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The Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and Private Bodies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1999

Nicholas Bamforth
Nicholas Bamforth*
Affiliation:
Robinson College, Cambridge
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Abstract

The Human Rights Act 1998 applies only to “public authorities”. This article begins by examining the Act's definition of a “public authority” and how this will interact with existing distinctions between public and private law in domestic judicial review and EU law. It is then argued that the Act may, through two different routes, have a limited horizontal impact between private bodies – although certain technical obstacles will need to be overcome. The article considers, finally, the operation between private bodies of the requirement that legislation be interpreted as far as possible in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights.

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Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 58 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 159 - 170
Copyright
Copyright © The Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors, 1999

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Footnotes

I should like to thank Ivan Hare and Susan Marks for their helpful comments on a draft of this article.

References

1 The list of rights can be found in section 1. Whether the Act incorporates those rights in any way—or merely creates a new principle of judicial interpretation—is debatable: see HL Deb. vol. 582 cols. 508–509 (18 November 1997); HL Deb. vol. 585 col. 840 (5 February 1998). The White Paper Bringing Rights Home, Cm. 3782, p. 1 (referred to hereafter as Bringing Rights Home) simply talks of the Act bringing Convention rights into domestic law—a formulation possibly designed to avoid this difficult constitutional point.

2 HC Deb. vol. 314 cols. 409–410 (17 June 1998). See also the analogous statements of the Lord Chancellor during the measure's House of Lords stages: HL Deb. vol. 582 col. 1232 (3 November 1997); HL Deb. vol. 583 cols. 811–812 (24 November 1997); and in Bringing Rights Home, para. 2.2.

3 See, generally, Taggart, M. (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford 1997)Google Scholar.

4 Unlike Murray Hunt's comparative and theoretical survey of the horizontal effect issue, this article focuses on the text of the Act and existing domestic case law; cf., M. Hunt, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights Act” [1998] P.L. 423.

5 HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 406 (17 June 1998), echoing a statement of the Lord Chancellor during the House of Lords second reading debate: HL Deb. vol. 582 cols. 1231–1232 (3 November 1997).

6 A position which can be reconciled with the Lord Chancellor's objection merely to full horizontal effect—HL Deb. vol. 583 col. 798 (24 November 1997); cf., however, HL Deb. vol. 585 col. 840 (5 February 1998).

7 HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 410 (17 June 1998); HC Deb. vol. 306 col. 775 (16 February 1998); HL Deb. vol. 584 col. 1262 (19 January 1998); HL Deb. vol. 583 cols. 758, 796–797 (24 November 1997); HL Deb. vol. 583 col. 475 (18 November 1997); Bringing Rights Home, para. 2.2.

8 See section II below.

9 HC Deb. vol. 314 cols. 408–410 (17 June 1998); cf., however, cols. 432–433, for one important difference between the domestic position and that in Strasbourg.

10 HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 409.

11 R. v. Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, ex p. Aegon Life Assurance [1994] C.L.C. 88, 93. See, e.g., R. v. Advertising Standards Authority, ex p. the Insurance Service (1990) 2 Admin.L.R. 77, 86; R. v. Code of Practice Committee of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, ex p. Professional Counselling Aids (1991) 3 Admin.L.R. 697, 716–717; R. v. Lord Chancellor, ex p. Hibbit and Saunders [1993] C.O.D. 326, 328; R. v. Great Western Trains, ex p. Frederick [1998] C.O.D. 239.

12 [1987] Q.B. 815, 847; see also Sir John Donaldson M.R., p. 838.

13 At p. 93.

14 In his speech (HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 410), the Home Secretary referred to Datafin as well as to R. v. Football Association, ex p. Football League [1993] 2 All E.R. 833 and R. v. Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p. Aga Khan [1993] 1 W.L.R. 909—yet seemingly ignored the “source of power” elements which determined the outcome in the latter two cases.

15 HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 410 (17 June 1998).

16 See, e.g., R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p. Datafin [1987] Q.B. 815; R. v. Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations, ex p. Wachmann [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1036; R. v. Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p. Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All E.R. 207; R. v. Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p. Aga Khan [1993] 1 W.L.R. 909.

17 R. v. Football Association, ex p. Football League [1993] 2 All E.R. 833; R. v. Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p. Aga Khan [1993] 1 W.L.R. 909; R. v. Lloyd's of London, ex p. Briggs (1993) 5 Admin.L.R. 698; R. v. Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, ex p. Aegon Life Assurance [1994] C.L.C. 88; R. v. Panel of the Federation of Communication Services, ex p. Kubis [1998] C.O.D. 5.

