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Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonist and satirist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2013

A. A. Long
A. A. Long
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
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The twentieth century has been so begrudging to Timon of Phlius that he could be forgiven for identifying himself with his misanthropic namesake. About a hundred and fifty of his ‘glänzenden Sillen’ (the phrase is Wilamowitz's) survive, but in Albin Lesky's Geschichte der griechischen Literatur Timon gets only a third of the space devoted to Anaximander from whom we possess one possible sentence. Serious work on Timon largely came to a stop with Hermann Diels who edited the fragments and testimonia in Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta (Berlin, 1901), a book which is as difficult to come by as the older and much fuller study of Timon by C. Wachsmuth in Sillographorum Graecorum reliquiae (Leipzig, 1885). In spite of his skilful parody of Homer and his Aristophanic versatility in language (some sixty neologisms, many of them comic formations, occur in the fragments), Timon has been ignored by those who give such generous attention to Hellenistic poetry. Many fragments raise at least one major textual difficulty. A new edition and literary study of the material is badly needed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society (Second Series) , Volume 24 , 1978 , pp. 68 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s). Published online by Cambridge University Press 1978

References

NOTES

1. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U., Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos (1924) 224Google Scholar; Lesky, , GGL ed. 3 (1971) 195–6; 757Google Scholar.

2. All fragment references of Timon will be to Diels' edition whose judgements and conjectures are much superior to Wachsmuth's. A study by Voghera, G., Timone di Fliunte e la poesia sillografica (1904)Google Scholar, is referred to by Dal Pra, Mario, Lo scetticismo greco ed. 2 I (1975) 87Google Scholar, but I have been unable to find a copy.

3. Cf. Wachsmuth, , Sill. Graec. 203–4Google Scholar.

4. It is good news that Hugh Lloyd-Jones and Peter Parsons will include Timon in their Suplementum Hellenisticum forthcoming from de Gruyter, Berlin, and after delivering this paper I had the good fortune to read a draft of their text. The principal accounts of Timon available at present are Hirzel, R., Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften III (1883) 19–63Google Scholar; Brochard, V., Les sceptiques grecs ed. 2 (1887) 79–91Google Scholar; Zeller, E., Die Philosophie der Griechen ed. 4 rev. Wellmann, E. III. 1 (1909) 499–507Google Scholar; Goedeckemeyer, A., Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus (1905) 20–26Google Scholar; Nestle, W., RE sv Timon suppl. 12 (1937)Google Scholar; Robin, L., Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec (1944) 27–32Google Scholar; M. Dal Pra (n.2 above) 83-109.

5. See most recently, in addition to Dal Pra, Stough, Charlotte L., Greek skepticism (1969) 16–34Google Scholar; Dumont, J.-P., Le scepticisme et le phénomène (1972)Google Scholar; Conche, M., Pyrrhon ou l'apparence (1973)Google Scholar; Long, A. A., Hellenistic philosophy (1974) 75–88Google Scholar.

6. Praeparatio evangelica 14.18.2-4= Diels, , Poet. Phil. Graec. 9A.2, 175–6Google Scholar. This text, discussed in all the standard books, purports to give Timon's three-fold ‘headings’ which have to be considered by anyone seeking εὐδαιμονία. The many problems it raises are too extensive to be discussed here, but I take the opportunity of making two points now: (i) Dumont (n.5 above) 140-47 rightly notes that Aristocles, Eusebius' source, is unlikely to be quoting Timon at first hand, cf. the reference to Ainesidemus at the end of the passage; (ii) I have no serious doubts that the passage is mainly an accurate report of Timon. It is likely that he wrote to this effect in his Pytho, a prose work describing Pyrrho's ‘disposition’ (D.L. 9. 67=fr. 79), from which D.L. 9.76=fr. 80 quotes . Aristocles knew the Pytho in whole or in summary (ap. Euseb., PE 14.18.14–15Google Scholar), cf. Ferrari, G. A., SIFC 40 (1968) 208Google Scholar.

