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The Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the Greek-Italian War, 1940-1: an Analysis of Zahariadis’ Three Letters
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2016
Extract
An analysis of the position of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) during the Greek-Italian war is interesting not only because it involves a hitherto unsolved puzzle – how and why the KKE’s General Secretary, Nikos Zahariadis, wrote his ‘three letters’ – but also because, it involves background factors that help explain how the KKE emerged, during the occupation period, in possession of an invaluably useful ‘patriotic’ image. Such an image, obtained from Zahariadis’ ‘first’ letter, undeniably facilitated the party’s successful efforts to build up the country’s largest liberation movement (EAM) and, through this movement, to come close to capturing power during the years 1943-4.
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- Copyright © The Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies, University of Birmingham 1979
References
1. The KKE (Kommounistiko Komma tis Elladas) was created in November 1918 under the initials SEKE (Socialist Working Party of Greece). In April 1920, SEKE, after its ‘left’ faction had predominated over the ‘right’ faction, joined the Communist International under the name SEKE (K) (K, for ‘Communist’) and in 1924 it took the name KKE. During the years 1920-30 the party, torn apart by internal divisions, appeared unable to expand; the greatest membership it reached was about 2,500. During the party’s worst crisis – the so-called ‘factionalist struggle without principles’, in 1930 – the membership dropped to 1,500. One year later, the Comintern intervened in the KKE’s internal affairs, imposing as a new leader the Moscow-trained Zahariadis, then twenty-nine years old. Zahariadis quickly succeeeded in unifying and reorganizing the party, whose membership rose steadily : from 6,000 in 1934 to 14,000 in 1936 (i.e. just before the Metaxas dictatorship). It was under Zahariadis that the KKE’s Fourth Plenum (1934) dropped the slogan ‘autonomy of Macedonia’ (see footnote 3, below), something which undoubtedly contributed to its gaining 5.7 per cent of the vote in the 1936 elections. For a study of the 1918-40 period see the sole scholarly history of the KKE – a very right wing one, though – by D. G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat. The Story of the Greek Communist Party (London, 1965); an ‘unorthodox’ communist interpretation by D. Nefeloudis, Stis Piges tis Kakodemonias, 1918-68 (Athens, 1974); an ‘orthodox’ brief history of the KKE by H. Ioannidis, ‘To KKE, Psyhi tou Ellinikou Ergatikou Kinimatos’, Neos Kosmos, No. 1 (January 1971). For KKE views on the party’s relations with the Comintern see V. Tsikoulas, ‘O Georgi Dimitrov ke to KKE sta Deka Prota Hronia tis Yparxis tou’, Neos Kosmos, No. 6 (June 1972), and D. Sarlis, ‘Ena Istoriko Documento Me Epikera Didagmata’, Neos Kosmos, No. 11 (November 1971). For a collection of KKE documents see Episima Kimena 1918-1940, 4 vols. (Athens, 1974).
2. The Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (National Liberation Front) was formed in September 1941, being a coalition of communists and small socialist groups, with the KKE in control.
3. The KKE replaced its slogan ‘autonomy for Macedonia’ with ‘equality of rights for all national minorites living in Greece’, in its Third Plenum resolution, in April 1935. See ‘I Triti Olomelia tis K. E. tou KKE’, Episima Kimena, 1934-40, IV, p. 157. Hereafter cited as KKE documents, 1934-40.
4. D. G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, pp. 118-25, attempts to justify the dictatorship along these lines, his relevant chapter having the characteristic title: ‘The Alternatives : Dictatorship or Revolution’.
5. The fact that the army was under right-wing control makes it imperative for those writers who attempt to justify the Metaxas dictatorship to talk about communist infiltration in the army. Such an effort is made by Haralambidis and Hadjiathanasiou in ‘To Mystikon Arhion’ (The Secret Archive), a series of articles in the daily newspaper Ethnikos Kiryx, 9 October 1949ff. The archives in question were those of Maniadakis, the Minister of Public Order during the Metaxas regime. But the only thing these articles succeed in demonstrating is precisely how negligible KKE infiltration in the army in fact was.
