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Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory, Managerial Practice, and the General Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Shareholders

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Richard Marens  and
Andrew Wicks
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Abstract:

Stakeholder theorists have generally misunderstood the nature and ramifications of the fiduciary responsibilities that corporate directors owe their stockholders. This fiduciary duty requires the exercise of care, loyalty, and honesty with regard to the financial interests of stockholders. Such obligations do not conflict with the normative goals of stakeholder theory, nor, after a century of case law that includes Dodge Bros. v. Ford, do fiduciary responsibilities owed shareholders prevent managerial policies that are generous or sensitive to other corporate stakeholders. The common law recognizes a multitude of legal relationships between various corporate constituents, and fiduciary duties are only a subset of the obligations that arise from these relationships. This article argues that statute and case law can bring comparable legal protection to constituents other than stockholders, and suggests ways that these protections might be further strengthened. Implications for management education are also discussed.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , April 1999 , pp. 273 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1999

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