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Cognitive Pathology and Moral Judgment in Managers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Eleonora Curlo  and
Alan Strudler
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Abstract:

We examine the moral and managerial significance of some empirical studies in cognitive psychology. We suggest that these results may plausibly be interpreted as expressing deontological commitments of experimental subjects, even though psychologists who discuss the results seem to suppose that they show that people are irrational consequentialists. We argue that the plausibility of our interpretation suggests how managers who wish to take seriously entrenched social views on morality might best craft corporate policy on corporate responsibility, and we suggest that the form of argument we employ may be regarded as a kind of appeal to reflective equilibrium.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , October 1997 , pp. 27 - 39
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1997

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