6. ‘Mystikon Arhion’, loc. cit., 9-10 October 1949.
7. KKE, Episima Kimena 1940-5, V, ed. KKE Esoterikou (1973), p. 24. Hereafter cited as KKE Documents, 1940-5.
8. ‘Mystikon Arhion’, loc. cit., 11-13 October 1949. According to one of the authors of this study, Haralambidis, who was an officer in the Maniadakis’ police, Tyrimos told him that he had decided to struggle against the KKE only when he found out that his younger brother, who was studying in Moscow, had been executed as a Trotskyist.
9. Partsalidis interview. Dimitris (Mitsos) Partsalidis, whom I interviewed on 7 January 1975, is probably the most eminent KKE personality still alive. In various periods of the KKE history he has occupied the following posts: Member of the Central Committee of the KKE, member of the Politbureau, representative of the KKE in EAM, Secretary of the Central Committee of EAM, Prime Minister of the ‘Provisional Democratic Government’ formed by the KKE ‘somewhere in the mountains’ during the 1946-9 civil war. A moderate and broadminded communist, he clashed in 1950 with the then all-powerful Zahariadis. When Zahariadis, due to Soviet pressure, was toppled in 1956, Partsalidis was expected to take his place but the Soviets thought differently. Partsalidis later clashed with the new KKE leadership, and was one of the founders of the ‘liberal’ splinter Greek Communist Party, the ‘KKE Esoterikou’.
10. Mihailidis’ role is unclear. It has been asserted that despite his collaboration with Maniadakis he remained a communist at heart and tried to warn KKE members of the PA’s role. See KKE Documents, 1940-5, p. 34.
11. ‘The 2nd Panhellenic Conference of the KKE’, December 1942, KKE Documents 1940-5, p. 113.
12. According to Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, p. 130, Maniadakis’ ‘repentance declaration’ tactics, which aimed at ‘breaking’ an individual, were ‘seemingly mild’. It is interesting to note that in one of the confidential Maniadakis’ orders to the police, it is revealed that a communist when confronted with the dilemma of signing such a declaration chose to commit suicide by jumping from the window of the police station. See ‘Mystikon Arhion’, loc. cit., 28 December 1949.
13. Quoted in ‘Mystikon Arhion’, 28 December 1949. See also 27 December.
14. ‘The 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the KKE’, KKE Documents 1934-40, p. 463. The agreement in question was signed by General Metaxas in his capacity as acting president of the Balkan Alliance (Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania) and the Bulgarian Foreign Secretary Giorgi Kiosseivanoff on 31 July 1938. It was agreed that Bulgaria should be allowed to rearm and fortify its borders and that the Balkan Alliance would not insist on the implementation of relevant clauses of the Neuilly and Lausanne treaties. Furthermore, the Agreement stated that all signatories should desist from using violence ‘in their mutual relations, in conformity to the agreements each of these states had signed on the issue of non-aggression’. For the full text of the Agreement see Efimeris tis Kyvemiseos, 12 November 1938, No. 429, pp. 2823-4.
15. Quoted in Kaila, M., ‘To KKE ke i Kommounistiki Diethnis’ (The KKE and the Comintern), Neos Kosmos, No. 11 (November 1973), p. 27 Google Scholar. Siantos revealed the directive’s existence in 1942 during his speech to the Panhellenic Conference.
16. The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents. Selected and edited by Degras, III, 1929-43 (London, 1965), pp. 439-40 (hereafter cited as The Communist International 1929-43).
17. Ibid., p. 441.
18. Extracts from an Article by Dimitrov on the ‘Tasks of the Working Class in the War’ (November 1939), ibid., pp. 450-1.
