 78.

57 [1939] A.C. 277.

58 Cf. Pillet, Principes, p. 253, no. 110; p. 255, no. 112; but see p. 250.

59 See Unger (1957) 43 Transactions of the Grotius Society 87, at p. 94.

60 (1891) 7 L.Q.R. 113, 120, General Principle II, Exception (2); see also Pillet, Principes 516, 36, 42.

61 See Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960] 2 Q.B. 19Google Scholar; for an earlier pronouncement, see Sottomayor v. De Barros (No. 2) (1879) 5 P.D. 94 (personal incapacity not recognised by English law).

62 Legitimation by subsequent marriage was recognised long before this institution was introduced in England; see Re Goodman's Trusts (1881) 17 Ch.D. 266, and foreign judicial decrees of divorce were recognised before they became possible in England; see Warrender v. Warrender (1835) 2 Cl. & F. 488; foreign proxy marriages are recognised although they are unknown in English law: see Apt v. Apt [1948] P. 83.Google Scholar

63 Re Wilson [1954] Ch. 733Google Scholar; Re Marshall [1957] Ch. 507Google Scholar; Re Valentine's Settlement [1965] Ch. 831, at 844, 846, 848Google Scholar, overruling Re Wilby [1956] P. 174.Google Scholar

64 Travers v. Holley [1953] P. 246Google Scholar; Arnold v. Arnold [1957] P. 237Google Scholar; Manning v. Manning [1958] P. 112Google Scholar; Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott [1958] P. 71Google Scholar, limited by the considerations in Levett v. Levett [1957] P. 156.Google Scholar

65 The doctrine of “rinvio ricettizio” in its various forms is not part of English law, and foreign law, when applied by English courts, remains the law of a foreign country. The principles on proof of foreign law bear out this contention.

66 Lorenzen (1920) 20 Col.L.R. 20.

67 Beckett (1934) 15 B.Y.I.L. 46; Unger (1937) 19 Bell Yard 3; Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940); (1939) 52 Harv.L.R. 747; see also Falconbridge (1937) 53 L.Q.R. 235, 537; revised (1952) 30 Can. Bar Rev. 103; Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), pp. 50Google Scholaret seq.

68 Re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692Google Scholar; for a strict differentiation between the interpretation of connecting factors and characterisation of operative facts, see Makarov (below, n. 70). p. 151, n. 8.

69 For the use of this term, see Rabel, Conflict of Laws I (1945), p. 42; (2nd ed., 1958), p. 47; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), p. 44; and see Makarov (below, n. 70) at p. 150, n. 7.

70 See also Makarov, Vom deutschen zum europäischen Recht II (1963), 149, at p. 154; Wengler, Rev.crit.d.i.p. 1954, 66 at pp. 670, 673, 682, rejecting for such countries the approach advocated here—see loc. cit., pp. 666–667, 671, 674; see also Wengler, Festschrift für Martin Wolff (1952) 337, at pp. 340, 356.

71 As was suggested above, Dicey's theory of acquired rights may perhaps have been derived from such an analysis of the process in an English court leading to a choice of law. The court in England does not apply foreign law as such. It determines whether a particular claim based on foreign law is supported by the English choice of law rules.

72 Cf. Robertson, p. 127; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (1947), p. 101; (2nd ed., 1954), p. 59, believes that the court provisionally consults foreign law before finally characterising the question for the purpose of selecting the proper law. See the valid critique in Dicey, Conflict of Laws (8th ed., 1967), p. 27. The present account avoids this pitfall by analysing the concrete situation.

73 e.g., contract, tort, succession, capacity to marry, formality.

74 e.g., status, rights in movables or immovables, evidence, procedure, property relations between spouses.

75 It is assumed that the application is opposed by the other party, who alleges that another legal system is applicable.

76 In order not to complicate and to confuse this analysis no mention is made at each stage that the same process applies, if the defendant relies for his defence on English law. Here again the court must apply its own rules of Private International Law (which are not always expressed in terms of English domestic law) in order to determine whether English law applies: see British Linen Co. v. Drummond (1830) 10 B. & C. 903; Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing.N.C. 202, 210, 213; Don v. Lippman (1837) 5 Cl. & F. 1, 13, 16; Leroux v. Brown (1852) 12 C.B. 801, 823; Bristow v. Sequeville (1850) 5 Ex. 275; Re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900] P. 211, 230, 233, 240Google Scholar; S. A. de Prayon v. Koppel (1933) 77Google Scholar S.J. 80; Re Cutcliffe's Will Trust [1940] Ch. 565Google Scholar; Re Middleton's Settlement [1947] Ch. 329, 583 (C.A.)Google Scholar; [1949] A.C. 418; Re Priest [1944] Ch. 58Google Scholar; Adams v. National Bank of Greece [1961] A.C. 255, 287Google Scholar; see also Dreyfus (C. and H.) Foundation Inc. v. I.R.C. [1956] A.C. 39Google Scholar; Rae (Inspector of Taxes) v. Lazard Investment Co. Ltd. [1963] 1 W.L.R. 555Google Scholar; Baron Inchyra v. Jennings (Inspector of Taxes) [1966] Ch. 37.Google Scholar

77 This seems to be the view expressed by Inglis (1958) 74 L.Q.R. 493, at pp. 509, 513, who argues from the decisions in Re Cohn [1945] Ch. 5Google Scholar and Re Maldonado [1954] P. 223Google Scholar that where conflicting claims are made which rely respectively on English and foreign law, only the claim based on English law is characterised. If English law is then found to be inapplicable according to the relevant English rule of Private International Law, the claim based on foreign law is not characterised and is admitted without further consideration. The cases cited do not bear out this contention. Di Vignano, Tommasi, Lex fori e diritto straniero (1964) 217Google Scholar, holds that a relationship alleged to be governed by foreign law remains a factual relationship.

78 Ogden v. Ogden [1907] P. 46Google Scholar (C.A.), and the comments in Dicey and Morris, pp. 237–239; Westlake, P.I.L. (2nd ed., 1925), p. 61; Phrantzes v. Argenti [1960] 2 Q.B. 19.Google Scholar

79 Note to Re Maldonado [1954] P. 223Google Scholar; [1954] C.L.J. 123.

80 See the cases cited above n. 76, and see Re Wilks [1935] Ch. 645Google Scholar; Re Kehr [1951] 2 T.L.R. 788Google Scholar; [1951] 2 All E.R. 812; Re Barnett's Trusts [1902] 1 Ch. 842Google Scholar; Mahadervan v. Mahadervan [1964] P. 233, 241–242.Google Scholar

81 Batthyany v. Walford (1887) 36 Ch.D. 269, 278; De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] A.C. 21Google Scholar; Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch. 394, 396 (C.A.)Google ScholarPhrantzes v. Argenti [1960] 2 Q.B. 19, 36Google Scholar and the comments in (1960) 9 I.C.L.Q. 508; (1960) 23 M.L.R. 446.

