Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T04:23:29.172Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Once Bitten: Defection And Reconciliation In A Cooperative Enterprise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Abstract:

Business negotiations often involve cooperative arrangements. Sometimes one party will renege on a cooperative enterprise for short-term opportunistic gain. There is a common assumption that such behavior necessarily leads to a spiral of mutual antagonism. We use some of the philosophical literature to frame general research questions and identify relevant variables in dealing with defection. We then describe an experimental approach for examining the possibility of reconciliation and discuss the results of one such experiment where participants were the victims of defection. In contrast to the initial assumptions we found that many participants were willing to reconcile, and that penance conditions, when demanded, were less stringent than expected. We suggest that these findings warrant further study and have implications for business dealings.

Very little can be learnt about [retribution] from Aristotle’s Politics or his three ethics. In modern ethico-political concepts of justice (in Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel), the problem of retribution appears in conjunction with other problems and is not of central importance.—Agnes Heller

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aesop’s Fables. Trans. Townsend, G.Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968.Google Scholar
Axelrod, R.The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.Google Scholar
Bottom, W.; Gibson, K.; Daniels, S.; and Murnighan, J. K.Rebuilding Relationships: Defection, Repentance, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation.” Unpublished Manuscript, 1996.Google Scholar
Cialdini, R.Influence: Science and Practice. New York: Harper Collins, 1993.Google Scholar
Colman, A., ed. Cooperation and Competition in Humans and Animals. Wokingham, UK: Van Nostrand Reihold, 1982.Google Scholar
De Waal, F.Peacemaking among Primates. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989.Google Scholar
Farrell, J. and Gibbons, R.Cheap talk with two audiences.” American Economic Review, 79 (1988).Google Scholar
Fisher, R. and Brown, S.Getting Together. New York: Penguin, 1988.Google Scholar
Gambetto, D., ed. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.Google Scholar
Hall, L., ed. Negotiation. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1993.Google Scholar
Heller, A.Beyond Justice. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.Google Scholar
Hume, David. Treatise on Human Nature. New York: Dent Everyman, 1911.Google Scholar
Kahn, L., and Murnighan, J. K.A general experiment on bargaining in demand games with outside options.” American Economic Review 83 (1993).Google Scholar
Kant, I.Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. Trans. Ellington, J.Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983.Google Scholar
Lang, B.Forgiveness.” American Philosophical Quarterly 31, no. 2 (1994).Google Scholar
Locke, John. Second Treatise of Civil Government. Chicago: Gateway Press, 1955.Google Scholar
Luce, R. D., and Raiffa, H.Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley, 1957.Google Scholar
Murphy, J. and Hampton, J.Forgiveness and Mercy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.Google Scholar
North, J.Wrongdoing and Forgiveness.” Philosophy 62 (1987).Google Scholar
Poundstone, W.Prisoner’s Dilemma. New York: Bantam Doubleday, 1992.Google Scholar
Roth, A. E. and Murnighan, J. K.Equilibrium behavior and repeated play in prisoners’ dilemma games.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17 (1978).Google Scholar
Wilson, J.Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance.” Philosophy 63 (1988).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L.Philosophical Investigations. Trans. Anscombe, G. E. M.Oxford: Blackwell, 1973.Google Scholar