As the end of the era of abundant natural petroleum oils approaches, the United States finds itself heavily committed to a way of life based on cheap liquid hydrocarbon fuels. Whether such fuels will be available at any price in adequate quantities in the future, is the question today. Professor Vietor shows that it was also a serious question for some years after World War II, and that the United States carried a long way towards definitive demonstration a program for the development of high-volume synthetic liquid fuels production techniques. What that program accomplished; how the interests, public and private, who were responsible for the American fuel supply reacted to it; and why it was shelved for 25 years are among the points Vietor covers. The reader is left to weigh for himself the several reasons why this program was sidetracked, but he can hardly fail to conclude that where such fundamental matters as energy policy are concerned, American planning has been distressingly short range.

Students of planning may profitably ponder the myriad difficulties faced by the British aircraft industry in the decade before the outbreak of World War II. On a small civilian aircraft industry, provided with hardly any opportunity to gain military aircraft experience between World War I and the early 1930s, the Air Ministry tried to impose a nearly anarchic system of strategic military planning in which the very philosophy of the use of aircraft in war was at issue. Forced to work under conditions that included a “shadow industry” of civilian plant space that was theoretically capable of quick conversion to military aircraft production and that in the meantime turned out automobiles, the aircraft industry somehow ended up with two superb heavy bombers, the Halifax and the Lancaster, and a highly dependable prime contractor, A. V. Roe. Basing his narrative on both government and industry sources, Dr. Smith concludes that this was an outstanding example of British wartime “muddling through.”

Dominated as it is by the powerful personality of Frederick W. Taylor, the history of scientific management thought has neglected important figures like Alexander Hamilton Church. Professor Jelinek shows that whereas Taylor's contribution was to move thinking down one “level of abstraction” to concrete shop operations, Church moved it up one level to construct a pattern of observations useful for management planning and evaluation.

It has been a long time since clichés like “cotton was king” have satisfied historians as an answer to the question of why the American South did not develop a manufacturing industry at least as vigorous as that of the Midwest in the antebellum years. Professor Cohn thinks that the South may well have done just that, and presents an analysis based on location theory that supports such a conclusion.

Will the lack of hard data forever preclude firm conclusions about the impact of industrialization upon antebellum America? Whether it does or not, it seems unlikely to prevent continuation of one of the liveliest debates in American economic history. Professors Vedder and Gallaway contribute their findings to the controversy, and conclude that the rate of profit on manufacturing capital before 1860 was much lower than recent work has suggested.