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PULLING A TRIGGER OR STARTING A JOURNEY? BREXIT IN THE SUPREME COURT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 July 2017

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Extract

FOLLOWING a referendum on 23 June 2016 in which 52% of voters (38% of the total electorate) had expressed a preference for the UK to leave the EU, the Government announced that it would start the process of withdrawal, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), by notifying the European Council of the UK's decision, exercising the Government's prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. A number of legal challenges were fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Birnie and others intervening) [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 after an expedited hearing, the Court decided two issues: (1) whether the Government could exercise its power under the royal prerogative to give notice, or needed an Act of Parliament to authorise the giving of notice; and (2) whether the Government required the consent of devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales before giving notice or introducing to Parliament a Bill authorising the giving of notice. The Court sat unprecedentedly with all 11 serving members. On issue (1), the Court, by an 8–3 majority, held that an Act of Parliament would be required in order to authorise the giving of notice. On issue (2), the Court unanimously held that there was no legal requirement for consent by the devolved institutions.

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Case and Comment
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2017 

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