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The Origins of British-Based Multinational Manufacturing Enterprises*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2012

John M. Stopford
John M. Stopford
Affiliation:
Professor of International Business, London Graduate School of Business Studies
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Abstract

Professor Stopford explores the patterns of British direct investment in overseas manufacturing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, paying special attention to the quality of Victorian entrepreneurship and the opportunities and problems presented by the Empire and then the Commonwealth.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business History Review , Volume 48 , Issue 3: Multinational Enterprise , Autumn 1974 , pp. 303 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1974

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References

1 Company annual reports and press releases.

2 See, for example, Servan-Schreiber, J. J., Le Défi Américain (Paris, 1967)Google Scholar, and Behrman, Jack, Some Patterns in the Rise of Multinational Enterprises (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969).Google Scholar

3 Business Monitor, Miscellaneous Series, M4, Overseas Transactions (various issues); excludes banking, insurance, and oil industries.

4 There are many competing definitions of what constitutes a multinational enterprise in the manufacturing sector. For the purposes of this article, one of the simplest definitions – if it can really be called a definition – is used: a firm that has more than 25 per cent of its manufacturing output abroad.

5 Country and regional studies provide a rich source of data that can be explored further than has been attempted here. See, for example, Rippy, J. Fred, British Investments in Latin America, 1822–1949 (Hamden, Conn., 1966)Google Scholar; Bagchi, Amiya K., Private Investment in India, 1900–1939 (Cambridge, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; MacKay, John P., Pioneers for Profit, Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialisation 1885–1913 (Chicago, 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also useful are industry studies such as Erickson, Charlotte, British Industrialists: Steel and Hosiery 1850–1950 (Cambridge, 1959)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also, firms, such as Bowring, which started when Benjamin Bowring moved his clock and watch making business to Newfoundland in 1811, are increasingly beginning to publicise their origins. Finally, works such as Jenks, Leland H., The Migration of British Capital to 1875 (London, 1963)Google Scholar are invaluable.

6 For a fascinating account of government attitudes, see Platt, D. C. M., Finance, Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914 (Oxford, 1968).Google Scholar

7 Rippy, British Investments, 37.

8 Carrington, C. E., The British Overseas (Cambridge, 1968), 474.Google Scholar

9 £600,000,000 of railway bonds alone were sold to help finance the war effort.

10 Due mainly to a spate of government-guaranteed railway issues, and its special importance in the Empire, India was one major exception to the general “laissez-fairerdquo; policies towards capital exports.

11 Hobsbawm, Eric J., Industry and Empire (London, 1968), 148.Google Scholar

12 For more detailed figures, see Feis, Herbert, Europe; The World's Banker 1870–1914 (New Haven, Conn., 1930).Google Scholar

13 This figure excludes investments in oil, and is an estimate based on data from Conan, A. R., Capital Imports into Sterling Countries (London, 1960), 85.Google Scholar Data for Canada from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada's International Investment Position 1926–1954 (Ottawa, 1956).Google Scholar See also Conan, A. R., The Problem of Sterling (London, 1966), 68.Google Scholar

14 Rippy, British Investments, provides much information that can be interpreted to support this point.

15 For details, see Feis, Europe: World's Banker.

16 The estimates were derived as follows: manufacturing investments (£209,000,000) were allocated half to direct, one quarter to “expatriate,” and one quarter to portfolio; investments (£891,000,000) in utilities, extractive industries, banks, finance, and land, were allocated equally between portfolio and “expatriate;” railways (£1,531,000,000) were allocated as three-fourths portfolio and one-fourth “expatriate;” government and municipal securities (£1,125,000,000) were portfolio.

17 Sources for the estimates are: for 1927 data, SirKindersley, Robert, “A New Study of British Foreign Investments,” The Economic Journal, XXXIX (March, 1929)Google Scholar; for the firms, the London Business School Multinational Data Bank, some components of which are included in Vaupel, James W. and Curhan, Joan P., The World's Multinational Enterprises (Harvard Business School, Division of Research, 1974)Google Scholar. During the 1930s, Britain's foreign investments fell in nominal value by over £100,000,000. Though direct investments continued to be made, albeit at a low level, repayments of portfolio investments were made on a massive scale. For details, see Kindersley's series of articles in The Economic Journal, up to 1959. Note that Kindersley's figures apply only to capital flows through the securities markets and must be supplemented by internal transactions of the multinationals.

18 The title of this section and much of the analysis is taken from A. L. Levine's excellent study, Industrial Retardation in Britain 1880–1914 (London, 1967).

19 The severe limitations of the data make comparisons difficult. For a critical review of this period, see Musson, A. E., “The Great Depression in Britain, 1873–1896: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Economic History (June, 1959).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an interpretation of the available indices, see Derek H. Aldcroft's introduction to Aldcroft, , ed., The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875–1914 (London, 1968), 11–36.Google Scholar

20 See, for example, Hobson, J. A., The Evolution of Modern Capitalism (London, 1949), 146Google Scholar, and Landes, David S., The Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge, 1969).Google Scholar

21 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 178.

22 For detailed examinations of the role of foreign technology, and of foreign firms in many industries, see the series of excellent papers in Aldcroft, ed., Development of British Industry.

23 See Levine, Industrial Retardation, for a careful evaluation and dismissal of such familiar arguments as the handicap of an inadequate resource base, the small size of the home market, the heavy exports of capital, non-competitive behaviour of firms due to sociological causes, and soon.

