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Bürgerliche Gesellschaft and Consumer Interests: The Berlin Public Market Hall Reform, 1867–1891

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2011

Andrew Lohmeier
Andrew Lohmeier
Affiliation:
ANDREW LOHMEIER is an independent scholar and writer living in Arlington, Massachusetts.
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Abstract

By building retail and wholesale market halls in the 1880s, the city of Berlin rationalized the distribution of food while maintaining public control of commerce. In designing the market hall system, technological improvement and public orderliness emerged as top priorities, while the interests of consumers and small retail dealers who had relied on the traditional outdoor public markets remained secondary. The emphasis on order reflected the interests of the city's economic and cultural elite, the Bürgertum, who sought to make Berlin fit their image of a world-class city.

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Articles
Information
Business History Review , Volume 73 , Issue 1 , Spring 1999 , pp. 91 - 113
Copyright
Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1999

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References

1 See Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, The German Empire, 1871–1918 (Leamington Spa, U.K., 1985).Google Scholar Translated from the German by Kim Traynor (Göttingen, 1973). Wehler argues that the central government never introduced a policy to improve German living standards or even to stimulate consumer spending in part because Prussian agricultural interests kept food prices high through tariff protection. Several economic historians also note the relative impotence of the German consumer sector, as a source of both growth and innovation, relative to the role of capital investment and manufacturing, in Germany's industrial growth during the late nineteenth century. See Tilly, Richard, Vom Zollverein zum Industriestaat (München, 1990)Google Scholar and Borchardt, Knut, “Wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Wechsellagen 1800–1914,” in Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte, vol. 2, ed. Zorn, W. (Stuttgart, 1976).Google Scholar These works echo earlier scholarship, such as Gerschenkron's, AlexanderBread and Democracy in Germany (Ithaca, N.Y., 1943).Google Scholar

2 Kocka, Jürgen, “The European Pattern and the German Case,” in Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-century Europe, eds. Kocka, Jürgen and Mitchell, Allan (Oxford, 1993), 3–39.Google Scholar Kocka notes two limitations on the vigor of bourgeois society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) in the imperial period: the power of pre-bourgeois elites in the economy and society and the discomfort with democracy on the part of bourgeois elements. Kocka writes, on page 18, “State intervention in the economy and society slowly intensified, and this helped to reinforce once again the old tradition of bureaucratic control from above, a feature that had characterised German society from the period of absolutism, particularly in Prussia. This tradition stood opposed to the demand for autonomous self-government, appropriate to the model of the bürgerliche Gesellschaft.”

3 In addition, traditional seasonal and annual markets also met on the market plazas. The goods traded in these less frequent market meetings included wood and metal crafts as well as Christmas gifts. These markets also remained viable throughout the nineteenth century, but posed much less of a problem for traffic and sanitation.

4 It is difficult to analyze the business structures of the outdoor markets from municipal sources. The city published detailed administrative reports only with the opening of the market halls in 1886. The first administrative report mentions that there were 1,400 contracts for renting booths in the market halls. It is not clear how many people actually worked in these booths or how many were able to make contracts on their own. Landesarchiv Berlin, Aussenstelle Breitestrasse (hereafter L.B.) Repositeur 00–02, Section 1, Akte 2212 (herafter 00–02/1/2212). Verwaltungs Berichte über die Städtische Markthallen 1888–1917; First annual report, 1 Apr. 1886–31 Mar. 1887.

