The Federal Communications Commission rule making for low power FM radio was widely reported as an instance where Congress sharply rebuked a regulatory agency for enacting rules too favorable to entrants. Theories of bureaucratic control generally agree that when such events occur, policy differences of Congress and the agency must be large. Because rival policy positions are quantifiable in this case, the preferences of Congress and the Commission can be directly evaluated. While the distance between the policy position of the Commission and Congress appear large, they signified a negligible increment in competition when compared to a benchmark efficient policy. A financial event study supports this interpretation, as radio broadcaster's equity values were not materially affected by either events in Congress or the Commission. Thus, even marginal differences may prompt a costly intervention by Congress to ostensibly discipline an agency.

We are currently witnessing the evolution of global accounting standards, as developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This is a remarkable development, not only because accounting standards are relevant for all business operations. Whereas accounting standard-setting has previously been a task of national authorities, the process will now be managed internationally by a London-based organisation whose parent foundation is a private company incorporated in the US state of Delaware and mainly financed by the Big Four accounting firms. Furthermore, the US appear to be willing to accept foreign standards that are quite different from their own Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP). This does not only contradict a widespread perception that equals globalization with Americanization, but also offers a remarkable contrast to US unilateralism in other policy fields. Finally, we are also amidst a major change in the substance of accounting standards, as indicated by a shift from historic cost to fair value accounting within the work of the IASB. This special issue of Business and Politics is devoted to a systematic explanation of these developments, drawing on concepts from International Relations, International Political Economy and Systems Theory.

Negotiations for China's accession to the WTO provoked a debate between pessimists who believed that opening the economy would lead to a flood of imports and a de-nationalization of manufacturing industry, and those who believed that it would spur rationalization of state-owned enterprises, lock in domestic reforms, attract foreign investment, and open the way for trade expansion. The industry most frequently mentioned as endangered was motor vehicles, where an awkward combination of Stalinist central planning with localized autarky had resulted in a proliferation of inefficient producers. With the partial exception of two investments by Volkswagen, initial joint ventures in assembly operations failed miserably. China's commitments on joining the WTO banned (or at least complicated) many of the most important industrial policy tools it had used to promote the auto industry since the opening to joint ventures in the early 1980s'including performance requirements, high tariffs, and numerical quotas. After accession in 2001, tariffs fell steadily while output and foreign investment soared. The Chinese government moved towards a lighter-handed but more effective form of industrial policy that reduced top-down planning while expanding market incentives and scope for managerial freedom. Rather than destroying industrial policy for the auto industry, WTO accession constrained and disciplined it. When foreign auto firms and their governments pushed for more aggressive protection of trademarks and other intellectual property rights under the WTO, the Chinese government initially stalled. Continuing pressure then tilted the balance of state policy toward promotion of independent design, whether by state-owned enterprises testing the boundaries of their joint ventures with foreign multinationals, or by audacious smaller firms purchasing foreign designs and technology to complement inexpensive local parts and assembly, thereby creating the conditions for the emergence of a more competitive industry.

This paper applies an economic approach to empirically investigate differences in inward foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns between East Asia and Latin America and discusses the implication of regional trade arrangements. International production/distribution networks in East Asia effectively utilize the new economic logic of fragmentation, agglomeration, and optimal internalization and seem to greatly contribute to economic development. The paper examines statistical data for international trade as well as the activities of Japanese and U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs) and argues that international production/distribution networks, particularly in machinery industries, are extensively developed in East Asia while remaining immature in Latin America. The impact of regional trade arrangements is substantially different depending on whether international production/distribution networks have already been developed or not. Our findings suggest that the impact of FTAA on FDI in Latin America by East Asian MNEs could be either positive or negative, depending on the content of FTAA and accompanying policies. If differentials between intra-regional tariffs and MFN-based tariffs are kept large, import-substituting FDI from East Asia may stagnate or even decrease. With a proper policy package to nurture international production/distribution networks, on the other hand, FDI from East Asia could be accelerated and contributed to deeper integration of Latin America.

This article starts by highlighting the significance of two forms of authority'private and technical authority'that are becoming increasingly important relative to public authority, which traditionally has been considered the only relevant form of authority in international affairs. It then suggests that public, private and technical authority are related to one another not by the erasure of one by another, but rather through a process of politicized functional differentiation. Functional differentiation involves the transformation of multi-functional units into a set of more autonomous units that are related to one another in specific limited ways. The article explores differentiation between and within each of the three types of authority in the globalization of accounting, and the role of power as well. It challenges the view that globalization necessarily involves a centralized exercise of power or an elimination of differences.

Scholars of business associations have recently learned a great deal about how associations contribute to development, but much less about the origins of such developmental associations. This essay introduces and assesses a new political explanation for the origins of ‘developmental associations.’ Conventional wisdom holds that developmental associations must be able to rise above political and collusive pressures and establish autonomy from states. Yet, I argue that these associations' developmental capacities emerge as a result of active state support by key actors, and in response to challenges and threats posed by competitive business organizations. Developmental associations emerge and acquire their capacities as they confront internal threats from other associations, as well as utilize the opportunities presented by the national state and international channels. In this view, functional or organizational capacity is not enough, rather, developmental business associations, must exhibit political capacity'that is the ability to manage the political environment, and respond to the structure of opportunities and threats. This explanation views developmental business associations as political organizations seeking power as well as offers a historically sensitive analysis of transformation of business politics in reforming India.

This article traces the ascent of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) from an obscure group with little influence in the early 1970s to a pre-eminent position as global accounting standard-setter in 2001. I argue that the rise of the IASC can be explained by several factors, including the IASC's ability to build legitimacy through technical expertise, to embed itself in a network of international organizations, and to benefit from rivalries among developed and developing countries and among European and American regulators. But the most important reason for the IASC's success is that its core values aligned strongly with the interests of the most powerful regulator-the US Securities and Exchange Commission.

