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THE REFORMATION OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW? “RIGHTS”, RHETORIC AND REALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2013

Jason N.E. Varuhas
Jason N.E. Varuhas*
Affiliation:
Junior Research Fellow, Christ's College, University of Cambridge.
*
Address for correspondence: Dr Jason Varuhas, Christ's College, Cambridge CB2 3BU. Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

This article examines and responds to a doctrinal claim, made by an increasing number of commentators, that English administrative law is in the midst of a “reformation” or “reinvention”, with the notion of “rights” at the heart of this radical recalibration. The article is critical of such claims on several grounds. First, these claims are steeped in ambiguity, such that the nature and doctrinal scope of the claimed metamorphosis are not clear. Second, these commentators have not undertaken the sort of detailed doctrinal analysis which is required to make credible claims about the development of the law, meaning their broad claims have a strong propensity to mislead, and pass over the nuances and complexities of doctrine. An analysis of significant features of doctrine tends to tell against a wholesale recalibration of administrative law around rights, and indicates an increasingly pluralistic rather than unitary legal order. Third, despite the centrality of the idea of “rights” to their claims, these commentators do not squarely address what they mean by “rights”, in general using the term indiscriminately, and thereby plunging their claims into uncertainty. The article demonstrates the importance of conceptual clarity in analysing “rights”-based developments through a doctrinal analysis of “rights” in administrative law, conducted through the prism of W.N. Hohfeld's analytical scheme.

Keywords

Administrative LawJudicial ReviewHuman Rights Act 1998Principle of LegalityAnxious ScrutinyProportionalityWednesbury unreasonablenessPublic DutiesRightsHohfeld
Type
Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 72 , Issue 2 , July 2013 , pp. 369 - 413
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2013 

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References

1 (2009) 68 C.L.J. 142 [“Reformation”].

2 In N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 2003), ch. 12 [“Reinvention”].

3 “Reformation”, pp. 165, 167.

4 Ibid., p. 142.

5 Ibid., pp. 142–147.

6 Ibid., pp. 142, 144.

7 Ibid., p. 153.

8 E.g. ibid., pp. 146–147, 148ff. Similarly, Poole only discusses proportionality in his other paper which broaches the subject: T. Poole, “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Administrative Law in an Age of Rights” in L. Pearson, C. Harlow and M. Taggart (eds.), Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart 2008), 34–42 [“Age of Rights”].

9 “Reformation”, pp. 146–147 (emphasis added).

10 Ibid., p. 142 (emphasis added).

11 Ibid., p. 144.

12 Ibid., p. 142 (emphasis added).

13 Ibid., p. 145.

14 Ibid.

15 “Age of Rights”, p. 41.

16 Ibid., p. 43.

17 “Reformation”, p. 145; ibid., pp. 19, 33.

18 “Reformation”, p. 147.

19 Ibid. As Poole has said in another paper, “[m]any cases of judicial review do not involve rights, however defined. This being so, it would be possible to advance an argument that any theory that prioritizes rights is likely to be incapable of explaining – or likely to undervalue – many other aspects of the jurisprudence” (“Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review” (2005) O.J.L.S. 697, 703 [“Legitimacy”]); see also, Shah, S. and Poole, T., “The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the House of Lords” [2009] P.L. 347, 370–371Google Scholar.

20 See note 10 above.

21 “Reformation”, p. 147.

22 “Age of Rights”, pp. 33–34 (emphasis added).

23 “Reinvention”, pp. 311–312, 332–335; M. Taggart, “The Tub of Public Law” in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (Oxford 2004), 475 [“Tub”]; and see Dyzenhaus, D., Hunt, M. and Taggart, M., “The Principle of Legality in Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation” (2001) 1 O.U.C.L.J. 5Google Scholar [“Principle of Legality”]. For completeness I note that tucked away in the final footnote of Taggart's Reinvention paper he states that “[d]ue to space constraints” his argument is confined to administrative law cases concerning infringements of “rights” in rights-instruments and at common law (at p. 334, note 144). It is difficult to know what to make of this. Throughout the paper his claims are made in the broadest possible terms, his central argument expressly being that “British administrative law is in the process of being reinvented” (at p. 312), while his reinvention claim is repeated without caveat elsewhere (e.g. “Tub”, p. 475; M. Taggart, “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury” [2008] N.Z. L. Rev. 423, 461). Muddying the nature and scope of this caveat are Taggart's view that the law's “role” in “protecting rights” may not be visible at the level of doctrine, and his adoption of a undefined notion of “rights” (at p. 326). In any case Taggart's express inclusion of generally applicable common law doctrines, such as Wednesbury and reason-giving, as well as the procedure governing review, within his reinvention thesis, coupled with his views that “rights” and proportionality are a fixture at common law (at p. 334), and that public law is being forged into a coherent whole, make clear that he considers there has been radical change well beyond the HRA. Further, his description of the remainder of administrative law, once the area concerning rights has been subtracted, as a “rump” suggests he foresees the area concerned with rights as predominant within a reinvented, “righted” administrative law (at p. 334 note 144, and see pp. 323ff).

24 “Reinvention”, pp. 323–327; “Reformation”, pp. 142–145.

