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AN ASSIMILATED APPROACH TO DISCHARGE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BY DELAY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2017

J.W. Carter ,
Wayne Courtney  and
Gregory Tolhurst
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Extract

The conflict between common law and equity on the question of when time should be regarded as being “of the essence” for the performance of a contract has often been debated, as has the impact of its resolution by the Judicature reforms in favour of equity's more relaxed approach. Even so, it is tolerably clear that the two approaches have been substantially assimilated within general principles of discharge for breach. If, as a matter of construction, a time stipulation is a condition, then time is of the essence. Alternatively, time may have become of the essence by an effective notice to perform served by a promisee. If the contract has been validly discharged on either basis, specific performance will not be ordered in favour of the promisor.1

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Articles
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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 76 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 63 - 86
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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2017 

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Footnotes

* Professor Emeritus, University of Sydney; General Editor, Journal of Contract Law; Consultant, Herbert Smith Freehills.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Sydney and Associate Professor of Law, National University of Singapore.
*** Professor of Law, University of Sydney.

References

1 See e.g. Union Eagle Ltd. v Golden Achievement Ltd. [1997] A.C. 514 (sale of land – time expressly of the essence).

2 Urban 1 (Blonk Street) Ltd. v Ayres [2013] EWCA Civ 816; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 756 (“Urban”). See also Sir Terence Etherton, “Time Provisions at Common Law and Equity” [2013] Conv. 355. cf spar shipping A.S. v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd. (The Spar Capella) [2016] EWCA Civ 982; [2016] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 447 at [104] per Sir Terence Etherton M.R.

3 Urban [2013] EWCA Civ 816; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 756, at [44].

4 Ibid. See further text at note 138 below.

5 Ibid.

6 5th ed., 2011 (“Standard Conditions of Sale”). See text at note 102 below. Relevantly, the clause is to the same effect as in the 4th ed. referred to in Urban.

7 The purchasers in Urban were not legally represented.

8 See Stoljar, S.J., “Dependent and Independent Promises” (1957) 2 Syd.L.R. 217 Google Scholar.

9 See Pordage v Cole (1669) 1 Wms. Saund. 319; 85 E.R. 449 (promise to pay for land “before Midsummer”). See also Nichols v Raynbred (1615) Hob. 88; 80 E.R. 238 (sale of goods).

10 See e.g. Pordage (1669) 1 Wms. Saund. 319, 320; 85 E.R. 449, 450 per the court (“mutual remedy”).

11 The usual example was a contract stating that payment would be made “for” the other party's performance, as in Peeters v Opie (1671) 2 Wms. Saund. 350; 85 E.R. 1144. Pordage was therefore a strong case: the presumption was not rebutted by the purchaser's covenant to pay the vendor “for all his lands”.

12 At least while the contract remained executory. See Thorp v Thorp (1701) 12 Mod. 455, 460–61; 88 E.R. 1448, 1451, per Holt C.J. (for the King's Bench).

13 Key cases include Kingston v Preston (1773) 2 Doug. 689; 99 E.R. 437; and Jones v Barkley (1781) 2 Doug. 684; 99 E.R. 434.

14 See e.g. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 28.

15 But see Stoljar, S.J., “Untimely Performance in the Law of Contract” (1955) 71 L.Q.R. 527 Google Scholar (“somewhat misleading generalization”).

16 See e.g. Glazebrook v Woodrow (1799) 8 T.R. 366; 101 E.R. 1436. Contrast Campbell v Jones (1796) 6 T.R. 570; 101 E.R. 708.

17 See e.g. Goodisson v Nunn (1792) 4 T.R. 761; 100 E.R. 1288 (claim for penalty). Contrast Jones (1781) 2 Doug. 684; 99 E.R. 434. Readiness and willingness included ability to perform: Duke of St. Albans v Shore (1789) 1 H. Bl. 270; 126 E.R. 158.