7. Stough (n.5 above) 16, Dal Pra (n.2 above) 39-40.

8. Apart from the Silloi, with which this paper is largely concerned, Timon praised Pyrrho's ‘unique’ and ‘godlike’ guidance of mankind in the Indalmoi (‘Images’), written in elegiacs, D.L. 9.65, S.E. M. 1.305, 11.1, put together by Diels as fr. 67. Timon's question there about the source of Pyrrho's utter tranquillity is probably answered by ‘Pyrrho’ in S.E. M. 11.20=fr. 68 (cf. n.16 below). From Concerning Sensations (), a prose work, one sentence is attested, , D.L. 9.105=fr. 74. Three other works in prose are attested: Against the physicists (), in which Timon seems to have challenged the procedure of , a line of attack constantly used by Sextus Empiricus, the source of the reference, M 3.1 =fr. 75; Pytho frs. 77-80 (cf. n.6 above); and Funeral feast of Arcesilaus (), D.L. 9.115=fr. 73, a work ‘praising’ Arcesilaus, whom Timon strongly attacked during his lifetime (cf. frs. 31-4 of Silloi, and below p.80). For Timon's acquaintance with Lacydes Arcesilaus' successor as head of the Academy, cf. Athenaeus 10.438A= Diels, , Poet. Phil. Graec. 9A.6, 181Google Scholar.

9. Vol. xxiv sv Pyrrhon (1) col. 89. Von Fritz does not properly distinguish between the writings of Timon, which were well known (cf. Sotion's commentary on the Silloi, Athen. 8.336d, a reference which seems to be absent from all standard works on Timon), and the oral testimony, if that is the word, of Philo of Athens (D.L. 9.67), a follower of Pyrrho whom Timon described (fr. 50, as he also described Eurylochus, a further follower, fr. 49), and Numenius (D.L. 9.68), whom some have identified with the Middle Platonist, though D.L.9.102 is against this. No written word about Pyrrho is quoted from any of his followers besides Timon, but cf. D.L.9.102.

10. Cf. Dal Pra (n.2 above), 42-3.

11. M. 11.140, . Hirzel, , Untersuch. III 56 n.1Google Scholar changed νόωι to νόμωι, and was followed by Wachsmuth, 24. Diels' rejection of this reading is uncharacteristically dogmatic.

12. = fr. 80. The text, cited in n.6 above, is quoted to illustrate Timon's explanation of οὐ μᾶλλον.

13. For fr. 67 cf. n.8 above. Fr. 1=D.L. 9.112 (the ἀρχή of the Silloi, ibid.), is a parody of Il. 2.484 (of the Muses) and also, perhaps, of Hesiod, Th. 114–15Google Scholar.

14. κενός frs. 11, 20, 21, κενεοϕροσύνη fr. 48. κενοσπουδία is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope by D.L. 6.26, and the other two qualities of men which ‘Pyrrho’ illustrated from Homer recall Cynic preaching (cf. D.L. 6.27 for ’good men nowhere, good boys in Sparta’). It was of course familiar Cynic practice to quote or parody Homer, and I argue later that Timon draws heavily on the Cynics in his representation of Pyrrho.

15. fr. 64, drawing on Od. 11.575 and 5.392=12.169. This metaphorical use of γαλήνη is a moralist's chliché, especially in Epicureanism, cf. the material collected by Usener, H., Glossarium Epicureum ed. Gigante, M. and Schmid, W. (1977) 150–52Google Scholar. D.L. 9.45 uses γαληνῶς in explaining Democritus' τέλος of εὐθυμία. S.E. PH 1.10 combines γαληνότης with ἀοχλησία (cf. n.42 below) in defining ἀταραξία, which is a still more familiar term common to Epicureans and Pyrrhonists. Timon's two references to Epicurus are contemptuous (frs. 7 and 51), but Epicurus himself is said to have admired Pyrrho (D.L.9.64), and frequently inquired about him from Nausiphanes who, before he influenced Epicurus, had been a follower of Pyrrho. In fact Pyrrho and Epicurus offered totally different routes to ἀταραξία, and the Epicureans opposed scepticism, cf. Barigazzi, A., Assoc. Budé Actes du VIIIe Congrès (1969) 286–93Google Scholar. But this is consistent with a positive influence from Pyrrho on Epicurus' moral philosophy, cf. Sedley, D. N., ‘Epicurus and his professional rivals’, Cahiers de Philologie ed. Bollack, J. I (1976) 136–7Google Scholar; and, apart from their common interest in equanimity, the followers of Pyrrho and Epicurus were alike in treating their leader as a quasi divine and unique discoverer of its grounds.