82 Ogden v. Ogden [1908] P. 46Google Scholar, and see also Bliersbach v. McEwen 1959 S.C. 43Google Scholar; Lodge v. Lodge (1963) 107Google Scholar S.J. 437, and see the comments by Anton (1959) 3 Jur.Rev.(n.s.) 253, 277; Carter in (1960) 36 B.Y.I.L. 417; Re Maldonado [1954] P. 223, 231, 244Google Scholaret seq., but see Lipstein [1954] C.L.J. 22. See also Castillo, Garde, La Institución Desconocida en el d.i.p. (1947), pp. 46–47.Google Scholar

83 [1945] Ch. 5. According to Master Jacob in Smit, International Cooperation in Litigation (Europe) (1965), p. 103Google Scholar n. 205, the parties in this case agreed not to plead foreign law and to leave the question of foreign law to the court.

84 [1966] 2 W.L.R. 717, at pp. 735, 736–738.

85 It is useful to note the approach adopted in recent times by the German Federal Supreme Court in a decision of 12 January 1967, NJW 1967, 1171, IPRspr. 1966–67, no. 19, p. 64. The court said: “The subsumption of these rules [i.e., Art. 992 of the Dutch Civil Code] must be made in accordance with German law. In this connection the following principles of interpretation must be observed: the rules of foreign law must be examined with a view to their meaning and purpose, they must be analysed from the standpoint of foreign law and must be compared with the institutions of the German legal order. On the basis of this knowledge they must be subsumed by the German rules of Private International Law, the characteristics of which are shaped by the notions and delimitations of German law.” See also B.G.H.Z. 29, 137, IPRspr. 1958–59, no. 112, p. 389; and see Castel (1961) 39 Can. Bar Rev. 93, 192, citing Livesly v. Horst [1924] S.C.R. 605Google Scholar; [1925] 1 D.L.R. 159.

86 Compare Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing.N.C. 203 at pp. 212, 213; Robertson, op. cit. p. 248; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (1947), pp. 101, 106.

87 Only if the English court, in deference to the English doctrine of renvoi, sits as a foreign court, it must have regard to the characterisation, if different, by the foreign lex causae. The present conclusions constitute, therefore, a rejection of secondary characterisation. For this problem, see Robertson, op. cit., pp. 118–134, 255–279; Cheshire, Private International Law (3rd ed., 1947), pp. 71–85; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (1st ed., 1947), pp. 98 et seq., 107, 161 et seq.; 184 et seq., but see (2nd ed., 1954), p. 68, note g; (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 369; (1941) 19 Can. Bar Rev. 311, at 334.

88 Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), pp. 59 60, 134, is inclined to think in terms of abstract rules.

89 The popular analysis which detects a process in three stages is thus accepted subject to the explanations given above that: (i) analysis of the function of the rule of foreign (or English) law within its own setting and (ii) interpretation of the operative facts of the rules of Private International Law of the forum alleged to be relevant must be carried out simultaneously followed by (iii) application of the rule of foreign law found to be applicable. Cf. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (8th ed., 1967), p. 30; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), pp. 50 et seq., 133–136; Inglis (1958) 74 L.Q.R. 493, 503.

90 These categories were first discussed by Lewald, Hague Rec. 69 (1939, III) 1, at p. 129.

91 According to Neuhaus, Grundbegriffe des Internationalen Privatrechts (1962) 251Google Scholar, n. 604, the category described as transposition merges into the other two. There is some substance in this contention, at least as far as any overlap between transposition and substitution is concerned.

92 (1883) 8 App.Cas. 577, at pp. 591, 600, 604.

93 [1895] 1 Ch. 83, 89.

94 Re Marshall [1957] Ch. 507 (C.A.)Google Scholar, overruling Re Wilby [1956] P. 174.Google Scholar

95 See, e.g., Tursi v. Tursi [1958] P. 54Google Scholar: effect of a foreign separation order upon a state of desertion according to English law.

96 It is superficially reminiscent of situations such as that decided in the arrêt Bartholo, Clunet 1891, 1171; Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), p. 158 et seq.

97 Baudoin v. Trudel [1937] 1 D.L.R. 216Google Scholar; [1937] O.R. 1.

98 See the California Probate Code, s. 201.5 (California Statutes 1957, c. 490). And see the cases cited by Lewald, pp. 140–148.

99 Re Johnson [1903] 1 Ch. 821Google Scholar; Re Bowes (1906) 22 T.L.R. 711.Google Scholar

1 Private International Law (4th ed., 1905), pp. 33Google Scholar, 40, (5th ed., 1912), pp. 32, 34; Falconbridge, op. cit., pp. 212–215, esp. p. 214, note (y).

2 Re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692Google Scholar; Re Ross [1930] 1 Ch. 377 (foreign court theory)Google Scholar; Re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259 (acquired rights).Google Scholar

3 Status: Re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259Google Scholar; succession to movables: Re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692Google Scholar, and to immovables: Re Ross [1930] 1 Ch. 377Google Scholar; Re Duke of Wellington [1947] Ch. 506Google Scholar, [1948] Ch. 118 (C.A.); capacity to marry: R. v. Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, ex p. Arias [1968] 2 Q.B. 956Google Scholar; formalities of marriage: Taczanowska v. Taczanowski [1957] P. 301Google Scholar, 305. Renvoi does not apply to contracts: Re United Railways of Havana v. Regla Warehouses Ltd. [1960] Ch. 52, at pp. 96–97Google Scholar, 115 (C.A.), but see [1958] Ch. 724, 760 (Wynn-Parry J.); Hall (1959) 109 L.J. 645; see also Rosencrantz v. Union Contractors Ltd. (1960) 23 D.L.R. (2d) 473Google Scholar; Castel (1961) 39 Can. Bar Rev. 93; (1961) 21 Rev. du Barreau de Quebec 181, 199; Sherwood (1956) 5 A.J.Comp.L. 120–125. The question remains open for discussion whether it should be admitted in the law of contract, if the parties have not exercised an express or implied choice. See the survey by Graue, Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebsberaters 1968, 121; Gamillscheg (1962) 27 Rabels Z. 591; Maier, 1962 NJW 323, 325; Kreuzer, Das Internationale Privatecht des Warenkauts (1964) 284; Hartwig, Renvoi im internationalen Privatrecht (1967) 152, 156; Vischer, Internationales Vertragsrecht (1962) 111; Batiffol, Conflits de Lois en matière de contrats (1938) no. 53; Traité de d.i.p. (4th ed., 1967), no. 311, p. 358 and note 52 bis: Kegel in Soergel's Kommentar (10th ed., 1970), note 34 to article 27; Kelly (1969) 18 I.C.L.Q. 249, at p. 257, n. 39. And see the following cases: Mason v. Rose 176 F. (2d) 486 (2 Cir. 1949)Google Scholar; Siegelman v. Cunard 221 F. (2d) 189 (1 Cir. 1955)Google Scholar; University of Chicago v. Dater, 227 Mich. 658, 279 N.W. 175 (1936)Google Scholar; ca: Lann v. United Steel Works Corpn., 166 Misc. 465, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 951, 957; Frankfurt, C. A., 13 November 1956Google Scholar, IPRspr. 1956–57 No. 24, affirmed by the German Supreme Court, 14 February 1958, NJW 1958, 750, AWD 1958, 57, IPRspr. 1958–59 no. 39, p. 155 and of 9 June 1960, NJW 1960, 1720, AWD 1960, 183, IPRspr. 1960–61 no. 23, p. 94; but see Swiss Federal Tribunal, 21 October 1955, BGF 81, II 391.

