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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2015
This book has two purposes: first, to state what it means to have a right; and second, to state which rights human beings have. Because Thomson believes that the first question is prior to the second, she begins by asking why it is morally significant that human beings have rights. Her answer to this question is that rights are a kind of moral constraint such that, other things being equal, one's rights ought to be accorded. As to the second question, Thomson distinguishes rights human beings have qua human beings from rights they have by participating in private transactions or living under a legal system. The former category includes the right not to be killed or harmed; the latter category includes rights related to promise keeping and private property. By explaining what in general makes the attribution of a human or social right true, Thomson seeks to provide a foundation for the notion that the interests of human beings are worthy of respect.
1 Judith, Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 15.Google Scholar
2 Ibid., p. 16.
3 Ibid. Thomson is not concerned with refuting the Fact-Value thesis. That thesis provides “that no statement of fact entails any moral judgment.” Ibid. It should be noted that this thesis has been called into question. See Alan, Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 57, 159, 160-61, 354–55.Google Scholar
4 It may be recalled that David Hume made a similar argument that all people share in common sentiments as to what is right and wrong. See David, Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Freeman, E. (LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1966), p. 2.Google ScholarContra Gewirth, pp. 6, 8-9.
5 See generally ibid., ch. 1. Note, that while many philosophers treat rights as claims humans can make qua human (Gewirth, Feinberg), not every philosopher does so. Maclntyre, McCloskey and Nozick treat rights as entitlements which presuppose “a socially established set of rules.”
6 Ibid., p. 56-60. Here, Thomson is following Carl, Wellman, “A New Conception of Rights,” in Human Rights, eds. Kamenka, E. and Tay, A.E.S. (London: Edward Arnold and New York: St. Martin Press, 1978).Google Scholar
7 Ibid., pp. 61-89.
8 Ibid., p. 76.
9 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
10 Ibid., p. 85.
11 Ibid., p 114.
12 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
13 Ibid., p. 124.
14 Ibid., p 146.
15 Ibid., p. 148.
16 Ibid., p. 149.
17 Ibid., p. 150.
18 Ibid., p. 151.
19 Ibid., pp. 152-53.
20 Ibid., p. 162. Here, I would note that some moral theorists (including Gewirth) argue that a person has a positive right to be saved provided there is no comparable cost to another. See Gewirth, pp. 223, 229. Contra Jan, Narveson, “Negative and Positive Rights in Gewirth’s Reason and Morality,” in Gewirth s Ethical Rationalism, ed. Regis, E. Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 96–107;Google Scholarsee also E. Mack, “Deontologism, Negative Causation, and the Duty to Rescue,” in ibid., pp. 147-66. Alan Gewirth, “Reply to the Critics,” in ibid., pp. 233-41; see also Deryck, Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), ch. 10.Google Scholar
21 Thomas, p. 166.
22 See John, Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 136–142.Google Scholar
23 The approach I have in mind would be consistent with an application of the doctrine of double-effect to the trolley car situation.
24 Thomas, p. 205.
25 Ibid., p. 226.
26 Ibid., p. 228.
27 Ibid., pp. 258-259. For an argument for not accepting belief-mediated distress in the privacy area see Vincent, J. Samar, The Right to Privacy: Gays, Lesbians, and the Constitution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 70-71, 111–112.Google Scholar For a more general discussion of the relation of offense to the harm principle see Joel, Feinberg, Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 2. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).Google Scholar
28 Thomas, p. 260.
29 See Samar, pp. 99-101.
30 See Gerald, Dworkin, “Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts,” in Paternalism, ed. Sartorius, R. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 105–112.Google Scholar
31 Thomas, p. 289.
32 Ibid., p. 292; see also Peter, S. Wenz, Abortion Rights as Religious Freedom (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992)Google Scholar (arguing that there is a constitutional right to abortion based on religious freedom at least until the fetus becomes viable); Samar, pp. 172-81, (arguing that a fetus is not an agent in the relevant sense); Ronald Dworkin, “The Great Abortion Case,” the New York Review of Books, June 29, 1989, pp. 49-54 (arguing that a consistent application of existing law would not treat the fetus as a person). See Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives, eds. Garfield, J. and Hennessey, P. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984)Google Scholar (providing a broad set of articles on abortion).
33 Thomas, pp. 296-97, 320.
34 Ibid., pp. 327, 333.