The rentier-state literature pays little attention to the initial political conditions that shape the way an oil-rich country develops its resources. One of the key causal mechanisms linking oil wealth and regime type is the relationship between foreign investors and host governments. Especially in the developing countries that depend on international financing and expertise, the role of foreign capital in fashioning the balance of power in the political system and thereby the distribution of oil wealth becomes ever more important. As the experiences of Azerbaijan and Russia in the 1990s demonstrate, among oil-rich states in the developing world, those with authoritarian regimes tend to fare better in terms of attracting FDI in the oil sector than states with democratizing (or hybrid regimes). The durability of some authoritarian regimes in the developing world is partly a function of this external legitimation from foreign investors.

In recent years programs of private regulation have spread from North America and Europe to developing countries around the world. Though central to debates over public versus private international governance, little is known about the actual operations of these programs, especially in developing countries where weak state regulation has failed for decades to control environmental degradation. This paper assesses the effectiveness in Argentina of two prominent global private environmental regulatory programs'the chemical industry's Responsible Care® program and the Forest Stewardship Council. Argentina presents an intriguing country case because, despite conditions and policies that should support such programs, their implementation there has been stunted when compared against other regional cases. A focus on the demand and supply factors that shape these programs in Argentina reveals that market demand is a necessary but insufficient condition for regime effectiveness. Supply-side factors such as industry characteristics, public policies, and the institutional culture of firms significantly influence program implementation. Some transnational corporations helped export these program to Argentina; however, many others have shown opposition or disinterest, stifling program development. Also, feckless and unstable state agencies have created an institutional environment unfavorable even for private initiatives aimed at bypassing government interference.

In 1998, the domestic steel industry in the United States devised and executed a complex and sophisticated effort to achieve an effective non-market response to a sudden, persistent, and damaging surge of imported steel. This campaign lasted until 2002, when President George W. Bush invoked Section 201 of the U.S. trade laws to impose tariffs on imports of most steel products. This case of the steel industry's trade policy campaign provides an opportunity to examine selected models of protection-seeking industries and lobbying to ask why and how the steel coalition achieved this extraordinary governmental response. These questions are explored though a descriptive case of the steel industry's protection-seeking campaign followed by a comparative examination of previous models of protection-seeking firms, and lobbying to achieve protectionist policies. A comparison with selected models of the determinants of protection-seeking and factors affecting lobbying strategies show that most, almost all, were present in the steel case. In fact, a meta-strategic approach that transcends the customary understanding of lobbying is suggested in a complex policy environment. Such an environment can be characterized by: the need to influence multiple governmental entities – legislative, regulatory, executive; the desire for multiple outcomes with varying levels of specificity – laws or resolutions, administrative rulings, policy choices; interactions between different levels and branches of government; employment of coordinated interrelated lobbying techniques; and simultaneity of these factors.

This paper examines the interplay between leading international and American accounting authorities over the span of a critical four-year period, 2001–2005. Historically, US regulators and private-sector accounting institutions have taken a cautious approach to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), citing the superior rigor and overall quality of their own Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). During the past four years, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have each become markedly receptive to the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) efforts to harmonize accounting standards worldwide based on IFRSs. Why? This paper offers an explanation that highlights the role of the high-profile American corporate scandals (2001–2002) in precipitating a shift in US accounting authorities' views of the optimal form of accounting rules, an issue that has stood in the way of trans-Atlantic accounting standard convergence. Prior to the accounting scandals, the highly-detailed rules that are characteristic of US GAAP were widely seen to be the most effective form of accounting rule. Since 2002, a normative shift has taken place such that the SEC now endorses objectives-oriented rules that are conceptually aligned with the principles-based standards promulgated by the IASB. The analysis is framed by insights from contemporary International Relations theory which emphasize the influence of scope conditions on patterns of governance.

Rulings made by the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement body have, since the organization's creation in 1995, significantly advanced global economic liberalization. The response of business has been varied and far from uniformly supportive of the WTO agenda. The reason stems from the fact that adjusting to liberalization measures is easier in some industries than in others. The response is premised on the strategic alternatives available within an industry. Through examining antidumping (AD) elements of the European Union (EU) trade policy regime in the context of two European industries - chemicals and textiles - we find that both are under severe competitive pressure, due to WTO-induced market liberalization. However, the responses taken by companies within the respective industries are very different. We suggest that while WTO activity catalyzes industry evolution, the form of that adjustment is highly industry specific. In the case of textiles, the disaggregation of the industry value chain allows for a variety of product and locational adjustment strategies. In contrast, the chemicals industry is nationally based, reliant on intellectual property for competitive advantage and structurally limited in its ability to adopt a wide range of adjustment strategies. Therefore, in the absence of alternative strategy options, EU chemical companies lobby for rule harmonization in the WTO.

The article takes a political economy perspective on the current harmonization of accounting standards. It argues that the process not only signals a major shift in the mode of governance (towards private authority), but also in the substance of what is being governed. In political-economic terms, the most significant change which the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) brings to accounting is an increased reliance on market values in the form of so-called Fair Value Accounting (FVA). The FVA paradigm represents a financial perspective on business operations. This perspective is matched by the process and structure of the institutions that govern international accounting standard setting, particularly the IASB and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group which advises the Commission of the European Union on the adoption of IASB standards. A network analysis of the different committees and working groups of these two institutions demonstrates that financial sector actors wield substantially more influence than other categories of business actors within the governance of international accounting standard setting.