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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 December 2011
The part played by Queen Victoria in the conduct of foreign affairs during the early phases of Bismarck's unification of Germany, and more particularly during the crisis of 1866, has been but incompletely revealed in her published correspondence.1 The editors of the Queen's letters, obliged to make a careful selection from abundant manuscript material, could not, from the nature of their task, give a comprehensive account of the Queen's influence on the conduct of diplomatic affairs. Nor has any subsequent historian examined in detail the Queen's tenacious struggle for the success of her German policy. Hardie's study, the only one which covers the subject, is based, on the diplomatic side, exclusively on the Queen's published letters.
1 The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series. Ed. Buckle, G. E. (London, 1926), Vol. i (hereafter cited as Letters)Google Scholar.
2 Hardie, Frank, The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861–1901 (Oxford, 1935)Google Scholar.
3 I have to acknowledge the gracious permission of His Majesty the King to make use of material from the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle.
4 The Clarendon MSS. are in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
5 Clarendon MSS. Loftus to Clarendon. Private, 3 March 1866.
6 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/46. Capt. V. Normann to Sahl, 3 March 1866.
7 Windsor MSS. Male to Clarendon, Private, 2 March 1866.
8 P[ublic]R[ecord]O[ffice], F.O. 181/441. Mensdorff to Apponyi. Private, 1 March 1866. Copy in Clarendon to Buchanan, 7 March 1866, no. 81. Confidential.
9 F.O. 120/437. Clarendon to Bloomfield, 7 March 1866, no. 62. Confidential.
10 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/54 Clarendon to the Queen, 8 March 1866.
11 It was regarded as certain that the Estates of the Duchies, if consulted, would pronounce themselves in favour of the Duke of Augustenburg. When Clarendon asked the Prussian minister in London whether the difficulty about the future of the Duchies might not be solved by ‘calling together the States, & allowing them to decide who should be their ruler’, he received the reply that such a course was impossible ‘because they would elect the Duke of Augustenburg’. F.O. 244/208. (Clarendon to Loftus 22 March 1866, no. 30.)
12 Cf. Valentin, Veit, Bismarcks Reichsgriindung im Urteil Englischer Diplomaten (Amsterdam, 1937), P. 208Google Scholar.
13 ‘The Queen’, Clarendon told Russell on 31 March, ‘thinks of nothing but the Duchies and with reference to the Augustenburgs getting back that which they were handsomely paid never to claim; … ’ (Clarendon to Russell, 31 March 1866. Printed in Gooch, G. P., The later correspondence of Lord John Russell (London, 1925), 11, p. 345)Google Scholar. General Grey considered that Clarendon would not recommend a reference to the Estates ‘because it would be tantamount to the establishment of the Duke of Augustenburg, against whom Ld. Clarendon appears to take the matter all personally’. Windsor MSS. 1, 43/122. Grey to the Queen, 25 March 1866.
14 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/59. Russell to the Queen, 12 March 1866.
15 Grand Duke Peter of Oldenburg was the only serious rival of Duke Frederick of Augustenburg as claimant to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.
16 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/59. Russell to the Queen, 12 March 1866.
17 The Grand Duke of Oldenburg was a member of the junior branch of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, of which the senior branch was the Imperial Russian family. For Russia's support of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg's claim cf. Friedrich, Graf Revertera,’ Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten in St. Petersburg 1864 bis 1868’, Deutsche Revue, 2ger Jahrgang (Stuttgart u. Leipzig, 1904), pp. 42 f. and Denkwiirdigkeiten des Botschafters General v. Schweinitz (Berlin, 1927), I, 201.
18 On 11 March 1866, Loftus, after a conversation with Bismarck, telegraphed from Berlin that the latter 'spoke strongly against Prince Frederick (Augustenburg) but would accept Grand-Duke of Oldenburg’. Windsor MSS. 1,43/58. Loftus to Clarendon, telegram. Private, 11 March 1866. Copy.
19 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/60. The Queen to Russell, 12 March 1866. Copy.
20 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/68. Grey to Clarendon. Private, 12 March 1866. Copy.
21 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/69. Clarendon to the Queen, 12 March 1866.
22 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/70. The Queen to Clarendon, 13 March 1866.
28 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/71. Russell to the Queen, 13 March 1866.
24 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/72. Clarendon to the Queen, 13 March 1866.
25 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/73. Grey to the Queen, 13 (or 14) March 1866.
26 By the 23rd Protocol of the Congress of Paris it was laid down that before having recourse to war, the signatories involved in a quarrel would seek the good offices of a friendly Power; cf. British and Foreign State Papers, XLVI, 133.
