No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 December 2011
On 21 June, 1897, the German Ambassador at Rome, Herr von Bülow, found on his table in the Palazzo Caffarelli a telegram summoning him to Kiel. On his arrival there he was greeted on board the Hohenzollern by the Emperor William II with the words: “My dear Bernhard, I'm sorry for you and even more for the Contessina (for this is what the Empress Frederick and her children always called my wife) but you must go to the front. The Man from Baden has betrayed me.” In conversation William II proceeded to explain that Marschall von Bieberstein—the “Man from Baden”—had forfeited the Imperial confidence by intriguing with the Social Democrats and the Centre to introduce parliamentary government into Germany. In consequence, the Emperor added, he proposed to appoint Bülow Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in succession to Marschall von Bieberstein. Bülow was too clever to accept the proffered office at once and contented himself by pleading that, “until I had thoroughly informed myself about our international situation by studying the documents of the Foreign Office, I could not possibly give a definite answer as to whether I could conscientiously accept the post offered to me or not. Besides, I would have to collect my thoughts before I made the final decision, not through any kind of timidity, but because I felt my responsibility towards the country and the throne.”
1 B.M. I, 14. The following abbreviations have been used throughout the article. Brandenburg. Brandenburg, E., From Bismarck to the World War (Eng. trans. 1927). B.M. Prince von Bülow, Memoirs, I, 1897–1903; II, 1903–9 (Eng. trans. 1931); III, 1909–19 (Eng. trans. 1932); IV, 1848–1897 (Eng. trans. 1932). Dugdale. Dugdale, E. T. S., German Diplomatic Documents [a selection from the Grosse Politik], vols. I-IV (Eng. trans.), 1928–31. Front. Front Wider Bülow [a criticism of the Memoirs by various German writers], ed. F. Thimme, München, 1931. G.P. Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914, ed. Lepsius, J., Bartholdy, A. M., Thimme, F.. 40 Bde. Berlin, 1922–1927.Google Scholar
Ö-U.A. Oesterreichs-Ungarns Äussernpolitik, ed. L.Bittner, A. F.Pribram, H.Srbik, H.Uebersberger. 8 Bde. Wien, 1930. Gooch and Temperley. British Diplomatic Documents, ed. G. P. Gooch and H. W. V.Temperley. Vols. I-VII, XI. 1926.
2 B.M.. I, 14–15.
3 In his Memoirs Bülow has drawn a portrait of William II which will survive as an example of what can be accomplished by a pen dipped in the gall of envenomed bitterness. That the likeness is excellent can no more be doubted than can the want of taste and good breeding displayed by the aged and vengeful Prince in painting it. Critics in the future may point to places where the high-lights have been unduly emphasised and the shadows deliberately darkened (cf. F. Thimme, “Fürst Bülow und Kaiser Wilhelm II” in Front, a volume containing a number of essays of varying degrees of merit criticising Bülow's Memoirs) There can be no doubt of the difficulty experienced by Bülow in governing Germany in conjunction with the excitable and bombastic Emperor. William's sudden excursions into foreign politics often destroyed overnight what it had taken his advisers months to accomplish. Remonstrance with a man so filled with a consciousness of his Divine mission to rule over Germany was dangerous and seldom effective. Finally, close association with William II over a long period of time was excessively wearing to nerves already strained by a Chancellor's responsibilities. In 1903 the French Ambassador in Rome, M. Barrère, wrote of Bülow whom he had just seen: “Ce qui m'a plus frappé que ses propos qui ne m'ont rien appris de nouveau, c'est son aspect. II y a quelques années, j'avais connu un Bülow tiès jeune d'aspect et d'ailleurs ne portant pas son âge. J'ai retrouvé en lui un vieillard á cheveux blancs, flottant dans une mauvaise graisse. Le contact du maître impérial l'a terriblement usé” (Documents diplomatiques français, 2 Série, III, 320. Barrère to Delcassé. Très confid. 10 May 1903). Cf. also Eulenburg's brilliant description of William II in B.M. I, 3 and B.M. IV. Further interesting criticism of the Memoirs is to be found in Sülddeutsche Monatshefte for March, 1931, and in Berliner Monatshefte for February, 1931.
4 B.M. I, 42.
5 B.M. I, 27. Monts was subsequently German Ambassador at Rome. He is the object of bitter attack by Bülow (cf. the article “Botschafter Graf Monts,” by Baron von Oppenheimer in Front), and the publication in the near future of his memoirs and correspondence may possibly throw some light on dark places in the history of Wilhelmine diplomacy.