5 Although difficult to measure, these items were significant to the diets and budgets of most Germans. Estimates based on composite working-class budgets for the years 1887 and 1888 compiled by Lothar Schneider and cited in Hohorst, Gerd, Kocka, Jürgen, Ritter, Gerhard, eds., Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch II (München, 1975), 118Google Scholar, suggest that these types of food represented between one third and one half of the entire dietary budgets of typical working-class Germans (though it is notclear how Berliners might have differed from the composite). See also Schneider, Lothar, Der Arbeiterhaushalt im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1967), 50.Google Scholar Potatoes, vegetables, fruit, meat, and dairy products represented approximately 225 of 647 Reichmarks spent by a seven to eight member household on food in 1887; the same household spent an estimated 140 Reichmarks on bread. Furthermore, based on average per capita earned income estimated at 367 Reichmarks in Prussia in 1887, a household of sevenor eight would have spent roughly 8–10 percent of annual income on the types of food sold in the public markets. For the income estimates, see Hohorst, Kocka, Ritter, 101. A recent analysis of consumer budgets demonstrates that these proportions remained fairly consistent after the turn of the century as well, except for higher income groups. See Triebel, Armin, Zwei Klassen und die Vielfalt des Konsums; Haushaltsbudgetierung bei abhängig Erwerbstätigen in Deutschland im ersten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1991).Google Scholar

6 Lange, Annemarie, Berlin zur Zeit Bebeh und Bismarcks (Berlin, 1972), 111.Google Scholar

7 “Bericht über den Handel und die Industrie von Berlinim Jarhre 1872, erstattet vond den Aeltesten der Kaufmannshaft von Berlin,” in Jahresberichte der Handelskammern und kaufmännischen Korporationen des Preuβischen Staats für 1872 (Berlin, 1873), 27–28. The elders wrote that railroads were well suited to the distribution of perishable foods, but that grains and other bulk items could be shipped economically on Germany's waterways and canals.

8 Landeshauptarchiv Berlin, Aussenstelle Breitestrasse. Rep. 00–0211, Akte Nr. 2212. Verwalthungs-Bericht, Magistrats zu Berlin, 1. April-31. März 1891, Bericht über Städtische Markthallen, “Zusammenstellung der Grunderwerbs- und Baukosten,” 1.

9 See Hohorst, Kocka, Ritter, 118. With spending of approximately RM 225 per household, the public markets might have supplied 8334 households.

10 Landeshauptarchiv Brandenburg, Rep. 30, Titel 77 (hereafter 30/77). Polizei-Präsidium zu Berlin.

11 Ibid.Berliner Intelligenz-Blatt, 23 Aug. summarizing sections 14 and 70 of the Weekly Market Ordinance for Berlin of 9 Feb. 1848, according to which items brought to the market could only be traded in the market plaza in prescribedhours. They could not be traded in the streets or at town gates, nor could wholesalers have earlier access to producers than the general public was allowed.

12 Tilly, Charles, “Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe,” in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Tilly, Charles (Princeton, N.J., 1975), 380–455.Google Scholar

13 Teuteberg, Hans J., “Food Consumption in Germany since the Beginning of Industrialisation: A Quantitative Longitudinal Approach,” in Consumer Behaviour and Economic Growth in the Modern Economy, eds. Baudet, Henri and Meulen, Henk van der (London, 1982), 231–278.Google Scholar Teuteberg emphasizes that only the upper classes had consumed a wide variety of vegetables until the late 1800s; the majority of the population ate only from a limited range, such as cabbage and carrots. These dietary habits reinforced the ties to local farmers.

14 Mattern, Daniel Stewart, “Creating the Modern Metropolis: The Debate over Greater Berlin, 1890–1920” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1991), 31.Google Scholar

15 Evans, Richard, Death in Hamburg; Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830–1910 (London, 1987), 146.Google Scholar Berlin's central water works purified water with a sand filtration method. Evans contrasts Berlin's decisions to build municipal infrastructure, such as advanced water works and a sewage system in the 1870s, that Hamburg's civic leaders considered too expensive or unnecessary—decisions that later made Hamburg much more vulnerable to cholera epidemics.

16 Mattem, 60. Mattem notes that Goethe had designated Paris a Weltstadt, because of its size, modern infrastructure, and cosmopolitan culture.

17 Mattem, 17–18. Mattem states that it was Wilhelm I's goal to alleviate traffic congestion in the Altstadt of Berlin, though he did not pushfor any plan to re-settle inhabitants as had occurred in Paris.

18 Grais, Graf Hue de, Handbuch der Verfassung und Verwaltung in Preuβen und dem Deutschen Reich (Berlin, 1906), 317–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar According to de Grais, the Police Presidium was both Landespolizei and Ortspolizei, meaning that it answered to both state and municipal executive authorities.