18 See e.g. Morton v Lamb (1797) 7 T.R. 125; 101 E.R. 890 (sale of goods).

19 Section 57 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 permitted a general averment of fulfilment of conditions precedent, but it remained a good defence for the defendant to identify delay as non-fulfilment of a condition precedent. See e.g. Graves v Legg (1854) 9 Exch. 709; 156 E.R. 304. Cf. Raineri v Miles [1981] A.C. 1050, 1082, per Lord Edmund-Davies (impact of Common Law Procedure Act 1854 on relationship between law and equity).

20 Cf. United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v Burnley Borough Council [1978] A.C. 904, 940 per Lord Simon.

21 Parkin v Thorold (1852) 16 Beav. 59, 65; 51 E.R. 698, 701.

22 Ibid. See also Roberts v Berry (1853) 3 De G.M. & G. 284, 291; 43 E.R. 112, 114–15, per Turner L.J.

23 See e.g. Macbryde v Weekes (1856) 22 Beav. 533, 539–40; 52 E.R. 1214, 1216, per Sir John Romilly M.R. (contract to lease working mine).

24 Parkin (1852) 16 Beav. 59, 66–67; 51 E.R. 698, 701. See also Tilley v Thomas (1867) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 61, 67, per Lord Cairns L.J. See Carter, J.W., The Construction of Commercial Contracts (Oxford, 2013), §4–26.Google Scholar

25 A theory emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century, in cases such as Hochster v De la Tour (1853) 2 E.&B. 678; 118 E.R. 922 (anticipatory breach), and Behn v Burness (1863) 3 B.&S. 751; 122 E.R. 281 (conditions and warranties). See also Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 A.C. 185, 193, per Lord Millett, with whom the other members of the House of Lords agreed (before middle of the nineteenth century, the basis for discharge was failure of condition precedent, not breach of contract).

26 See Carter, J.W., “Discharge as the Basis for Termination for Breach of Contract” (2012) 128 L.Q.R. 283, at 285Google Scholar.

27 Parkin (1852) 16 Beav. 59, 67; 51 E.R. 698, 701. See also e.g. Tilley (1867) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 61, 69, per Sir John Rolt L.J.

28 See Martindale v Smith (1841) 1 Q.B. 389, 395; 113 E.R. 1181, 1184, per Lord Denman C.J.

29 See e.g. Ellen v Topp (1851) 6 Exch. 424; 155 E.R. 609.

30 See e.g. Davidson v Gwynne (1810) 12 East. 381; 104 E.R. 149.

31 See e.g. Re Sandwell Park Colliery Co. [1929] 1 Ch. 277, 285, per Maugham J. (whether before Judicature Act court would have restrained a common law action).

32 See e.g. Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch. D. 89, 103, per Fry L.J.; Cornwall v Henson [1900] 2 Ch. 298, 304, per Collins L.J.; Stickney v Keeble [1915] A.C. 386, 403, per Lord Atkinson; Re Sandwell Park Colliery Co. [1929] 1 Ch. 277, 284, per Maugham J.; Wendt v Bruce (1931) 45 C.L.R. 245, 257, per Dixon J. Cf. Maynard v Goode (1926) 37 C.L.R. 529, 537, per Isaacs J. (“dissolution by acts of the parties is the same both in law and equity”). That “rescission” meant “discharge” was not clarified until Johnson v Agnew [1980] A.C. 367 (see text at note 46 below).

33 Stickney [1915] A.C. 386, 417.

34 See Holland v Wiltshire (1954) 90 C.L.R. 409, 418–19, per Kitto J.

35 See Howe (1884) 27 Ch. D. 89, 103, per Fry L.J.

36 See e.g. Bowes v Shand (1877) 2 App. Cas. 455; Reuter Hufeland & Co. v Sala & Co. (1879) 4 C.P.D. 239. Contrast Bettini v Gye (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 183, 187, per Blackburn J., for the court (delay in performance of independent promise).

37 See e.g. Harold Wood Brick Co. Ltd. v Ferris [1935] 2 K.B. 198, 206–07, per Slesser L.J. In Lock v Bell [1931] 1 Ch. 35, 43, per Maugham J., noted the inappropriate reference to “construction” in s. 41.

