PowerMaster was a malt liquor which Heileman Brewing Company sought to market to inner-city blacks in the early 1990s. Due to widespread opposition, Heileman ceased its marketing of PowerMaster. This paper begins by exploring the moral objections of moral illusion, moral insensitivity and unfair advantage brought against Heileman’s marketing campaign. Within the current market system, it is argued that none of these criticism was clearly justified. Heileman might plausibly claim it was fulfilling its individual moral responsibilities.

Instead, Heileman’s marketing program must be viewed as part of a group of marketing programs which all targeted inner-city blacks. It is argued that those marketers who target this particular market segment constitute a group which is collectively responsible for the harms imposed by their products on inner-city blacks. This responsibility is reducible neither to individual responsibility nor to a shared responsibility. It constitutes a dimension of moral responsibility to which marketers must pay attention.

The aim of this paper is to create a framework which can serve as a guide to the understanding of organizational ethicality. This is done by linking ethical and organizational theory. Organizational ethicality is about “being” as well as “doing”: relevant ethical theory is therefore both substantive (agent-centred, concerned with the “good”) as well as procedural (act-centred, concerned with the “right” in the sense of the moral or just thing to do). The ethical theories of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jurgen Habermas, as representatives of these two traditions, are mapped onto a framework which characterises organizations as assemblages of practices supported by a climate embedded within an organizational culture. Organizational practice is articulated and given meaning within a discourse of “sensemaking” in which narrative creates space-time links between people and events. Within that same communicative climate practices are evaluated and decisions taken. This theoretical framework is specified in such a way as to highlight the parallels with the ethical theories of MacIntyre, who uses notions of practice, tradition and the narrative unity of moral experience to create an ethical theory of the “good,” and Habermas, who spells out the process of moral argumentation by which consensus on the “just” or “right” is reached. Some possibilities for further research are suggested at the end of the paper.

In Western philosophy, the study of human psychology and of ethics has been intertwined since before the time of Plato. Plato relies on Greek psychology’s account of the three parts of the soul—the rational, the appetitive and the spirited, and describes the just person and just state as ones who align those parts into a harmonious whole. A balanced person, for Plato, is what we would call an ethical person. But if Plato were alive today, he would be accused of muddling the normative and the descriptive, or of deriving what ought to be from what is, an objection first made famous by David Hume in the 17th century and reiterated by G. E. Moore in the early twentieth century.

It has been a quarter century since issues of trust began attracting the attention of those concerned with business and the management of business (cf. Zand). During the quarter century prior to that point, trust was particularly the concern of psychologists and those focused on issues of international security and relations between the superpowers. It is ironic, then, that at a time when there is increased trust between the superpowers, there seems to be less trust by many within and between businesses. Downsizing, mergers, outsourcing, and reengineering have led to mistrust by many employees of the business for which they work (or worked). Dangerous products, invasive marketing, and efforts to pressure people to agree to unneeded repairs have fostered mistrust between customers and businesses. Takeovers, leveraged buyouts and corporate espionage have fostered mistrust among businesses.

And yet the importance of trust within and between business organizations, both nationally and internationally, is increasingly recognized. Trust is said not only to reduce transaction costs, make possible the sharing of sensitive information, permit joint projects of various kinds, but also to provide a basis for expanded moral relations in business. Indeed, many (such as Gewirth and Hosmer) have claimed that ethics and trust are bound up together. One CEO has even claimed that “ethics is simply and ultimately a matter of trust. People act in their economic self-interest. But a system based on that fact must also be grounded on mutual trust, among individuals and among organizations” (Loucks, 1989: 55).

In light of these apparently conflicting movements of both extensive mistrust and expanding trust, as well as the strong claims made on behalf of trust, it is not surprising that trust has become an important topic for those studying business and its values.

This paper examines recent communitarian writing about the market. Much of this work explains the loss of community in our times as a result of the expansion of the market and market values. As the market has invaded other domains, such as family and neighborhood, relationships there have become infected by the instability and transience that characterize market relations. Central to this critique of the market is the view that the market is unable to sustain lasting commitments. This paper tests this hypothesis by examining the fate of the family—the paradigmatic case of commitment—in three separate historical periods when market or commercial values were especially dominant. It then extends the analysis to two other component institutions of community—voluntary and charitable activities. Finally, it examines institutions where so-called market values should presumably hold unchallenged sway, namely in the work place and the marketplace. The paper finds that communitarian values appear to thrive in market society. Instead of being a juggernaut the market may be an endangered species.

