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Professional Autonomy: A Framework for Empirical Research1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Michael Davis
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Abstract

Employed professionals (e.g., accountants or engineers)—and those who study them—sometimes claim that their status as employees denies them the “autonomy” necessary to be “true professionals.” Is this a conceptual claim or an empirical claim? How might it be proved or disproved? This paper draws on recent work on autonomy to try to answer these questions. In the course of doing that, it identifies three literatures concerned with autonomy and suggests an approach bringing them together in a way likely to be useful both to philosophers interested in the concept and to social scientists interested in studying autonomy in the workplace.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , October 1996 , pp. 441 - 460
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1996

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Footnotes

1

One version or another of this paper was read at IIT's Philosophy Colloquium, February 8, 1995; to the Philosophy Department of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, March 23, 1995; and as a GTE Lecture at Purdue University-Calumet, April 13, 1995. I should like to thank those present, as well as Kenneth Kipnis and Mike Rabins, for helpful comments. I should also like to thank the National Science Foundation for grant SBR-9320166 under which this paper was written.

References

Notes

2 Edwin, Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Research University, 1971), p. 5.Google Scholar

3 Gerald, Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University press, 1988), p. 22.Google Scholar

4 Thomas, Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1 (Winter 1972), pp. 204–26;Google ScholarAdina, Schwartz, “Autonomy in the Workplace,” in Just Business: New Introductory Essays in Business Ethics, ed. Tom, Regan (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 129–66;Google ScholarJoseph, Raz, “Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,” in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence ofH. L A. Hart, ed. Ruth, Gavison (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 313–33;Google ScholarStanley, I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), esp. Ch. 8 and 9;Google Scholar and Diana, T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

5 John, Christman, ed., “Introduction,” The Inner Citadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 9.Google Scholar For an historical conception Christman missed, see Charles, Taylor, “What's Wrong with Negative Freedom,” in Alan, Ryan, ed., The Idea of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 175–93.Google Scholar

6 Michael, Davis, “Brandt on Autonomy,” in Rationality and Rule-Utilitarianism, ed. Brad, Hooker (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 51–65;Google Scholar and Irving, Thalberg, “Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 8 (June 1978), pp. 211–26.Google Scholar But the most famous hypothetical conception of autonomy is certainly Kant's. For Kant, autonomy is acting in accordance with those maxims one can (without contradiction) will to be universal laws. Immanuel, Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2d., edited by Lewis, White Beck (New York: Macmillan/Library of the Liberal Arts, 1990), pp. 63–73)Google Scholar One need not actually will the maxim to be a universal law. It is enough that one could.

7 Gerald, Dworkin, “Concept of Autonomy,” in Science and Ethics, Rudolph, Haller, ed. (Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, 1981), pp. 203–213.Google ScholarHarry, G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68 (January 1971), pp. 5–20.Google Scholar

8 Robert, Young, “Autonomy and the Inner Self,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 17 (January 1980), pp. 35–43.Google Scholar

9 Kenneth, Kipnis, “Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Professions,” in Profits and Professions: Essays in Business and Professional Ethics, ed. by Wade, L. Robinson, Michael, Pritchard, and Joseph, Ellin (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983), p. 16.Google Scholar

10 Arlene, Kaplan Daniels, “How Free Should Professions Be?” in The Professions and Their Prospects, edited by Eliot, Freidson (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 39.Google Scholar

11 Actually, it probably would be better to say “as Canada and Mexico try to do.” I have been told by officers of engineering societies in both Canada and Mexico that many engineers in both countries who work in large companies are in fact unlicensed. They will get into trouble if they are publicly identified as an engineer (for example, in a newspaper article, during a TV interview, or even on company letterhead), but not otherwise. So, the contrast with U.S. practice is not nearly as sharp as it has seemed (and will probably become less sharp as the three countries move toward economic union).