38 United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904.

39 General analysis of the interaction between law and equity under the Judicature Act therefore excited considerable controversy. See e.g. Baker, P.V., “The Future of Equity” (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 529 Google Scholar; F. Dawson (1979) 8 N.Z.U.L.R. 281.

40 See United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 926 per Lord Diplock, 937 per Viscount Dilhorne, 944 per Lord Simon, 957 per Lord Fraser.

41 See e.g. Lombard North Central plc v Butterworth [1987] Q.B. 527.

42 See United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 937, per Viscount Dilhorne, 941 and 944 per Lord Simon, 958 per Lord Fraser.

43 4th ed. (London 1974), vol. 9, para. 481 (“Halsbury”).

44 United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 928. Subject to certain exceptions: see p. 924.

45 Cf. ibid., at p. 962, per Lord Fraser.

46 Johnson [1980] A.C. 367.

47 Raineri [1981] A.C. 1050.

48 See ibid., at pp. 1089, 1092, per Lord Fraser (with whom Lords Russell and Keith agreed).

49 Bunge Corp New York v Tradax Export S.A. Panama [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711 (“Bunge”).

50 Ibid., at pp. 728–29. See also p. 716, per Lord Wilberforce (with whom Lords Fraser, Scarman and Lowry agreed).

51 Ibid., at p. 729. See also p. 716, per Lord Wilberforce (with whom Lords Fraser, Scarman and Lowry agreed).

52 Halsbury, vol. 9, para. 482.

53 And also in Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 26, 69.

54 Lord Wilberforce gave the answer that time stipulations admit of “only one kind breach …, namely, to be late”: Bunge [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711, 715.

55 Nomination by the buyers was a condition precedent to the sellers’ ability to nominate the loading port. See ibid., at p. 729, per Lord Roskill.

56 United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 928.

57 Roberts (1853) 3 De G.M. & G. 284, 291; 43 E.R. 112, 114–15.

58 Parkin (1852) 16 Beav. 59, 71; 51 E.R. 698, 703. If time was of the essence, but waived, a notice to perform had to be given. See Webb v Hughes (1870) L.R. 10 Eq. 281, 286, per Sir Richard Malins V.-C.

59 King v Wilson (1843) 6 Beav. 124, 126; 49 E.R. 772, 773, per Lord Langdale M.R.

60 Parkin (1852) 16 Beav. 59, 71; 51 E.R. 698, 703.

61 See Neeta (Epping) Pty Ltd. v Phillips (1974) 131 C.L.R. 286, 298, per Barwick C.J. and Jacobs J. (“same effect in equity as it had at law”).

62 See e.g. Taylor v Brown (1839) 2 Beav. 180, 183; 48 E.R. 1149, 1150, per Lord Langdale M.R.

63 See Reynolds v Nelson (1821) 6 Madd. 18, 26; 56 E.R. 995, 999, per Sir John Leach V.-C.

64 See e.g. United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 946, per Lord Simon. See also K.E. Lindgren, Time in the Performance of Contracts, 2nd ed. (Sydney 1982), §227.

65 Green v Sevin (1879) 13 Ch. D. 589, 599.

66 Compton v Bagley [1892] 1 Ch. 313.

67 Bain v Fothergill (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158.

68 Stickney [1915] A.C. 386, 418–19. See also p. 401, per Lord Atkinson.

69 Ibid., at p. 419. See also O'Brien v Dawson (1941) 41 S.R. (N.S.W.) 295, 304, per Jordan C.J., with whom Halse Rogers and Roper JJ. concurred (affirmed on other grounds (1942) 66 C.L.R. 18).

70 See Green (1879) 13 Ch. D. 589, 599, per Fry J.

71 See Wendt (1931) 45 C.L.R. 245, 253, per Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ. (time of essence “both at law and in equity”).