25 “Tub”, pp. 475, 479. On the unification theme see also D. Dyzenhaus, “Baker: The Unity of Public Law?” in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (Oxford 2004), ch. 1; Jowell, J., “Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review” [2000] P.L. 671, 683Google Scholar.

26 “Age of Rights”, pp. 18–19; “The Reformation of English Administrative Law” (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper 12/07), 2–4 <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS12-2007PooleN2.pdf>.

27 See similarly, Rawlings, R., “Modelling Judicial Review” (2008) 61 C.L.P. 95, 118–119Google Scholar.

28 This is despite the central importance of procedural review in contemporary public law. See for example: Tomkins, A., “National Security and the Role of the Courts: A Changed Landscape?” (2010) 126 L.Q.R. 543Google Scholar.

29 King, J., “Proportionality: A Halfway House” [2010] N.Z. L. Rev. 327, 363Google Scholar; R. v Devon CC, ex p. Baker [1995] 1 All E.R. 73, 88.

30 See note 153 below.

31 “Age of Rights”, p. 18.

32 Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review”, pp. 96–97, 114–115.

33 E.g. Gordon, R., EC Law in Judicial Review (Oxford 2007)Google Scholar; Anthony, G., UK Public Law and European Law (Hart 2002)Google Scholar; for a snapshot see: de la Mare, T., “The Use of EU Law in English Courts” [2012] J.R. 111Google Scholar.

34 G. De Búrca, “The Language of Rights and European Integration” in G. More and J. Shaw (eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon 1995), ch. 3.

35 “Reinvention”, pp. 332–334.

36 Ibid., pp. 324, 335; Tub, pp. 474–475. Note that on a normative level Taggart originally favoured the proportionality method being applied to both rights and non-rights cases but later changed his mind, at least in the New Zealand context: Taggart, “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury”.

37 Stefan v GMC [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1293, 1300.

38 R. (Hasan) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2008] EWCA Civ 1312, [2009] 3 All E.R. 539 at [8]; Gupta v GMC [2001] UKPC 6, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1691; M. Elliott, “Has the Common Law Duty to Give Reasons Come of Age Yet?” [2011] P.L. 56.

39 “Principle of Legality”, p. 23; “Reinvention”, p. 333.

40 Stefan, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1293, p. 1301; Hasan, [2008] EWCA Civ 1312 at [8].

41 Stefan, ibid.

42 Elliott, M., Beatson, Matthews and Elliott's Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Oxford 2011), 408Google Scholar; R. (Wooder) v Feggetter [2002] EWCA Civ 554, [2003] Q.B. 219 at [46].

43 E.g. R. v Higher Education Funding Council, ex p. IDC [1994] 1 W.L.R. 242, 263.

44 R. (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 A.C. 532 at [32]; R. (ABCIFER) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473, [2003] Q.B. 1397 at [32]–[37]; Doherty v Birmingham CC [2008] UKHL 57, [2009] 1 A.C. 367 at [135]; R. (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1482, [2011] 3 All E.R. 81 at [34]–[37] (cf. [78]).

45 R. (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2011] UKSC 33, [2011] 4 All E.R. 881; R. (KM) v Cambridgeshire CC [2012] UKSC 23, [2012] 3 All E.R. 1218; R. (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 A.C. 245; see also In re Duffy [2008] UKHL 4.

46 See note 252ff below. It is sometimes claimed that in Daly Lord Bingham applied proportionality at common law, and thereby departed from Wednesbury. Assuming he did apply a proportionality method, he did so in the context of the interpretive principle of legality, such that there was no departure from Wednesbury. That he saw the inquiry as one of vires is captured by his conclusion: “Section 47(1) of the 1952 Act does not authorise such excessive intrusion, and the Home Secretary accordingly had no power to lay down or implement the policy in its present form” (Daly, [2001] UKHL 26 at [21], and see [31]; Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 A.C. 167 at [13]).

47 King, “A Halfway House?”, p. 362.

48 “Reinvention”, p. 324; “Tub”, p. 474.

49 As Taggart has himself acknowledged: “Principle of Legality”, p. 17.

50 Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 A.C. 395 at [64].

51 E.g. ibid., at [26], [64], [73]; Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 A.C. 225 at [136]; Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406. The development of the action for misuse of private information is the exception (Campbell v MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457), but this was more or less directly required by the Strasbourg jurisprudence.

52 See text to notes 116ff, 219ff below.

53 “Principle of Legality”, p. 31.

54 “Tub”, pp. 475, 479; ibid.

55 “Principle of Legality”, pp. 6–7, 30–34.

56 “Tub”, pp. 475, 479; ibid, pp. 30–32.

57 “Age of Rights”, p. 34; “Tub”, p. 475.

58 Though it is easier to see how some of these doctrines might to some extent be affected by rights-based thinking than others. Relevant considerations is one example: Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257.

59 H.W.R Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 10th ed. (Oxford 2009), xi.

60 Harlow, C. and Rawlings, R., Law and Administration, 3rd ed. (Cambridge 2009), 713–714CrossRefGoogle Scholar; M. Sunkin et al, “Mapping the Use of Judicial Review to Challenge Local Authorities in England and Wales” [2007] P.L. 545. This is one reason why general conclusions about the impact of the HRA cannot be drawn from empirical studies of its impact in the House of Lords: Shah and Poole, “The Impact of the Human Rights Act”, pp. 369–370; cf. “Reformation”, pp. 144–145.