16. Fr. 68=S.E. M. 11.20.

These important lines have never been satisfactorily explained. According to one reading of verse 2, ‘Pyrrho’ (the presumed subject) claims to have ‘a correct rule’ consisting in ‘a word of truth’, and then makes a further dogmatic statement about the nature of the divine and the good: so Brochard 62f., Goedeckemeyer 9, Robin 31 (all n.4 above). Most of those who read the lines in this way refer to Cicero's interpretation of Pyrrho as a strict moralist (see pp. 76-7), and suppose that Pyrrho and Timon did not extend their scepticism to cover practical morality, being convinced that they had found the best way of life. But if this interpretation were correct, the claims here made about the ϕύσις of the divine and the good would glaringly contradict the view attributed to Pyrrho and Timon (main text above) that nothing is good by nature.

The interpretation rests on an unnatural reading. is best taken as the direct object of ὲρέω and not with ἔχων (cf. λέγω μῦθον A. Pers. 698, Emped. D.-K. 31 Bl 14.1). ‘I will state a word (or myth) of truth, as it seems to me to be, who have a correct standard, that …’ The key phrase is , as S.E., the source of the lines, understood them (M. 11.19-20). He distinguishes between ‘the existence of goods and evils and neither of these’ and their appearance (τὸ ϕαινόμενον), which the Pyrrhonist is in the habit of calling good, bad, and indifferent. This permits us to regard the ‘correct rule’ as the stating of truth ‘as it seems to (me) to be’, and no unqualified existential claim about ϕύσις is made. The likelihood that this is the correct reading is confirmed by the fact that the lines belong to the Indalmoi, which probably gave later Pyrrhonists support for the notion that the criterion of conduct is τὸ ϕαινόμενον, S.E. PH 1.21-4. Cf. further Hirzel, , Untersuch. III 46–53Google Scholar, Stough 24-6, Conche 88-9 (nn.4 and 5 above). Pyrrho's intense concern with ethics, underlined by D.L. (main text above) and by Cicero, is not contradicted by this reading.

It may be possible to improve the interpretation of the difficult lines 3-4. Mr. M.F. Burnyeat has suggested the possibility of deleting the comma, and taking 3 to be the predicate of the subject expressed in line 4: ‘the source of what makes a man's life most equable is at any time the nature of the divine and the good’; i.e. the divine and the good are not set up as objective entities but are identified with just the phenomenal source of tranquillity. If this reading can be justified as Greek (and I do not wish to commit Mr. Burnyeat or myself to that claim), it would certainly be a great improvement on the normal reading: ‘the nature of the divine and the good exists for ever…’.

17. Notice too that solitariness and talking to oneself, attributed to Pyrrho by D.L. 9.63-4, are credited to his follower, Philo of Athens, by Timon, fr. 50=D.L. 9.69.

18. Further details about Anaxarchus in D.-K. 72 vol. II 235-9; on Pyrrho and Anaxarchus cf. Dal Pra (above n.2) 53-6, von Fritz (above n.9) cols. 94-5; Timon fr. 58= Plutarch, Virt. mor. 446BGoogle Scholar.

19. D.L. 9.67, on the word of Philo of Athens. For Timon's ‘praise’ of Democritus cf. D.L. 9.40, the source of fr. 46.

20. That Ainesidemus wrote about Pyrrho's life as well as his philosophy is implied by D.L. 9.62.

21. He refers to Timon's life, as described by D.L.9.109-10, which drew both on Antigonus of Carystus (111) and Apollonides of Nicaea who wrote a commentary on the Silloi in the first century A.D. (109).

22. Cf. the tradition that Timon taught Aratus (Suda sv Aratos), and the drinking party at which he and Lacydes commented on one another's alcoholic condition with quotations from Homer, Athen. 10.438A.

23. Cf. Dillon, John, The Middle Platonists (1977) 39–43Google Scholar. I am not convinced by H.-J. Krämer's interesting attempt to demonstrate strong dialectical interests in the Academy at this time, Platonismus und Hellenistische Philosophie (1972) ch. 1.

24. On Megarians, ‘Eristics’, and ‘Dialecticians’, cf. Sedley, D. N., ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy’, PCPhS n.s. 23 (1977) 75–77Google Scholar.

25. For Stoic interpretation of the poets cf. Pfeiffer, R., A history of classical scholarship I (1968) 237–8Google Scholar, and of Heraclitus, my article in Philosophia 5/6 (1975–1976) 133–53Google Scholar. I hope shortly to publish a paper on ‘The Stoics and their Authorities’.