72 See e.g. Laurinda Pty. Ltd. v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty. Ltd. (1989) 166 C.L.R. 623, 644–45, per Brennan J.; British and Commonwealth Holdings plc v Quadrex Holdings Inc. [1989] Q.B. 842, 858, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. (with whom Woolf and Staughton L.JJ. agreed).

73 See Laurinda Pty. Ltd. (1989) 166 C.L.R. 623, 652, per Deane and Dawson JJ. (“real sense” and “traditionally … so described”).

74 See e.g. British and Commonwealth Holdings plc [1989] Q.B. 842, 857, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. (with whom Woolf and Staughton L.JJ. agreed).

75 See e.g. Laurinda Pty. Ltd. (1989) 166 C.L.R. 623, 652, per Deane and Dawson JJ.; Morris v Robert Jones Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 275, 280, per Hardie Boys J.; Lau Suk Ching Peggy v Ma Hing Lam (2010) 13 H.K.C.F.A.R. 226, 240–41, per Lord Millett (for the court).

76 The logic of Sir Terence Etherton C.’s suggestion that the notice should warn the recipient that the contract may be terminated if the notice is not complied with is challenging. Since, in his view, noncompliance does not entitle the promisee to terminate the contract, the warning is incorrect as a matter of law. By asserting a right that does not exist, the notice may be a repudiation by the promisee. See e.g. Total Oil Great Britain Ltd. v Thompson Garages (Biggin Hill) Ltd. [1972] 1 Q.B. 318, 322, per Lord Denning M.R. (with whom Edmund-Davies and Stephenson L.JJ. agreed); Metro Meat Ltd. v Fares Rural Co. Pty. Ltd. [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 13, 17 per the Privy Council.

77 Sir Terence Etherton C.’s treatment of failure to comply with a general law notice to complete is also difficult to reconcile with his “in principle” view (text at note 5 above) that a promisor's entitlement to specific performance depends on the criteria applied to determine whether delay is a repudiation.

78 Laurinda Pty. Ltd. (1989) 166 C.L.R. 623, 645.

79 In Bunge, the further statement which Lord Roskill adopted was introduced with “[a]part from … notice making time of the essence”.

80 Johnson [1980] A.C. 367, 392. The other members of the House of Lords agreed. See also J. McGhee (ed.), Snell's Equity, 33rd ed. (London 2015), §17–042.

81 Johnson [1980] A.C. 367, 392.

82 Graham v Pitkin [1992] 1 W.L.R. 403.

83 Ibid., at p. 406. See also Bechal v Kitsford Holdings Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 105, 107, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C.

84 Mana Property Trustee Ltd. v James Developments Ltd. [2010] NZSC 90; [2010] 3 N.Z.L.R. 805, at [37], per Blanchard J. (for the court).

85 Behzadi v Shaftesbury Hotels Ltd. [1992] Ch. 1. See C. Harpum, “Conveyancing: Notices to Fulfil a Contractual Obligation” [1991] C.L.J. 40.

86 Smith v Hamilton [1951] 1 Ch. 174.

87 Ibid., at p. 181.

88 Louinder v Leis (1982) 149 C.L.R. 509. See also J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming and P.G. Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity, Doctrines and Remedies, 5th ed. (Sydney 2015), §3–150.

89 See Behzadi [1992] Ch 1, 15, per Nourse L.J. (with whom Purchas and Glidewell L.JJ. agreed), 29–31 per Purchas L.J. (with whom Glidewell L.J. agreed).

90 Louinder (1982) 149 C.L.R. 509, 514. See also Laurinda Pty. Ltd. (1989) 166 C.L.R. 623, 664, per Gaudron J.

91 Louinder (1982) 149 C.L.R. 509, 526. Gibbs C.J., Stephen and Wilson JJ. agreed. See also Ciavarella v Balmer (1983) 153 C.L.R. 438, 446, per the court (“non-compliance … evidences a fundamental breach or renunciation”); Braidotti v Queensland City Properties Ltd. (1991) 172 C.L.R. 293, 316, per Gaudron J. (“repudiation of the entire contract”).