19 Mattern, 31. It is interesting to note that the 1862 Hobrecht Plan for Berlin had been co-sponsored by the Police Presidium and the Prussian Ministry of Trade. Mattern, 16.

20 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preuβischer Kulturbesitz, Aussenstelle Merseburg Rep. 89H, Nr. 28145. Königliches Geheimes Civil-Cabinet, (hereafter GStA Merseburg 89H/28145.)

21 GStA Merseburg 89H/28145. Königliches Geheimes Civil-Cabinet.

22 GStA Merseburg 89H/28145. Königliches Geheimes Civil-Cabinet. Quote: “weil dergle-iche Anstalten in den Händen einer zugleich auf der Erwerb bedachten Privatgesellschaft die Gefahren einer vertheuerung der Lebensmittel und der Corruption der Polizeibeamten in sich trugen.” Three political bodies had jurisdiction over market regulations in Berlin: the Royal Police Presidium (Königliches Polizei Präsidium), the civilian magistrate (Magistrat) and the city's Assembly of Deputies (Stadtverordnetenversammlung). For further details on the politics of food markets, see Tilly, “Food Supply,” 380–455.

23 GStA Merseburg 89H/28145. Königliches Geheimes Civil-Cabinet. This argument is in accord with the findings of Teuteberg, Hans J. and Wiegelman, Günter in Der Wandel der Nahrungsgewohnheiten unter dem Einfluβ der Industrialisierung (Göttingen, 1972).Google Scholar The work states that until late in the 1800s many German households still produced or processed foodstuffs in one manner or another and were potential sellers of food. The proposed market reform did not seek to exclude existing dealers from the food trade.

24 Lange, 112.

25 GStA Merseburg 89H/28145. The Vossische Zeitung of 29 Apr. 1886 stated that the previous Police President, Herr v. Wurmb, had been more willing to accept private ownership of the market hall system. His successor, Herr v. Madai opposed granting a private monopoly.

26 L.B. 00/2214. The document is a proposal to appoint a new deputation to investigate establishing the market hall system, dated 14 Feb. 1881.

27 L.B. 00/2216. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 24 Feb. 1881.

28 L.B. 00/2390. Stadverordneten-Versammlung zu Berlin.

29 L.B. 00/2214. Stenographisches Bericht, Sitzung des Stadtverordnetenversammlung von 15 Jan. 1880.

30 L.B. 00/2214. Excerpt from the Berliner Tagesblatt, 26 Juli 1881.

31 The Assembly debates make almost no reference to the imperial tariffs on cereal grains that were raising the price of bread for Berlin consumers, but it is worth noting as background that the grain tariffs grew more and more onerous as the Assembly debated the market hall plans. The initial tariffs passed in 1879 taxed the value of grain imports at 5–7 percent of their value. The Reichstag raised the tariffs in 1882, 1885, and finally in 1887 to ad valorem 46 percent on rye and 33 percent on wheat. Borchardt, Perspectives on Economic History, 8. A competitive wholesale market for food could have helped to offset part of the burdens of imperial agricultural tariffs.

32 Binger, Lothar, “Stadtbahnbögen,” in Industriekultur in Berlin im 19. Jahrhundert; Exerzierfeld der Moderne, ed. Glaser, Hermann (München, 1984), 106–113.Google Scholar The construction of the Stadtbahn began in 1874 as a joint enterprise of the Kingdom of Prussia and the Berliner Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft. When the private company failed shortly thereafter, the state continued construction, designing the railway to serve civilian and military transport by bisecting the Ringbahn with a line through the middle of the city. The elevated line consisted of four tracks; the two interior tracks were for cargo and military uses, and the two outside lines were four local rail transport.

33 Binger, “Stadtbahnbögen.” To leverage their central-city real estate investment, the city made 597 of the 731 viaducts beneath the rails viable for commercial purposes. The Stadtbahn opened on 7 Feb. 1882.