4 The other concerns the rejection of foreign law on the ground of public policy.

5 Lazard Bros. v. Midland Bank [1933] A.C. 289Google Scholar, at 298; A. S. Talinna Laevauhisus v. Esthonian S.S. Line (1946)Google Scholar 80 Lloyd's List Law Report 99, at p. 107 et seq.

6 The desire to reach a decision identical with that which would be reached in the country of the lex causae induced Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), p. 775, to relate renvoi to jurisdiction.

7 See Hanisch, NJW 1966, 2085 with lit. and cases p. 2086, n. 15; see especially Neuhaus, Grundbegriffe des I.P.R. (1962) 190–194; JZ 1954, 704; Gündisch, Fam. R.Z. 1961, 352; Jayme, Dir. Int. 22 (1968), pp. 84, 88, notes 33, 34, with lit.; Ehrenzweig, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1962) 404. For a case of concealed reference on (transmission) see the decision of the Court of Mainz of 21 October 1966, StAZ 1967, 24; IPRspr. 1966–67, no. 159, p. 502, reported by Jayme, loc. cit., and in (1969) 21 Florida L.R. 290; Soergel-Kegel, , Kommentar zum BGB, vol. VII (10th ed., 1970)Google Scholar, note 14 to art. 27. Mehren, Von in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law (1961), pp. 380Google Scholar, 382, uses the term in a different sense.

8 The situation is not unlike that in Armitage v. Att.-Gen. [1906] P. 135Google Scholar, which is not regarded as one involving renvoi. See Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Laws, pp. 61–62.

9 See above p. 73.

10 [1906] P. 135. See also Abate v. Abate [1961] P. 29Google Scholar; Mather v. Mahoney [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1773Google Scholar; [1968] 2 All E.R. 223.

11 Dicey, Rule 2.

12 Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K.B. 532Google Scholar; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 K.B. 718Google Scholar; Re Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetchesky), Royal Exchange Assurance v. The Liquidator [1952] 1 All E.R. 1269Google Scholar, 1271; Re Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetchesky) (No. 2) [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1108Google Scholar, 1113; Re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] Ch. 745, 766Google Scholar. They will be disregarded if the confiscatory law is penal: Novello v. Hinrichsen [1951] Ch. 595, 1026 (C.A.).Google Scholar If the foreign confiscatory legislation purports to operate in respect of assets in England, the rule that English law as the lex situs must be applied, and not the confiscatory character of the foreign law, leads to the disregard of the foreign law; see Bank voor Handel v. Slatford [1953] Q.B. 248, 261Google Scholar; Banco de Vizcaja v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria [1935] 1 K.B. 140.Google Scholar

13 Gray v. Formosa [1963] P. 259Google Scholar; Lepre v. Lepre [1965] P. 52.Google Scholar

14 Re Langley's Settlement Trust [1962] Ch. 541.Google Scholar

15 Re Langley's Settlement Trust [1962] Ch. 541, 555, 557–558 (C.A.)Google Scholar; Russ v. Russ [1963] P. 87, 100Google Scholar; [1964] P. 315, 327–328; 334, 335 (C.A.); Cheni v. Cheni [1965] P. 85, 98Google Scholar; Gray v. Formosa [1963] P. 259, 269, 270, 271 (C.A.)Google Scholar; Lepre v. Lepre [1965] P. 52, 63Google Scholar; Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 1 All E.R. 325Google Scholar, 343 (55), 346 (63), [1971] 2 W.L.R. 518, 536 (4), 540.

16 Dicey and Morris, pp. 76–77; Grodecki (1962) 11 I.C.L.Q. 578, 582; Nygh (1964) 13 I.C.L.Q. 39, 51; Cheshire, 151–152.

17 Aldricus (1170–1200): quaeritur si homines diversarum provinciarum quae diversas habent consuetudines, sub uno eodemque judice litigant, utram earum judex qui judicandum suscepit sequi debeat. Respondeo eam quae potior et melior videtur. Debet enim judicare secundum quod melius ei visum fuerit secundum Aldricum. See Gutzwiller, Hague Rec. 29 (1929, IV)Google Scholar 291, 301 n. 1; Neumeyer, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwickelung des internationalen Privat- und Strafechts bis Bartolus, II (1916) 67; Meijers, Bijdrage, p. 87; Niederer in Festschrift für Hans Fritzche (1952) 115; Rev. crit.d.i.p. 49 (1960) 137, 141.

18 [1961] Ch. 541, 554.

19 [1946] P. 122 (C.A.).

20 At p. 129.

21 See also Scarman, J. in Russ v. Russ [1963] P. 87Google Scholar, 99–100, [1962] 2 W.L.R. 708, at 714–715; In the Estate of Fuld [1966] 2 W.L.R. 717Google Scholar, 737.

22 [1962] Ch. 541, 554.

23 Despite Lord Greene's warning: [1946] P. 122, 125.

24 At pp. 554–555.

25 At pp. 557–558.

26 7th ed., (1957), p. 225; see now (8th ed., 1967), pp. 225–231.

27 (1880) 49 L.J.Ch. 261.

28 [1902] 1 Ch. 488.

29 (1880) 49 L.J.Ch. 261, 262; [1902] 1 Ch. 488, 492.

30 [1963] P. 259.

31 Dicey, Conflict of Laws (8th ed., 1967), pp. 317–318, 376–377.

32 Dicey, Rule 40 (4), pp. 318–319.

33 [1963] P. 259, followed to this extent by Lepre v. Lepre [1965] P. 52.Google Scholar

34 (1879) 5 P.D. 94; Dicey and Morris, Rule 31, Exception 3, pp. 269–270, supported by Cotton L.J. in Sottomayor v. De Barros (No. 1) (1877) 3 P.D. 1, at p. 7, where he said: “No country is bound to recognise the law of a foreign state when they work injustice to its own subjects.” See also Cheni v. Cheni [1965] P. 85Google Scholar, at p. 98.