26. Cic., Acad. 1.44Google Scholar, Plut., Adv. Col. 26.1121FGoogle Scholar with comments by Einarson, B. and De Lacy, P. in Plutarch Moralia XIV (Loeb, ed., 1967) 156–8Google Scholar.

27. D. N. Sedley's excellent article (n.15 above) should be consulted for background reading as well as for its demonstration that much of the abuse supposedly heaped by Epicurus on other philosophers has been misinterpreted and misattributed to him.

28. The main evidence for Timon's dates is a report that he was nearly ninety when he died (D.L.9.112), and the inference from his work (ibid. 116) that he outlived Arcesilaus. Lacydes succeeded Arcesilaus as head of the Academy in 241/0 (D.L. 4.61), and Timon must be born early enough to study as a young unmarried man with Stilpo in Megara (D.L. 9.109). Stilpo is likely to have died by about 280, cf. Döring, K., Die Megariker (1972) 140Google Scholar. So Timon was probably born not later than 310. Pyrrho's approximate dates are 360-270.

29. D.L. 2.125-6- =fr. 170 Döring; D.L.2.113=fr. 164A Döring.

30. Euseb., Ap.PE 14.17.1Google Scholar =fr. 27 Döring.

31. D.L. 9.22 , though grammatically satisfactory, cannot be correct in view of Parmenides' philosophy and usage of νοεῖν/νόημα. Wachsmuth's ἀπὸ, accepted by Diels, is plausible, but perhaps ἐκ is a better correction with is apparently a coinage by Timon, alluding to ἕθοςπολύπειρον, Parm. D.-K.28 B7.3-5, the lines quoted by D.L. ad loc., and the erroneous δόξαι of men (D.-K.B1.30, 8.51). Timon's praise of Parmenides recalls his eulogy of Pyrrho (fr. 48) and fr. 9.3 may echo Parm. B6.6-7. His usage of the contemporary term ϕαντασία can be read as enlisting Parmenides as an enemy of Epicurean and Stoic empiricism.

32. D.L. 9.25. The description of Zeno as ἀμϕοτερόγλωσσος, another neologism, was much quoted by later philosophers, cf. the texts cited by Diels ad loc. Wachsmuth, Sill. Graec. 98f.Google Scholar sees a reference both to Zeno's dilemmas (cf. Plut., Pericles ch. 4Google Scholar) and to the tradition that Zeno was the inventor of dialectic. It may be Melissus D.-K.30 B8 which has inspired Timon's comment on him.

33. Cf. frs. 11, 12, 19, 20, 48, 54, 57, 59, 60, 66.

34. D.L. 2. 119=fr. 199 Döring. Similar criticism of (Platonic) εἴδη is attributed to Antisthenes (frs. 50A and C Caizzi) and to Diogenes of Sinope (D.L. 6.53). This proves that it was later regarded as a characteristic Cynic position, whether true of Stilpo or not.

35. Plut., Adv. Col. 22.1119C-DGoogle Scholar, 23.1120A-B, Simplic. in Phys. 120.12-17Diels= frs. 197-8 Döring. Whether the same doctrine should be attributed to Antisthenes and also to Menedemus of Eretria is controversial; cf. Zeller, , Phil. d. Griechen ed. 4 II.1 (1889) 278f.Google Scholar; Guthrie, W.K.C., A history of Greek philosophy III (1969) 2091–18Google Scholar; Döring, , Die Megariker 154–5Google Scholar. Plato, Soph. 251bGoogle Scholar ridicules the view of those who ‘insist that we must not say a man is good, but only man is man and good is good’. This is identical to Stilpo's position, as reported by Plutarch above, and strengthens its genuineness as Megarian doctrine, cf. Guthrie op. cit. 217.

36. S.E. M. 10.197, 6.66= fr. 76. Diels attributes the fragment to the work Πρὸς ϕυσικούς, cf. n.8 above.

37. S.E. M. 10.155 whose accuracy is rightly questioned by Sedley, D.N., PCPhS n.s. 23 (1977) 89Google Scholar and n.83. Timon may also have been influenced by Diodorus Cronus' doctrine of ἀμερῆ, cf. Sedley op. cit. 84-89.

38. Frs. 151A-1511 Döring.

39. D.L. 2.115= fr. 151A Döring.

40. D.L.2.134= fr. 172 Döring; Cic., Fat. 10Google Scholar= fr. 158 Döring; Sen., Ep. 9.1-3Google Scholar= fr. 195 Döring; Teles fr. III pp. 21.2-23-4 Hense ed. 2= fr. 192 Döring.

