No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2015
1 Autonomy and Intervention: Parentalism in the Caring Life, p. 62.
2 Ibid., p. 76. Kultgen observes that, in actual cases one must also consider the goods and harms for the agent, the recipient, bystanders and anyone else who might be affected. Of course, once we start doing that, however, it is not clear that acts, if justified, are cases of justified paternalism since it is then no longer clear that they are strictly speaking acts of pure (rather than impure) paternalism. For more on the distinction between pure and impure paternalism, see John, Kleinig, Paternalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 12.Google Scholar
3 Ibid., p. 80.
4 Ibid., p. 127.
5 Ibid., p. 143.
6 Ibid., p. 143.
7 Ibid., p. 143.
8 Ibid., pp. 143-44.
9 Ibid., p. 67.
10 Ibid. p. 201.
11 Ibid., p. 162.
12 Ibid., p. 165.
13 For more on this model see Michael, BaylesProfessional Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981).Google Scholar
14 Ibid., p. 196. Michael, Bayles argues, in Professional Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981),Google Scholar that professionals have several sorts of obligations to clients, involving honesty, candor (which requires complete disclosure), competence, diligence, loyalty and fairness. But since Kultgen allows that we can exploit our position of dominance to further paternalistic objectives, these obligations may clearly be overridden.
15 Ibid., p. 191.
16 Ibid., p. 193.
17 There are no examples given of where professional parentalism might be justified. In fact there are really only two examples discussed (in more than an off-hand way) throughout the entire book — one about how a parent might be justified in intervening with her child's life and another example where a friend may be justified in having a friend committed. In both cases, that paternalism is justified is far from clear.
18 It is important to focus on the well-being of the mother rather than the child in this case. For this to be a case of pure rather than impure paternalism it must be justified in terms of the benefits to the person being interfered with, rather than a third party. For more on the pure/impure distinction (or mixed/unmixed distinction) see, for instance, John, Kleinig, Paternalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 12.Google Scholar
19 Kultgen seems to acknowledge something like this point in some ways, for instance, his chapter divisions suggest that he sees the relevance of different relations to cases of parentalism. Yet, none of this is explicitly built into his principle of Justified Paternalism (PP) or decision-procedures for determining whether paternalism is justified.
20 Moreover, taking family interactions as the model of just interactions has been wisely criticized, for instance, by Susan, OkinJustice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).Google Scholar
21 Ibid., p. 51.
22 Ibid., p. 51.
23 Ibid., p. 51.
24 Ibid., p. 52.
25 Ibid., p. 52. As Kultgen also observes, even ideal parenting exercises only “a temporary and strictly circumscribed power over the child for its own good, and it relinquishes it just as soon as the child can take it on itself,” pp. 52-53.
26 (F1) and (F2) alone might be sufficient; or perhaps (F1), (F2) and (F4) would be. (F1)-(F4) all being satisfied might be overkill from a justificatory standpoint.
27 My account seems to cut across the strong/weak or soft/hard paternalism distinction, though it lines up with the positive/negative paternalism distinction.
According to Dworkin, soft paternalism is a view according to which paternalism is justified only if the agent is not competent, whereas hard paternalism is a view such that paternalism is sometimes justified for fully competent agents performing fully voluntary actions. According to Kleinig, “X acts toward Y in a positively paternalistic fashion to the extent that X, in order to secure some positive benefit for Y, imposes upon Y. If, however, X's rationale for imposing upon Y is to protect Y from (further) harm or to restore Y from some harmful condition, then to that extent, X acts in a negatively paternalistic fashion” (p. 14, Paternalism). For more on these distinctions see, for instance, Gerald, Dworkin, “Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts”, in Rolf, Sartorius, ed., Paternalism (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983), p. 105 and p. 107,Google Scholar or John, KleinigPaternalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 8 and p. 14.Google Scholar
Though others draw conceptual distinctions between (say) positive and negative paternalism (or capture the same idea with different distinctions), I have not seen an account of justified paternalism which tries to give separate accounts of the conditions for justified paternalism along these lines, as articulated in my Appropriate Care View.
28 Moreover, manipulating others for the sake of increasing their expected well-being hardly fosters a caring community in which mutual respect, trust and care can flourish.
29 Government paternalism may also be justified on grounds quite different from the person to person case, for instance, inefficiency if every consumer is to be solely responsible for all information gathering and processing, the undesirable consequences to third parties of a “caveat emptor” position, and so forth.
30 It is not obviously the case that great relations between Sally and her child are unlikely to come about unless Bill cuts her work schedule. It is not obvious that Sam is unlikely to be self-actualized unless Barbara dupes her into buying the house. In both cases P is not the agent of last resort (so to speak), the agent charged with special responsibilities to ensure benefits of a particular sort are bestowed.
31 According to the anti-paternalist view in business, the default mode is “stay out of it.” The guiding slogan would be “caveat emptor/employee” and “it's every persons duty to look after him or herself.”
32 Henry, Shue, “Exporting Hazards” in Peter, Brown and Henry, Shue, eds., Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littelfield, 1981), p. 124.Google Scholar
33 Paternalism may be justified for far less dire harms as well. Where to draw the line may be somewhat problematic, however, the fact that we are able to identify some cases is all that is needed here.
34 The roles occupied by employers, distributors, salespersons, manufacturers, advertisers, co-workers and so forth cannot be construed as professional roles without making a mockery of professional roles and obligations.
35 The argument is that greater specialist knowledge can create obligations to protect others from harm in virtue of the principle of nonmaleficence, see George, Brockway, “Limited Paternalism and the Salesperson: A Reconsideration”, The Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 12 (1993), pp. 275–79.Google Scholar
36 See David, Holley, “A Moral Evaluation of Sales Practices,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, vol. 5 (1987).Google Scholar
37 Ibid.
38 See Holley for what counts as meeting each of the conditions acceptability.
39 I am grateful for good discussions with Jan Crosthwaite, Tim Dare, Christine Swanton, Martin Wilkinson, and Tamara Zutlevics on related topics.