Almost by definition American wool manufacturers and wool growers stood on opposite sides of any question relating to tariffs. Yet the Wool and Woolens Act of 1867 served the interests of both groups and was pushed through Congress and across the desk of a reluctant President by their determined joint efforts. The circumstances surrounding this historic episode of commercial alliance are revealing as to the forces that have shaped American tariff policy and provide an insight into incipient efforts on the part of the businessman to control his environment by co-operative as well as by competitive means.

The pragmatic approach adopted by business historians has inhibited utilization of their findings for theoretical purposes. Economic theory, at the same time, has hitherto provided no apparatus for attacking a whole range of problems deemed vital by historians today. The consequent breach between business history and economic theory, however, may be bridged by the development of new theoretical tools. Linear programming, statistical decision theory, and the theory of games are examples of arenas where the skills and interests of historian and theorist can converge.

The performance of industrial securities in the depression of 1893-97 went far toward ridding the financial community of the idea that such securities generally lacked investment quality. This ship in investing sentiment was a factor of major significance in accelerating the merger movement, the promoters of which, in turn, broadened the market for industrials still further. This they accomplished by offering wide participations in promising ventures, by sweetening those participations through extensive recourse to preferred stocks, and by employing promotional techniques new to the field of industrial security marketing. The creation of a broad market for industrial stocks, hitherto highly inflexible administrative tools, meant vastly increased fluidity of ownership. By the turn of the century the transition was well under way from closely held, “inside” ownership of American business to semipublic, “outside” hands.

Business history and business inevitably share the problem of dealing with records in bulk. Here is a suggestion that historians borrow and adapt certain techniques that have proved effective in solving the problem for business.

Attempts to monopolize the automobile industry began early in its history but were never successful because the industry possessed characteristics which made monopolization exceptionally difficult. The first of these efforts provides an illuminating example of business failure resulting from avoidable errors of judgment. The Electric Vehicle Company began its operations on the assumption that the electric automobile was going to be the dominant type; when this became demonstrably a bad guess, the company tried to compensate by using the Selden patent to collect royalties from the manufacturers of gasoline automobiles. This scheme likewise misfired, and the company collapsed into bankruptcy. The scheme also brought disaster to the Pope Manufacturing Company of Hartford, Connecticut, which abandoned a very promising position of leadership in the automobile field in order to participate in a highly speculative enterprise.

When attention is shifted from individual entrepreneur to the socio-economic group of which he is a part, new historical perspectives are opened to view. This study of a group of bankers in frontier Cincinnati considerably sharpens the historical concept of the “Western Banker” and provides insight into the nature of the banking function in a developing economy. The data employed yield significant conclusions about the nature of the bankers' backgrounds and about the importance both of those backgrounds and of the frontier environment in shaping the bankers' function and role.

In order to utilize the new science of records management, historians need detailed, specific information on the various techniques which have been worked out. The Controlled Record Keeping program of the National Records Management Council, developed by historically oriented specialists, offers three basic tools which are equally useful to businessmen and scholars in helping to win the “Battle of the Bulk.”

Accounts of the “birth of the petroleum industry” traditionally have emphasized the discovery and exploitation of early oil fields. Equally important, however, was the growth of a market for the production of those fields. Little information has hitherto been available about Dr. Abraham Gesner and his Kerosene Works. Here was one of the significant origin points for a major industrial development. Gesner's story, interesting in itself, contributes greatly to an understanding of all phases of the early petroleum industry.

The appeal by scholars for businessmen to incorporate historical consideration in their records management programs is likely to be more widely heeded if businessmen (and scholars) are aware of contemporary experience with business history. Until recently no systematic effort had been made to determine what that experience had been. The present article surveys the factors which have led to authorization of company histories; experiences in selecting authors; uses to which company histories have actually been put; impacts on employee, customer, and public relations programs; and comparative costs incurred in specific instances.