18 (1993) 5 Admin.L.R. 159, 175. Contrast R. v. Governors of Haberdashers’ Aske's Hatcham College Trust, ex p. T [1995] E.L.R. 350.

19 Y. v. United Kingdom, Edwards v. United Kingdom, Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, Series A, vol. 247, paras. 26–28. The relationship with EU law may also pose interesting questions—see NUT v. Governing Body of St. Mary's Church of England (Aided) Junior School [1997] I.R.L.R. 242.

20 The remedial consequences will depend upon how domestic courts develop the concept of Drittwirkung—see section II, below.

21 SirWade, William, “The United Kingdom's Bill of Rights”, in Cambridge Centre for Public Law, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Practice and Principles (Oxford 1998)Google Scholar (referred to hereafter as Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom), pp. 62–64.

22 Op. cit., p. 63.

23 HL Deb. vol. 583 col. 783 (24 November 1997).

24 HL Deb. vol. 582 col. 1232 (3 November 1997).

25 HC Deb. vol. 312 col. 979 (20 May 1998). Lord Lester categorises section 8 as a “new ‘public law tort’ ” allowing damages to be awarded in public law cases—“The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Public Law” in Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, p. 106.

26 HL Deb. vol. 583 col. 785 (24 November 1997); see, more generally, the Home Secretary's statement during the House of Commons Second Reading stage: HC Deb. vol. 306 col. 771 (16 February 1998).

27 Such rules are surveyed in detail in Olowofoyeku's, A. Suing Judges: A Study of Judicial Immunity (Oxford 1993)Google Scholar, chs. 2 and 5.

28 See, generally, Re Racal [1981] A.C. 374, 384, 392; R. v. Hull University Visitor, ex p. Page [1993] A.C. 682, 693, 702–703; R. v. Visitors to the Inns of Court, ex p. Calder and Persaud [1994] Q.B. 1, 40–41; R. v. Bedwellty Justices, ex p. Williams [1996] 3 W.L.R. 361, 367; Wade, H.W.R. and Forsyth, C.F., Administrative Law, 7th ed. (Oxford 1994), pp. 305–306Google Scholar.

29 Re Racal [1981] A.C. 374.

30 See A. Olowofoyeku, “State Liability for the Exercise of Judicial Power” [1998] P.L. 444, pp. 447–448.

31 Providing an enforceable right to compensation for victims of arrest or detention in contravention of Article 5.

32 HL Deb. vol. 582 col. 1232 (3 November 1997). See the similar statement by the Home Secretary during the House of Commons Second Reading: HC Deb. vol. 306 col. 781 (16 February 1998).

33 HL Deb., 24 Nov., col. 856–857 (the principle of Crown immunity for judicial acts was given a statutory basis in section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947). During the House of Commons Committee Stage, the Home Secretary was concerned to prevent the proliferation of remedies: HC Deb. vol. 312 col. 979 (20 May 1998).

34 [1979] A.C. 385, 399; see also R. v. St. Germain (1984) 53 A.R. 2d. 264.

35 A. Olowofoyeku, “State Liability for the Exercise of Judicial Power” [1998] P.L. 444, pp. 452–455.

36 [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667, 675–678, 692, 697–703, 718.

37 Compare, in relation to this point, J.A. Smillie, “ ‘Fundamental’ Rights, Parliamentary Supremacy and the New Zealand Court of Appeal” (1995) 111 L.Q.R. 209; A.Hunt, “Fundamental Rights and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act” (1995) 111 L.Q.R. 565.

38 Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur v. Federal Republic of Germany and R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame [1996] E.C.R. I-1029, paras. 32–33.

39 [1994] 1 A.C. 377.

40 See Lord Denning M.R.'s observations in Sirros v. Moore [1974] 3 All E.R. 779, 782.

41 Marckx v. Belgium Series A, vol. 31, para. 31; see also Airey v. Ireland Series A, vol. 32, para. 32; Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom Series A, vol. 44, paras. 48–49 (responsibility of state for alleged breach of Articles 9 to 11 engaged by the enactment of legislation).