35 Dicey and Morris, p. 370.

36 Corbett v. Corbett [1957] 1 W.L.R. 486.Google Scholar

37 Berthiaume v. Dastous [1930] A.C. 79.Google Scholar

38 It is interesting to note that in the 7th ed. (1958) of Dicey, at p. 57, characterisation is illustrated by reference to this example.

39 At p. 269.

40 At p. 270.

41 At p. 27, citing [1899] 1 Ch. 781, at p. 790, approved in Salvesen (or von Lorang) v. Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] A.C. 641Google Scholar, at pp. 659, 663.

42 (1879) 5 P.D. 94; cf. Kahn-Freund (1953) 39 Transactions of the Grotius Society 39, at p. 53.

43 [1939] 2 All E.R. 150n.

44 [1939] P. 237.

45 Imposed upon Roman Catholics not only in Malta but also in Spain, Còdigo civil, art. 42; also in Greece, Civil Code, art. 1367.

46 Die Grundlagen des deutschen internationalen Privatrechts (1932), p. 249Google Scholaret seq.

47 (1934) 8 Rabels Z. 148; (1963) 17 Dir.Int. I, 50. See also Hoogstraten, van in Mélanges Kollewijn (1962), p. 209Google Scholar; Lagarde, Rev.crit.d.i.p. 1960, 459, with further Iit. at n. 1. For a survey, see Voskuil (1965) 19 Dir.Int. I, 183.

48 Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940) 135–156Google Scholar; (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 565, at p. 584.

49 It is generally agreed that neither the domestic law of the forum nor that of the lex causae can furnish the solution.

50 Birtwhistle v. Vardill (1840) 7 Cl. & F. 940; Re Wright's Trusts (1856) 2 K. & J. 595; Mette v. Mette (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 416; Brook v. Brook (1861) 9 H.L.C. 193; Shaw v. Gould (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 55; Re Goodman's Trusts (1881) 17 Ch.D. 266; Re Andros (1883) 24 Ch.D. 637; Re Grove (1888) 40 Ch.D. 216; Re Bozelli [1902] 1 Ch. 751Google Scholar; De Wilton v. Montefiore [1909] 2 Ch. 481Google Scholar; Skottowe v. Young (1871) L.R. 11 Eq. 474; Atkinson v. Anderson (1882) 21 Ch.D. 100; Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding etc. Co. [1924] A.C. 226Google Scholar; Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943] A.C. 32Google Scholar; Kahier v. Midland Bank [1950] A.C. 24.Google Scholar In the case of suretyship Voskuil, p. 192, distinguishes between preliminary and incidental questions.

51 [1963] 37 D.L.R. (2d) 467; (1964) 42 D.L.R. (2d) 622, 633; [1964] O.R. 430, 441 (C.A.) [1965] S.C.R. 148, [1965] 48 D.L.R. (2d) 644. The decision could have been supported on another ground, drawn from the principle of the conflict of laws in time: see Lipstein (1967) 2 Ottawa L.R. 49, 56, relying on arguments developed in [1967] C.L.J. 42. If this approach had been chosen, the problem would have involved two principal questions of equal standing, i.e., the recognition of a divorce in Italy of Hungarian domiciliaries and the capacity to marry of a person domiciled in Israel who had been divorced, on the strength of a decree recognised in Ontario. See also Lysyk (1965) 43 Can. Bar Rev. 365; Webb (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q. 659.

52 Above section (4).

53 See above the observations on the problem of adaptation.

54 See Wolff, Private International Law (2nd ed., 1950), ss. 196, 198, pp. 206–209.

55 Gottlieb (1955) 33 Can. Bar Rev. 523, 528.

56 Lipstein (1967) 2 Ottawa L.R. 49, at p. 58; see also Unger (1957) 43 Transactions of the Grotius Society 86, at p. 94.

57 Cf. Wolff, Private International Law s. 196.

58 Wengler (1958) 22 Rabels Z. 535, at 544, is more pragmatic.

59 (1869) L.R. 3 H.L. 55.

60 According to Inglis (1957) 6 I.C.L.Q. 202, at p. 214, Shaw v. Gould turned on the validity of the first marriage, and therefore on English law as that of the domicile of the children. However, in this case the presumption of legitimacy would have applied.

61 Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, s. 11.

62 Legitimacy Act 1959, s. 2.

63 Legitimacy Act 1926, s. 1; Legitimacy Act 1959, s. 1.

64 See in a different context, but in a similar vein, Melchior, Grundlagen p. 260, and notes 3 and 4; Lagarde, Rev.crit.d.i.p. 1960, 459, at p. 468, who speaks of “eloignement.” And see Wolff, Private International Law, paras. 362, 363.

65 Dicey and Morris, Rule 60, p. 418.

66 Subject to the modifications set out above, see Lipstein in (1954) I Festschrift für Rabel 611.

67 e.g., a marriage valid in England under the rule in Sottomayor v. De Barros (No. 2) (1879) 5 P.D. 94.

68 Private International Law (2nd ed., 1950)Google Scholar, s. 200.

69 On 18 December 1970 divorce was introduced in Italy. (Law No. 898 of 1 December 1970). According to art. 3 of the Law, a marriage abroad after a decree of divorce granted abroad will be recognised in respect of parties subject to Italian law.

70 [1968] 2 Q.B. 956.

71 Ibid. p. 966, 967.

72 s. 11. For the text, see (1969) 18 I.C.L.Q. 658. It has been incorporated in the English Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, s. 7.

73 Cf. Lipstein, (1967) 2 Ottawa L.R. 49.

74 See Lipstein, , Ius Privatum Gentium I (1969) 411, at pp. 420–421.Google Scholar

75 The Halley (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193, at p. 203; cf. S.S. Diana, The Cliveden [1894] A.C. 625, 629; The Youri v. The Spearman (1885) 10 App.Cas. 276; The Talabot (1890) 15 P.S. 194; The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse [1907] P. 36, 43–44Google Scholar; The City of Berlin [1908] P. 110.Google Scholar

76 The Augusta (1887) 57 L.T.R. 326, 327; The Darlington [1903] P. 77Google Scholar, 78, 80; The Prinz Hendrick [1899] P. 177, 181; The Guy Mannering (1882) 7 P.D. 132, 135; The Agnes Otto (1887) 12 P.D. 56, 57; The Andoni [1918] P. 14, 18Google Scholar; The Waziristan [1953] 2 All E.R. 1213Google Scholar; The Peerless (1860) Lush. 30; The Arum [1921] P. 12Google Scholar, 18, 20.

77 Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] K.B. 287.Google Scholar

78 Mann (1937) 18 B.Y.I.L. 97, 107–113; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws 387, pp. 391–394; Morris (1953) 6 Vanderbilt L.R. 505 at 510; Rabel II, 536; Cheshire and North 228–229. See also Serick (1953) 18 Rabels Z. 633, 647 with reference to the decision of the German Supreme Court RGZ 161, 296, 300; 93, 182, 184 and the lit. cit. in n. 79.