34 Teuteberg, , “Zum Problemfeld Urbanisierung und Ernährung im 19. Jahrhundert” in Durchbruch zum modernen Massenkonsum, ed. Teuteberg, (Münster, 1987).Google Scholar

35 L.B. 00/2216. Vorlage zur Beschluβfassung, betreffend Einsetzung einer gemischten Deputation zur Vorberathung der Angelegenheit, betreffend die Nutzbarmachung des Stadteisenbahnunternehms für die Lebensmittelversorgung der Stadt, debated 14. Feb. 1881. Quote: “… daβ unser Interesse, das Stadtbahnunternehmen des Staates für unsere städtischen Zwecke nutzbar zu machen, ein groβes ist. In gleichem Maβe liegt aber auch ein Interesse des Staates vor, das von ihm übernommene Unternehmen nutzbar zu machen für die regelmäβige und bessere Lebensmittelversorgung der Hauptstadt und Sicherung regelmäβigen Absatzes für die Lebensmittelproduktion des Landes. Zu diesem allgemeinen Staatsinteresse kommt das besondere des Staates als des Eisenbahneigenthums und der besseren finanziellen Fructi-firung seines Transportunternehmens.” See also Klee, Wolfgang, Preuβische Eisenbahngeschichte (Stuttgart, 1982), 160–62.Google Scholar Klee notes that one of Bismarck's motives in Prussia's takeover of the railways was toavoid the sort of shortages of rolling stock that occurred during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–71. The private railways refused to keep excess inventories of rolling stocks. Nationalization meant that there would be more slack in the system, but also created a new incentive to cover the inventory costs with steady revenue sources.

36 L.B. 00/2216. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 29 Dec. 1881.

37 L.B. 00/2214. Document dated 27 Nov. 1880. The Berlin police posted a notice in late August 1854, stating that commerce in goods intended for the market could occur only in the marketplace and during market hours, basing this upon the General Industrial Code of 17 Jan. 1845 and the Weekly Market Ordinance of 9 Feb. 1848. Landeshauptarchiv Brandenburg 30/ 77/11 (“Polizeilicher Bekanntmachung” cited in the Berliner Intelligenz-Blatt of 23 Aug. 1854).

38 L.B. 00/2214. Letter of C. Cohn to Stadtverordnetenversammlung dated 7 Feb. 1882.

39 L.B. 00/2216. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 29 Dec. 1881. The cost of three parcels of land, Neue Friedrichstrasse 24, 25, and 26 (the city later bought lots 27 and 28 as well) was RM 1,520,000. The city paid for it by issuing new bonds and by using some of the proceeds of an 1878 bond issue.

40 L.B. 00/2214. Stenographisches Bericht, Sitzung des Stadtverordnetenversammlung von 15 Jan. 1880.

41 L.B. 00/2216. Auszug aus dem Versammlung Protocol, 22 Juni 1882. As an Obligationanleihe, the bonds' principal and interest payments would be guaranteed by the tax revenues of the city.

42 L.B. 00/2214. Stenographisches Bericht, Sitzung des Stadtverordnetenversammlung von 15 Jan. 1880.

43 L.B. 00/2216. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 20 Dec. 1881. This point was substantiated by City Building Planner (Stadtbaurath) Blankenstein in a later debate, in which he showed that the German Railway Company (Deutsche Eisenbahngeselhchaft) paid a much smaller amount ten years earlier for the same parcels adjoining the train stations. Speculators were commonly accused of profiteering at the expense of public welfare in other municipal reform efforts.

44 L.B. 00/2216. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 29 Dec. 1881. Deputy von Forckenbeck declared that the state government was equally concerned with supplying Berlin and insuring revenue for the railways.

45 Ibid., 12 Jan. 1882.

46 Ibid., 24 Feb. 1881.

47 The city was already planning to build a central slaughterhousein Friederichsberg, near the planned site of the central market hall. Slaughterhouses stood as a distinct issue. Many German cities had them, or were in the process of building them, because meat was quite expensive owing to the small scale of many butchers and to the higher cost of grain feeds during the years of tariff protection. Moreover, central slaughterhouses facilitated safety inspections by the Imperial Health Office (Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamt), which had been created in 1876 by the Federal Interior Ministry (Reichsamt des Innern). Karl-Peter Ellebrock, “Lebensmittelqualität vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Industrielle Produktion und staatliche Gesundheitspolitik” in Durchbruch zum Modernen Massenkonsum, 144.