42 Series A, vol. 91, para. 23 (emphasis added).

43 Case of Plattform “Arzte fur das Leven” Series A, vol. 139, paras. 32, 34.

44 Mrs. W. v. United Kingdom (1983) 32 D. & R. 10; Mrs. W. v. Ireland (1983) 32 D. & R. 211. Similar reasoning seems to have been used in Case 87/1997/871/1083, Osman v. United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, where the Court accepted that the state could in principle be liable under Article 2 for a failure to protect an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of another, although it was accepted that the United Kingdom had not breached Article 2 on the facts. See also Hughes v. United Kingdom (1986) 48 D. & R. 258 (unresolved whether Article 2 requires states to impose an obligation on private citizens to take prompt medical actions when life is endangered).

45 Alkema, E., “The Third Party Applicability or “Drittwirkung’ of the European Convention on Human Rights”, in Matscher, F. and Petzold, H. (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: the European Dimension (Cologne 1988), p. 38Google Scholar. See, generally, Clapham, A., Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford 1993)Google Scholar, chs. 4, 7.

46 “Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights on Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (1982) 3 H.R.L.J. 121, 137.

47 Harris, D.J., O'Boyle, M. and Warbrick, C., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London 1995), pp. 19–22Google Scholar.

48 van Dijk, P. and van Hoof, G.J.H., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Deventer 1990), pp. 17–18Google Scholar. The treatment of Article 2 of the Convention in Case 87/1997/871/1083, Osman v. United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, would appear to provide an example of such an approach.

49 See HC Deb. vol. 314 cols. 432–433 (17 June 1998).

50 “The European Human Rights Convention and Relations Between Private Parties” (1979) 26 N.I.L.R. 163, 165–166.

51 HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 406 (17 June 1998).

52 See F., Jacobs and R., White, The European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1996), pp. 18–19Google Scholar. For general criticisms of Drittwirkung, see A. Clapham, op. cit., ch. 7.

53 Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial International de Alimentacion SA [1990] E.C.R. I-4135, para. 8; see also Case C-192/94, El Corte Ingles SA v. Rivero [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 507. Marleasing builds on the interpretative obligation set out in Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein Westfalen [1984] E.C.R. 1891, para. 26, and acts as a counterweight to the rule that directives do not have horizontal direct effect: see Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] E.C.R. 723; Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl [1994] E.C.R. I-3325, paras. 19–30.

54 For the approach of national courts, see Webb v. Emo Air Cargo (UK) Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 49, 59F–60F (Lord Keith); MacMillan v. Edinburgh Voluntary Organisations Council [1995] I.R.L.R. 536.

55 Case C-168/95, Luciano Arcaro [1996] E.C.R. I-4705, para. 42; Cases C-74 and 129/95, Procura della Repubblica v. X. [1996] E.C.R. I-6609, paras. 24–26. It is unclear whether the limitation in the Procura della Repubblica formulation was deliberately intended to be narrower than that in Arcaro.

56 See generally Sir William Wade, op. cit., p. 66; G. Marshall, “Patriating Rights—with Reservations: the Human Rights Bill 1998” in Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, pp. 80–81, and P. Duffy, “The European Convention on Human Rights, Issues Relating to its Interpretation in the Light of the Human Rights Bill” in Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, p. 103.

57 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696.

58 HC Deb. vol. 313 col. 422 (3 June 1998).

59 In Case C-194/94, CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL [1996] E.C.R. I-2201, the Court of Justice arguably accepted horizontal direct effect in the special circumstances of the case; see also Case C-180/95, Draehmpaehl v. Urania Immobilienservice OHG [1997] E.C.R. I-2195. For further analysis, see P. Craig, “Directives: Direct Effect, Indirect Effect and the Construction of National Legislation” (1997) 22 E.L.Rev. 519; A. Ward, “New Frontiers in Private Enforcement of EC Directives” (1998) 23 E.L.Rev. 65.

60 M. Forde, “Non-Governmental Interferences with Human Rights” (1985) 56 B.Y.I.L. 253, 279; E. Alkema, op. cit., pp. 33–35; A. Clapham, op. cit., ch. 5.

61 D. Evrigenis, “Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (1982) 3 H.R.L.J. 121, p. 136.

62 See further Bamforth, N., “The Public Law–Private Law Distinction: A Comparative and Philosophical Approach”, in Leyland, P. and Woods, T. (eds.), Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (London 1998)Google Scholar. In relation specifically to the Human Rights Act, see M. Hunt, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights Act” [1998] P.L. 423, pp. 424–435.