61 McInnes v Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1520, 1528.

62 e.g. R. (Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755 at [30], [50]; C. Sheldon, “Consultation: Revisiting the Basic Principles” [2012] J.R. 152.

63 Ibid. at [49]–[50].

64 R. v Brent LBC, ex p. Gunning (1986) 84 L.G.R. 168.

65 Sheldon, “Consultation”, pp. 156–157.

66 Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review”, p. 97; C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Pressure Through Law (Routledge 1992), ch. 7; Law and Administration, ch. 15.

67 See Feldman, D., “Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theory in Comparative Perspective” (1992) 55 M.L.R. 44Google Scholar, particularly 47, 49, 70; T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice (Oxford 2001), 194–199. Note that the presence or absence of another responsible challenger is a relevant factor in deciding upon standing under the prevailing approach: R. v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p. World Development Movement Ltd. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386, 395; R. v Inspectorate of Pollution, ex p. Greenpeace Ltd. (No. 2) [1994] 4 All E.R. 329, 350.

68 E.g. Morris v Beardmore [1981] A.C. 446, 454E; Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] A.C. 655, 692, 724; MCC Proceeds Inc. v Lehman Bros International (Europe) [1998] 4 All E.R. 675, 685–686; Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd. v Panatown Ltd. [2001] 1 A.C. 518.

69 HRA, s. 7(1).

70 R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617.

71 An alternative hypothesis is that the common law is being “righted”, or that the basic norms were already “rights”, but that the nature of those rights is distinct from that of rights under the HRA: see J. Miles, “Standing under the Human Rights Act 1998: Theories of Rights Enforcement and the Nature of Public Law Adjudication” (2000) 59 C.L.J. 133; text to note 268ff below.

72 C. Harlow, “A Special Relationship? American Influences on Judicial Review in England” in I. Loveland (ed.), A Special Relationship? American Influences on Public Law in the UK (Oxford 1996), 86.

73 Ibid.

74 Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review”, p. 101 note 30.

75 World Development Movement, op. cit., p. 395; Inland Revenue Commissioners, op. cit., p. 644; R. v Somerset CC, ex p. Dixon [1998] Env. L.R. 111, 116–118, 121; R. v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p. Argyll Group plc. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 763, 773. Of course an applicant's case for standing can only be strengthened if their interests are directly affected: R. (Feakins) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2003] EWCA Civ 1546, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1761 at [23].

76 E.g. R. (Howard League for Penal Reform) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2497 at [3]; R. (Hasan) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC (Admin) 2630 at [8]; R. (UK Uncut Legal Action Ltd.) v Commissioners of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2012] EWHC (Admin) 2017; R. (Greenpeace Ltd.) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC (Admin) 311; R. (Greenpeace Ltd.) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2005] EWCA Civ 1656; R. (CPAG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC (Admin) 2579; R. (CPAG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2616.

77 E.g. R. (CPAG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] UKSC 54, [2011] 2 A.C. 15 (concerning personal obligations and liabilities of beneficiaries in respect of overpaid social security benefits); R. (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 A.C. 756.

78 E.g. R. (Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2005] UKHL 28, [2005] 2 A.C. 561.

79 AXA General Insurance Ltd. v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 A.C. 868 at [169]–[170]; see also Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 at [90]; O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237, 275.

80 “Reinvention”, pp. 329–330.

81 Ibid., p. 330.

82 Harlow, “A Special Relationship?”, pp. 87–88, 92.

83 E.g. Inland Revenue Commissioners, op. cit., p. 644; World Development Movement, op. cit., p. 395.

84 Taggart, “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury”, pp. 463–465.

85 E.g. Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2006] UKHL 53, [2007] 1 A.C. 650; Ruddy v Chief Constable of Strathclyde [2012] UKSC 57; R. (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1545, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 419 at [24]–[27], [56]–[62].

86 Ruddy, ibid.; Wilkinson, at [61]; ID v Home Office [2005] EWCA Civ 38, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1003 at [105].

87 HRA, s. 8(2)–(5).

88 Case C-6/90, Francovich v Italy [1991] E.C.R. I-5357 at [40]; C-46/93, Brasserie du Pecheur S.A. v Germany [1996] Q.B. 404 at [51].

89 M. Amos, “Extending the Liability of the State in Damages” (2001) 21 L.S. 1.

90 E.g. X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 A.C. 633, 730–731; F & I Services Ltd. v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2001] EWCA Civ 762 at [73]; R. (Quark Fishing Ltd.) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2003] EWHC (Admin) 1743 at [44]; R. (Wells) v Parole Board [2009] UKHL 22, [2010] 1 A.C. 553 at [5]; Mohammed v Home Office [2011] EWCA Civ 351, [2011] 1 W.L.R. 2862; Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 A.C. 395 at [26].

91 Mohammed, ibid. at [24].

92 Law Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen (Law Com. No. 322, 2010); see the discussion of the fate of the project in Mohammed, ibid. at [20]–[24].