6 B.M. I, 25.
7 B.M. I, 43–4.
8 B.M. 1,44–5. Bülow skilfully exploits the “incredible mistake “of the non-renewal of the Re-Insurance Treaty to provide himself with an excuse for the ill-success of his own policy (cf. B.M. I, 445–6).
9 B.M. I, 45
10 B.M. I, 45.
11 B.M. I, 45.
12 B.M. I, 113. The article “Fürst Bülow und die deutsch-englischen Beziehungen” by Count Pückler in Front is a very slight, almost negligible, contribution to the study of the most important aspect of Bülow's foreign policy.
13 B.M. I, 401. Bülow derides the Emperor's fitful flirtations with France.
14 B.M. I,46.
15 B.M. I, 396. Cf. Bülow's statement to the Emperor at the time of the Bosnian crisis (supra, pp. 89–90). The glaring inconsistency between many of Bülow's statements is partly to be explained by his age (72) and the number of years—eight—which he took to compile his Memoirs yet claims are made by Franz von Stockhammern, B.M. I, 6, for his unusually powerful memory and repeated verification of references.
16 B.M. I, 396.
17 B.M. 1, 396–7.
18 G.P. XIV, Nos. 3782, 3784, 3793, 3798, 3800.
19 G.P. XIV, Nos. 3783, 3785. B.M. I, 323.
20 G.P. XIV, No. 3786. Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, London, 5 April 1898.
21 Dugdale, III 23–4. Bülow to Hatzfeldt, 30 March 1898. Tel. Very secret. Translated from G.P. XIV, I, No. 3783.
22 B.M. I,323.
23 B.M. I, 307–8.
24 Gooch and Temperley, II, 68–9. Memorandum by the Marquess of Salisbury, 29 May 1901.
25 Hatzfeldt energetically repudiated the idea that Great Britain would not honour her treaty obligations. G.P. XIV, No. 3784. Hatzfeldt to the Foreign Office,1 April 1898.
26 G.P. Cf. especially XIV, Nos. 3778, 3783, 3785, 3868; XVI, No. 4837; XVIII, No. 5421 (Holstein).
27 B.M. I, 44.
28 Brandenburg, p. 107. This was the view of Radolin.
29 B.M. I, 408.
30 B.M. I, 322. Hatzfeldt also emphasised the necessity for securing the assent of the Opposition to any treaty of alliance.
31 G.P. XIV, No. 3783. Bülow to Hatzfeldt, 30 March 1898.
32 G.P. XIV, No. 3868. Memorandum by Holstein, 26 August 1898. The uncertainty in 1898 as to the acceptance by Parliament of such an alliance greatly increased this risk.
33 B.M. II, 229. This accusation is repeatedly brought forward against British policy by continental historians.
34 Gooch and Temperley, II, 68. Memorandum by the Marquess of Salisbury, 29 May 1901.
35 Gooch and Temperley, II, 68. Salisbury's italics.
36 Gooch and Temperley, II, 81. Lansdowne to Lascelles, 19 December 1901.
37 B.M. I, 323.
38 G.P. XVII, No. 4985. Holstein to Eckhardstein, 21 January 1901; G.P. XIV, No. 3785. Bülow to Hatzfeldt, 3 April 1898.
39 G.P. XIV, No. 3783. Bülow to Hatzfeldt, 30 March 1898.
40 G.P. XVII, No. 5027. Memorandum by Holstein, 1 November 1901.
41 G.P. XVII, No. 5027. Marginal comment by Bülow, p. 109, n. 4.
42 Vide supra, p. 68.
43 B.M. I, 409–10.
44 B.M. I, 411–12. Bülow's references to the Samoan Question and to the seizure of German vessels during the South African War are opposed to the known facts. Cf. Gooch and Temperley, I, chaps, iii and vii; G.P. XIV and XV; Brandenburg, chap. vi.
45 B.M. I, 413. For a refutation of Bülow's contention that his policy did not “offend England's susceptibilities” it is only necessary to glance through the pages of the Letters ofQueen Victoria, Third Series, III, 1932.
46 B.M. I, 413–14.
47 B.M. I, 414.
48 B.M. I, 411–14; II, 310–16, 404–8, 415–28, 454, 491–3, 501–5.
50 B.M. II, 227. Some important evidence is quoted in Front. According to Franz Ludwig von Collenberg (pp. 181–2) Bülow had no programme and understood little of naval affairs. According to Thimme, Front, p. 201, Bülow wrote Bethmann-Hollweg a letter, 14 July 1911, declaring war impossible in future in Europe. This was in the midst of the Agadir crisis. He supported it by further letters (30 December 1912, 15 May 1913, 14 April 1914) all of which argue that Germany's fleet makes it impossible for England to risk a war.
