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“Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2004

Steven Greer
Steven Greer*
Affiliation:
University of Bristol
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Abstract

At the core of contemporary political, constitutional, and legal theory, lie the questions of how “constitutional”, “fundamental”, and “human” rights are, and should be, reconciled with each other and with considerations of the wider public interest. This article considers how the debate between Habermas and Alexy about the appropriateness of “balancing” as a way of addressing these problems might apply to the adjudication of the European Court of Human Rights, and concludes that, with some modification, Alexy's model is to be preferred.

Type
Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 63 , Issue 2 , 18 June 2004 , pp. 412 - 434
Copyright
Copyright © The Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2004

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Footnotes

This article relates to a book-length study of the European Convention on Human Rights, under contract for publication by Cambridge University Press, and prepared by the author as British Academy ‘‘Thank Offering to Britain” Research Fellow 2002-2003. I am extremely grateful to Julian Rivers and Pat Capps for their comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimers apply. Permission, from Oxford University Press, to reproduce a few paragraphs from another recent article, S. Greer, ‘‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2003) 23 O.J.L.S. 405 433, is also gratefully acknowledged.

References

1 Lord Irvine of Lairg Q.C., ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act: Parliament, the Courts and the Executive’ [2003] P.L. 308-325, 310, 313-314, 316, 319, 323. Italics in original. See also F. Klug and K. Starmer, ‘Incorporation through the ‘front door’: the first year of the Human Rights Act’ [2001] P.L. 654, 664-665; F. Klug, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2003] E.H.R.L.R. 125-133; D. Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ (1999) 19 L.S. 165-206, 173-178.

2 R. Alexy, ‘Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131-140, at p. 134.

3 R. Ryssdall, ‘Opinion: The Coming Age of the European Convention on Human Rights’ [1996] E.H.R.L.R. 18-29, at p. 23.

4 These are neatly set out by Alexy, op. cit., at pp. 134-135. I have taken the liberty of distinguishing five points from the two Alexy identifies in Habermas's critique. Habermas's objections to balancing derive from his view about the different roles played by deontological ‘norms’ and teleological ‘values’ in the logic of argumentation, J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (trans.W. Rehg) (Cambridge 1996), pp. 256-259.

5 Habermas, op. cit., at p. 256.

6 Ibid., at p. 258.

7 Ibid., at p. 259.

8 As Habermas states, although ‘valid norms make up a flexible relational structure, in which the relations can shift from case to case … this shifting is subject to the coherence proviso, which ensures that all the norms fit together into a unified system designed to admit exactly one right solution for each case'’ (italics in original), ibid., at p. 261.

9 Alexy, op. cit.; R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (trans. J. Rivers) (Oxford 2002), pp. 44-110 and 388-425; R. Alexy, ‘On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison” (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433-449.

10 Alexy, Theory of Constitutional Rights, at pp. 47-48.

11 Ibid., at p. 402.

12 McHarg, A., ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 62 M.L.R. 671;Google Scholar S. Greer, The Exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Human Rights Files No. 15, 1997).

13 S. Greer, ‘Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 23 o.J.L.S. 405.

14 Ibid.

15 For a useful review of the literature see McHarg, op. cit., at pp. 674-678.

16 Alexy, Theory of Constitutional Rights, at pp. 65-66.

17 Greer Exceptions, at pp. 24-29 and 35-36.

18 Numerous examples could be cited. See, for example, Appl. No. 7215/75 X v. UK (1980) 19 D.R. 66, at paras. 145 and 155; Sigurjonsson v. Iceland (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 462, at paras. 39- 41; Kokkinakis v. Greece (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 397, at paras. 42-50; Kutzner v. Germany (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 653, at paras. 64-67.

19 (1996) 24 E.H.R.R. 1.

20 Ibid., at para. 9.

21 Ibid.

22 Two other judges agreed with the majority decision but on different grounds. Mr. Schermers thought the film contributed to public debate on the notion of “ecstasy”, while Mr. Loucaides thought the film portrayed the human problems of St. Teresa rather than projecting an offending or degrading image of Christ.

23 (1996) 24 E.H.R.R. 1, Comm. Rep., at para. 65.

24 (1996) 24 E.H.R.R. 1, at p. 24.

25 The applicant argued, without objection from the respondent, that there is no uniform law of blasphemy in the UK, ibid., at para. 16.

26 The terms, ‘contemptuous’, ‘reviling’, ‘scurrilous’, or ‘ludicrous’ are derived from the domestic law of blasphemy in the UK as confirmed in Lemon and Gay News Ltd. v. Whitehouse [1979] AC 617: ibid., at paras. 26-29.

27 Wingrove v. UK (1996) 24 E.H.R.R. 1, at paras. 59-65.

28 Ibid., at para. 15.

29 As the Board pointed out in its letter to the applicant notifying him of the rejection of his application for a certificate and recommending cuts which would circumvent the problem, ibid., at para. 13.

30 See note 8.

31 See McHarg, op. cit., at pp. 685-695; Greer, Exceptions, at pp. 42-44; F. G. Jacobs, ‘The ‘Limitation Clauses’ of the European Convention on Human Rights’ in A. de Mestral, The Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law, (Cowansville 1986), pp. 21-40; B. Hovius, ‘The Limitation Clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights: A Guide for the Application of Section 1 of the Charter?’ (1985) 17 Ottowa Law Review 213.

32 Sunday Times v. UK (1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 245, at para. 62; Barthold v. Germany (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 383, at para. 55; Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey (2001) 31 E.H.R.R., at para. 57.

33 Autronic AG v. Switzerland (1990) 12 E.H.R.R. 485, at para. 61; Weber v. Switzerland (1990) 12 E.H.R.R. 508, at para. 47; Tele 1 Privatfernsehgesellschaft MBH v. Austria (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 181, at para. 34.

34 OZDEP v. Turkey (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 674, at para. 44.

35 Klass v. Germany (1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 214, at para. 42; Sunday Times v. UK (1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 245, at para. 65.

36 Hatton v. UK (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 1, at para. 97.

37 Gaskin v. UK (1990) 12 E.H.R.R. 36, at para. 40; Barfod v. Denmark (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 493, at para. 29; Grande Oriente d’Italia de Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 629, at para. 25.

38 See, for example, H.C. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (The Hague/Boston/London 1996), ch. 3.C.

39 (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 1 (Chamber judgment); (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 611 (Grand Chamber judgment).

40 (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 611, at para. 114.

41 (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 1, at para. 96.

42 Ibid., at para. 97.

43 Ibid., at para. O-III7.

44 Ibid., at para. O-III9.

45 Ibid., at para. O-III11

46 Ibid., at para. O-III16.

47 For a critique of the Grand Chamber's decision, which argues that the Court misunderstood the role of the margin of appreciation and failed properly to weigh all the alleged consequences of the night flight regime, see J. Hyam, ‘Hatton v. United Kingdom in the Grand Chamber: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’ [2003] E.H.R.L.R. 631-640.

48 (20 0 3) 37 E.H.R.R. 611, at para. 123.

49 Ibid.

50 See C. Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 9th edn. (London 1999), ch. III.

51 Jayasena v. R [1970] A.C. 618, 624, per Lord Devlin.

52 Tapper, op. cit., at p. 153.

53 Ibid., at p. 154.