93 Ibid. at [2.9]–[2.12].

94 Ibid. at [2.58]–[2.59].

95 E.g. Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (No. 1) [2001] 2 A.C. 603, 608, 616; R. (Edwards) v Environment Agency (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 22, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1587 at [63]; R. (C (A Minor)) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 882, [2009] Q.B. 657; Tata Steel UK Ltd. v Newport CC [2010] EWCA Civ 1626 at [15]; R. (Corbett) v Restormel BC [2001] EWCA Civ 330 at [17], [32], [34]. Cf. Walton, op. cit. at [103], [156].

96 E.g. Edwards, ibid. at [63]–[65]; R. (Hurley) v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills [2012] H.R.L.R. 13 at [99]; R. (CPAG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC (Admin) 2579 at [64]–[77]; R. (English Speaking Board (International) Ltd.) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC (Admin) 1788 at [62]–[63]; R. v Lincolnshire CC, ex p. Atkinson (1996) 8 Admin. L.R. 529, 550.

97 Caldwell, J., “Judicial Review: The Fading of Remedial Discretion?” (2009) 23 N.Z.U.L.R. 489, 498–499, 510–511Google Scholar.

98 For example the role of habeas corpus in protecting the “right to liberty” has been relied on to explain its availability as of right: Rahmatullah v Secretary of State for Defence [2012] UKSC 48, [2012] 3 W.L.R. 1087 at [74].

99 E.g. Ashby v White (1703) 2 Lord Raymond 938, 953.

100 R. v Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith [1996] Q.B. 517, 537–538.

101 E.g. Berkeley, above note 95, pp. 608, 616; Edwards, above note 95, at [63]; Tata, above note 95, at [15]; Bolton MBC v Secretary of State for the Environment (1991) 61 P. & C.R. 343, 353; Hurley, above note 96, at [99].

102 E.g. C (A Minor), above note 95, at [41], [49], [54]–[55], Atkinson, above note 96, p. 550; Corbett, above note 95, at [32].

103 T. Bingham, “Should Public Law Remedies Be Discretionary?” [1991] P.L. 64.

104 “Reinvention”, pp. 312–313, 335.

105 For example Poole describes it as the “odd one out”, a “long-stop category” and an “outlier of the conceptual system of which it was a part” (“Reformation”, p. 143).

106 “Principle of Legality”, p. 31.

107 “Reinvention”, p. 329 (emphasis added).

108 Craig, P., EU Administrative Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2012)Google Scholar, chs. 19–20; Gordon, EC Law in Judicial Review, ch. 11; F.G. Jacobs, “Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community Law” in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart 1999), ch. 1.

109 P. Craig, “Proportionality, Rationality and Review” [2010] N.Z. L. Rev. 265, 270–271.

110 “Reformation”, p. 145; see also, “Age of Rights”, p. 19.

111 “Reformation”, pp. 146–147.

112 “Reinvention”, p. 325

113 Ibid., pp. 326, 329.

114 “Reformation”, pp. 146–147.

115 E.g. R. (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [2011] UKSC 33, [2011] 4 All E.R. 881 (Wednesbury pleaded concurrently with Article 8 claim); R. (KM) v Cambridgeshire CC [2012] UKSC 23, [2012] 3 All E.R. 1218 (provision of welfare services to meet needs of disabled person); R. (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 A.C. 245 (Wednesbury applied in the form of the Hardial Singh principles, in the context of deprivation of liberty: see [30]); R. (Hillingdon LBC) v Lord Chancellor [2008] EWHC (Admin) 2683 (anxious scrutiny applied where children's “human rights” at stake).

116 It is clear that Taggart considers the principle of legality to form part of the constitutionalisation process, and to come close to proportionality analysis: “Principle of Legality”, pp. 20–23; “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury”, p. 431 (but see the contradictory remarks at p. 435, attributing emergence of proportionality to the HRA). It is therefore unclear why he places exclusive emphasis on the HRA as the source of fundamental methodological change in his Reinvention piece: “Reinvention”, pp. 326, 329.

117 E.g. M. Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart 1997), chs. 4–6; Jowell, “Constitutional Judicial Review”, pp. 674–675.

118 For explanation and analysis of the principle see text to note 219 below.

119 “Principle of Legality”, p. 20.

120 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 125G.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid., pp. 129–130, 130H-131B, 142; R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Leech (No. 2) [1994] Q.B. 198, 212F.

123 Leech, ibid., p. 217G.

124 Simms, [2002] A.C. at p. 142.

125 Leech, [1994] Q.B. at p. 212E.

126 Ibid., pp. 212E-214F; Simms, [2002] 2 A.C. at pp.127–129.

127 Thomas v Chief Adjudication Officer [1991] 2 Q.B. 164; R. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p. Roberts [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 555; Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B & Q Plc. [1993] A.C. 900; R. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 250; R. v Chief Constable of Sussex, ex p. ITF Ltd. [1999] 2 A.C. 418; Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA Civ 351, [2002] Q.B. 1213; R. (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2006] EWCA Civ 817, [2007] Q.B. 305.

128 E.g. P. Craig, “The Courts, the Human Rights Act and Judicial Review” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 589, 594–596; Administrative Law, 7th ed. (Sweet and Maxwell 2012), at [20-033]–[20-034]; “Age of Rights”, p. 41; “Reformation”, p. 146.