Most of the infrequent contacts between CEO’s and philosophy professors take place on airplanes. These contacts take the form of exchanges of life-stories between seatmates, exchanges which mitigate the boredom of the flight. Such exchanges provide one of the few ways in which inhabitants of the world of business and inhabitants of the academy get a sense of what the other is doing.

Professors who work in fast-breaking fields like molecular biology or neopragmatist philosophy are always flying off to conferences in places like Sao Paulo, Taipei or Vienna. Our trans-oceanic flights are usually in economy class, but we nevertheless have our reward. When we return home we find that the airlines have sent us upgrade certificates for domestic air travel. This means that we can sometimes go first class to conferences in places like Los Angeles or Seattle. We thus get to sit next to richer and more important people.

The three leading normative theories of business ethics are the stockholder theory, the stakeholder theory, and the social contract theory. Currently, the stockholder theory is somewhat out of favor with many members of the business ethics community. The stakeholder theory, in contrast, is widely accepted, and the social contract theory appears to be gaining increasing adherents. In this article, I undertake a critical review of the supporting arguments for each of the theories, and argue that the stockholder theory is neither as outdated nor as flawed as it is sometimes made to seem and that there are significant problems with the grounding of both the stakeholder and social contract theory. I conclude by suggesting that a truly adequate normative theory of business ethics must ultimately be grounded in individual consent.

Professor Ian Maitland advances a version of utilitarianism, constrained by Robert Nozick’s minimal state, that finds no connection between the pervasiveness of “market values,” which he gamely pursues, and the kind of problems that dominate our social scene. In his judgment, the prevailing tendency towards community or communitarian ends needlessly obstructs freedom, the overriding value of the libertarian-minimal state. When coupled with wrongheaded and perverse policies, communitarianism shackles the free market with crippling inefficiencies. This paper will interrogate Maitland’s characterization of communitarianism, challenge his view that traditional values can be instrumentalized without harming community, and paint a more plausible and complex picture of the communitarian tendency.

In this essay, we argue that trust is a dynamic emotional relationship which entails responsibility. Trust is not a social substance, a medium, or a mysterious entity but rather a set of social practices, defined by our choices, to trust or not to trust. We discuss the differences and the relationship between trust and trustworthiness, and we distinguish several different kinds or “levels” of trust, simple trust, basic trust, “blind” trust, and authentic trust. We then argue that trust as an emotional practice, can be “willful,” voluntary and a matter of personal responsibility.

Contemporary marketing is commonly characterized by the marketing concept which enjoins marketers to determine the wants and needs of customers and then to try to satisfy them. This view is standardly developed, not surprisingly, in terms of normal or ordinary consumers. Much less frequently is attention given to the vulnerable customers whom marketers also (and increasingly) target. Though marketing to normal consumers raises many moral questions, marketing to the vulnerable also raises many moral questions which are deserving of greater attention.

This paper has three objectives. First, it explores the notion of vulnerability which a target audience might (or might not) have. I argue that we must distinguish those who are specially vulnerable from normal individuals, as well as the susceptible and the disadvantaged - two other groups often distinguished in marketing literature. Second, I contend that marketing to the specially vulnerable requires that marketing campaigns be designed to ensure that these individuals are not treated unfairly, and thus possibly harmed. Third, I maintain that marketing programs which violate this preceding injunction are unethical or unscrupulous whether or not those targeted are harmed in some further manner. Accordingly, social control over marketing to the vulnerable cannot simply look to consumer injury as the measure of unfair treatment of the vulnerable.

I discuss the characters Don Quixote and Sancho Panza and their relationship in order to understand better the place of idealistic theory and realistic practice in business ethics. The realism of Sancho Panza is required to made the idealism of Don Quixote effective. Indeed, the interaction and development of these characters can serve as a model for both the effective communication between and blending of the idealistic moral theoretician and the practical businessperson. Specifically, I argue that a quixotified Sancho Panza, as a combination of theoretical idealism and practical realism, is necessary for managerial statesmanship. I first consider the position that this concept is unrealistic. In the final section, however, I show that a number of leadership and business theorists believe that managerial statesmanship requires a quixotified Sancho Panza. I also consider the question, what helps to make a quixotic vision for business ethical, and what is its content?