27 For the text of this letter cf. The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, 1862–1879, Second Series (London, 1894), 11, pp. 43 ff.
28 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/58. Loftus to Clarendon, telegram. Private, 11 March 1866. Copy.
29 F.O. 64/591, no. 48. Loftus to Clarendon, telegram, 17 March 1866. Text in Loftus to Clarendon, 17 March 1866.
30 F.O. 64/591. Loftus to Clarendon, no. 55, 17 M a r c h 1866. Confidential.
31 F.O. 64/591. Loftus to Clarendon, no. 54, 17 March 1866. Most confidential.
32 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/95. The Crown Prince of Prussia to the Queen, 17 March 1866.
33 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/110. Russell to the Queen, 22 March 1866.
34 Letters, pp. 305 f. The Crown Princess of Prussia to the Queen, 20 March 1866.
35 Bismarck, Gesammelte Werke, v, 407. Bismarck to Bernstorff, telegram, 20 March 1866.
36 The letter is printed in Bismarck, Werke, v, pp. 408 ff.
37 F.O. 244/208. Clarendon to Loftus, 22 March 1866, no. 30.
38 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/120. Clarendon to the Queen, 24 March 1866.
39 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/124. Grey to Russell, 26 March 1866. Private and confidential. Copy. Letters, pp. 308 f.
40 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/125. Russell to the Queen 26 March 1866.
41 Letters, pp. 310 ff. The Queen to the Crown Prince of Prussia, 28 March, 1866. (Translation.)
42 Letters, p. 310. Russell to the Queen, 27 March 1866.
43 Ibid. p. 313. The Queen to Russell, 28 March 1866.
44 General Grey to Wood (no date given). Printed in Sir H. Maxwell, The Life and Letters of the Fourth Earl of Clarendon (London, 1913), ii, 282. The effect of this little unpleasantness’, writes Clarendon's biographer, ‘was to be felt in a later year.’ (Maxwell, op. cit. II, 282.) Clarendon himself was unrepentant. ‘In a long conversation I had yesterday with the Queen,’ he wrote to his friend Cowley, the ambassador in Paris, early in 1864, ‘I ventured to call the King of Prussia a fool and to say that a man so weak and obstinate in his position easily became a great criminal. She laughed and did not protest, so she has made progress towards seeing things and men as they are.’ Quoted in Wellesley, Hon. F., The Paris Embassy during the Second Empire (London, 1928), p. 269Google Scholar.
45 Clarendon to Russell, 31 March 1866. Printed in Gooch, op. cit. p. 345.
46 Windsor MSS. 1, 90–8 passim and I, 43–4 passim.
47 The Queen, Clarendon once confided to Cowley, was ‘sadly in want of an adviser not only to induce her to do what is right but to keep her from what is wrong under the influence of C. Grey’. Quoted in Wellesley, op. cit. p. 279.
48 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/122. Grey to the Queen, 25 March 1866.
49 Maxwell, op. cit. 11, 310.
50 Letters, p. 310. Russell to the Queen, 27 March 1866.
51 Maxwell, op. cit. II, 310.
52 Letters, p. 310. Russell to the Queen, 27 March 1866.
53 Letters, p. 313. The Queen to Russell, March 28, 1866.
54 Maxwell, op. cit. 11, 310.
55 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/124. Grey to Russell, 26 March 1866. Private and confidential. Copy.
56 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/143. The Duchess of Coburg to the Queen, 28 March 1866. Copy.
57 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/144. Clarendon to the Queen, 29 March 1866.
58 Windor MSS. 1, 43/152. Gray to the Queen, 30 March 1866.
59 Letters, p. 314. Extract from the Queen's Journal.
60 Russell's arguments against British intervention in 1866 were identical with those which the Queen had made use of in arguing against British intervention in 1863–4. The roles were now reversed for during the earlier crisis Russell had been the principal advocate of a Policy of navel assistance to Denmark in her struggle against Prussia and Austria. Russell's reference to 1864 shows that he at least was aware of the irony of the situation.
61 Russell to Clarendon, 30 March 1866. Printed in Maxwell, op. cit. 11, 311.
62 Clarendon to the Queen, 31 March 1866. Printed in Letters, 314 f.
63 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/160. Grey to the Queen, 1 April 1866.