129 E.g. Articles 5(4), 6(1).

130 See J. Simor, “Procedural Aspects of Convention Rights” [2008] J.R. 232.

131 Indeed there are indications that Poole conflates substantive review and review in terms of rights: “rights and other substantive interests” (Reformation, p. 143); “rights … and other substantive considerations” (at p. 144); “HRA by requiring courts to apply ECHR rights … squared the circle between the desire for more upfront application of substantive judicial review and the constitutional need for Parliament to sanction such a development” (at p. 145).

132 Elliott, Administrative Law, p. 356.

133 “Reformation”, p. 146.

134 How these “rights” differ from those within the legality context is analysed in Section IV below.

135 That this is the primary function of human rights law is demonstrated by significant internal features of that body of doctrine: Varuhas, J.N.E, “A Tort-Based Approach to Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2009) 75 M.L.R. 750, 765–767Google Scholar; “Damages: Private Law and the HRA – Never the Twain Shall Meet?” in D. Hoffman (ed.), The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge 2011), 232–235; Damages for Breaches of Human Rights (Hart forthcoming), chs. 2–3.

136 E.g. R. v DPP, ex p. Kebeline [2000] 2 A.C. 326, 381; Samaroo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1139 at [35]; International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158, [2003] Q.B. 728 at [84]. One need only consider the approach in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 A.C. 72, concerning an Article 2 claim, where the Court rejected as “misplaced” a submission that a margin of appreciation ought to be afforded to the primary decision-maker (at [43]), and the relevant legal tests were applied as liability criteria in tort would be applied to a set of facts.

137 E.g. “Age of Rights”, p. 34.

138 “Reformation”, pp. 142, 144.

139 Ibid., p. 144.

140 “Age of Rights”, p. 43.

141 “Reformation”, p. 144.

142 Ibid., p. 167.

143 Ibid., p. 147.

144 “Age of Rights”, p. 43.

145 “Reformation”, p. 147.

146 “Reinvention”, p. 312.

147 “Reformation”, pp. 148ff; “Age of Rights”, p. 34.

148 “Reformation”, p. 145.

149 Ibid., p. 142.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid., p. 145.

152 See further Section IV(A)(2)-(3) below.

153 R. (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [68]–[69]; R. (Wood) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC (Admin) 3256 at [52] onwards; Paponette v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2010] UKPC 32, [2012] 1 A.C. 1 at [38].

154 [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 A.C. 357 at [99]–[103].

155 Case C-6/90, Francovich v Italy [1991] E.C.R. I-5357 at [31]–[34]; C-46/93, Brasserie du Pecheur S.A. v Germany [1996] Q.B. 404 at [39]–[40] (Advocate General's opinion). For critical commentary see: Harlow, C., “Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State” (1996) 2 E.L.J. 199, 204ffGoogle Scholar; State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (Oxford 2004), 57–58; Caranta, R., “Judicial Protection Against Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes Shape” (1995) 32 C.M.L.Rev. 703, 710Google Scholar; T. Tridimas, “Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing Down?” in D. Fairgrieve, M. Andenas and J. Bell (eds.), Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (BIICL 2002), 149–150.

156 For critical commentary see: , J. and O'Neill, A., “The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?” (1992) 12 L.S. 227, 245Google Scholar; O'Neill, A., “The EU and Fundamental Rights – Part 1” [2011] J.R. 216, 222Google Scholar.

157 “Tub”, p. 475.

158 Ibid.; see also “Principle of Legality”, p. 31.

159 Taggart, “Proportionality, Deference, Wednesbury”, p. 461.

160 Taggart does, under the heading “‘Righting’ Administrative Law”, very briefly mention a number of changes which have contributed to the “growth” of administrative law over the last half-century such as emergence of legitimate expectations and factual review, but it is not clear how these do or do not relate to the righting or constitutionalisation processes: “Reinvention”, pp. 323–324.

161 Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review”, pp. 96, 114ff; Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration, pp. 669–679.

162 For description of recent changes including according the Charter of Fundamental Rights Treaty-status, and the winding road towards EU accession to the ECHR, see: O'Neill, A., “The EU and Fundamental Rights – Part 2” [2011] J.R. 374Google Scholar. There remains scepticism about the priority accorded to human rights within a predominantly economic order: O'Neill, A., “How the CJEU Uses the Charter of Fundamental Rights” [2012] J.R. 203, 210Google Scholar; De Búrca, G., “The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor” (2011) 105 A.J.I.L. 649Google Scholar; Douglas-Scott, S., “The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon” (2011) 11 H.R.L.R. 645Google Scholar.

163 P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU Law, 5th ed. (Oxford 2011), 364; Douglas-Scott, ibid.

164 Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review”, p. 121; Harlow, C., “Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values” (2006) 17 E.J.I.L. 187, 195Google Scholar.

165 E.g. Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v ADBHU [1985] E.C.R. 520, 531.

166 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers' Federation v Viking Line ABP [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 51; C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 9.

167 E.g. Nadarajah, [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [68]; S.J. Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford 2000), ch. 1.

