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Taiwan's PC Industry, 1976–2010: The Evolution of Organizational Capabilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2014

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Abstract

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The stellar growth of Taiwan's personal-computer (PC) industry over the past three decades represents a paradox. Participating in the global production system, local firms in Taiwan grew in association with established firms in the West. Despite their technical know-how, manufacturing prowess, and size, most leading Taiwanese firms did not develop their own capabilities in branding and marketing. A close examination of the historical evolution of the industry reveals that interactions with established companies in the West, in addition to local competition, decisively shaped capability development among latecomer firms. A few firms in Taiwan that eventually joined the ranks of global PC brands had been investing in marketing early, guided by a strategic vision rather than near-term economic calculation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 2014 

References

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14 In 2010, Acer and ASUSTek's laptops ranked fourth and fifth respectively in global shipment volume, surpassing household names such as Sony, Samsung, and Toshiba in the PC sector. Stephen Shen, “Worldwide PC Shipments Increase 2.3% in 2Q10, Says Gartner,” DigiTimes, 15 July 2010. Ricky Morris, “Taiwan Motherboard Industry Overview,” DigiTimes (2009).

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16 A motherboard is the central printed circuit board of a PC. All other components are connected to it, and its job is to relay information between them.

17 Arguably, Xerox's PARC (Palo Alto Research Center) developed the first PC in 1973, even though the firm failed to capitalize on its invention. See Smith, Douglas and Alexander, Robert, Fumbling the Future: How Xerox Invented, Then Ignored, the First Personal Computer (New York, 1988)Google Scholar. Steve Jobs famously took the graphical user interface that Xerox had pioneered and implemented it on Apple's machines, propelling Apple to a leading PC manufacturer. By the time the first IBM PC was launched in 1981, earlier incumbents such as Tandy Corporation (Radio Shack) had quickly exited the industry.

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32 For Intel to double the number of transistors on integrated circuits approximately every two years, technical breakthrough was not sufficient. Intel had to induce (or even coerce) its partners within the PC industry to commercialize its technologies. See Gawer, Annabelle and Henderson, Rebecca, “Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16 (Spring 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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34 ASUSTek's average profit margin was around 23 percent during the period; “Growing Influence,” TechVantage (July 2001): 94–100.

35 In 1986, former Sony engineer Joseph Hsu, along with four other colleagues, set up MSI. In 1989, four former engineers from Acer started ASUSTek. Three years later, Jonney Shih, who had also been working at Acer, joined ASUSTek as CEO and has stayed with the company ever since. At Gigabyte, CEO Danny Yeh and four other founders of the company were engineers by training.

36 伍忠賢, 華碩馬步心法: 施崇棠的策略雄心, 台灣: 達人館 (2006), 90 [Wu, Z. X., Asus Strategy: Jonney Shih Strategic Ambitions (Taiwan, 2006)Google Scholar, 90].

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61 今周刊, 退休、紅酒、枕邊人 面板鐵嘴陳瑞聰的三十年職涯夢 4 May 2008 [“Retirement, Red Wine, Three Decades of Dreams,” Business Today, 4 May 2008].

62 Interview with Ted Chang, Executive Assistant to the Chairman and CEO, Planning and Program Office, Quanta Research Institute, Quanta Computer, Inc., 15 Sept. 2010.

63 Wistron was a contract manufacturer spun off by Acer. The subject is covered in the following section. “Taiwan Notebook Industry Overview,” DigiTimes, 11 Jan. 2005.

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73 CommonWealth, 25 Oct. 2004, 118.

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76 Up to 40 percent of Acer's output was sold under contract manufacturing.

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80 Interview with Tony Chen, COO and NB BU General Manager, ASUSTek Computer, Inc., 7 Jan. 2009.

81 Wu, Asus Strategy, 94–95.

82 Arik Hesseldahl, “Acer's Gateway to the U.S. Market,” BusinessWeek, 28 Aug. 2007.

83 Interview with Joe Hsieh.

84 CommonWealth, 1 Mar. 1994, 102–10.

85 In the early 1990s, Microsoft's most important investment was Windows 95, which was designed as a replacement for DOS and Windows 3.1 and only worked with Intel architecture microprocessors. It created a standard that allowed diverse applications to interact simultaneously without crashing and bundled programs such as networking software and Microsoft Mail that previously had been kept separate.

86 Jamie Beckett, “The Business of Bidding: Reinventing Auctions for Better Results,” http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2005/jul-sep/auctions.html (accessed on 15 May 2009).

87 CommonWealth, 1 Sept. 2003, 160–65. In a high-profile dispute in 2003, ASUSTek refused to fulfill all of the orders from a previous bidding. It was reported that the bid price per motherboard was $7 to $10 lower than the average production cost.

88 “Dell Aims to Establish a New Model for Notebook Procurement,” DigiTimes, 1 Dec. 2003.

89 “HP's Fiorina Upsets Taiwan Suppliers,” DigiTimes, 11 June 2003.

90 Interview with Steve Kung, 22 Dec. 2009.

91 Interview with Ken Kan, Vice President, Notebook Engineering, FlexComputing, 9 July 2009.

92 Interview with Peter Ju, General Manager, NB Vertical Sales and Marketing, FlexComputing, 9 July 2009.

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101 Acer also progressively reduced its equity holding in Wistron, signaling to the market that the two firms were truly operating as separate entities. “Acer to Release 70 Million Shares in Wistron,” DigiTimes, 2 Jan. 2007.

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103 Interview with Samson Hu, General Manager, EPC Business Unit, ASUSTek Computer, Inc., 13 Jan. 2007.

104 Interview with Zing Chen, Deputy Director Product Planning & Management Div. EPC Business Unit, AOOP Business Group, ASUSTek Computer, Inc., 13 Jan. 2007. Interview with Jerry Shen, CEO, ASUSTek Computer, Inc., 13 Jan. 2007.

105 Suzanne Nam, “The Jonney Machine: How Taiwan's ASUSTek Built Its Cheap Laptop for Grown-Ups,” Forbes.com, 12 Nov. 2007.