79 Dicey and Morris, Rule 132, Exception, pp. 761–762.

80 [1958] A.C. 301.

81 Morris (1953) 6 Vanderbilt L.R. 505, at p. 510 with references.

82 See Dicey and Morris, p. 40, n. 1, with lit., esp. Mann (1954) 31 B.Y.I.L. 217; Grodecki (1959) 35 B.Y.I.L. 58.

83 Dicey and Morris, p. 44. Cf. Mann, 217, at p. 219. In reality the so-called retroactive effect discussed by writers resolves itself into two separate effects. Either the subsequent legislation purports to affect ex nunc the previously existing situation (e.g., s. 8 (1) of the Legitimacy Act 1926) or ex tunc. Only the latter effect can properly be regarded as retroactive. Thus two different questions arise: the first is whether the law applies to an existing legal relationship and, secondly, whether it applies ex tunc. The former involves a question of the conflict of laws in time; the latter involves the interpretation of domestic law found to apply to an existing legal relationship. No retroactive effect was envisaged by the statutes in issue in Lynch v. Government of Paraguay, Re Aganoor's Trusts and Nelson v. Bridport (see infra).

84 Critical Wengler (1958) 23 Rabels Z. 535, 552, 558 et seq.

85 See my review of Roubier, Le droit transitoire (2nd ed., 1960) in [1961] C.L.J. 123. The term is used in a simpler sense than that adopted by Mendes da Costa (1958) 7 I.C.L.Q. 217, 251.

86 e.g., contracts, matrimonial relations both of a personal and of a proprietary nature and other family relationships. For the use of this distinction, see Wengler (1958) 22 Rabels Z. 535, 543; for its practical application, see Parkasho v. Singh [1968] P. 233.Google Scholar

87 Unless a positive rule of Private International Law requires the contrary, as does the rule in Phillip v. Eyre (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, at p. 28.

88 Wengler (1958) 23 Rabels Z. 535; Adams v. National Bank of Greece S.A. [1961] A.C. 255Google Scholar, and see Lipstein [1960] C.L.J. 169. The objection that the reference to the domicile “at the time of his death” refers to the connecting factor domicile is irrelevant in the present context, which concerns a different problem. Ca. Dicey and Morris, p. 46, with lit. n. 37; Mann, loc. cit., p. 234, but see pp. 237, 242; Grodecki, loc. cit., p. 66; Makarov (1957) 22 Rabels Z. 200, who speaks of the “petrification” of the law applicable. But see Wengler, loc. cit., at pp. 548, 554. And see In the Estate of Musurus [1936] 2Google Scholar All E.R. 1666, with a note by Schoch, M. (1939) 5 Giur.Comp.d.i.p. n. 103, p. 308.Google Scholar

89 (1871) L.R. 2 P. & D. 268, esp. p. 272.

90 See now Bank voor Handel etc. v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q.B. 248, at p. 257Google Scholaret seq. Diplock, L.J. in Adams v. National Bank of Greece and Athens [1958] 2 Q.B. 59Google Scholar, 76, 77, but see Lord, Reid in Adams v. National Bank of Greece S.A. [1961] A.C. 255, 282.Google Scholar

91 (1895) 66 L.J.Ch. 521.

92 Ca. Dicey and Morris, p. 45; Mann 234, who argues that Italian law altered the beneficial interests in the trust fund. According to the view taken here it altered the nature of proprietary interests in general capable of being held according to Italian law as the lex situs. See also Grodecki, 69.

93 (1846) 8 Beav. 547.

94 (1895) 66 L.J.Ch. 521.

95 (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 28.

96 Lipstein in Ius Privatum Gentium I (1969) 411, at p. 426, and note 88 with lit.

97 Ibid., pp. 411, 422.

98 R. v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders A.G. [1937] A.C. 500, and the cases cited in Dicey and Morris, p. 47, n. 44; Grodecki, loc. cit., p. 78. See also Wengler (1958) 23 Rabels Z. 335, at p. 355.

99 Cf. Rossano v. Manufacturers' Life Insurance Co. [1963] 2 Q.B. 352, 362.Google Scholar

1 [1954] A.C. 155; see Mann, loc. cit., p. 243.

2 Ca. Mann, loc. cit., pp. 242, 244, who stresses the continuance de facto of the marriage; Grodecki, p. 72.

3 See Wengler, loc. cit., at pp. 535, 560.

4 [1954] A.C. 155, 157, and see pp. 169, 172 (Lord Reid: “remedial legislation was promptly enacted”), pp. 173, 176 (Lord Tucker) p. 177 (Lord Asquith of Bishopstone)—but see Mendes da Costa, p. 256.

5 Mendes da Costa, p. 257 overlooks this point, but states rightly (at p. 254) that the court did not rely clearly on the time when the subsequent legislation came into force, but did not either rely wholeheartedly on the time when the marriage was registered subsequently.

6 Dicey and Morris, p. 118; First Report of the Private International Law Committee (1954) Cmd. 9068; Seventh Report (1963) Cmnd. 1955.

7 See Lipstein [1965] C.L.J. 224, at p. 225, and note 3; Wills Act 1963, s. 1; Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, s. 3.

8 See the Convention on the Form of Wills, art. 1 (d), Wills Act 1963, s. 1; Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees relating to Adoption of 1965, see arts. 2, 3, 7; Adoption Act 1968, s. 11.

9 Art. 2.

10 Art. 3.

11 Art. 3.

12 This conclusion seems to follow from art. 6, last para, of the Convention and is apparent from s. 3 (2) and s. 5 (2) of the Act of 1971 (above p. 100, n. 7).

13 Re Lloyd Evans [1947] Ch. 695Google Scholar; Re Flynn [1968] 1 W.L.R. 103, 112–115Google Scholar [1968] 1 All E.R. 49, 56–58; Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 2 W.L.R. 518, 530.Google Scholar

14 Leaving aside the cases influenced by conditions in wartime; see May v. May (1943) 168 L.T. 42Google Scholar; Cruh v. Cruh [1945] 2 All E.R. 545.Google Scholar

15 Laid to rest in Casdagli v. Casdagli [1919] A.C. 145.Google Scholar

16 Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 2 W.L.R. 518, 531–533.Google Scholar

17 Harrison v. Harrison [1953] 1 W.L.R. 865Google Scholar; Henderson v. Henderson [1967] P. 77.Google Scholar

18 Donaldson v. Donaldson [1949] P. 363.Google ScholarCruickshanks v. Cruickshanks [1957] 1 W.L.R. 564Google Scholar; [1957] 1 All E.R. 889; Stone v. Stone [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1287Google Scholar; [1959] 1 All E.R. 194; Sears v. Sears (1962) 106 S.J. 529.Google Scholar

19 Beginning with articles by Beckett (1932) 48 L.Q.R. 341; Vesey-Fitzgerald (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 253; (1948) Current Legal Problems 222 et seq.; Morris (1952–53) 66 Harv.L.R. 961; Festschrift für M. Wolff (1952) 287–336Google Scholar, and others.