51 B.M. II 310–11.
52 B.M. II, 405. Compare this with his statements in his speech to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag, supra, pp. 76–78.
53 B.M. II, 415.
54 B.M. II, 419–25. Cf. also G.P. XXVIII, No. 10,306. “Protokoll einer Besprechung im Reichskanzlerpalais über die Frage einer Verstandigung mit England.” 6 June 1909.
55 B.M. I, 428–9.
56 G.P. XVIII, No. 10,248. Memorandum by Bülow, 5 January 1909.
57 Brandenburg, pp. 179–81 and 296–9, severely criticises Bülow's policy to England before his apologia appeared. But he is even more severe on Tirpitz and the Kaiser. Cf. also Gooch and Temperley, III 397–420. Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe, 1 January 1907—but note Lord Sanderson's comments, especially pp. 429–31.
58 Cf. Brandenburg, p. 219, where he quotes a dispatch to Metternich dated 16 November 1904.
59 Ibid. p. 220.
60 Ibid. pp. 219–22.
61 Cf. Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock (1930), chap. vii.
62 Gooch, G. P., Franco-German Relations, 1871–1914 (1923), p. 47. The above summary of the Moroccan crisis is based on the admirable narratives to be found n Gooch, op. cit. pp. 40–7 and Brandenburg, pp. 208–31.
63 Cf. the able article in Front by the former German Secretary of State, Baron von Schoen, who as official representative of the Foreign Office accompanied William II on his visit to Tangier. This article is also of value for Bülow's policy in the Annexation crisis.
64 B.M. II, 100–1.
65 B.M. I, 431. Holstein to Bülow, 24 August 1900.
66 B.M. II, 104.
67 B.M. II, 106.
68 B.M. II.
69 B.M. II, 108–9.
70 B.M. II, 109.
71 B.M. II, 81-.
72 B.M..II, 115.
73 B.M. II, 118–19.
74 B.M. II, 119–20.
75 Bülow expressly denies that his policy in the Moroccan crisis was inspired by Holstein and accepts the entire responsibility for himself. This is almost certainly a distortion of fact due to vanity. His statement that Holstein's influence during his (Bülow's) term of office “was not so great as during the preceding two decades” is not borne out by the known facts. Cf. B.M. II, 107. Also cf. Gooch and Temperley, III, 332–3, Lascelles to Grey, 5 April 1905 and Lascelles to Grey, 23 October 1907.
76 B.M. II, 162.
77 B.M. II, 193.
78 B.M. II, 201–2.
79 B.M. II, 104.
80 B.M. II, 99.
81 B.M. II, 204.
82 Cf. Brandenburg, chaps, ix and x.
83 B.M. II, 200.
84 B.M. II, 320.
85 B.M. II, 321.
86 B.M. II, 321.
87 B.M. II, 332. It seems clear from the report of Counts Szögyènyi and von Flotow that William II and Bülow differed throughout on the issue. Vide Ö-U.A. I, Nos. 183, 272. A private letter of Prince Bülow under date 30 October 1908 (No. 451) addressed to Vienna shows that he agreed to “stand firm” by Austria-Hungary at that date. On the same day Count Mensdorff suggested from London that the result of the Daily Telegraph interview would enable Bülow to override the Kaiser in their difference of opinion over Austria-Hungary. But even on 9 February 1909, Count Szögyényi (No. 978) thought the Kaiser wanted some convincing.
88 B.M. II, 332.
89 B.M. II, 388–9.
90 B.M. II, 389.
91 B.M. II, 392–3.
92 G.P. XXVI, No. 9454. Der Reichskanzler an den Botschafter in Wien, 18 March 1909.
93 Gooch and Temperley, V, 691–2. Goschen to Grey, Berlin, 16 March 1909. Another interesting account of Bülow's policy at this time is to be found on pp. 608–9 in a Memorandum by Sir C. Hardinge, dated 11 February 1909, containing an account of his conversation on the previous evening with Bülow.
94 B.M. II, 502.
95 Brandenburg, p. 348.
96 B.M. II, 226.
97 On 15 November 1906, the Neue Freie Presse, in commenting on Bülow's defence in the Reichstag of his policy in the Moroccan crisis, declared that “Prince von Bülow was called on to answer the question whether Germany was isolated and whether her position was safe, and that he has only been able to reply that she was peaceable.” Cf. Gooch and Temperley, V, 160–1. Boothby to Grey, Vienna, 15 November 1906. This judgment applies with even greater force to the situation in which Germany found herself after the Annexation crisis.
98 B.M. II, 227.