168 See text to notes 62, 64 above.

169 Rawlings, “Modelling Judicial Review”, p. 121.

170 Such variations also suggest that legal norms such as “rights” within these different bodies of doctrine likely perform different roles from one body of doctrine to the other. In contrast Poole has, like the common law constitutionalists he has criticised, approached the “role of rights” in administrative law as though “rights” perform a single role across administrative law, in his account to secure the legitimacy of and counter mistrust in government: Legitimacy; Reformation, p. 167.

171 For example in EU law proportionality is applied rather differently in different contexts, and in some contexts may impose only a limited justificatory burden on the defendant: for a summary see Craig, “Proportionality, Rationality and Review”, pp. 267–270; Administrative Law at [21-021]–[21-024]; and see note 108 above. Other differences between proportionality in the human rights and EU contexts have been noted by the courts: e.g. R. (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2006] EWCA Civ 817, [2007] Q.B. 305 at [158]–[159].

172 As noted above, while human rights may be afforded primacy in human rights law, they may be a countervailing factor in EU law: text to note 166.

173 “Reformation”, pp. 142–147.

174 “Age of Rights”, p. 33.

175 See the text to notes 111, 138–145 above.

176 See note 17 above.

177 “Reinvention”, p. 334; “Tub”, p. 475.

178 “Reinvention”, p. 326.

179 E.g. Allan, T.R.S., “Dworkin and Dicey: The Rule of Law as Integrity” (1988) 8 O.J.L.S. 266, 273Google Scholar; Craig, Administrative Law, ch. 1.

180 As Poole has observed: “Legitimacy”, p. 710.

181 Hohfeld, W.N., “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1913) 23 Yale L.J. 16Google Scholar [“Hohfeld 1913”]; (1917) 26 Yale L.J. 710.

182 See M.H. Kramer, N.E. Simmonds and H. Steiner, A Debate Over Rights (Oxford 1998).

183 E.g. R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford 2007), ch. 2; Eleftheriadis, P., “The Analysis of Property Rights” (1996) 16 O.J.L.S. 31Google Scholar.

184 By contrast “rights to” formulations, such as a “right to property”, tell us little about specifically what the rights-holder is entitled to, or the precise obligations of others in respect of the subject of the rights-holder's entitlement.

185 E.g. McInnes v Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1520, 1528; In re F [1990] 2 A.C. 1, 13; R. (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1482, [2011] 3 All E.R. 81 at [74].

186 But see: N. Bamforth, “Hohfeldian Rights and Public Law” in M.H. Kramer (ed.), Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities (Palgrave 2001), ch. 1.

187 M.H. Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings” in Kramer et al, A Debate Over Rights, p. 58.

188 See for example, N.E. Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge” in Kramer et al, A Debate Over Rights, pp. 141–142.

189 Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings”, pp. 49–60.

190 Ibid., p. 9.

191 For a thorough-going analysis and response to criticisms and misinterpretations of Hohfeld's analytical scheme see: ibid., pp. 1–60.

192 See Phillipson, G. and Williams, A., “Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint” (2011) 74 M.L.R. 878Google Scholar.

193 HRA, ss. 3(2), 4(6).

194 Feldman, D., “The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles” (1999) 19 L.S. 165, 187Google Scholar.

195 However this would be a difficult argument to make, not least as the Houses of Parliament and anyone exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament are not public authorities under the Act: HRA, s. 6(4) and see s. 6(2), (6).

196 For an analysis of these different formulations see: N.J. McBride, “Rights and the Basis of Tort Law” in D. Nolan and A. Robertson (eds.), Rights and Private Law (Hart 2012), ch. 12.

197 Simmonds, “Rights at the Cutting Edge”, p. 152.

198 I leave open the possibility, which cannot be explored here, that Convention rights also entail legal phenomena other than claim-rights, such as Hohfeldian immunities or liberties. It is also worth noting that the statutory scheme for protection of Convention rights entails a range of phenomena which may be conceptualised as Hohfeldian powers, liberties and immunities. For example a “victim” has a power under section 7(1) HRA to initiate proceedings against the relevant public authority, and a liberty to exercise it. It is also likely that claim-rights under Convention rights and held vis-à-vis public authorities are accompanied by immunities which are also held against those authorities, such that the authorities are in general disabled from extinguishing the right-holders' claim-rights (but see: HRA, ss. 14–15): see M.H. Kramer, “Rights in Legal and Political Philosophy” in K.E. Whittington, R.D. Kelemen and G.A. Caldeira (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford 2010), pp. 416–418.

199 Rights in private law are also sometimes expressed as “rights to” or “rights of” (e.g. Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 A.C. 962 at [60]; Allen v Flood [1898] A.C. 1, 29), but this has not negated a Hohfeldian analysis.

200 R. (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45, [2012] 1 A.C. 621 at [44], [59] (emphasis added).

201 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 A.C. 72 at [12]; see similarly, Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 A.C. 357 at [87], in respect of Article 6(1).

202 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 245.

203 Paraphrasing Birks on an unrelated topic: “Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies” (2000) 20 O.J.L.S. 1, 7.

204 The EHRC has the power to initiate proceedings under the HRA, but importantly it “may act only if there is or would be one or more victims of the unlawful act”, and it may not be awarded HRA damages: Equality Act 2006, s. 30(3).