64 Windsor MSS. 1, 43/161. Russell to the Queen, 1 April 1866.
65 Maxwell, op. cit. 11, 310.
66 The Queen to the King of Prussia, 10 April 1866. Translation in Letters, pp. 317 f.
67 The Queen to Russell, 10 April 1866. Printed in Letters, p. 318.
68 Ibid.
69 Indeed, it was Russell himself who had inspired the Queen's attack on Bismarck. ‘There is but one remedy’, he had written to the Queen on 27 M arch, ‘one certain mode of preserving Peace—It is the dismissal of Count Bismarck by the King. If this can be accomplished by any patriotic Prussians who may have access to the King, all may go right-not otherwise.’ (Windsor MSS. I, 43/130. Russell to the Queen, 27 March 1866.) Since no patriotic Prussians could be found to undertake the task, the Queen was now trying to take it over herself.
70 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/7. Clarendon to the Queen, 10 April 1866.
71 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/33. Loftus to Grey, 14 April 1866.
72 ‘Schliesslich darf ich Dich bitten zu glauben dass nicht ein Mann, den Du nicht nennst, an der jetzigen Crisis Schuld ist, sondern dass mich die Schuld, wenn es eine ist, selbst trifft, da ich mit meinem ersten Rathgeber auch nicht einen Augenblick verschiedener Ansicht gewesen bin.’
73 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/20. The King of Prussia to the Queen, 13 and 21 April 1866.
74 On 17 April Russell had again informed the Queen that there was ‘only one security for peace; the removal of Count Bismarck’. (Windsor MSS. I, 44/42. Russell to the Queen, 17 April 1866.)
76 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/69. Grey to the Queen, 24 April 1866.
76 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/64. Clarendon to the Queen, 25 April 1866.
77 During this illness, Bismarck was reported to have said that ‘his illness & possible death might prevent the war upon wch, if he had been in health, he wd have insisted’. (Windsor MSS. 1, 44/64. Clarendon to the Queen, 25 April 1866.)
78 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/94. Clarendon to the Queen, 30 April 1866.
79 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/35. Russell to Apponyi, 16 April 1866. Copy.
80 The aim of Russell's proposal was to further the national aspirations of Italy and at the same time to save Austria from a war on two fronts. He was unaware that after much hesitation the Italian government had, on 8 April, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with that of Prussia. Even had his advice been taken in Vienna, it would no longer have helped to separate Italy from Prussia.
81 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/78. Mensdorff to Apponyi, 26 April 1866. Copy.
82 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/131. The Queen to Clarendon, 4 May 1866. Draft. It is curious to note that in 1863 and 1864 it had been the Queen herself who had pressed for the adoption of the principle of nationality, whilst it was Palmerston, then Prime Minister, who had pointed out its dangers. ‘What Sovereign is there in Europe’, Palmerston had then asked, ‘Your Majesty not excluded, in some parts of whose Dominions a set of factious Demagogues acting from without as well as from within might not raise a local cry for Separation, & for transfer to some other Authority. If the Theories now put forward in Germany were to be admitted, they might be applied to break into Fragments every European State.’ (Letters, p. 141, Palmerston to the Queen, 4 January 1864.)
83 Clarendon, the Queen recorded after an interview with the Foreign Secretary, ‘alluded to Ld. Russell's extraordinary letter’, of which, to her great satisfaction, he ‘entirely disapproved’. (Letters, pp. 325 f. Memorandum by the Queen, 6 May 1866.)
84 Russell to Clarendon, 17 May 1866. Maxwell, op. cit. ii, 312.
85 Memorandum by Queen Victoria, 6 May 1866. Printed in Letters, pp. 325 f.
86 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/145. Clarendon to the Queen, 6 May 1866.
87 Letters, p. 325. Memorandum by the Queen, 6 May 1866.
88 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/176. Clarendon to Grey, 14 May 1866.
89 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/180. The Queen to the Crown Prince of Prussia, 16 May 1866. Copy. The Queen's letter repeated suggestions which Clarendon had made on the previous day. (Cf. Windsor MSS. 1, 44/178. Clarendon to the Queen, 15 May 1866.)
90 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/189. The Crown Princess of Prussia to the Queen, 19 May 1866.
91 Windsor MSS. 1, 44/193. The Crown Prince of Prussia to the Queen, 22 May 1866. ‘Fast klingt's aus seinem Munde’, the Crown Prince wrote in speaking of his father,’ als ware ein Verhängnis iiber uns gesetzt, dem man eben entgegen gehen muss, weil die Dinge sich einmal so gestalten.’
92 Windsor MSS. 1, 87/11. Clarendon to the Queen, 31 May 1866.
93 Windsor MSS. I, 87/12. Grey to the Queen, 2 June 1866.
94 Windsor MSS. 1, 87/16. Grey to the Queen, 3 June 1866.