24 For a discussion of the relative merits of these processes and the reasons why the Solvay process became the basic process of the modern chemical industry, see Haber, L. F., The Chemical Industry 1900–1930, (London, 1971).Google Scholar

25 For details, see Burn, Duncan, The Economic History of Steelmaking 1867–1939 (Cambridge, 1961), 172–182.Google Scholar

26 For a useful summary, see Wilson, Charles, “Technology and Industrial Organisation,” in Singer, C.et al., eds., History of Technology; Volume 5 (Oxford, 1958), 807, 808.Google Scholar

27 Hobsbawn, Industry and Empire, 178–179, however, argues convincingly that ship building was one of the few industries where economics of scale were not important, and where the complex subdivisions of the construction process both multiplied the opportunities and minimised the risks of technical advance and specialisation.

28 For a summary of recent reappraisals, see McCloskey, Donald N., ed., Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840 (London, 1971).Google Scholar See also McCloskey, D. N., Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline: British Iron and Steel, 1870–1913 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973).Google Scholar

29 Hobsbawn, Industry and Empire, 146.

30 One telling example of this behaviour was provided by the Pilkington family. See Barker, T. C., Pilkington Brothers and the Glass Industry (London, 1960), 197.Google Scholar

31 There are well documented instances of firms, even those with unrivalled skills, that refused to make foreign investments when approached by local interests primarily because they would require too much effort. See, for example, Houseman, Lorna, The House that Thomas Built: The Story of De La Rue (London, 1968), 99Google Scholar, for a refusal to invest in Italy in 1864; see also Corley, T. A. B., Quaker Enterprise in Biscuits (London, 1972)Google Scholar, 218 for a refusal in the U.S.A. on the grounds of undue management difficulties.

32 The constraints against factory production in China were great, as was governmental resistance to foreign incursions. See Allen, George C. and Donnithorne, Audrey G., Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development (London, 1954).Google Scholar

33 For expositions of the theory of how both oligopoly and new technology influence investment behaviour, see Caves, Richard, “International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment,” Economica (February, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Knickerbocker, F. T., Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprises (Boston, 1973)Google Scholar, Wells, Louis T. Jr., The Product Life Cycle and International Trade (Boston, 1972).Google Scholar

34 See Coleman, D. C., Courtaulds: An Economic and Social History (Oxford, 1969)Google Scholar, II, Chapters 2–5 for details of Tetley's long struggle to overcome the scepticism of the Courtaulds family.

35 A major factor that helped Courtaulds achieve its position of dominance was that it was the only one of the patent holders to have a well-developed textile business; the others were not initially as experienced in the weaving of fabric.

36 Allen and Donnithome, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Development, 231.

37 Reader, W. J., Imperial Chemical Industries: A History (London, 1970), I.Google Scholar

38 For fascinating glimpses of the negotiations, both with governments and with other armaments manufacturers, see Scott, J. P., Vickers, A History (London, 1962).Google Scholar

39 The saga is told in authoritative detail by Wilson, Charles, The History of Unilever (London, 1970), I.Google Scholar

40 Ibid., 196.

41 Reckitt, B. N., The History of Reckitt & Sons (London, 1965), 43.Google Scholar

42 T. C. Barker, Pilkington, 165.

43 Ibid.

44 For details of these policies, and of the series of amalgamations that shaped the industry, see Macrosty, Henry W., The Trust Movement in British Industry (London, 1907), 126–147.Google Scholar

45 For some details of the early investments, see “Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.,” in Smith, G. A., Christensen, C. R., and Berg, N. A., Policy Formulation and Administration (Homewood, Ill., 1968).Google Scholar

46 See, for example, Gerretson, F. C., The History of Royal Dutch (Leiden, 1953).Google Scholar

47 R. E. Tyson, “The Cotton Industry,” in Aldcroft, ed., Development of British Industry, 125.

48 For some detailed estimates and comparisons of income per capita in 1914, see Staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Income of the United States; Its Amount and Distribution 1909–1919 (New York, 1921), I.Google Scholar

49 Many of the important empire trading companies, such as Dalgety, had small manufacturing units attached to their import/export activities. They represent a special category of investment that is not considered here.

50 Wilson, Unilever, I, 165ff.

51 Estimates from Woytinsky, W. S. and Woytinsky, E. S., World Commerce and Developments (New York, 1955), 191.Google Scholar

52 For a detailed and fascinating account of the early foreign investments of American firms, see Wilkins, Mira, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass., 1970).Google Scholar

53 Stocking, George W. and Watkins, Myron, Cartels in Action (New York, 1946)Google Scholar; and Hexner, Ervin, International Cartels (London, 1946)Google Scholar, provide many examples in chemicals, steel, rubber, and other industries.

54 Baker Perkins Limited, An Introduction to Baker Perkins (Peterborough, 1957), 8.Google Scholar

55 Turner and Newall Limited: The First Fifty Years, 1920–1970 (London, 1970), 22.

56 Cadbury Brothers: Industrial Record 1919–1939 (Cadbury, 1945), 77.

57 The story is told by Cartwright, A. P., The Dynamite Company (London, 1964), 234.Google Scholar Note that Lewis Berger was wholly owned by Sherwin Williams of Canada Limited, which in turn was closely affiliated with the U.S. Sherwin Williams Company. Such “accidents” happen, of course, to companies of any nationality.

58 Burmah also owned, and still does, approximately 23 per cent of British Petroleum, due to its involvement in the early development of Anglo-Persian.

59 Consolidated Gold Fields was one of the few major British investors in Tsarist Russia, and also owned mines in many parts of Africa, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States.

60 Levenstein, Herbert, “From Within the Dyestuffs Industry,” Journal of the Society of Chemical Industries, vol. 50 (1931).Google Scholar

61 For example, the investments in France and Germany were in small zip-fastener factories managed by the metals side of Nobel Industries. See Reader, , Imperial Chemical Industries, 405–407.Google Scholar

62 This expressive phrase was used during an interview by one manager of a large firm suffering from this disease.