41. Adv. Col. 22.1119C= fr. 197 Döring.

42. Ps.- Aphr., Alex.De an. II 150Google Scholar, 34-35 Bruns= fr. 196 Döring. The reliability of this evidence is questionable, as Döring notes. It forms part of a list of philosophers' views on the which, originating as a Stoic concept, has typically become a jargon omniumgatherum in late philosophical writers. But the history of ἀοχλησία is very relevant to Pyrrhonism. The noun and the adjective probably originate as Epicurean terms: at Ep. Men. 127, the first certain instance, Epicurus uses ἀοχλησία to refer to desires which are necessary for the body's freedom from disturbance (cf. Alciphron's imitation, Ep. 3.55), and at Sent. Vat. 79 explains the man who is ἀτάραχος (further references in Usener, Glossarium Epicureum). Posidonius cites ἀοχλησία along with ἡδονή or ‘some other such thing’ as an instance of the σκοπός which is similar to that intended by those Stoics who contract into ϕύσιν (F187 Edelstein-Kidd), cf. my remarks in Phronesis 12 (1967) 84–6Google Scholar. It is difficult to know whether Posidonius has any group of philosophers besides the Epicureans in mind here. But, possibly through the mediation of Timon, ἀοχλησία is used in later Pyrrhonism in a way which cannot fail to recall Epicureanism, cf. S.E. PH 1.10 , and ibid. 29.

43. D.L.1. 16= fr. 189 Döring; cf. frs. 187-8 Döring for the alternative view.

44. D.L. 2.119= fr. 199 Döring, which should be compared with ‘Pyrrho’ (D.L.9.61) and Timon fr. 80= D.L.9.76.

45. Cf. Brochard (above n.4) 52 n.1 and von Fritz (above n.9) col. 93. For D.L. ad loc. Roeper suggested , but this hardly solves the problem.

46. According to the Suda article on Pyrrho= fr. 203B Döring the Bryson who taught Pyrrho was ‘the pupil of Cleinomachus’, a figure recently brought out of the darkness by Sedley, D.N., PCPhS n.s.23 (1977) 176–7Google Scholar. Cleinomachus was reputedly the founder of the so-called ‘dialectical’ school (frs. 34-5 Döring). Unfortunately (a) Bryson is also recorded as Cleinomachus' predecessor, in the Suda article on Socrates. Döring has discussed the conflicting testimonies about Bryson fully (Die Megariker 157-63), concluding that one man only is meant - famous for his attempts to square the circle - who probably had no connections with Socrates or the Megarians. If this Bryson taught Pyrrho no traces of his influence survive. We hear too of a ‘Bryson the Achaean’, a teacher of the Cynic Crates of Thebes (frs. 205 A-C Döring), whom C. Baeumker plausibly identified with Pyrrho's teacher, RM 34 (1879) 70–2Google Scholar.

47. Fr. 28= D.L. 2.107= fr. 8 Döring: , . ϕλέδων, which Timon also applies to the Socratic Antisthenes (fr. 37= D.L. 6.18), is attested elsewhere only in A. Ag. 1195 (cf. E. Fraenkel, comm. ad loc), where Cassandra challenges the Chorus to call her , a similar word, is commoner, and attributed to Diogenes of Sinope, D.L. 6.27.

48. The passage is quoted below, p.75.

49. Fr. 29 = D.L. 2.126: . Timon also satirised Menedemus in fr. 31 (see p.80 below), and his follower Ctesibius in fr. 16 = Athenaeus 4.162E.

50. Dal Pra (above n.2) 88-9 recognizes that Timon's teaching was indebted to Stilpo, but he does not consider the evidence discussed above.

51. D.L. 9.109.

52. So Wachsmuth, , Sill. Graec. 11–12Google Scholar, citing Pausanias 2.13.7, followed by Goedeckmeyer (above n.4) 20. The evidence is found only in Aristocles ap. Euseb., PE 14.18.14Google Scholar = fr. 77, cf. n.6 above.

53. So Diels in his comments ad loc., supported by Untersteiner, M., Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 9 (1954) 284–7Google Scholar, who suggests that Timon located his meeting with Pyrrho at an Amphiareion in order to suggest a parallel to Amphiaraus' advice to his son which, he thinks, formed a large part of the epic tradition of the .