205 H. Steiner, “Working Rights” in Kramer et al, A Debate Over Rights, pp. 239–247. For the locus classicus see: H.L.A. Hart, “Bentham on Legal Rights” in A.W.B. Simpson (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Second Series (Clarendon 1973), ch. 7.

206 Quila, [2011] UKSC 2 at [44]; Belfast CC v Miss Behavin' Ltd. [2007] UKHL 19, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1420 at [12]–[13], [15]–[16], [20].

207 Quila, ibid. at [61].

208 R. (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100 at [48], [59]; Rabone, op. cit. at [107]; Tweed v Parades Commission for Northern Ireland [2006] UKHL 53, [2007] 1 A.C. 650 at [5].

209 Miss Behavin', [2007] UKHL 19 at [90].

210 R. (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1545, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 419 at [61].

211 Quila, [2011] UKSC 2 at [59], [80].

212 Ibid.

213 Miss Behavin', op. cit. at [12]–[15], [31], [44]; Begum, op cit. at [29]–[31]; Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 A.C. 167; And see: Quila, ibid. at [46], [61], [91]; E v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2008] UKHL 66, [2009] 1 A.C. 536 at [13], [52] onwards; M. Amos, “Separating Human Rights Adjudication From Judicial Review” [2007] E.H.R.L.R. 679.

214 Begum, ibid. at [30].

215 See note 255 below.

216 This has most often been recognised where the claim is initiated via ordinary proceedings, and the relief sought is damages: e.g. Rabone, op. cit. at [108]; A v Essex CC [2010] UKSC 33, [2011] 1 A.C. 280 at [116]; and see also Ruddy v Chief Constable of Strathclyde [2012] UKSC 57. Cf. R. (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 673; Anufrijeva v Southwark LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 1406; [2004] Q.B. 1124 at [52]–[55], [72], [74].

217 See note 135 above.

218 Ibid.

219 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Leech (No. 2) [1994] Q.B. 198, 210B; Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 A.C. 1, 10E; International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158, [2003] Q.B. 728 at [70] onwards; R. v Lord Chancellor, ex p. Witham [1998] Q.B. 575, 580–586; Ahmed v HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 5, [2010] 2 A.C. 534 at [111].

220 Raymond, ibid., pp. 13A, 14G; R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 130E; Ahmed, ibid. at [184].

221 Roth, [2002] EWCA Civ at [70] onwards; Simms, ibid. pp. 130E, 131F; Leech, [1994] Q.B. at p. 212D; Ahmed, ibid. at [111]; R. (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 36, [2004] 1 A.C. 604 at [31].

222 Simms, ibid., at p. 131E, G.

223 Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 A.C. 395 at [61], and [24].

224 Raymond, [1983] 1 A.C. at pp. 12H, 13A; Leech, [1994] Q.B. at p. 210B.

225 Raymond, [1983] 1 A.C. at p. 13A-B; Leech, ibid.

226 Leech, ibid., p. 210C; Raymond, ibid., pp. 10H, 14G.

227 Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 5 at [111], [184].

228 Simms, [2000] A.C. at p. 130A, C.

229 Raymond, [1983] 1 A.C. at p. 13A; Leech, [1994] Q.B. at pp. 202E, 208B, 216–217, 218C; Simms, [2000] A.C. at pp. 125C-D, 130C, 132C; R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Anderson [1984] Q.B. 778, 785D, 793C-D, 795B.

230 Simms, ibid., at p. 131E, G; Leech, ibid., pp. 210A, 213F; Anufrijeva, [2003] UKHL 36 at [26].

231 Wheeler v Leicester [1985] A.C. 1054, 1065.

232 Simms, [2000] 2 A.C. at pp. 126H, 143C.

233 E.g. Raymond, above note 219; Anderson, above note 229; Leech, above note 219; Witham, above note 219.

234 E.g. Simms, above note 220; R. (Calver) v Adjudication Panel for Wales [2012] EWHC (Admin) 1172 at [40]–[42], [44].

235 “Hohfeld 1913”, pp. 32–44; Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings”, pp. 10–20; The distinction between claim-right and liberty has long been recognised in English law: e.g. Allen v Flood [1898] A.C. 1, 29. However, the distinction has not always been accurately expressed: R. (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1482, [2011] 3 All E.R. 81 at [37], and see the more orthodox analysis at [74].

236 See W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London 1959), ch. VIII.

237 R. (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55, [2007] 2 A.C. 105 at [34]; see also R. (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 A.C. 307 at [1]; Wheeler, [1983] 1 A.C. at p. 1065; Attorney-General v Observer Ltd. [1990] 1 A.C. 109, 283.

238 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (MacMillan 1931), 499.

239 [1936] 1 K.B. 218, 222.

240 Jennings, Law and the Constitution, p. 262, see also pp. 259–260.

241 Ibid, pp. 262–263.

242 E.g. Watkins, [2006] UKHL 17 at [24] (“In all these [legality] cases the importance of the right was directly relevant to the lawfulness of what had been done to interfere with its enjoyment”).

243 Ibid. at [61].

244 Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 5 at [60].