12 Pavlovic, K. R., “Autonomy and Obligation: Is there an Engineering Ethics?,” in Ethical Problems in Engineering, 2nd ed., vol. I, ed. by Albert, Flores (Troy, NY: Center for the Study of the Human Dimensions of Science and Technology, 1980), p. 90.Google Scholar

13 Paul, F. Camenisch, Grounding Professional Ethics in a Pluralistic Society (New York: Haven, 1983), p. 30.Google Scholar

14 Kipnis, p. 16.

15 Mike, W. Martin, “Professional Autonomy and Employers’ Authority,” in Profits and Professions: Essays in Business and Professional Ethics, ed. by Wade, L. Robinson, Michael, Pritchard, and Joseph, Ellin (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983), pp. 265–73;Google Scholar Schwartz, “Autonomy in the Workplace;” and Heinz, C. Luegenbiehl, “Computer Professionals: Moral Autonomy and a Code of Ethics,” Journal of Systems Software, vol. 17 (1992), pp. 61–68.Google Scholar

16 Layton, p. 7. Compare Magali Sarfatti, Larsen, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), for example, p. 30:Google Scholar “The analysis of engineering shows, in turn, that autonomy in defining the content of work—or the control over new cognitive areas—does not by itself compensate for the structural subordination of the professional market. The subordination of the engineer's role submits the selection of the technical problem and the criteria that are brought to bear in its solution, at least partially, to hetero-nomous considerations. Autonomy is chiefly gained outside the professional role, by acceding to positions of command or responsibility in the dominant market.”

17 Daniel, Hovey Calhoun, The American Civil Engineer (Cambridge, MA: Technology Press-MIT, 1960), esp. pp. 182–99.Google Scholar

18 Compare, StephenO'Connor, J. and Joyce, A. Lanning, “The End of Autonomy? Reflections on the Postprofessional Physician,” Health Care Management Review, vol. 17 (Winter 1992), pp. 63–72;Google ScholarGeorge, J. Agich, “Rationing Professional Autonomy,” Law, Medicine & Health Care, vol. 18 (Spring-Summer, 1990), pp. 77–84;Google Scholar and John, Child and Janet, Fulk, “Maintenance of Occupational Control: The Case of Professions,” Work and Occupations, vol. 9 (May 1982), pp. 155–92.Google Scholar

19 Robert, Perrucci and Joel, E. Gerstl, Professions without Community: Engineers in American Society (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 119.Google Scholar

20 Daniel Sherman, J., “Technical Supervision and Turnover Among Engineers and Technicians: Influencing Factors in the Work Environment,” Group and Organization Studies, vol. 14 (December 1989), pp. 411–21;CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Steven, P. Feldman, “The Broken Wheel: The Inseparability of Autonomy and Control in Innovation within Organizations,” Journal of Management Studies, vol. 26 (March 1989), pp. 83–102;Google Scholar and Bernard, Rosenbaum, “Leading Today's Professionals,” Research-Technology Management (March-April 1991), pp. 30–35.Google Scholar

21 Gene, F. Brady, Ben, B. Judd, and Setrak, Javian, “The Dimensionality of Work Autonomy Revisited,” Human Relations, vol. 43 (1990), pp. 1219–1228,Google Scholar p. 1220; Paul, E. Spector, “Perceived Control by Employees: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Concerning Autonomy and Participation at Work,” Human Relations, vol. 39 (November 1986), pp. 1005–1015,Google Scholar p. 1006; Jiing-Lih, Farh and Scott, W. E. Jr., “The Experimental Effects of ‘Autonomy’ on Performance and Self-Reports of Satisfaction,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, vol. 31 (1983), pp. 203-22, p. 205;Google ScholarPatrick, B. Forsyth and Thomas, J. Danisiewicz, “Toward a Theory of Professionalization,” Work and Occupation, vol. 12 (February 1985), pp. 59–76,Google Scholar p. 60; Peter, Meiksins, “Science in the Labor Process: Engineers as Workers,” in Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism, ed. Charles, Derber (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1982), pp. 121-40, p. 131:Google Scholar and even Layton, p. 5.

22 Martin, “Professional Autonomy and Employers’ Authority,” is good on this point.

23 Michael, Davis, “Technical Decisions: Time to rethink the Engineer's Responsibilities?,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, vol. 11 (Fall-Winter 1992), pp. 41–55;Google Scholar or Michael, Davis, “Ordinary Technical Decision-Making: An Empirical Investigation,” in James, A. Jaska and Michael, S. Pritchard, eds., Communication in High Risk Technologies: Global and Local Concerns (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1995),Google Scholar forthcoming.