92 See also J.E. Stannard, “In the Contractual Last Chance Saloon: Notices Making Time of the Essence” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 137, at 154.

93 Behzadi [1992] Ch. 1, 11. Louinder (1982) 149 C.L.R. 509 was also such a case.

94 Behzadi [1992] Ch. 1, 12, emphasis in original.

95 See also MacIndoe v Mainzeal Group Ltd. [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 273, 280–81, per Cooke P., with whom Hardie Boys J. agreed (basis for “cancellation” under Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (N.Z.) is repudiation (or substantial breach), rather than breach of an essential term).

96 United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 946. See also p. 947, per Lord Simon (no entitlement “unilaterally by notice to introduce a new term into” the contract); Behzadi [1992] Ch. 1, 12, per Nourse L.J.

97 Ciavarella (1983) 153 C.L.R. 438, 446. See also Braidotti (1991) 172 C.L.R. 293, 307, per Deane J. (“not based upon default in the performance of a particular term of the contract”); Morris [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 275, 280, per Hardie Boys J. (notice “does not turn” non-essential term into essential term).

98 Urban [2013] EWCA Civ 816; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 756, at [44].

99 Samarenko v Dawn Hill House Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 1445; [2013] 1 Ch. 36, at [42]. Surprisingly, there is no reference to this aspect of Rix L.J.’s judgment in that case.

100 Sentinel International Ltd. v Cordes [2008] UKPC 59, at [41].

101 Contrast the text at note 120 below (conferral of express right to terminate).

102 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 C.L.R. 406, 445, per Mason and Deane JJ.; Lombard North Central plc [1987] Q.B. 527.

103 The right to terminate is stated in cll. 7.4 and 7.5.

104 See Butt, P., “Notices to Perform Obligations in Conveyancing Transactions: A View From Down Under” [1991] Conv. 94, 105ffGoogle Scholar.

105 See e.g. McNally v Waitzer [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 294; British and Commonwealth Holdings plc [1989] Q.B. 842, 857, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. (with whom Woolf and Staughton L.JJ. agreed); Chaitlal v Ramial [2003] UKPC 12, at [28].

106 See Re Barr's Contract [1956] Ch. 551, 558–59, per Danckwerts J.

107 Quadrangle Development and Construction Co. Ltd. v Jenner [1974] 1 W.L.R. 68, 72, per Russell L.J. (with whom Lawton L.J. agreed).

108 See e.g. Finkielkraut v Monohan [1949] 2 All E.R. 234; ibid.; Balog v Crestani (1975) 132 C.L.R. 289, 298, per Gibbs J.

109 See e.g. Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v De Haan (1983) 47 P. & C.R. 1, 9–10, per Gerald Godfrey Q.C. (sitting as a deputy High Court judge); Country and Metropolitan Homes Surrey Ltd. v Topclaim Ltd. [1996] Ch. 307, 314, per Timothy Lloyd Q.C. (sitting as a deputy High Court judge).

110 See United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 928, per Lord Diplock (“no close counterpart”).

111 See e.g. Page v Cowasjee Eduljee (1866) L.R. 1 P.C. 127, 145, per the court.

112 R.V. Ward Ltd. v Bignall [1967] 1 Q.B. 534, 550. Russell L.J. agreed. See also H. Beale, Remedies for Breach of Contract (London 1980), 90.

113 In Bunge [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711, 728–29, Lord Roskill stressed that the approval in United Scientific related to the entire statement.

114 United Scientific Holdings Ltd. [1978] A.C. 904, 934 and 962, respectively.

115 Carr v J. A. Berriman Pty. Ltd. (1953) 89 C.L.R. 327, 348–49, per Fullagar J. (with whom the other members of the court agreed).

116 North Eastern Properties Ltd. v Coleman [2010] EWCA Civ 277; [2010] 1 W.L.R. 2715, at [71], per Briggs J. (with whom Longmore and Smith L.JJ. agreed). See also Charles Rickards Ltd. v Oppenhaim [1950] 1 K.B. 616, 628, per Singleton L.J.