This essay examines how normative theories of enterprise can be strengthened by incorporating the empirical study of motivation into the theory-development process. The link between moral conduct and motivation in the literature is reviewed, the framework for Motivational Appeal Analysis introduced and applied, and implications for theory and research are discussed.

Ignited in this and other countries by the rapid rise of the modem corporation to a position of strategic importance, both nationally and internationally, an intense debate continues today unabated. At the heart of the debate is a fundamental question: What role should the modern corporation play in a free society? And, as corporations become increasingly multinational, the fundamental question might more accurately be stated as a question about the role the multinational corporation should play in a free society, indeed, in the world. This question, I believe, should provide the orientation for research inquiries in Business Ethics and Business and Society.

Within the business community in the U.S., two dominant responses to the fundamental question emerged quite early in the century, responses which have been characterized as the Classical and Managerial business ideologies. Approaching the 21st century, these remain the two major alternatives, reflecting not merely the competing ideological frameworks of the business community, but of the larger society in the U.S. as well. That these constitute the dominant alternatives is extremely regrettable, even dangerous, for, as I have argued elsewhere, both are seriously inadequate.

This article defines and analyzes the nature of a trust relation. It specifically examines the internal and external morality of trust relations and the ethical limits of those relations. It examines both the ends pursued by trust relations as well as the means by which trust is developed. It shows that the ends need to be evaluated by traditional ethical theories, while the ethical constraints of the trust process depend upon the specific bases of trust. In addition, the consequences of the trust process differ in their impact on the trustor and third parties. Despite the popularity of trust in the literature, this study recommends caution in the use of trust as an ethical basis for economic organization. The optimal form of trust, although still subject to limitations, is fairness-based trust.

Psychological forces in play across individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis increase the likelihood that people in business organizations will engage in misconduct. Therefore, it is argued, we must turn our attention from dominant normative and empirical trends in business ethics, which revolve around boundaries and constraints, and instead concentrate on methods for promoting ethical behavior in practice, exploiting psychological forces conducive to ethical conduct. This calls for a better understanding of how organizations and their inhabitants function, and, in turn, it points to pragmatic solutions. Ethical conduct can be promoted by (1) normatively justifying vivid aims worthy of pursuit alongside economic objectives, and (2) empirically identifying the conditions and practices that advance those aims in firms. This approach challenges us to bring empirical and normative inquiry together—in ways unsettling to both. It pushes us to move beyond an empirical preoccupation with decision making and judgment, and it requires us to cope with political liberalism’s legitimate qualms about discussions of the good.

This article adds to the discussion of the legitimation of stakeholding, by studying the implications of investing financial assets, years of labor, community resources, or other such scarce goods in a corporation. It attempts to respond to those who argue that it is not possible for all stakeholders to be effectively represented in corporate governance and that if they were, this would undermine the well-being of the corporation.

The specific purpose of this introductory paper is to explicitly introduce readers to some of the important Biblical, Talmudic, and post-Talmudic texts which deal with business ethics. As the discussion will show, Judaism’s traditional texts treat an amazing variety of issues emphasizing responsibilities in the business context. These texts are both legalistic and aspirational in character. The theme of this study is that an authentic Jewish business ethics needs to grow out of an understanding of the needs of modern, complex economies but need not accept the status quo as binding. Jewish business ethics texts provide rules of behavior, but more importantly, the texts reveal a vision encouraging us to incorporate the highest human and spiritual ideals into the common world of business.

The second section of the paper emphasizes that in order to develop Jewish business ethics, especially (but not exclusively) at the level of the organization, models of aspiration will of necessity play an integral role. A Jewish business ethics which conceptualizes Judaism as merely a set of legal rules is bound to failure. A key conclusion of this section is that Jewish business ethics needs to continue to selfconsciously promote models of aspirations, as well as rely on fixed legal norms.

Finally, the third section of the paper examines a specific corporate policy (no smoking) in light of a Jewish business ethics.