24 I have defended this analysis of profession in greater detail in a number of articles including: “The Moral Authority of a Professional Code,” NOMOS, vol. 29 (1987), pp. 302-37; “The Use of Professions,” Business Economics, vol. 22 (October 1987), pp. 5-10; “Vocational Teachers, Confidentiality, and Professional Ethics,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 11-20; “Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First,” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (Summer 1988), pp. 352-66; “Thinking Like an Engineer: The Place of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of a Profession,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 20 (Spring 1991), pp. 150-67; “Do Cops Need a Code of Ethics?,” Criminal Justice Ethics, vol. 10 (Summer/Fall 1991), pp. 14-28; “Treating Patients with Infectious Diseases: An Essay in the Ethics of Dentistry,” Professional Ethics, vol. 2 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 51-65; and “The State's Dr. Death: What's Unethical about Physicians Helping at Executions?” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 21 (Spring 1995), pp. 31-60.

25 I say “typically” because a few professions—or quasi-professions—have an impersonal ideal. For example, science, at least on some conceptions, serves no client, employer, or public but only the truth. What distinguishes professions from other occupations is not service to others as such but a moral ideal, defensible in part by the way serving it benefits others. The truth of science, though an impersonal object of service, remains a morally good object of service (just as justice, health, and safety are) because the truths of science serve us all, whether practically (as many of physics, chemistry, and biology do) or just intellectually (as many of those of astronomy, etymology, and anthropology do).

26 For someone who rejects “moral permissibility” as a condition altogether (reducing profession to mere “competence”), see, John T. Sanders, “Honor Among Thieves: Some Reflections on Professional Codes of Ethics,” Professional Ethics, vol. 2 (Fall\Winter 1993), pp. 83-103. If the article's title is not an argument against equating mere competence with profession, the article's suggestion that we consider the mafia to be a prototypical profession should be.

27 We are, of course, assuming that this “anyone” includes only sane adults of at least ordinary intelligence, in other words, the sort of people professions typically admit to practice.

28 This question has its counterpart in political philosophy: Can one owe allegiance to law and still be morally autonomous? For a sample of the arguments against consistency between legal obligation and moral autonomy, see Robert, Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), esp. pp. 3–19).Google Scholar While our question is easier to deal with than the political—because membership in a profession is voluntary in a way subjection to law is not—it is worth noting that one major approach to making legal obligation and autonomy consistent is social contract theory, which tries to understand subjection to law as if it were as voluntary as membership in a profession. The real voluntariness of professions does, however, change significantly what is necessary to preserve autonomy. Compare the solution I offer here with my response to Wolff, Michael, Davis, “Avoiding the Voter's Paradox Democratically,” Theory and Decision, vol. 5 (October 1974), pp. 295–311.Google Scholar

29 Indeed, agent-centered conceptions probably have a different purpose in view, to distinguish those who have a right to autonomy we are bound to respect from those who have no such right. A right to autonomy is, typically, a right to have primarily self-regarding decisions respected whatever their apparent merit. It is not surprising then that agent-centered conceptions do not suit our purposes; the decisions of professionals are, typically, not primarily self-regarding (and are not supposed to be). Compare, Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, p. 19:Google Scholar “I am not trying to analyze the notion of autonomous acts.”

30 Kant scholars may object that I am being unfair to Kant. They might be right. Kant has a notion of “contradiction with a system of nature,” which may provide a substantive test. Kant, p. 39. I decline to use Kant here because so many have found this notion too obscure to be helpful and because it seems less demanding than the test I propose.

31 For a defense of the equation of rationality with autonomy, see Davis, “Brandt on Autonomy” (and the work of Richard Brandt there cited).

32 Someone who objects to acting according to a standard she believes inconsistent with, or just independent of, service to the moral ideal in question does not object to acting as a member of the profession. Instead, she objects, as a member of the profession, to the claim that acting as a member of the profession includes that.

33 Layton, p. 5.

34 Layton, p. 5.

35 We can now offer an analogous analysis of moral autonomy: moral autonomy consists in being able to do as morality requires (where that ability includes both having the appropriate desires and having the capacity to act on them). So, one can both submit to law and be morally autonomous, so long as the law does not require anything morality forbids. Interestingly, this analysis of moral autonomy makes the relationship between moral and personal autonomy hard to sort out. Do I, for example, have personal autonomy whenever I can act as morality requires or must I have other capacities as well (such as, say, the ability to look after my own interests)?