48 L.B. 00/2216. An addendum to the proposal submitted by the Deputation to the City Assembly on 14 Feb. 1881 contained the figure that 68 million of the 148 million kilograms was transported on urban rail.

49 Ibid. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 24 Feb. 1881, The file also contains a letter dated 30 Mai 1881, from the Magistrat des Reichshaupt- und Residenzamt Wiens. According to information supplied by Viennese officials in response to Berlin's inquiry, the central market hall of Vienna was built at a rail terminus which connected it to the countryside, but it was not connected by rail to peripheral market halls in the city. Nonetheless, Viennese officials contended that railway links to the provinces had boosted consumption of butter and eggs among city residents. Later in the year, members of the Berlin Assembly charged that the central market in Vienna was a financial failure because it did not integrate with rail transport, nor was it part of a retail network. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 20 Dec. 1881.

50 Ibid. Vorlage zur Beschluβfassung, betreffend Einsetzung einer gemischten Deputation zur Vorberathung der Angelegenheit, betreffend die Nutzbarmachung des Stadteisenbah-nuntemehms für die Lebensmittelversorgung der Stadt, debated 14 Feb. 1881.

51 Ibid. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 16. Juni, 1881.

52 Ibid. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 20 Dec. 1881. Deputy Scheiding noted that the construction of Kaiser Wilhelmstrasse had ruined business on Königstrasse. In the current case, Scheiding claimed, the city's plan had not anticipated that vegetables passing through the central market were still more likely to be transported by wagon than by train because so many growers lived within five miles of the city.

53 Ibid. Auszug aus dem Stenographischen Bericht, 29 Dec. 1881.

54 Ibid.

55 L.B. 00–02/1/2212. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin, Verwaltungs-Berichte über die Städtische Markthallen 1888–1917. Overall, the city paid a considerable sum for a capital investment with an uncertain return. Records from 1890 suggest that the costs of erecting the market halls far exceeded the revenues they generated. Four years after the halls opened, the annual sales volumes of several of the halls (let alone the rents from them) were only 10 percent of the initial costs. See below. Note: The total surplus of RM 297,397 was further diminished by 117,369 charged to the maintenance fund (“Erneuerungsfonds zushlieβenden Abschreibungs-summen”), for a net surplus of RM 180,028. (Source: same as Table 1.)

Market Hall Revenues Expenses Surplus Deficit

I 683,181 587,497 95,683 -

II 309,107 250,572 58,534 -

III 124,103 123,224 879 -

IV 147,066 159,049 - 11,983

V 104,676 58,044 46,631 -

VI 142,682 109,841 32,840 -

VII 183,253 145,388 37,865 -

VIII 181,105 144,157 36,948 -

Total 1,875,173 1,577,772 297,397

56 The central hall at Alexanderplatz was the largest and most expensive of the halls, costing RM 5,031,352, or approximately 31 percent of the overall costs of the nine halls. Ibid. The terms of the service agreement with the Stadtbahn stipulated that two trains would be assigned to shipping food between the cetnral market and retail markets each night between 12:30 a.m. and 4:30 a.m

57 Rindt, Erich, “Die Markthallen als Faktor des Berliner Wirtschaftslebens” (Inaug. diss., Friedrich-Wilhelm Universität Berlin, 1928), 109.Google Scholar

58 L.B. 00–02/1/2212. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin, Verwaltungs-Berichte über die Städtische Markthallen 1888–1917. The first annual report covers the dates 1 Apr. 1886–31 Mar. 1887.

59 Ibid. The initial rental contracts in the market halls suggest that large- and small- capital enterprises operated side-by-side. The first 1,400 contracts were fairly evenly split between monthly and annual contracts. In the four retail market halls, dealers from Berlin outnumbered outsiders by six to one. At the central market hall, Berlin firms outnumbered other competitors by only 423 to 257.

