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A Responsive Approach to Organizational Misconduct: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and the Reduction of Reoffense

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Stephanie Bertels ,
Michael Cody  and
Simon Pek
Stephanie Bertels
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
Michael Cody
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
Simon Pek
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
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Abstract:

In this article, we examine how regulators, prosecutors, and courts might support and encourage the efforts of organizations to not only reintegrate after misconduct but also to improve their conduct in a way that reduces their likelihood of re-offense (rehabilitation). We explore a novel experiment in creative sentencing in Alberta Canada that aimed to try to change the behaviour of an industry by publicly airing the root causes of a failure of one the industry’s leaders. Drawing on this case and prior work, we articulate a model for a responsive and restorative approach to organizational misconduct that balances the punitive role of regulators and courts with new roles in supporting and overseeing rehabilitation.

Keywords

misconductrehabilitationreintegrationrestorative justiceregulatorsresponsive regulation
Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 343 - 370
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 2014

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