54. Antigonos von Karystos 38.

55. Fr. 79 = D.L. 9.67, fr. 80 = D.L. 9.76, fr. 81 = D.L. 9.105.

56. Sill. Graec. 72.

57. Cf. D.L. 6.7 Antisthenes, D.L. 6.26 Diogenes, D.L. 6.85-6 Crates, D.L. 6.83 Monimus = Menander fr. 215 Sandbach, a passage which appeals to common knowledge of the Cynics (cf. S.E. M. 8.5); ὀλβιότυϕος D.L. 4.52 Bion = F7 Bion of Borysthenes by Kindstrand, J.F., Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 11 (1976), and see his note p. 195Google Scholar for further references and bibliography. τῦϕος and τυϕόω are used by Sextus Empiricus in disparaging reference to ‘dogmatists’, PH 1.62, 3.193, 237, M. 1.55.

58. Fr. 9 = Aristocles ap. Euseb., PE 14.18.19Google Scholar: ; fr. 38 = D.L. 7.15: , see further below p.80. For ἀτυϕία cf. Antisthenes fr. 97A Caizzi (the τέλος) and Bion F16A Kindstrand.

59. Fr. 60 = S.E. PH 1.224, and fr. 3 = Athenaeus 4.159D. Both words are neologisms.

60. Cf. Plut., De tuenda sanitate 125FGoogle Scholar, and for other references Kindstrand (above n.57) 218.

61. Fr. 27 = D.L. 2.66.

62. fr. 11 = Aristocles ap. Euseb., PE 18.14.28Google Scholar, and cf. Timon frs. 20, 53. For the Cynic background see Kindstrand 221. S.E. glosses τῦϕος by οἴησις at M. 8.5.

63. Fr. 48 = D.L. 9.64. Cf. Crates' ‘free kingdom for those unenslaved to pleasure’, fr. 5 Diels.

64. Fr. 12 = Athen. 1.22D and fr. 61 = S.E. M. 1.53; for Cynic attacks on philosophers and learning cf. D.L. 6.11, 27-8, 101, 103-4, Bion F 3-10 Kindstrand; Wachsmuth, , Sill Graec. 66–7Google Scholar; Dudley, D.R., A history of cynicism (1937) 27–9, 44–5, 73Google Scholar.

65. ἔρις in frs. 21-2, see below p.75; ἐρίζεσκεν of Stilpo in Crates fr. 1 Diels = D.L. 2.118; ὑπάτη ἔρις of Archytas in Bion ap. D.L. 4.52 = F7 Kindstrand.

66. fr. 71 = Athen. 8.337A. Timon attacks doxa in frs. 9,48, 50, 57, and it is unnecessary to repeat other words he uses to censure trumpery. For Cynic attacks on doxa in both the senses stated above cf. Kindstrand 223.

67. Fr. 18 = Athen. 9.406E: , playing on the title of Prodicus Horai; cf. Diogenes ap. D.L. 6.50 , and 6.28.

68. Fr. 6 = Athen. 6.251B. In Cynics cf. D.L. 6.51, 92.

69. ὀχλοάρεσκος fr. 34 = D.L. 4.42. In Cynics cf. D.L. 6.34, Stobaeus, Ecl. 3.14.20Google Scholar.

70. D.L. 2.118: .

71. ; cf. Plato, Prot. 315c8Google Scholar, Socrates referring to Prodicus.

72. Plut., De vit. aere al. 830CGoogle Scholar: . Crates fr. 2 = D.L. 2.126 refers to the philosopher friends Asclepiades of Phlius and Menedemus of Eretria.

73. Sill. Graec. 72-3; his claim was questioned by Helm, R., Lucian und Menipp (1906, repr. 1967) 20Google Scholar.

74. The Nekuia as the model for the Silloi was first suggested by Meineke, A. in Philologicarum exercitationum in Athenaei Deipnosophistas (1843) 6–7Google Scholar. As Dr. M. Schofield reminded me, Plato draws on Od. 11 in introducing the sophists at the house of Callias, , Prot. 315c–dGoogle Scholar (cf. n.71 above).

75. Fr. 22 = Alex., Clem.Strom. 5.1.11Google Scholar, II p.333 Stählin: , . (Cf. the relation between fr. 21 = Clem. Alex. loc. cit. and Iliad 5.518, 4.440-3.) Diels ad loc. well compares with the ‘chorus’ of Protagoras' followers, Plato, Prot. 315a–bGoogle Scholar. In Timon fr. 47 = D.L. 9.52 Protagoras is .