60 Landeshauptarchiv Brandenburg 30/77. The Police Presidium confirmed in 1886, at the opening of the market halls, and in 1891, that sales areas were open to everyone (“jedermann”), dealers, merchants, or mediators, whopaid the necessary rental fees to the city.

61 L.B. 00–02/1/2212. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin. Page 4 of the report. Although when appointed in 1875 the commission had four goals (referred to above), three of these goals—a large, efficient means for selling food, protection from the climate, and reduction of transport time—could conceivably fit under the umbrella of “rationalization.”

62 Ibid. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin.

63 Ibid. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin, Verwaltungs-Berichte über die Städtische Markthallen 1888–1917. The first annual report covers the dates 1 Apr. 1886–31 Mar. 1887.

64 Stresemann, Gustav, “Die Entwicklung des Berliner Flaschengeschäfts,” (Inaug. diss., Univ. Leipzig, 1900), 12.Google Scholar

65 L.B. 00–02/1/2212. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin, Verwaltungs-Berichte über die Städtische Markthallen 1888–1917.

66 Eduard Lange, “Die Versorgung der groβstädtischen Bevölkerung mit frischen Nahrungsmitteln,” 9. Some dealers also regretted the loss of the outdoor markets because, according to common belief, daylight induced shoppers, especially women, to buy more, according to Lange. Produce looked fresher and communication between buyers and sellers was easier and more pleasant in a quiet and natural setting.

67 Ibid., 48.

68 L.B. 00–02/1/2212. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin, Verwaltungs-Berichte über die Städtische Markthallen 1888–1917. See also Lange, 9.

69 Rindt, “Die Markthallen als Faktor des Berliner Wirtschaftslebens,” 39. Rindt lists the buyers at the central market as middlemen, independent and hall merchants, store clerks, representatives of department store representatives, canteen superintendents, and cafeteria managers.

70 Ibid. This opinion also surfaced in many of the statements of the shopkeeper movement collected by the municipal and state governments. This condition stemmed in part from the greater amount of public physical labor which occurred in marketplaces and market halls.

71 Ibid., 112. Rindt even claims street-peddling owed its development to the market halls.

72 Ibid., 113. While better food preservation facilities were available, dealers still found it better to sell at a loss rather than to throw away food.

73 Ibid. An ordinance finally banned peddling in streets adjacent to halls in 1898, according to Lange, 54–55.

74 Rindt, “Die Markthallen als Faktor des Berliner Wirtschaftslebens,” 36.

75 This assertion of the market hall administrators is contradicted by documented wholesale food prices for meat and potatoes, which showed no sustained downward trend in the first few years of the market halls' operation. Berlin prices of potatoes jumped in 1888, while meat prices spiked in 1889. See Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsches Reich, 11. Jahrgang 1890 (Berlin, 1890), 123.

76 L.B. 00–02/1/2212. Stadtverordnetenversammlung Berlin. Report for the fiscal year 1989–1990.

77 Ibid. The report does not name which type of farmers suffered from the new system: the most likely victims were the vegetable, dairy, and livestock farmers who lived closest to Berlin, rather than the large grain producers of Prussia.

78 Ibid., 13.

79 See Kocka in Bourgeois Society, 3–39. Analysis of the market halls reform illustrates that Kocka is correct in arguing that even in the period of industrialization Prussian bureaucrats maintained control from above. However, as other recent German historiography has demonstrated, definite progressive trends emerged in the Empire despite the bureaucracy's opposition. For a concise summary, see Retallack, James, Germany in the Age of Kaiser Wilhelm II (New York, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, or, in narrative form, Blackboum, David, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany 1780–1918 (Oxford, 1997).Google Scholar

80 Although the city only rented a handful of viaducts, the business still helped the state, which was having trouble finding renters for the rail viaducts. According to Binger, in 1887, a year after the market halls opened, only 247 out of 453 viaducts available for rent had been leased to businesses. See Binger, “Stadtbahnbögen,” 106.