20 Baindail v. Baindail [1946] P. 122Google Scholar; Risk v. Risk [1951] P. 50Google Scholar; Sowa v. Sowa [1961] P. 70. But see the proposals of the Law Commission, Report on Polygamous Marriages (Law Com. No. 42 (1971); Morris, Conflict of Laws (1971), p. 128.Google Scholar

21 Morris, loc. cit., Ali v. Ali [1968] P. 564.

22 Re Bethell (1887) 38 Ch.D. 220.

23 Qureshi v. Qureshi [1971] 2 W.L.R. 518, 537, 538Google Scholar; Pearl [1971] C.L.J. 41, at p. 43.

24 Cf. Lendrum v. Chakravarti, 1929 S.L.T. 96Google Scholar; McDougall v. Chitnavis, 1937 S.C. 390.Google Scholar

25 Cf. Chetti v. Chetti [1909] P. 67Google Scholar; Sottomayor v. De Barros (No. 2) (1879) 5 P.D. 94.

26 Divorce Reform Act 1969, s. 2 (1) (a).

27 For this problem, seen now the Law Commisson's Report, No. 42 (1971), paras. 42–75.

28 Wilson v. Wilson (1872) L.R. 2 P. & D. 435, 441–442; Harvey v. Farnie (1882) 8 App.Cas. 43, 50, 57; Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A.C. 517, 526–527. The assumption of jurisdiction in favour of a deserted wife whose previous domicile was in England, foreshadowed in Armytage v. Armytage [1898] P. 178, 185; Ogden v. Ogden [1908] P. 46, 83Google Scholar, and put into practice in Stathatos v. Stathatos [1913] P. 46Google Scholar; De Montaigu v. De Montaigu [1913] P. 154Google Scholar, did not survive for a number of reasons. Cf. Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), Appendix Note 13, p. 826, and Rule 63, Exception, p. 294.

29 Shaw v. Gould (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 55, 69, 79, 83, 87, and the cases cited above, note 28.

30 Armitage v. Att.-Gen. [1906] P. 135.Google Scholar

31 Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey [1921] 1 A.C. 146.Google Scholar

32 Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, s. 13 = M.C. Act 1950, s. 18 (1) = M.C. Act 1965, s. 40 (1) (a). And see the Matrimonial Causes Bill 1921; Westlake, Private International Law (7th ed., 1925), p. 89; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3rd ed., 1922), App. Note 14, p. 835.

33 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949, s. 1 = M.C. Act 1950, s. 18 (1) (b) = M.C. Act 1965, s. 40 (1) (b).

34 Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, s. 40 (2).

35 For this possibility, see Lord Watson in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A.C. 517, at p. 528; Wolff, Private International Law (2nd ed., 1950), para. 358, p. 379 and n. 3.

36 (1879) 5 P.D. 94.

37 For this possibility, see Lord Watson in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A.C. 517, at p. 528; Wolff, Private International Law (2nd ed., 1950), para. 358, p. 379 and n. 3.

38 Travers v. Holley [1953] P. 246Google Scholar; Dunne v. Saban [1955] P. 178Google Scholar; see also Carr v. Carr [1955] 1 W.L.R. 422.Google Scholar

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41 Levett v. Levett [1957] P. 156 (C.A.).Google Scholar

42 Domicile of the spouses, nationality of the spouses with or without qualifications, possibly residence, if coupled with a substantial connection such as nationality even of one of the spouses only; the last matrimonial home, in virtue of the rule in Armitage v. Att.-Gen. or of the rule in Travers v. Holley. See the analysis in Dicey and Morris, First Supplement to 8th ed. (1968), p. 315; Graveson, Conflict of Laws (6th ed., 1969), p. 325; Cheshire and North (8th ed., 1970), pp. 363–365; Morris, Conflict of Laws (1971), pp. 143–144.

43 (a) Travers v. Holley; Tijanic v. Tijanic [1968] P. 181Google Scholar; [1967] 3 All E.R. 976; Brown v. Brown [1968] P. 518Google Scholar; (b) habitual residence (1 year) and nationality: Angelo v. Angelo [1968] 1 W.L.R. 401Google Scholar; [1967] 3 All E.R. 314; (c) habitual residence (2 plus or 3 years): Welsby v. Welsby [1970] 1 W.L.R. 45Google Scholar; [1970] 2 All E.R. 467; (d) if respondent has a real connection with the country: Mayfield v. Mayfield [1969] P. 119Google Scholar; [1969] 2 All E.R. 219—see also Angelo v. Angelo, supra (b); Turczak v. Turczak [1970] P. 198Google Scholar; [1969] 3 All E.R. 317; Brown v. Brown, supra (a); (e) if the petitioning husband formerly had a real connection with the country: Blair v. Blair [1969] 1 W.L.R. 221Google Scholar; [1968] 3 All E.R. 639, 642; (f) if the petitioning husband has established a substantial connection of one year's duration through residence: Munt v. Munt [1970] 2 All E.R. 516, 518Google Scholar; (g) or if the country with which the wife is connected will recognise the decree given elsewhere: Mather v. Mahoney [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1046Google Scholar; [1968] 3 All E.R. 223.

44 See the literature cited by Lipstein (1967) 2 Ottawa L.R. 49, 54, n. 37.

45 [1953] P. 246.

46 [1969] A.C. 33.

47 [1906] P. 135; consequently Mountbatten v. Mountbatten [1959] P. 43Google Scholar would stand and Mather v. Mahoney [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1773Google Scholar; [1968] 3 All E.R. 223 would be wrongly decided. See Lipstein (1967) 2 Ottawa L.R. 49, 54, 56, 70, and see Unger (1957) 43 Transactions of the Grotius Society 86, 93–94.

48 R. v. Brentwood Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, ex p. Arias [1968] 2 Q.B. 956.Google Scholar

49 (1879) 5 P.D. 94; the incapacity of the foreign party is not one of a kind to which the English party might not be subject, even if it does not affect the English party in the particular case.

50 Which provides in art. 2 a set of rules for the recognition of foreign divorces which does not differ greatly from those adumbrated in Indyka v. Indyka [1969] 1 A.C. 33Google Scholar. For the text, see, e.g., Cmnd. 3991 (1968); (1969) 18 I.C.L.Q. 658.

51 Simonin v. Mallac (1860) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; Ogden v. Ogden [1908] P. 46Google Scholar, 57, 67, 75, 76, 78, 80; Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1963] A.C. 280Google Scholar; Padolecchia v. Padolecchia [1968] P. 314.Google Scholar

52 Salvesen v. Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] A.C. 641.Google Scholar

53 [1937] P. 11; Mehta v. Mehta [1945] 2 All E.R. 690Google Scholar; Morris (1946) 62 L.Q.R. 117.