245 R. v Radio Authority, ex p. Bull [1998] Q.B. 294, 305–306.

246 Access to court is directly protected by article 6: Golder v United Kingdom (1979–80) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 at [26]–[36].

247 Raymond, above note 219.

248 Ibid., p. 10.

249 [1981] A.C. 446, 455, and see 461–462, 463–465.

250 R. (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12, [2012] 1 A.C. 245 at [53]; see also Secretary of State for the Home Department v GG [2010] Q.B. 585.

251 E.g. Lumba, ibid.; Morris, [1981] A.C. at pp. 463–465; GG, ibid.

252 R. v Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith [1996] Q.B. 517, 554.

253 Elliott, M., “The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review” (2001) 60 C.L.J. 301, 306Google Scholar.

254 Smith, [1996] Q.B. at pp. 540, 554.

255 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Brind [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 748–749.

256 Bamforth, “Hohfeldian Rights and Public Law”, p. 11 (emphasis omitted).

257 Brind, [1991] 1 A.C. at pp. 747–749, 750–751, 757, 759, 763.

258 Ibid., p. 751.

259 Ibid., p. 763.

260 Ibid., p. 757.

261 Ibid., p. 763.

262 Ibid., pp. 750, 763.

263 Ibid., p. 764.

264 Smith, [1996] Q.B. at pp. 554, 556, 564.

265 Ibid., p. 558.

266 Ibid., pp. 532, 539.

267 Ibid., p. 540.

268 “Rights Without Trimmings”, pp. 49–60.

269 Such as: “the general body of … taxpayers” (R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p. National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617, 647, 651), or “that section of the public that may be in need of legal advice, assistance or representation” (Swain v Law Society [1983] 1 A.C. 598, 607).

270 E.g. Law Society v Sephton & Co. [2006] UKHL 22, [2006] 2 A.C. 543 at [66], [83]; Stovin v Wise [1996] A.C. 923, 950B, 956E; R. (Wells) v Parole Board [2009] UKHL 22, [2010] 1 A.C. 553 at [44]; R. (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 36, [2004] 1 A.C. 604 at [15]; R. (West) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 1, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 350 at [1], [27]; First Secretary of State v Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd. [2005] EWCA Civ 520 at [14]; R. (Cawser) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 1522 at [48]–[52].

271 Lumba, [2011] UKSC 12 at [30], and see [196], [341], [359].

272 E.g. R. v Somerset CC, ex p. Dixon [1998] Env. L.R. 111, 121; Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1982] A.C. at p. 648.

273 E.g. Woolf, H., “Public Law–Private Law: Why the Divide? A Personal View” [1986] P.L. 220Google Scholar; Bourgoin S.A. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] Q.B. 716, 761B-C, 763G; O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237, 255–256, 275; Anns v Merton LBC [1978] A.C. 728, 754; IRC v City of London [1953] 1 W.L.R. 652, 661–662; Lord Leconfield v Thornely [1926] A.C. 10, 17–18; M v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C. 377, 416A; Swain, [1983] 1 A.C. at p. 607. But note that statutes may create individual claim-rights without providing for a statutory action for their enforcement, such that they fall to be enforced via review. Consider R. v Gloucestershire CC, ex p. Barry [1997] A.C. 584 in which the Law Lords held that section 2(1) of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 created a duty owed by a local authority to an individual personally (at pp. 595, 598, 605–606, 610), Lord Lloyd observing that such provision is “almost unique in the field of community care” (at p. 595). Contrast Ali v Birmingham CC [2010] UKSC 8, [2010] 2 A.C. 39; R. (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2557 at [35]–[36].

274 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] A.C. 53, 59 (emphasis added).

275 Gorringe v Calderdale MBC [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057 at [70] (emphasis added).

276 Stovin, [1996] A.C. at pp. 935D, 951H.

277 Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium Ld. [1949] A.C. 398, 408.

278 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 A.C. 633, 737; Swain, [1983] 1 A.C. at p. 618.

279 Swain, ibid., at p. 607.

280 R. (Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755 at [41]; Cutler, [1949] A.C. at p. 409.

281 Swain, ibid., at p. 607.

282 R. (CJ) v Cardiff CC [2011] EWCA Civ 1590 at [21].

283 It does not follow that it is conceptually impossible for a public authority to owe duties to individuals in the context of a duty owed to the public. For example authorities may owe duties of care to individuals in tort in the context of performance of public duties.

284 Though the matter cannot be fully explored here Mashaw's distinction between “individualistic” ideas of rights, which emphasise autonomy and consent, and “statist” ideas of rights, concerned with “pursuit of the general welfare”, may help to explain the difference in philosophical foundations between individual rights under the HRA and public rights at common law: “‘Rights’ in the Federal Administrative State” (1983) 92 Yale L.J. 1129.

285 Bourgoin, op. cit., p. 767.

286 Dixon, [1998] Env. L. R. at p. 121.

287 Within the will-theory of rights, the liberal standing rules would conclusively tell against the duties of reasonableness, legality etc being conceptualised as individual rights: see note 205 above.

288 Dixon, [1998] Env. L. R. at p. 121.

289 E.g. West, [2005] UKHL 1 at [30].

290 By analogy, damages are available under the HRA for violations of procedural rights: R. (Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 673; R. (Faulkner) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 23.