The development of banking in Utah advanced by stages, each of which marked an increase in the degree of specialization practiced by institutions performing banking functions. After the first settlement of the territory in 1847, banking functions were assumed principally by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon). With the inauguration of mining activity in the Mountain States in the early 1860's, formalized banking institutions were established in Salt Lake City. These miners' and merchants' banks predominated until the early 1880's when commercial banks were established in most of the settlement centers of the territory.

Having solved the initial problems of raising capital for its steamship venture on the Yangtze (Business History Review, June, 1954), the Boston trading firm of Russell & Co. then faced operational difficulties of a formidable nature. Fluctuating local trade, recurrent scarcity of working capital, and the presence of an outnumbering fleet of competing vessels provided a severe test of the resident-partner system of administration. Russell & Co.'s Far Eastern affiliate rode out the lean years, profited handsomely in the fat years that followed, and then liquidated its investment. This account of the Yangtze steamship venture further illuminates the methods and policies of American commission houses in the nineteenth-century China trade and has implications of interest to modern managers of foreign investments.

This study of the chief executives of large corporations over the period from 1900 to 1950 introduces specific evidence both to support and explain the thesis, hitherto vaguely entertained by many students of business, that administration of such corporations is rapidly becoming a profession.

Standing between expanding productive capacity on the one hand and growing consumer demand on the other, the marketing middleman in our economy has been forced into a succession of adaptive measures, significant among which has been department store retailing. A study of the general developmental pattern in down state Illinois reveals a “spawning era” and identifies three generic antecedents for the department store. Case studies of individual firms reveal the external underlying forces and the innovating policies which made the department store necessary and possible in this geographic area. Since by many criteria the small cities of Illinois were typical of those elsewhere, a study of retail developments there has more than regional implications.

Behind the formation, in 1890, of the National Association of Life Underwriters lay two decades of localized, often abortive attempts at self-regulation through association. Malpractice, while not universal, was sufficiently widespread to hinder the growth of a broad market for life insurance. Early regulatory efforts failed when the organizers of those efforts were unable to solve the administrative problems of dealing with apathy on the one hand and defiance on the other. But these failures paved the way for renewed efforts. When, at last, a number of widely scattered associations had succeeded in accomplishing reforms, thereby solidifying member support, the stage was set for organization on a national scale.

The processes whereby technical know-how is translated into business decisions are not widely understood; neither is there much definitive information about the role the engineer historically has played in administration. The data upon which this paper is based suggests that management of modern enterprise has been increasingly dependent upon graduates of engineering schools. The facts and implications are of interest not only to historians, but to businessmen and educators.

The changing attitude toward railroad regulation of reformer John H. Reagan tells much about the validity of the objections raised by railroadmen of the 1880's to such regulation. In tracing Reagan's career thus, a question of historiography is raised. Can careful utilization of contemporary attitudes toward business situations compensate for the subjectivity of the historian himself?

Nevada commercial banking has, from the start, been successively dominated by three organizations. The fact that these organizations rose to power under differing circumstances and by differing means suggests how deep-rooted and long-lived the propensity toward, economic concentration in some environments may be. In such environments the manner in which quasi-monopolistic powers are exercised has real cogency. Under two of the three historical situations studied, service to the consumer has not been noticeably different from that provided in more competitive banking areas.

These interesting papers and the data they present offer further testimony to the increasing study and understanding of the position of the businessman in our society. In general they focus on two topics: the recruitment of the business executive and the influence of recruitment patterns on the occupational role of the business executive. It would be redundant to attempt to elaborate further the careful and concise conclusions reached by the authors. A more rewarding use of this opportunity for discussion might be to make some examination of these data from an alternative point of view, readdressing them from a somewhat different theoretical position. From such an examination it may be possible to explore further the recruitment process in our business system.

British historians appear to have surpassed their American contemporaries in recognizing the importance of developments in accounting theory and practice in shaping the course of business. Students of British accountancy today enjoy increasing institutional support and have published several impressive works. From these and other sources it is possible to construct an outline of the background of British (and, more particularly, Scottish) accountancy which reveals much of interest to American scholars.