54 Gray (or Formosa) v. Formosa [1962] P. 259, per Lord, Denning M.R. at p. 269.Google Scholar

55 Lepre v. Lepre [1965] P. 52.Google Scholar

56 Chapelle v. Chapelle [1950] P. 134.Google Scholar

57 Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax [1956] P. 115Google Scholar; Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1963] A.C. 280Google Scholar, 311, 317; Szechter v. Szechter [1970] 3 All E.R. 905Google Scholar, 912; note that in 1925 the editor of Westlake believed that residence of the respondent was sufficient (p. 94).

58 Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, s. 40 (1) = Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, s. 18 (1).

59 Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [1931] P. 29.Google Scholar

60 Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax [1956] P. 115Google Scholar; see also Easterbrook v. Easterbrook [1944] P. 10Google Scholar; Hutter v. Hutter [1944] P. 95Google Scholar; possibly also the residence of the respondent alone: Magnier v. Magnier (1968) 112 S.J. 233.Google Scholar

61 Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1963] A.C. 280.Google Scholar

62 See above, n. 58.

63 Cohn (1948) 64 L.Q.R. 324, 337, 533; Grodecki (1957) 20 M.L.R. 566, 575; (1958) 74 L.Q.R. 225, 234–235.

64 De Reneville v. De Reneville [1948] P. 100Google Scholar; Dicey and Morris, Rule 45, pp. 359–367; Morris (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 424. In Ponticelli v. Ponticelli [1958] P. 204Google Scholar, the law of the husband's domicile at the relevant time coincided with the lex fori.

65 See Dicey and Morris, loc. cit.; Morris, loc cit., p. 55, n. 5.

66 (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 424.

67 [1948] P. 100.

68 [1963] A.C. 280.

69 See above, Section (3).

70 This may be the law governing the formalities of marriage, the capacity to marry or, possibly the law relating to certain grounds for rescinding the marriage for reasons appearing after the marriage ceremony. All require a formal determination by a court; for a so-called non-marriage not requiring a decree according to foreign law, see Merker v. Merker [1963] P. 283Google Scholar; [1963] C.L.J. 50; Berthiaume v. Dastous [1930] A.C. 79Google Scholar, as explained by Cohn (1948) 64 L.Q.R. at p. 339. Thus the test should be ideally whether the decree operates ex nunc or ex tunc, but the wording of the corresponding English decrees precludes this solution. However, see now the Nullity Act 1971, s. 5.

71 As happened in De Reneville v. De Reneville [1948] P. 100Google Scholar; Hill v. Hill [1960] P. 130Google Scholar; Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1963] A.C. 280Google Scholar; Easterbrook v. Easterbrook [1944] P. 10Google Scholar; Hutter v. Hutter [1944] P. 95Google Scholar; Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1954), pp. 695–698; (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 907, at pp. 915–917; (1944) 22 Can. Bar Rev. 923; F. H. (1944) 60 L.Q.R. 115, 116.

72 See Lepre v. Lepre [1965] P. 52Google Scholar, 60.

73 Mitford v. Mitford [1923] P. 130Google Scholar, and the explanation given by Westlake (7th ed., 1925), p. 57. See the wording of Dicey and Morris, Rule 46, pp. 371, 375, text to note 77, and see Corbett v. Corbett [1957] 1 W.L.R. 486Google Scholar, 490. But contrast the conclusions of Sir Jocelyn, Simon P. in Merker v. Merker [1963] 283Google Scholar, 297, relying on Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith [1963] A.C. 280.Google Scholar

74 For some differences, see Mann (1950) 3 Internat. Law Quarterly 60, 597, and see Morris, ibid., p. 197.

75 Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201, 219Google Scholar; The Assunzione [1954] P. 150, 179–180, 194, but see p. 164.Google Scholar

76 Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. [1963] 2 Q.B. 352, 360–361, 369Google Scholar; Whitworth Estates v. Miller [1969] 2 All E.R. 210Google Scholar, 212G, per Lord Denning M.R., at p. 215 per Widgery L.J.; [1969] 1 W.L.R. 377, 381, 384; but see Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords: [1970] 1 All E.R. 808D; Cie. Tunisienne de Navigation S.A. v. Cie. d'Armament Maritime S.A. [1969] 3 All E.R. 589, at p. 591Google Scholar, per Lord Denning M.R.; cf. Pick v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. [1958]Google Scholar 2 Lloyd's Rep. 93.

77 Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd. [1939] A.C. 277.Google Scholar

78 Ibid., p. 290.

79 This view was first put forward by Haudek, Die Bedeutung des Parteiwillensim Internationalen Privatrecht (1930), p. 5.

80 Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A.C. 277Google Scholar; The Torni [1932] P. 78Google Scholar; Ocean Steamship Co. v. Queensland State Wheat Board [1941] 1 K.B. 402Google Scholar; Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 2 K.B. 730Google Scholar; cf. Pena Copper Mines v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd. (1912) 105 L.T. 846Google Scholar; Kirchner v. Gruban [1909] 1 Ch. 413Google Scholar. And see Lord, Wilberforce in James Miller v. Whitworth Estates [1970] 1 All E.R. 796, at p. 809B.Google Scholar

81 Ralli Bros. v. Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (C.A.)Google Scholar; Dicey and Morris, Rule 132, Exception, pp. 760–766.

82 See the observations in Dicey (7th ed., 1958), p. 782, omitted in the 8th ed. (1967), referring to The Torni [1932] P. 78Google Scholar (C.A.). But see the Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967, s. 1 (4), which states that no provision of English law shall be regarded as mandatory, in contradistinction to art. 4 of the Convention itself.

83 Dicey and Morris, p. 758.

84 [1967] 2 All E.R. 615 (Milmo J.); [1968] 2 Q.B. 1 (C.A.); [1971] A.C. 356 (H.L.).

85 (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 28, on appeal from (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 225.

86 See the lit. cited by Dicey and Morris, p. 909, n. 1, and by Lipstein, Ius Privatum Gentium I (1969) 411, n. 4.

87 The Mary Moxham (1876) 1 P.D. 107, 110, 113; Chartered Mercantile Bank of London, India and China v. N.I. Steam Navigation Co. (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 521, 536, 537; The Tolten [1946] P. 135Google Scholar, 165.

88 The following discussion is based on Lipstein in Ius Privatum Gentium I (1969) 411–432; see pp. 412, 422–426.

89 Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1775) 1 Cowp. 161, 176. Such is the problem posed by Lord Pearson [1971] A.C. 394E–F; [1969] 2 All E.R. 1106G–H.

90 For Brazilian law, see Rabel, Conflict of Laws II (2nd ed., 1960), p. 240; for Neapolitan law in 1862, see Crompton J. in Scott v. Seymour (1862) 1 H. & C. 219, at p. 235.

91 Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1775) 1 Cowp. 161, 176.