76. Fr. 43 = D.L. 9.6: .

77. Iliad 1.247-8: .

78. Fr. 8 = Aristocles ap. Euseb., PE 18.17.17Google Scholar: . Cf. Il. 3.223, .

79. Frs. 3-10 Kindstrand.

80. Socrates (fr. 25 = D.L. 2.19) is a ‘chatterer about laws’ (), the ‘spell-binder of Greece’ (), ‘one who makes men quibble’ (); in μυκτὴρ Timon has a dig at Socrates' fluency and irony. For Antisthenes cf. n.47 above; other Socratics are attacked in frs. 26-9 (cf. nn.47, 49 above).

81. Lo scetticismo greco ed. 2 I 58–9Google Scholar. Dudley, D.R. hardly exaggerated when he wrote: ‘were it not for his exposition of the philosophy of Pyrrho, we should class Timon with Menippus as the outstanding literary representative of the Cynic nihilism’, A history of cynicism 107–8Google Scholar.

82. For evidence on Onesicritus cf. Jacoby, , F.G.H. 134 (1929)Google Scholar. Another Cynic who must be mentioned, in relation to Pyrrho, is Monimus of Syracuse (see n.57 above). Sextus Empiricus refers to a tradition which grouped together Metrodorus of Chios, Anaxarchus, and Monimus, as three philosophers ‘who abolished the criterion’ (of truth), M. 7.87-8. The influence of Anaxarchus is (one hopes) a decisive fact of Pyrrho's life (see above p.69), and the particularly interesting feature of S.E. loc. cit. is the claim that Anaxarchus and Monimus both likened τὰ ὄντα to . Sextus also lists Monimus as one who ‘perhaps said that nothing is true, in declaring that all things are trumpery’ (τῦϕος), M. 8.5. Monimus was probably somewhat younger than Pyrrho, and the evidence does not establish any historical link between them. But allowing for the fact that in Sextus' eyes Monimus is not a Pyrrhonist but a negative dogmatist, it is instructive, for the Cynic background to Pyrrhonism, to note the existence of a tradition which associates Pyrrho and Monimus via Anaxarchus.

83. See n.16 above and my remarks in Hellenistic philosophy 76-8.

84. For evidence on the term, and for attributing Silloi to Xenophanes, cf. Wachsmuth, , Sill. Graec. 5–8, 55–65Google Scholar. G. Voghera attempted to prove that Timon was the only writer of Silloi, and that it was due to his poems that the title Silloi was attached to Xenophanes, SIFC 11 (1903) 1–16Google Scholar. But it is absurd to deny this title to Xenophanes on the ground that none of his fragments corresponds exactly to Timon's Silloi, and Voghera failed to ask the basic question, why Timon took Xenophanes as his self-confessed mentor.

85. D.-K. 21 B11, 12, 14-16, 23-26. Also in favour of attributing all these lines to the Silloi are Burnet, J., Early Greek philosophy ed. 4 (1930) 115f.Google Scholar and Jaeger, W., The theology of the early Greek philosophers (1937) 40 and 210Google Scholar n.11. Cf. also Guthrie, W.K.C., A history of Greek philosophy I (1962) 363–6Google Scholar.

86. D.-K. 21 B34.3-4: .

87. Fr. 69 = D.L. 9.105 and S.E. M. 7.30: . The title Ἰνδαλμοί (cf. n.8 above) is clearly modelled on the epic usage of ἰνδάλλομαι, cf. Timon fr. 68.1 (n. 16above) with Od. 19.224, noted by Diels ad loc. Hirzel explained Timon's title by reference to the only other occurrence of the noun, in ps.-Hipp. 9.380 Littré = D.-K. 68 C5, Untersuchungen, III 21Google Scholar. But if there is any influence it is that of Timon on the writer of ‘Democritus' letter to Hippocrates’.

88. L.L. 9.18 = D.-K. 21 A1 and D.L. 8.36 = D.-K. 21 B7.

89. Ap. Euseb., PE 14.17.10Google Scholar.

90. D.L. 9.111, probably drawing on the commentary on the Silloi by Apollonides of Nicaea, dedicated to the emperor Tiberius, which D.L. cites at the opening of his life of Timon, 9.109.