19. ‘May Day Manifesto of the ECCI’ (April 1940), ibid., pp. 465-6.
20. Ibid., p. 443 and pp. 463-4.
21. Quoted in Lazitsch, B., Tito, et la révolution Yougoslave 1937-1956 (Paris, 1957), p. 42.Google Scholar
22. ‘Manifesto of the Central Committee of KKE’, KKE Documents 1940-45, p. 26.
23. See ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the KKE’, ibid., p. 37.
24. In Papakonstantinou, Th., Anatomia tis Epanastaseos (Anatomy of the Revolution) (Athens, 1952), pp. 146-7 Google Scholar. Also Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, p. 141.
25. Kousoulas, op. cit., p. 141. Kousoulas, who has an excellent chapter on Maniadakis’ anti-KKE tactics, has a very confusing and poor analysis of Zahariadis’ position during the Greek-Italian war.
26. KKE Documents 1940-45, pp. 16, 23, 35 and 57.
27. ‘Open Letter to the People of Greece’, KKE Documents 1940-45, p. 16.
28. KKE Documents 1940-45, pp. 17-18 and 19-21. It seems that the Akronafplia group had already adopted a ‘patriotic’ position prior to Zahariadis’letter (pp. 14-15).
29. The Communist International 1929-1943, op. cit., p. 454.
30. Nefeloudis, Stis Piges tis Kakodemonias, 1918-68, p. 140.
31. Ibid., p. 139.
32. Ibid., pp. 141-2.
33. Kousoulas, op. cit., p. 141.
34. All the above thoughts and conclusions – even though based to a great extent on Partsalidis’ information – are my own, and are not necessarily shared by Partsalidis.
35. Lazitsch, op. cit., p. 52.
36. ‘The 3rd Open Letter of N. Zahariadis’, KKE Documents 1940-45, p. 32.
37. In January 1941 Metaxas declined A. Wavell’s offer of men and material. For details see: ‘Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East’, from 7 February 1941 to 15 July 1941, Supplement to the London Gazette, No. 37638, 3 July 1946, pp. 3, 423-44.
38. ‘Open Letter’, KKE Documents 1940-45, pp. 22-3.
39. ‘The 3rd Open Letter of N. Zahariadis’, ibid., pp. 31-5.
40. Quotes from Zahariadis’ 3rd letter: pp. 32, 35. Italics my own.
41. Quotes from OCC declaration, pp. 25, 28. Italics my own except where indicated (*). All quotes from KKE Documents 1940-45.
42. Nikos Zahariadis, Epilog. Kimenon (Selection of texts) (Athens, n.d.), p. 38.
43. The ‘certain events’ were, for example: Metaxas’ failure to pursue a ‘neutralist foreign policy’ in the manner the Soviets viewed such a policy, Metaxas’ refusal to release KKE detainees thus indicating a softening of his anti-communist attitude, and, finally, Zahariadis’ discovery that the PA, which was enthusiastically backing his first letter, was a tool of the police.
44. P. Nefeloudis, op. cit., p. 139.
45. ‘Partsalidis’ speech towards the 7th Plenum (1950) of the Central Committee of the KKE’, Neos Kosmos (August 1950), No. 8, p. 494.
46. For such examples consult: Rizospastis, 28 October 1945, p. 1; ‘Materials of the 7th Plenum of the KKE (1957)’, Neos Kosmos, March 1957, pp. 89, 98, 99; and P. Mavromatis, ‘O Defteros Pangosmios Polemos ke i Synepies tou gia tin Ellada’, Neos Kosmos, No. 12 (December 1969). An interesting discussion on the KKE’s recent attitude towards Zahariadis’ letters is found in Karras, S., ‘Politiki Provlimatismi’, Apo tin Istoria ke tin Synhroni Pragmatihotita tou Ellinikou Kommounistikou Kinimatos (Athens, 1957), pp. 86-7.Google Scholar