117 See British and Commonwealth Holdings plc [1989] Q.B. 842, 856, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. (with whom Woolf and Staughton L.JJ. agreed).

118 See also Balog (1975) 132 C.L.R. 289, 296, per Gibbs J.; Morris [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 275, 280, per Hardie Boys J.; Shawton Engineering Ltd. v D.G.P. International Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 1359; [2006] B.L.R. 1, at [32], per May L.J.; Dalkia Utilities Services plc v Celtech International Ltd. [2006] EWHC 63 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 599, at [131], per Christopher Clarke J.

119 See Bunge [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711, 720, per Lord Lowry. See also J.W. Carter, Carter's Breach of Contract (Oxford 2012), §§5–59, 5–64.

120 See e.g. Financings Ltd. v Baldock [1963] 2 Q.B. 104 (hire purchase contract).

121 Charles Rickards Ltd. [1950] 1 K.B. 616.

122 Ibid., at p. 625.

123 Ibid., at pp. 624–25.

124 Stickney [1915] A.C. 386, 419. See text at note 69 above.

125 For the concept, see e.g. Thomas v Ken Thomas Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 1504; [2007] Bus. L.R. 429, at [15], per Neuberger L.J., with whom Mummery and Jacob L.JJ. agreed (failure to pay rent under lease).

126 Cf. Panoutsos v Raymond Hadley Corp. of New York [1917] 2 K.B. 473, 478, per Viscount Reading C.J. (with whom Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. and Scrutton L.J. agreed). Contrast the position under the principle of Barclay v Messenger (1874) 30 L.T. 351; 43 L.J. Ch. 449. See e.g. Tropical Traders Ltd. v Goonan (1964) 111 C.L.R. 41.

127 See Concordia Trading B.V. v Richco International Ltd. [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 475, 480–81, per Evans J.

128 See Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty. Ltd. (1976) 136 C.L.R. 444, 458, per Gibbs, Mason and Jacobs JJ.

129 See e.g. Hartley v Hymans [1920] 3 K.B. 475, 495–96, per McCardie J.; Aryeh v Lawrence Kostoris & Son Ltd. [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 63, 73, per Diplock L.J.

130 See e.g. A/S Awilco of Oslo v Fulvia SpA di Navigazione of Cagliari (The Chikuma) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 314, 322, per Lord Bridge (with whom the other members of the House of Lords agreed); Bunge [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711, 725, per Lord Roskill.

131 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 10(1).

132 The one general exception is failure to pay a deposit on time. See e.g. Samarenko [2011] EWCA Civ 1445; [2013] 1 Ch. 36.

133 Bunge [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711, 725, per Lord Roskill.

134 See e.g. Stocznia Gdanska S.A. v Latvian Shipping Co. (No. 3) [2002] EWCA Civ 889; [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 436 (right to terminate if payment outstanding for 21 days).

135 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 26.

136 Although rarely satisfied, the same criterion applies where the promisee invokes anticipatory breach by inability to perform. See Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v Citati [1957] 2 Q.B. 401.

137 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 26, 69.

138 Urban [2013] EWCA Civ 816, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 756, at [44]. See also at para. [48], suggesting that the promisee's position is “probably” the same if a notice to perform is served.

139 See Phibro Energy A.G. v Nissho Iwai Corp. (The Honam Jade) [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 38 (actual delay had fundamental effect on the contract).

140 Behzadi [1992] Ch. 1, 12. Cf. Laurinda Pty. Ltd. (1989) 166 C.L.R. 623 (delay in execution of lease a repudiation).

141 See National Carriers Ltd. v Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] A.C. 675.

142 See Total Oil Great Britain Ltd. [1972] 1 Q.B. 318.

143 That was one problem under the agreement for lease in Urban.

144 Cf. Stannard, “In the Contractual Last Chance Saloon”, p. 161.

145 But see Eminence Property Developments Ltd. v Heaney [2011] EWCA Civ 1168; [2011] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 223, at [61]–[64], per Etherton L.J. (with whom the other members of the court agreed).