91. PH 1.223-4= frs. 59-60.

92. Fr. 46 = D.L. 9.40: .

93. Cf. Brochard (above n.4) 47-9; von Fritz (above n.9) 94-5, 104-5; Dal Pra (above n.2) 47-53.

94. Fr. 5 = S.E. M. 9.56f. The speaker is more likely to be ‘Xenophanes’ since this passage is attributed to the second book of Silloi.

95. Fr. 47 (cf. n.75 above).

96. PH 1. 210-35.

97. fr. 36 = D.L. 5.11.

98. Phil. Graec. Frag. 183. Cf. Wachsmuth, , Sill. Graec. 39f.Google Scholar

99. Fr. 38, cf. n.58 above. I accept Diels' persuasive interpretation.

100. Fr. 32 = D.L. 4.33: .

101. Fr. 30 = D.L. 3.7: , cf. Athen. 3.118C, where it is claimed that the largest mullets are so called. M. Gigante prefers the reading πλατίστατος, Laerzio, Diogene, Vite dei filosofi ed. 2. (1976) II 489 n.30Google Scholar, but this weakens the pun, and I do not agree that ‘la vera lectio difficilior è πλατίστατος, forma non attestata e rara di superlativo’. πλατίστατος, is accepted by Lloyd-Jones and Parsons in their forthcoming edition (n.4 above).

102. Fr. 31 = D.L. 4.33 and Numenius ap. Euseb., PE 14.5.12Google Scholar.

103. I am grateful to Dr. J.G.W. Henderson for writing to me about these lines. If I have failed to interpret them as he would wish, I have certainly benefited from his comments.

104. Professor Lloyd-Jones has proposed for line 2 of the fragment, the reading . This has many attractions in view of the Iliad parallel. My main reason for preferring is the belief that Arcesilaus must be a fish here and not a fisherman.

105. As cited in n.102 above.

106. Poet. Phil. Frag. 183.

107. At fr. 32 (n. 100 above) Arcesilaus asserts his intention of swimming to them both.

108. Fr. 52 = Galen in Hipp. Epidem. VI comm. II 42, p. 112 Wenkebach (Corp. Med Gr. V 10.2.2Google Scholar). I follow the text of Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (n.4 above); Diels, reading εἰκάζων, did not regard the word as part of Timon's line. Others have thought a philosophical fish is referred to, cf. Diels ad.loc., Helm, Lucian und Menipp 303.

109. Quoted by D.L. 4.33, S.E. PH 1.234, Numenius ap. Euseb., PE 14.5.13Google Scholar. Ariston's epigram made L. Robin think that Pyrrho is the fish at the rear, ‘protecting the whole band’ (n.4 above) 30. I disagree.

110. Fr. 23 = D.L. 4.42 where ὀχλοάρεσκος is to be contrasted with ὀχλολοίδορος, applied to Heraclitus in fr. 43 (n.76 above).

111. Poet. Phil. Frag. 182-3.

112. Fr. 41 = D.L. 7.170, closely parodying Il. 3.196.

113. ‘Second Thoughts on Greek Biography’, Meded. d. Kon. Ned. Akad. van Wet., Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks 34.7 (1971) 14–15Google Scholar.

114. D.L. 9.40 = D.-K 68 A1 (Democritus); Timon fr. 5 = S.E. M. 9.56 = D.-K. 80 A12. I am grateful to Professor Momigliano for pointing this out to me.

115. Fr. 42 = D.L. 8.67, Fr. 24 = D.L. 2.6, fr. 25 = D.L. 2.19 (cf. n.80 above).

116. Fr. 54 = Aulus Gellius 3.17.4. Here again we may suspect the influence of Aristoxenus, cf. his claim that Plato largely derived the Republic from Protagoras' Disputations (Antilogika), D.L. 3.67 = fr. 67 Wehrli.

117. Timon is credited with epics and dramas (D.L. 9.110), and with assisting two tragedians (ibid. 113). Note also his supposed remarks (ad loc.) to Aratus criticizing contemporary corrected texts of Homer, cf. Pfeiffer, R., History of classical scholarship I (1968) 121f.Google Scholar

118. Cf. for instance M 7.320-6, arguing that no dogmatist is the criterion of truth because all dogmatists who have made such claims were equally old, hardworking, and intelligent, and therefore none of them can be differentiated in these respects. For Sextus' readiness to ridicule the dogmatists see n.57 above, and more generally my article, ‘Sextus Empiricus on the Criterion of Truth’, forthcoming in BICS (1978)Google Scholar.