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Business as Mediating Institution1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Timothy L. Fort
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Abstract

This paper argues that business can be helpfully conceived of as a mediating institution. Drawing upon neo-conservative theology, the author argues that mediating institutions serve a vital function in a free society to provide social justice out of an expanded civil society and provide a framework for a flourishing free market. Such institutions also nourish the attitudinal orientation of solidarity in applying the principle of subsidiarity by which self-interest becomes fulfilled through concern for others.

The author further argues that businesses also be conceived of as mediating institutions and thereby be held to criteria of meeting associational needs. In addition to normative reasons for revising the social contract so that businesses do serve the role of mediating institutions, contemporary management theories demonstrate that businesses can also meet their social obligations of creating wealth while meeting associational needs.

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , April 1996 , pp. 149 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1996

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Footnotes

1.

Copyright 1995 by Timothy L. Fort. All rights reserved.

References

Notes

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14. Id.

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26. Id.

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43. Boatright, supra note 12.

44. See e.g., Nisbet, supra note 32 at 89-108.

45. Id. at 91-92; 105-106.

46. Id. at 134-135.

47. Id. at 116-135.

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65. Id.

66. Id.

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69. Id. at 58-59.

70. Id.

71. Id.

72. Id. at 60.

73. Timothy, L. Fort, “The Spirituality of Solidarity and Total Quality Management” Business and Professional Ethics Journal (1996).Google Scholar

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75. Id. at 61-62.

76. Id. at 71.