92 Scott v. Seymour (1862) 1 H. & C. 219, per Wightman J. at p. 234, mildly supported by Willes J. at p. 236.

93 The Halley (1867) L.R. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3, at p. 7.

94 Ibid., at pp. 6, 9.

95 Ibid., p. 17 et seq.

96 Ibid., p. 6. This passage expresses for the first time the obligatio theory generally attributed to Mr. Justice Holmes; see Slater v. Mexican National Railways, 194 U.S. 120 (1904)Google Scholar; see also Phillips v. Eyre (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, at pp. 28–29, per Willes J.

97 (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193, at p. 201.

98 Ibid., at pp. 201, 203.

99 Ibid., at pp. 202–203.

1 For the application of this principle, see the cases cited above, p. 95, n. 76.

2 Machado v. Fontes [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.), foreshadowed by the observations of Wightman J. in Scott v. Seymour (1862) H. & C. 219, 234 and of Cockburn C.J. in Phillips v. Eyre (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 225, 239–240.

3 Walpole v. Canadian Northern Ry. [1923] A.C. 113Google Scholar, 119; McMillan v. Canadian Northern Ry. [1923] A.C. 120.Google Scholar

4 [1971] A.C. 356 (H.L.), affirming Boys v. Chaplin [1968] 2 Q.B. 1Google Scholar; [1968] 1 All E.R. 283 (Diplock L.J. diss.), dismissing an appeal from Milmo J. [1967] 2 All E.R. 665; and see the comments by North and Webb (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 24; Karsten, ibid., p. 35; Pearl [1968] C.L.J. 219; McGregor (1970) 33 M.L.R. 1; Graveson (1969) 85 L.Q.R. 505; Reese (1970) 18 A.J.Comp.L. 189; Webb (1967) 16 I.C.L.Q. 1145.

5 Lord Donovan [1971] A.C. 383(D); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1096 end, 1097(A); Lord Pearson [1971] A.C. 398(B), 400(E), 406(D); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1109(E), 1111(F), 1116(E); Lord Wilberforce [1971] A.C. 385(B), 387(B); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1098(F), 1100(B).

6 Lord Hodson [1971] A.C. 377(C); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1091(F); Lord Wilberforce [1971] A.C. 388(D); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1101(C); ca Lord Donovan [1971] A.C. 383(F); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1097(C); Lord Pearson [1971] A.C. 406(A); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1116(D). No such case is likely to arise in the future since in most legal systems—that of Brazil in 1897 and at present included—a criminal act gives rise to an action in tort either in civil proceedings or by means of partie civile proceedings in connection with criminal proceedings. Cf. Rabel, Conflict of Laws II (2nd ed., 1960), p. 240.

7 Lord Guest [1971] A.C. 381(E); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1095(D); Lord Wilberforce [1971] A.C. 389(F); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1102(B); ca Lord Donovan [1971] A.C. 383(D); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1097(B); Lord Pearson [1971] A.C. 398(C), 399 (E–F), 405(E); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1109(F), 1110(F), 1115(H).

8 Lord Guest [1971] A.C. 381(G), 382(E, F); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1095(F), 1096(D).

9 See for a first consideration of this solution Cussen, J. in Varawa v. Howard Smith (No. 2) [1910] V.L.R. 509, 529, 533.Google Scholar

10 (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193, at pp. 202–203; Lipstein in Ius Privatum Gentium I (1969) 411, at p. 419.

11 Lord Hodson [1971] A.C. 378(E), 379(G); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1092(G), 1093(H); Lord Wilberforce [1971] A.C. 392(C); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1104(F).

12 (1862) H. & C. 219, 235.

13 Lord Hodson [1971] A.C. 377(H); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1092(B); Lord Guest [1971] A.C. 381(C–D); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1095(B); Lord Donovan [1971] A.C. 383(G); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1097(D); Lord Wilberforce [1971] A.C. 391(D); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1102(F); Lord Pearson [1971] A.C. 405(H); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1116(A).

14 Lord Hodson [1971] A.C. 377(F–G), 380(A); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1092(B), 1094A; Lord Wilberforce [1971] A.C. 392(B); [1969] 2 All E.R. 1104(E). English Private International Law relies on domicile in personal matters, but not all legal systems agree. If the parties to an accident in Italy are German nationals domiciled in Italy, neither German nor Italian law would regard Italian law as preponderantly involved.

15 Karsten (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 35

16 It can exist in a federal state governed by a written constitution; cf. Morris, Conflict of Laws (1971), pp. 531–532, 533.

17 (1841) 24 Archiv für die zivilistische Praxis 230, at pp. 299, 304; (1842) 25 ibid. 150, at p. 162.

18 Karsten, loc. cit., p. 40; Morris, Conflict of Laws (1971), pp. 542–546; and see the observations above.

19 [1956] Ch. 593.

20 Private International Law (4th ed., 1952), pp. 492–494Google Scholar; see now 8th ed. (1970) by Cheshire and North, pp. 564–566.

21 Subject, possibly, to limited exceptions; see Dicey and Morris, p. 639; Re Egerton [1956] Ch. 593, at pp. 604–605.Google Scholar

22 Cf. Westlake, Private International Law (7th ed., 1925), p. 73.

23 [1956] Ch. 593, 605; see also p. 603, last six lines. It is to be noted that Westlake's editor stated in 1925 (at p. 72) that the application of the law of the matrimonial domicile in the sense of the husband's domicile at the time of the marriage may be replaced by that of any domicile “which may have been acquired immediately after the marriage in pursuance of an agreement to that effect made before it.” The difference in the wording is to be noted: here an agreement to set up the matrimonial domicile elsewhere, there an agreement to adopt the law of a future domicile.

24 Clunet 1961, p. 1152, but see Morris, Revue critique d.i.p. 1957, p. 78, at pp. 87–90.

25 e.g., as regards French law, in De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] A.C. 21.Google Scholar

26 In England the Married Women's Property Acts 1882–1964.

27 See Goldberg (1970) 19 I.C.L.Q. 557.

28 Lashley v. Hog (1804) 4 Paton 581, as analysed and explained by Goldberg, loc cit., pp. 580–584.

29 For the recent reforms in France, see L. Neville Brown (1965) 14 Am.J.Comp.L. 308.

30 See Dicey and Morris, Rule 112.

31 Bartholo Case, C.A. Algiers, 24 December 1889, Clunet 1891, 1171; Robertson, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws (1940), p. 158 et seq.

32 Beaudoin v. Trudel [1937] O.R. 1Google Scholar; [1937] 1 D.L.R. 216.

33 (1969) 85 L.Q.R. 339.

34 It does not appear to have done so when the same person acquired the movable estate in England and took the Scottish immovables as heir: Balfour v. Scott (1795) 6 Bro.P.C. 550, 566.

35 Outside common law countries, few states rely on this principle; France and Belgium apply the lex domicili to the succession to movables; Austria relies on the lex patriae.